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17 February 1959


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 28
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
IF DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGE TO: TS, S, C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 79
DATE 1/4/80 REVIEWER:

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17 FEBRUARY 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Marshal Malinovsky says USSR intends to maintain conventional forces while improving nuclear capabilities.

Peiping cool to Kishi's offer to resume Sino-Japanese trade.



II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran moves to counter Soviet propaganda pressure; blames Moscow for breakdown in recent talks.

India and Pakistan adopting more conciliatory attitude; high-level talks scheduled.

Cambodia - Sihanouk increasingly aware of domestic coup plots; Thailand still in contact with plotters.

Australia announces it would not oppose an agreement for transfer of Dutch New Guinea to Indonesia.



⑦ Ethiopia's relations with UK deteriorating over British plan for a Greater Somalia.

III. THE WEST

⑧ Italy - No change in foreign policy likely, but new cabinet probably unable to obtain important domestic legislation.

⑨ Cuba - Castro becomes prime minister; likely to press land reform and to continue plotting against other Latin American regimes.

LATE ITEM

⑩ Probable ICBM launching on Tyura Tam Range on 16 February 1959.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

17 February 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR:

ok
[redacted] Soviet Marshal Malinovsky said that the USSR intends to retain a modern conventional armed force while simultaneously improving its nuclear capability. Malinovsky said he believed NATO was in error for having favored nuclear capability at the expense of conventional forces. He admitted the possibility of limited warfare. a departure from Moscow's usual propaganda position. [redacted] (Page 1)

no
Communist China - Japan: A Chinese Communist spokesman on 15 February stated that Prime Minister Kishi's offer to restore trade was an effort to solve his domestic "political crisis" and that restoration would depend on a change in Kishi's "hostile" attitude. [redacted]

[redacted] agreed to hold "concrete discussions" on breaking the trade impasse with a Socialist party delegation scheduled to visit Peiping in March just prior to Japan's local and upper-house elections. [redacted] (Page 2)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

no
Iran-USSR: In response to strong Soviet propaganda pressure, Iran is making a concentrated effort diplomatically and through propaganda to place full blame on the USSR for the collapse of recent Soviet-Iranian negotiations in Tehran. Tehran asserts that it makes its decisions without external influence and that Iran will never surrender to threats and intimidation. [redacted]

(Page 3)

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

ok. India-Pakistan: New Delhi and Karachi apparently are adopting more conciliatory attitudes toward each other. High-level Pakistani and Indian officials will meet in Karachi on 23 February to attempt to settle some minor territorial disputes. Both capitals have expressed cautious optimism over prospects for agreement on the division of irrigation water derived from the major rivers which flow through both India and Pakistan. At present, Pakistan is pressing less hard than before for consideration of the Kashmir issue. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 4)

no Cambodia-Thailand: The developing estrangement of Premier Sihanouk and General Dap Chhuon probably reflects the premier's growing knowledge of Chhuon's coup plans and his liaison with other plotters. Thailand, meanwhile, has not broken completely with anti-Sihanouk elements. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 5)

ok. Australia-Indonesia: The joint communiqué issued on 15 February by Australian External Affairs Minister Casey and visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio indicates an alteration of Australia's previous position that it would not tolerate any transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch of West New Guinea to Indonesia. Although Australia would prefer the status quo, the announcement states that it would not oppose any Dutch-Indonesian agreement for a transfer. The Dutch Government is not likely for the foreseeable future to agree to transfer sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia, but it is possible that after the 12 March elections the Dutch may be more willing than before to consider some other disposition of the territory. [redacted]

no Ethiopia-UK: Ethiopia's relations with the UK appear to have deteriorated sharply over London's recently expressed nonopposition to an eventual association between Somalia and the British Somaliland Protectorate. Radio Moscow, echoing Ethiopia's controlled press, accuses London of plotting--with American support--to establish a Commonwealth-affiliated

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DAILY BRIEF

ii

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Greater Somalia, unifying ethnic Somalis now distributed among Somalia, British and French Somaliland, northern Kenya, and southeastern Ethiopia. [redacted] (Page 6) (Map)

III. THE WEST

ok
Italy: Premier Antonio Segni's all-Christian Democratic cabinet, which will probably meet its first parliamentary test in a few days, includes a number of prominent rightists and is expected to be invested with the vote of the Liberals, Monarchists, and neo-Fascists. No change in Italy's pro-NATO foreign policy is anticipated. In view of the differences between left and right in the cabinet and in parliament, little important domestic legislation is likely to be passed. This cabinet will be little more than a holding operation for the Christian Democrats. Unless they can reach an agreement on the future political course of the party at their April congress, national elections may be called.

[redacted]

ok
Cuba: Fidel Castro's assumption of the prime minister-ship on 16 February will eliminate the duality of power which has delayed government decisions and actions. His move, however, does not as yet indicate he will forego his speech-making trips and wholeheartedly assume the responsibilities of governing. Certain of his pet projects, such as land reform, will probably receive increased attention. Cuban plotting against the regimes in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Haiti will probably continue. [redacted] (Page 7)

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DAILY BRIEF

iii

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

LATE ITEM

***Probable ICBM launching on Tyura Tam Range:** A valid launching operation began on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range at 1100 hours EST on 16 February 1959 and culminated in the successful launching of an ICBM test vehicle at about 2045 hours EST. COMINT and ELINT reports indicate the ICBM covered the full 3500 nautical mile range.

no This is the first full-range ICBM flight test detected since 24 May 1958. The ICBMs launched on 18 July and 24 December 1958 failed to reach the intended impact area. To date, the detected ICBM test program on the Tyura Tam Range has included seven successful flight tests, two in-flight failures, and one failure to launch. [redacted]

[redacted]

17 Feb 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

[REDACTED]

Malinovsky Comments on Soviet Strategy

{Soviet Marshal Malinovsky told a visiting [REDACTED] military delegation [REDACTED] that the USSR intends to retain a modern conventional capability while building up its nuclear strength. The defense minister implied that some military leaders had favored preparing a nuclear capability at the expense of conventional forces, but that the government Presidium had decided in favor of simultaneous development, which he personally approved. NATO, Malinovsky noted, had adopted the other course, and he considered this an error.}

{Significant improvement of the ground forces in the past several years bears out Malinovsky's statement. Probably related to this decision is Malinovsky's comment that limited wars, including a limited nuclear war, were quite possible and would require a large army trained with nuclear weapons. Soviet propaganda, however, consistently has played down the possibility of limited warfare, while Soviet military literature has indicated that the USSR sees future warfare in the form of large-scale campaigns on land extending over a long period, accompanied by powerful nuclear air and missile strikes.}

{Malinovsky told the delegation that all agreed that nuclear weapons would be decisive in a general war but that other arms and weapons would continue to play a major role--a line both he and former Defense Minister Zhukov have expounded.}

{The [REDACTED] delegation apparently learned nothing about the present state of the Soviet ICBM program, except that ICBMs were referred to in the present tense. It was stated that intermediate-range ballistic missiles now cover Western bases in Europe.}

{A tactical exercise observed by the Swedes was in line with known Soviet tactical nuclear warfare, including the assignment of nuclear weapons to ground division commanders.}

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Peiping Denounces Kishi's Continued "Hostility"

Peiping has rejected Japanese Prime Minister Kishi's offers to resume trade and hold ambassadorial talks. It apparently considers these moves political maneuvers by Kishi to strengthen his position, and hopes that by rejecting them it will weaken the Liberal-Democratic party's chances in Japan's forthcoming upper-house elections.

An official of Peiping's bureau for the promotion of international trade told a Japanese visitor on 15 February that restoration of trade would depend on a change in Kishi's "hostile" attitude, which he characterized as a betrayal of the aspirations and interests of the Japanese people. He ridiculed the "deliberate impression" created by Kishi that China must have trade with Japan, saying China's "leap forward" continued unabated in the absence of trade with Japan. He attacked Kishi's persistence in continuing to recognize Taiwan.

{Liao Ching-chih, Peiping's Foreign Ministry expert on Japan, [redacted] the Communists had "no interest" in ambassadorial talks as long as Kishi persists in making "unfriendly remarks." He questioned Kishi's motives in suggesting that the talks be held in a third capital rather than in Peiping or Tokyo.}

{However, Liao expressed a willingness to hold "concrete discussions" on breaking the trade impasse with a Japanese Socialist party delegation scheduled to visit Peiping in March. The Chinese Communists will permit newsmen to accompany the delegation in what will probably be a pre-election attempt to boost the Socialists' prestige.} [redacted]

[redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran Makes Firm Rebuttal to Soviet Propaganda Attacks

Iran, after waiting to see what line the Soviet Union would take in explaining its unsuccessful attempt to obtain a new non-aggression treaty, now is making an intense diplomatic and propaganda effort to place full responsibility on the USSR for the collapse of negotiations on 10 February. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the government of Iran was completely "frank and honest" during the talks, the Soviet delegates produced nothing but a series of "arguments," mostly of a propaganda nature against the Baghdad Pact and against the pending bilateral defense agreement with the United States. Furthermore, Tehran claims that the Soviet Union backed down from its original terms and, by so doing, caused the collapse of the negotiations.

Foreign Minister Hekmat, at a session of the Iranian Senate on 14 February, expressed the government's determination not to be intimidated despite the fact that Iran's physical strength is like that of "a sparrow facing an eagle." The Shah, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has ordered his embassy in Washington to inform The New York Times that Iran's rejection of the USSR's proposals was not caused by any external influence, but was required by Iran's interests alone. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

India and Pakistan Adopt Conciliatory Attitudes

Since the assumption of power by Pakistani President Ayub last October, both his government and the government of India apparently have made efforts to improve relations between the two countries. Ayub and his foreign minister have both expressed a desire for better relations, and Ayub broke recent custom by attending the independence day celebration at the Indian High Commission in Karachi last January. Nehru has several times publicly stated the need for moderation and understanding between India and Pakistan.

Top-level Indian and Pakistani officials will meet in Karachi on 23 February to continue the effort begun last year to settle minor territorial disputes along the Punjab and Bengal borders. A similar meeting in 1958 on East Pakistan frontier problems led to a conference in September between Nehru and Firoz Khan Noon, head of the Pakistani Government at that time. While the agreement they reached has been criticized in India and has not entirely ended recurrent border shooting incidents, it apparently is regarded by both governments as final.

Directives to cease inflammatory propaganda, recently issued by New Delhi and Karachi to radio stations in border areas, indicate a willingness to settle border problems. Pakistan is sending a trade delegation to New Delhi, which should also facilitate such an agreement.

While great obstacles still stand in the way of an over-all Indo-Pakistani settlement, the deliberate friendly gestures being made suggest that both countries now hope agreement on minor questions will pave the way for eventual negotiations on such major problems as Kashmir. Official quarters in both capitals have expressed cautious optimism over the possibility of agreement on the canal waters issue as a result of current mediation by the World Bank.

Cambodian Situation Becoming Tense


[The sharp deterioration in relations between Cambodian Premier Sihanouk and General Dap Chhuon, governor of Siem Reap Province, implies that the premier is aware of Chhuon's coup designs and his liaison with other anti-Sihanouk plotters.]

[Officials visiting Siem Reap risk falling under government suspicion unless they carry Sihanouk's special authorization. The two principals, although in frequent consultation in the past, now avoid each other's "capitals," apparently fearing arrest or assassination. Sihanouk, despite his entrenched position, is fearful of Chhuon, whose nickname of "Diamond Needle" stems from his ruthlessness as the outstanding Cambodian resistance leader opposing the return of French rule after World War II. The Phnom Penh garrison has been strengthened, and Sihanouk at the same time is maneuvering to undercut Chhuon's position without recourse to a showdown.]

[As in the case of the South Vietnamese and Thai-supported coup plotting by former royal councilor Sam Sary, the United States is liable to be implicated by Sihanouk in this latest and more direct threat to his rule.]

[Despite official denials, Thailand's continuing support for anti-Sihanouk elements is revealed in recent Vietnamese intercepts, although the present level of Thai participation does not appear great. Thai authorities have supplied Sam Sary with money and a house, have assured him their policy toward the coup plotting has not changed, have tolerated the comings and goings of Vietnamese agents, and have continued to allow the development of Cambodian dissident bands in Thai territory. With the imminent departure from the area of special UN representative Beck-Friis, Thai involvement in these intrigues may assume greater proportions.]

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Ethiopia's Relations With London Deteriorating

[Ethiopian-British relations, long marked by suspicion and mistrust on the Ethiopian side, have been subjected to serious new strains as a result of London's recent policy statement indicating that Britain would not oppose an eventual association between the Italian trust territory of Somalia--scheduled to become independent in December 1960--and Britain's Somaliland protectorate. Ethiopian officials, sensing a threat to Ethiopia's traditional desire for hegemony over the East African Horn, reacted by accusing London of plotting--with American support--to establish a Greater Somalia affiliated with the British Commonwealth. Actually, London's statement was intended to undercut both Somali nationalism and UAR propaganda in the area and did not constitute support for the full union of the 2,500,000 ethnic Somalis now distributed in Somalia, British and French Somaliland, Kenya, and Ethiopia.]

[Ethiopian Foreign Minister Deressa has emphasized his country's concern over the British position by indicating to the American ambassador in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia might abrogate its 1954 border agreement with the UK, close British consulates, and seal Ethiopia's border with the protectorate. Although the Ethiopians probably will not carry out these threats, they are apparently searching for and may take some type of anti-British action.]

[In line with the Ethiopians' desire to appear as vigilant defenders of African interests who are unafraid to oppose the will even of great powers, the controlled press and radio of Addis Ababa has given unusually great publicity to the issue, directing unprecedented attacks against the United States as well as Britain. Its diatribes are already being exploited in Moscow radiobroadcasts.]

III. THE WEST

Fidel Castro's Appointment as Cuban Prime Minister

Fidel Castro's acceptance of the office of prime minister in Cuba's provisional government will eliminate the duality of power which has hindered the functioning of the Urrutia administration. Although Castro will undoubtedly continue to dominate the government, his assumption of a high post does not necessarily indicate he will wholeheartedly accept the responsibilities of office. His performance since the ouster of Batista on 1 January suggests he is more interested in retaining his own popularity than in attending to the affairs of government. With emerging signs of discontent over the administration's failure to act decisively on economic and social problems, Castro may be tempted to continue his speech-making trips at home and possibly abroad. However, certain projects of particular interest to Castro, such as land and labor reform, will probably receive his attention.

There is no indication of a letup in the "campaign against dictatorships," although activities against the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay have apparently not yet progressed much beyond the planning stage. Plotting will undoubtedly continue, and members of the Castro movement will probably offer material aid to exile groups. The propaganda campaign continues unabated. The Cuban representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) announced on 16 February that Cuba would withdraw from the OAS unless representatives of "dictatorships" are expelled.

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