

11 March 1959

Copy No.

C 65

CENTRA

INTELLIGE


JILLETIN



DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLA DEC: ASSIFIED CLASS, CHANGED TO: NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE 480 _REVIEWER:



TOP SECRET



Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023196



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 March 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Berlin: Advanced arrangements to move Soviet units from Berlin indicate that the USSR could be prepared at any time to transfer its quadripartite responsibilities physically to the East Germans. There is also evidence that the East Germans are being prepared to assume the responsibilities which the Russians may relinquish (Page 1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

*Iraq: The revolt in Mosul appears to have been put down and a number of the rebels are fleeing toward the Syrian border, according to Iraqi police messages. The UAR embassy in Baghdad has burned its secret documents and has withdrawn 9 or 10 employees expelled by Iraq. All UAR dependents may be withdrawn.

The Baghdad radio and press have charged President Nasir by name with being behind the revolt. On 10 March huge crowds of demonstrators surged through Baghdad proclaiming their loyalty to Qasim and shouting anti-American slogans. Moscow's reaction to the coup attempt is largely aimed at avoiding recriminations with the UAR by blaming the US and its Middle East allies as the "foreign" support for the rebels.

Japan: There are growing demands in the ruling Liberal-Democratic party for extensive revision of the administrative agreement which provides for implementation of the US-Japanese security treaty. Prime Minister Kishi's efforts for an early ratification of a new security treaty are thus being undermined.

i

TOP SECRET

(Page 2)

The proposed revisions go far beyond the previously indicated Japanese position. Behind the conservative opposition is an apparent attempt by anti-Kishi elements to prevent him from scoring a political victory. (Page 3)

III. THE WEST

West Germany - Berlin: West German officials and West Berlin Social Democrats are highly critical of the weakness shown by party chairman Ollenhauer in 9 March discussions with Khrushchev and apparently are concerned about its effect on morale in Berlin. They resent particularly Ollenhauer's failure at the subsequent press conference to emphasize the unity of the German people in rejecting the Soviet proposals, and regard as a major blunder his acceptance of Soviet terminology such as the "liquidation of the occupation regime in Berlin."

(Page 4)

11 Mar 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

TOP SECRET

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Preparations in East Germany for Transfer of Berlin Controls Near Completion
Various preparations in Berlin and East Germany indicate that the Soviet Union could at any time transfer to East Germany control over Western military access to Berlin.
training exercises have been scheduled for military and border- police units on the Berlin periphery beginning on 3 March and in the Helmstedt and Magdeburg areas from 20 April to 16 May. These appear to be indoctrination exercises to prepare military and border-police personnel for their new duties after East Ger- many assumes access controls.
The party's Alert Troops (Kampfgruppen) were ordered to commence heavy-weapons training on 9 March, Heavy-weapons battalions are to be established by 21 March. Kampfgruppen officers were told that provocations from West Berlin and the Federal Republic were expected during the last ten days of April.
Work has reached an advanced stage on a large new head- quarters installation near Bernau to accommodate Soviet per- sonnel now quartered in East Berlin. Completion, however, is still not expected until late May. Preparations are in prog- ress to move Soviet personnel from East Berlin, and some, including Soviet State Security (KGB) personnel, have already left.

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023196

II. ASIA-AFRICA

The Iraqi Situation

Although rioting and fighting continued in Mosul on 10 March, the backbone of the army revolt appears to have been broken and small groups of the rebels are fleeing toward Syria to seek refuge. Shammar Arab tribesmen have participated on the side of the rebels, but they have suffered serious casualties, The tribesmen apparently flocked into Mosul in hopes of pillaging the city. Iraqi aircraft have strafed fleeing rebels and are reported to have
attacked a Syrian border village. The rebel radio transmitter, evidently never in Mosul itself, has not been heard since the evening of 9 March. Baghdad authorities claim rebel leader Col. Shawwaf was killed on the morning of 9 March.
Qasim has thrown down the gauntlet to President Nasir by a radio and press campaign directly accusing the UAR of giving support to the rebels from across the "borders over which treason, news, intrigues, and plots are smuggled." At least ten UAR diplomats in Baghdad were expelled on 10 March; the UAR embassy has burned its secret documents and is considering evacuating all dependents. The UAR, was apparently not yet aware of the failure of the rebel cause and was laying plans to send "British-made" hand grenades and machine guns sufficient for 2,000 men to Iraq. Three airplanes with their markings obliterated were being readied by UAR authorities, possibly to deliver these arms.
As during the abortive coup in December, Moscow's comments on the revolt are aimed at side-stepping recriminations with the UAR, as well as manifesting support of Qasim. Whereas Qasim's charges now clearly refer to the UAR, the Soviet press and radio continue to imply that the United States and its allies, Turkey and Iran, are behind the move against Qasim. Moscow charges that in the recent bilateral defense pacts, the United States made a "secret pledge to support these countries in their political acts."
— TOP SECRET

US-Japan Security Treaty Talks Encounter New Difficulties

Leaders of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic party (LDP) are demanding sweeping revisions of the US-Japanese administrative agreement—the detailed status—of-forces document spelling out the broad principles of the US-Japanese security treaty. While there is general agreement on the revision of the security treaty, the demands for changes in the administrative agreement have forced Kishi to drop plans for submitting both documents to the Diet until he can achieve conservative unity against the strong Socialist opposition which will be encountered.

The revised security treaty probably will call for advance consultation on deployment of US forces in Japan and their use in hostilities in areas outside Japan; exclusion of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands from the area covered by the treaty; and a ten-year time limit on the treaty.

The government previously had indicated that the administrative agreement would be changed only by eliminating the requirement for Japan to contribute local currency for the support of US forces and facilities. However, under apparent pressure from anti-Kishi elements in the LDP, Foreign Minister Fujiyama suggested to Ambassador MacArthur on 6 March that either additional changes should be made now for submission to the Diet with the revised treaty or an understanding should be reached for later changes which would not require Diet approval.

While Fujiyama did not suggest specific changes, presumably they involve those provisions which, in effect, give the US extraterritorial rights in Japan. These provisions cover criminal jurisdiction, control over US bases and their access, air traffic controls, and importation by the US of equipment and materiel, including nuclear weapons.

The anti-Kishi elements are motivated largely by a desire to keep Kishi from scoring a political victory prior to the upperhouse elections in June. They also are concerned that if the revisions proceed as originally envisioned, Fujiyama, as their architect, will be established as a logical future successor to Kishi as prime minister.

_SECRET

III. THE WEST

West German Social Democrats Criticize Ollenhauer-Khrushchev Talks

West German officials and West Berlin Social Democrats are "deeply disturbed" by party chairman Ollenhauer's poor showing during the West Berlin press conference that followed his talk with Khrushchev on 9 March. They feel that Ollenhauer blundered badly by stressing Khrushchev's eagerness to negotiate and find a peaceful solution to all current problems without mentioning the fact that the current crisis is created by the USSR.

Social Democratic leaders are apprehensive that Ollenhauer's political naiveté may have a damaging effect on the morale of the West Berlin population, already uneasy over the possibility of a forced liquidation of the Western position in Berlin. Another major blunder, these officials believe, was his acceptance of the Soviet terminology in the communiqué issued after the talk, such as "liquidation of the occupation regime in Berlin."

Ollenhauer indicated at the press interview that he might accept an invitation from Khrushchev to come to Moscow. Two other high Social Democratic officialsCarlo Schmid, the par-
ty's presidential candidate, and Fritz Erler, its Bundestag leaderare expected to leave for Moscow soon in response
to an earlier invitation from Khrushchev. They are said to be eager to explain to the Soviet leaders the SPD's stand in favor of disengagement and against the atomic rearmament of Germany, points which Ollenhauer undoubtedly made in his interview with the Soviet leader.
Ollenhauer's appearance in Moscow would further discredit him in West German eyes, particularly in view of the refusal of West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt to talk with Khrushchev on the apparent ground that such interviews only confuse public

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023196

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

- CONFIDENTIAL

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023196

