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13 April 1959


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 26
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: 4.14.80
DATE: 4.14.80 REVIEWER

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13 APRIL 1959

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
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Protracted absence of USSR Ambassador Kissilev leads Nasir to keep UAR's Moscow ambassador in Cairo.

Iraq will explore and develop own oil resources with foreign technicians, granting no new concessions.

Iraqi Communists exploit Qasim's fear of army disloyalty to increase influence of Popular Resistance Force. [redacted]

New Iranian ambassador to Moscow has pro-Soviet record. [redacted]




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
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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

13 April 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Tibet: [redacted]

[redacted] conditions in the Tibetan capital now are "very peaceful," Chinese Communists in Lhasa estimate Tibetan opposition to Chinese rule to be widespread. Lhasa told Peiping [redacted]

[redacted] the "whole Tibetan race" is asking for independence and expects to set up a "Tibet kingdom" consisting of Tibet proper and Tibetan-inhabited areas of West China. [redacted]

[redacted] the rebels are well organized and that Khamba guerrillas from former Sikang Province had been provided with food and ammunition "everywhere they went" in Tibet. [redacted] (Page 1)

USSR-UAR: [redacted]

[redacted] the USSR's willingness to supply arms under even more liberal terms than those of the earlier agreement. The USSR continues, however, to refuse Egypt's requests for the inclusion of nonmilitary items under the arms contract. [redacted] (Page 3)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR-USSR: [redacted] Nasir has decided that UAR Ambassador Kuni who was called home from Moscow for consultation in early April, will remain in Cairo for the time being, in view of Soviet Ambassador Kissilev's extended absence from Cairo. Meanwhile, UAR [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

propaganda has alleged that a second Soviet shipload of "Russian" Kurds is en route to Iraq in order to carry out a coup in connivance with Iraqi Communists. Moscow on 11 April admitted that some 850 Iraqi Kurdish refugees were being repatriated, but it denied they had been trained in the USSR for guerrilla warfare. Moscow blamed Western press agencies, rather than Cairo, for such stories [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 4)

no Iraqi oil: [redacted] The Iraqi director of petroleum affairs has told the US Embassy that no new oil concessions will be granted, and that Iraq will henceforth explore and develop its oil resources using foreign contract technicians. He said that Iraq will employ Soviet oil technicians on this basis in the Khanaqin area--some 85 miles northeast of Baghdad near the Iranian border--where they are already at work, and in the offshore Persian Gulf. [redacted]

no Iraq: Premier Qasim's fear of further disloyalty in the army appears to have given the Communist-dominated Popular Resistance Force (PRF) increased influence at the expense of the army. The PRF commander claimed [redacted] to have been empowered to prevent "illegal interference" by the Iraqi Army in PRF activities. The Communist-controlled "Iraqi Peasant Organization" has petitioned Qasim for permission to arm for protection against antiregime tribesmen and to "reinforce the armed government forces." The Communists are thus continuing to exploit Iraq's instability to increase their paramilitary strength. [redacted]

no Iran-USSR: Abdol Hosein Masud-Ansari, named Iranian ambassador to Moscow last December, left for his post on 1 April, [redacted] Masud-Ansari, who has previously served in Moscow and has a long-standing record of being pro-USSR, played a prominent role in the recent abortive Iranian-Soviet negotiations in Tehran, and he may work for their renewal in Moscow. [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] The Shah may hope a representative with Masud- [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Ansari's background can help ease Soviet-Iranian relations, which remain strained as the result of continuing subversive propaganda and economic pressure from the USSR.]

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Algeria-Saudi Arabia:

the Algerian rebels, rather than the Omani dissidents as previously believed, may be the intended recipients of a clandestine shipment of arms and military vehicles being prepared in late March by the Saudi Government.

The premier of the Algerian provisional government stated earlier this month that "almost all" rebel funds now come from Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and that the Saudis have become the "strongest defenders" of the Algerian cause in the Arab world. Relations between the rebels and Nasir, who has recently been supplanted as the most vocal public champion of the Algerians by Iraqi Premier Qasim, appear to be worsening.

(Page 6)

South Vietnam - Cambodia: South Vietnamese President Diem intends shortly to launch an "all-out" press and radio campaign to expose the "Communist takeover" in Cambodia under Cambodian Premier Sihanouk. Diem attributes a worsening security situation in Vietnam in recent months to intensified activity by Cambodian-based Communist and other hostile elements who have the "blessing" of the Sihanouk government. Such a propaganda campaign would only serve to encourage Sihanouk to move closer to Peiping.]

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III. THE WEST

France-Laos: President de Gaulle has approved and Ambassador Alphand in Washington has presented a proposal apparently designed to end the US-French impasse over training the Laotian Army. The new proposal would center all Laotian combat training at the Seno base in Laos under French instructors financed by Paris, but it would allot to the US responsibility for training in logistical support.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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ok **Nicaragua:** Exiled opponents of Nicaraguan President Somoza continue to organize for a revolutionary invasion of that country. Most Nicaraguan revolutionary groups, in Cuba and elsewhere, now have endorsed as their leader and future provisional president Enrique Lacayo, who indicates he will seek to prevent Communist infiltration of the movement. The exiles do not, however, appear prepared for action in the immediate future. [redacted] (Page 9)

13 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Tibetan Situation

[redacted]

that the Chinese Communists estimate Tibetan opposition to Chinese rule to be widespread. The unknown official in Lhasa states that the "whole Tibetan race" is asking for independence and is expecting to set up a "Tibet kingdom" consisting of Tibet proper and Tibetan-inhabited areas of west China, including Szechwan and Yunnan provinces. [redacted] criticizes Chang Kuo-hua, Chinese commander of the Tibet Military District, for mishandling the revolt and describes his leadership as "quite inferior." [redacted]

Conditions in Lhasa are now "very peaceful," [redacted]

[redacted] The Lhasa speaker states there is no rifle fire inside the city or on the outskirts, and he adds that during the fighting, all personnel of the postal telecommunications bureau "did not dare" go outdoors. [redacted]

Despite the reported criticism, Chang Kuo-hua continues to be the regime's most prominent official in Lhasa. As vice chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, Chang told the committee's plenum on 8 April that the Tibetan rebels organized a "volunteers' headquarters for defending Lamaism," appointed a "military chief," recruited men between the ages of 16 and 60, and called for establishment of an "independent state of Tibet." He admitted that Khamba guerrillas from former Sikang Province had been provided with food and ammunition "everywhere they went" in Tibet, but he made it clear that he would not let the lamaseries serve as places of refuge for either Khambas or Tibetans.

Supplementing Peiping's military countermeasures, the organization of the Preparatory Committee has been expanded to include several new departments, of which the Public Security Department will have the major police role. The Panchen Lama

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

has called for the regimentation of ecclesiastical and secular members of Tibetan society and requested them "to feed information to army units engaged in quelling the rebellion, take part in transportation and supply work, and organize comfort activities" for the troops. He announced new criteria for political reliability, suggesting that reluctant acquiescence in regime policies will no longer be tolerated, as "willingness to follow the path of socialism" is now mandatory for all Tibetans.

Maintaining the pose that he is only second choice for the most prominent Tibetan position, the Panchen Lama insists he is serving as "acting chairman" of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region "during the period of the Dalai Lama's absence under duress." While he expressed "great sympathy and concern" for the safety of the Tibetan leader, he gave no indication that the Chinese Communists expect his return from India in the near future.

In continuing its line that the Dalai Lama has been abducted, Peiping is directly contradicting Nehru's stated view that he probably escaped "of his own free will." This tactic is designed in part to demonstrate to Tibetans that the Dalai Lama really supports Peiping and in part to warn Nehru against abetting "kidnappers" by permitting the Dalai Lama to engage in anti-Communist political activities. On 10 April the Chinese Communists repeated the charge that the rebels were "directed and supported" by elements in Kalimpong.

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New Soviet-UAR Arms Agreement

The UAR Embassy in Moscow informed Cairo on 4 April that the Soviet Government has agreed to sell arms to the UAR on extremely liberal terms but refuses to include nonmilitary items under the arms agreement as requested by the UAR on 11 March. In the past, Moscow has advised the UAR that the Soviet Union distinguishes between arms deals and commercial agreements, and that nonmilitary goods can be obtained only under short-term commercial credits without liberal discounts.

Negotiations for additional Soviet military aid have been under way in Moscow since last July, and a new agreement may be concluded shortly. The proposed terms of the new agreement are the most liberal yet extended to a nonbloc country by the Soviet Union, with the possible exception of a small arms deal concluded with Yemen in 1956. Under the new agreement, the UAR will obtain Soviet arms at one third of cost, with repayment to be made in five annual installments beginning in 1967 at a 2-percent rate of interest.

Since 1955 Egypt and Syria have received more than \$500,000,000 worth of military aid from the Soviet bloc.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Continuing Strains in UAR-USSR Relations

Nasir has decided that UAR Ambassador Kuni, who left Moscow for consultations in Cairo in early April, will not return to his post for the time being, [redacted]

[redacted] This move is in response to the extended absence from Cairo of Soviet Ambassador Kissilev, who returned to Moscow in February. Nasir believes that Kissilev had planned to return to Cairo in order to smooth over current UAR-Soviet friction, but that Nasir's 30 March speech--a strong criticism of the USSR for interference in Arab affairs--in the presence of Soviet military instructors was responsible for changing Soviet plans for Kissilev's return.

The UAR has continued its propaganda charges regarding the repatriation of Kurdish refugees from the USSR to Iraq. Cairo broadcasts on 11 April claimed that a second shipload of armed "Russian" Kurds is en route to Iraq and that Iraqi Communists, in connivance with the repatriated Kurds, are preparing to carry out a coup in Baghdad. A TASS statement on 11 April, denying that the 850 Kurds who previously returned to Iraq aboard the Gruzia are armed and trained for guerrilla warfare, accused Western press agencies with originating such reports, thus sidestepping the issue of UAR authorship.

[redacted] attacks by Nasir on Soviet policy have scared Soviet officials and technicians now in the UAR, [redacted] If Soviet-UAR tensions and the hostility allegedly being displayed by Egyptians toward Soviet personnel continue, Soviet dependents reportedly will be returned to the USSR. The same Soviet official is reported to have advised the captain of the Argun--a Russian ship calling at Alexandria in early April--not to permit shore leave for crew members because of possible hostile actions by Egyptians. [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Pro-Soviet Iranian Ambassador Leaves for Moscow

The new Iranian ambassador-designate to Moscow, Abdol Hosein Masud-Ansari, long a Soviet sympathizer, left Tehran for his new post on 1 April, [redacted]

Masud-Ansari, who played a prominent role in the recent abortive Iranian-Soviet negotiations in Tehran, may soon try to resume them in an effort to renegotiate the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship.]

Masud-Ansari was appointed to the Moscow post last December after the Russians succeeded in promoting the recall of his predecessor, Mostafa Samii, on the charge they were unable to work with him. Masud-Ansari delayed his departure for Moscow in order to participate in the Tehran negotiations. He alone accompanied Soviet Ambassador Pegov to the Tehran airport on 29 January, when the two secretly met the high-ranking Soviet delegation sent to Iran to negotiate a nonaggression pact.]

When the negotiations, some of which took place in his home, were abruptly, and somewhat heatedly, terminated on 10 February, Masud-Ansari decided to remain in Tehran until he had some "Iranian concessions in hand" to take to Moscow. Judging from the official temper in Tehran, however, it seems doubtful he has carried with him any substantial "concessions."]

Masud-Ansari is from an old-line diplomatic family. His father once served as ambassador to Moscow, and he himself began his diplomatic career there. Masud-Ansari also has a record of being at least sympathetic to the Iranian Tudeh (Communist) party during the period from 1945 to 1947, although his continued diplomatic status suggests that the Shah is convinced that he now has severed any such ties. The Shah probably hopes, however, that a representative with Masud-Ansari's background might be able to smooth Soviet-Iranian relations.]

Relations between the two countries continue to be strained as a result of subversive Soviet propaganda, especially against the Shah, and increased economic pressures, such as termination of lead-ore purchases and failure to enter new trade talks. The Iranian Senate, in a secret session on 11 April, urged that "energetic" countersteps be taken to correct the "improper state of affairs." [redacted]

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Saudi Arabia Stepping Up Support of Algerian Rebels

Saudi Arabia, along with Iraq, appears to be becoming an increasingly important source of support for the Algerian rebellion, while the role of the UAR seems to be diminishing, at least in relative terms.

[redacted] the Algerian rebels, and not Omani dissidents, were the intended recipients of a considerable quantity of unmarked arms and ammunition and a number of military vehicles which, [redacted] were being readied by the Saudi Government for clandestine shipment abroad. The embassy reported that an Algerian representative had conveyed the rebels' thanks for "material...being prepared" in Saudi Arabia and also for financial aid just received by the rebel office in Damascus.

Subsequently, Algerian rebel premier Ferhat Abbas, in an off-the-record interview granted an American correspondent on 3 April, stated that the Saudis had become the "strongest defenders" of the Algerian cause in the Arab world and that "almost all" rebel funds now come from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Abbas, who visited Saudi Arabia early last month, also indicated that the Saudis were making available to the rebels licenses originally granted to the Saudi Government for the purchase of arms in West Germany.

Meanwhile, relations between the Algerians and UAR President Nasir, their erstwhile chief patron and most vocal public champion, appear to have deteriorated further in recent weeks. [redacted] rebel officials in Tunis informed Algerian elements in Tripoli that Cairo would no longer permit Algerians who did not have a valid passport to cross the Egyptian-Libyan border in either direction. Personnel transporting "materiel" who had travel permits furnished by the Egyptian authorities were to be exempted from this regulation. [redacted]

[redacted]
~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

South Vietnam Plans to Open Anti-Sihanouk Campaign

[South Vietnamese President Diem has told American officials that he is determined to launch an "all-out" press and radio campaign exposing the "Communist takeover" in Cambodia under Premier Sihanouk. This campaign, which Diem insists will remain objective, is to have the double purpose of informing the Cambodian masses of the "real" situation in their country, and of confronting the Vietnamese people with the danger they face.]

[Diem attributes a worsening security situation in South Vietnam to increased activity by Cambodian-based Communist and other hostile elements who have the "blessing" of the Sihanouk government. He points to a sharp rise during the past three months in Communist-inspired terrorism in the provinces, highlighted by the assassination of 97 persons--most of them local officials. There have been independent reports that the Cambodian Government is encouraging anti-Diem activities by Vietnamese dissident sect forces in Cambodia.]

[Diem's projected propaganda campaign probably would serve only to rally additional Cambodian popular support for Sihanouk, and it might encourage him to seek even closer relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc on the grounds that the "Saigon-Bangkok plot" to overthrow him remains a threat. Disaffected Cambodian elements led by former Royal Councilor Sam Sary and ex-Premier Son Ngoc Thanh are already engaged in psychological warfare efforts against Sihanouk, apparently with the continued clandestine support of Vietnam and Thailand. "Radio Free Cambodia," presumably located in the Thai-Cambodian border region, has been heard almost daily during the past month, and anti-Sihanouk tracts have been distributed in Cambodia.]

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[REDACTED]

CORRECTION: Pages 3 and 4 of the Central Intelligence Bulletin for 11 April, with the back-up item "Plans for Iraqi Military Occupation of Kuwait Rumored," should have been classified [REDACTED] because of the final sentence of the article. The last two paragraphs should read:

The principal element of Kuwait's armed forces is the Frontier Force of 900-1,000 men organized into six infantry companies, one armored car company, one field artillery battery, an armored personnel carrier company, and a support company. The 1,500-man security force and the 1,000-man police force are equipped only with rifles.

There has been no indication of a deployment of Iraqi forces preparatory to a move against Kuwait. Iraqi forces in the Basra area consist of an infantry brigade and a field artillery battalion. These forces are capable of occupying Kuwait. Another infantry brigade is stationed at Nasiriya, about 100 miles northwest of Basra, while the 1st Division headquarters is farther north at Diwaniya. The main Iraqi troop concentration of three divisions, including most of the armor, is in central Iraq, while the 2nd Division is in the north. The northern forces have been increasingly occupied with growing tension on the Syrian-Iraqi border.

[REDACTED]

All divisional security units and most Iraqi tank units were alerted on 4 April, presumably because of indications that UAR-supported tribesmen will step up their forays into Iraqi territory, and persistent rumors of impending internal disturbances.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

III. THE WEST

Nicaraguan Exiles Planning Revolution

Nicaraguan revolutionary leader Enrique Lacayo was endorsed as the future provisional president of Nicaragua at a 6 April meeting in Havana of some 30 Nicaraguan exiles and seven Cuban sympathizers. Lacayo, who escaped from Nicaragua early last month after spending over two years in jail for alleged complicity in the 1956 assassination of Nicaraguan strongman Somoza, by late March had been selected by opposition factions inside Nicaragua and in exile in Costa Rica as their joint leader.

Lacayo's endorsement by those represented at the Havana meeting, which included the leader of an alleged 200 Nicaraguan exiles in the New York City area, strengthens his claim to leadership. It is not known whether he sought or received the backing of the pro-Communist Nicaraguan groups that have been sympathetically received by Cuban authorities, but prior to his departure for Cuba he indicated to the US ambassador in Costa Rica that he was determined to prevent Communist penetration of the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement. Lacayo is believed to look to former Costa Rican President Figueres as his revolutionary mentor, and Figueres is known to be strongly opposed to dealing with the Communists in revolutionary planning.

Manuel Gomez Flores, former Nicaraguan colonel and persistent revolutionary plotter for the past 12 years, apparently regards himself as qualified to lead the military phase of the movement. Now in Cuba, he claims he has already tentatively chosen the Man of War Keys--a few miles off the Nicaraguan Caribbean coast--as the rendezvous point for the invasion and the nearby Rio Grande estuary as the mainland landing area.

It appears unlikely that a concerted revolutionary invasion can be launched before the start of the rainy season, which will come in about a month and would make military operations exceedingly difficult in the swampy Nicaraguan coastal area. The exile groups are still subject to strong rivalries, however, and the possibility of a premature attempt by one faction trying to beat the others to the draw cannot be eliminated.

SECRET

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