

2 May 1959

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153736 . 2 MAY 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Peiping takes unusual steps in pre-paring rebuttal to Nehru's assertion that Tibetan nationalism was cause 1 of revolt. 2 II. ASIA-AFRICA Dalai Lama differs with Nehru on course of action on Tibet; he plans 3 to press for independence. Iraq - US ambassador's interview 4 with Qasim. Jordan - Report from British sources of plan to assassinate King. (5) Pakistan planning ambitious eco-6 nomic program. III. THE WEST De Gaulle's views on Algeria. 7

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2 May 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

ing to rebut Nehru's 27 April speech in which he said "a strong feeling of nationalism" contributed to the Tibetan revolt. Peiping's People's Daily on 1 May took the unusual step of reprinting the speech and urging all Chinese to study it closely, as a detailed commentary would follow in a few days. This approach suggests that Peiping is preparing to issue a major propaganda statement designed to warn Nehru that an even sharper deterioration in Sino-Indian relations will occur unless India drops its criticisms of China's Tibetan policy.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

*India-Tibet: In their meeting on 24 April, Nehru and the Dalai Lama were unable to reconcile their divergent views on future courses of action with regard to Tibet. Nehru favors a policy aimed at restoring Tibetan internal autonomy, while the Dalai Lama apparently is convinced he has no alternative but to struggle for independence.

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The Dalai Lama meanwhile appears to be following Nehru's advice to refrain from making public statements.

TOP SECRET

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Iraq: Qasim told the American ambassador in Baghdad, in a two-hour interview on 28 April, that Iraq would not "go Communist" because the "people were not disposed toward Communism." The prime minister gave no indication, however, that he contemplates any action to arrest the growth of Communist strength. As in the past, he insisted that he was trying to "keep doors open" to both East and West and again promised to settle the many difficulties in Iraqi-US relations. At the same time, he aired his suspicions that the United States is working behind the Iranian and Turkish frontiers to stir up trouble among Iraqi Kurdish tribes. As in the case of the ambassador's two previous sessions with Qasim this year, this visit was quickly followed by an interview between the Soviet ambassador and Qasim.

(Page 3)

Jordan: The British Foreign Office has obtained information which it cannot "dismiss" of another plan to assassinate King Husayn on his return to Amman, scheduled for 2 May. Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai has been informed. There is no confirmation available of this report.

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Pakistan: Pakistan's Planning Commission is considering a Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) which calls for expenditures of nearly \$3 billion designed to increase national income by 20 percent. The goal set is about twice as high as that of the First Five-Year Plan (1955-60), which was poorly implemented by previous governments. The draft plan, emphasizing agriculture and private industry, would require about \$200,000,000 annually in foreign aid. The vigor with which the present government has attacked Pakistan's economic problems since it came to power last October suggests it will make a determined effort to make the plan a success.

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III, THE WEST

France-Algeria: De Gaulle's 29 April statements during an interview with a French deputy from Algeria affirm his agreement with the army's version of integration of Algeria with France, on a basis of political, economic, and social equality for Moslems. The extremist settlers demand a type of integration which would simply perpetuate their privileges. De Gaulle's statement, reflecting his concern over mounting right-wing criticism of his policies, was probably aimed at limiting extremist demonstrations in Algiers at the 13 May coup anniversary ceremonies. (Page 5)

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

The Tibetan Situation

Peiping may be preparing to implicate Nehru with "Indian expansionists" whom Communist China has charged with "interference" in Tibet. People's Daily on 1 May took the unusual step of urging all Chinese to give "serious study" to the reprinted text of Nehru's 27 April speech as a commentary would follow "in a few days." While Peiping will seek to rebut Nehru's criticism of its actions and his statement that "a strong feeling of nationalism" helped spark the revolt, harsh personal invective probably will be avoided.

The Dalai Lama meanwhile ap-
pears to be following Nehru's advice to refrain from public state
ments. Nehru met with Nepal's King Mahendra on 30 April for
talks on the Tibetan situation, probably including specific prob-
lems of mutual security in the Himalayan frontier region. The
Nepalese Government has stated that Chinese troops have not
infiltrated Nepal and that the border now is quiet.
Katmandu, however, is checking daily with border
checkposts and is issuing nationality certificates to tribal cit-
izens who resemble Tibetans.

TOP_SECRET

Bloc Jets Delivered to Iraq

The first consignment of aircraft under the Soviet Union's \$103,000,000 arms agreement concluded last November with Iraq was delivered to Basra recently on the Soviet vessel Sukhona. The consignment presumably consisted of four MIG jet fighters. Another Soviet vessel, the Irkutsk, now is en route to Iraq with the ninth shipment of Soviet arms to Basra since November and may be transporting as many as 20 additional aircraft.

Under the Soviet-Iraqi arms deal, the Soviet Union will provide the Iraqi Air Force with Ilyushin-type aircraft (probably Il-28 jet light bombers and Il-14 twin-engine transports) and MIG jets (probably MIG-17 fighters and MIG-15 trainers). In addition Moscow apparently agreed to supply military helicopters.

Some Soviet Air Force personnel have already arrived in Iraq, presumably to provide training and to aid the Iraqi Air Force in assimilating the deliveries of bloc aircraft. Additional Soviet air personnel were requested by Baghdad last month. (Furthermore, Iraqi personnel are now taking flight training in the bloc.)

With the arrival of the Irkutsk around 15 May, the Soviet Union will have delivered at least 24,000 tons of arms and equipment to Iraq. Deliveries have included T-54 and T-34 medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, field and antiaircraft artillery, and mortars. Motor torpedo boats are also to be supplied.

Intercepted Soviet shipping messages suggest another Soviet vessel now is loading a cargo of arms at Nikolaev on the Black Sea under circumstances which make it appear that the vessel. the Lermotov, may be preparing for a voyage to Basra. EIDER NOFORN)



II. ASIA-AFRICA

American	Ambassador's	Interview	With	Qasim
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Prime Minister Qasim told American Ambassador Jernegan on 28 April that Iraq would not "go Communist" because the people are not "disposed toward Communism." He gave no indication that he intends to take any action to impede the further growth of Communist strength.

Qasim said again that the many difficulties in Iraqi-US relations would be settled. At the same time, he complained about continued US press attacks and alleged that US military personnel were working behind the frontiers of Iran and Turkev to stir up dissension among the Iraqi Kurdish tribes.

On 29 April, Qasim received the Soviet ambassador, as he did after previous meetings with Jernegan and Assistant Secretary Rountree. The American ambassador feels that this procedure may amount to more than an effort to demonstrate his neutrality and that Qasim may be giving the Soviet ambassador a careful fill-in on matters of current American interest?

Qasim's May Day speech to Communist-led Iraqi workers' organizations strongly attacked imperialism and extolled the progress of workers and farmers toward 'freedom and democracy.' He indicated that the time had not yet come for a return to a system of officially sanctioned political parties. While he made no reference to major changes in government or cabinet personnel, he spoke of "a great revolution--if not two revolutions" in the coming month, thus indicating a desire to overfulfill his norm of "one great revolution per month." His "great revolution" in March apparently was withdrawal from the Baghdad pact; that in April apparently was the decision to create a new set of specialized economic ministries.



Pakistan Drafting Ambitious Second Five-Year Plan

Pakistan's Planning Commission is considering a Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) calling for the expenditure of \$2.94 billion, of which \$1.89 billion would be spent by the government and \$1.05 billion by the private sector. The plan is designed to increase national income by 20 percent. After allowing for an estimated 10 percent population increase, this would raise per capita income by about 9 percent. The First Five-Year Plan (1955-60) called for expenditure of \$2.268 billion, but the lack of effort devoted to economic development by previous governments between 1955 and 1958 makes it unlikely that more than \$1.6 billion will be spent during the first plan period.

The draft plan gives top priority to the maximum utilization of existing productive units, many of which are operating at less than 50 percent of capacity, completion of projects now under way, and calls for inclusion of only the most essential new projects. Increased funds are to be devoted to agriculture and education--particularly technical education--and greater reliance is to be placed on the private sector.

The plan provides for new taxes on consumption and reduction of nonproductive expenditures. Military expenditures apparently are to be held at about present levels, which will be difficult in view of Pakistan's military modernization program. The plan will require about \$210,000,000 in foreign aid annually, a somewhat higher level than that of recent years. While the plan has a few unduly optimistic assumptions—including one envisaging an 18-percent increase in exports—it appears to be generally well conceived. The vigor with which the new military government has attacked Pakistan's economic problems since it came to power last October suggests that it will make a determined effort to make the plan a success.



III. THE WEST

De Gaulle Backs Army on Algerian Integration

The statements of French President de Gaulle published by an Oran newspaper on 29 April constitute his firmest public stand to date on a solution of the Algerian problem. He affirmed his agreement with the army's version of "integration of Algeria" rather than the version favored by the European extremists which would simply perpetuate the settlers' privileges. The army calls for political, economic, and social equality for Algerian Moslems.

De Gaulle's statements may have been prompted partly by irritation over mounting attacks by extremists on his Algerian policy and by a desire to discourage plans of Algerian deputies to introduce in the National Assembly a strong resolution favoring the extremist version of integration. He may also hope to limit extremist preparations to exploit the 13 May anniversary celebration of the Algiers coup and to quiet apprehensions recently voiced openly—by French commander in Algeria Challe and by Army General Massu—over such details of his policy as clemency for certain categories of rebels.

De Gaulle's decision to permit publication of his views at this time and particularly the assertion that he is the only Frenchman who can solve the Algerian problem may be intended as a reminder that he is reserving this problem for his personal action and that any move to thwart his program or remove him from the scene would result in the loss of Algeria.



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