
TOP SECRET



3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

30 April 1959

Copy No. C

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

I DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO:

NEXT REVIEW DATE:


AUTH: HR 79-2


DATE!

REVIEWER

TOP SECRET

for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163330





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 April 1959

SIRAB

 ω_0

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Iran: The USSR has begun a new phase in its propaganda campaign to undermine the Shah's regime by initiating broadcasts aimed at fomenting unrest among tribal elements. On 27 April, Radio Moscow's first specific references to the anti-Shah Qashqai tribes and to Iranian Kurds appeared in its Persian-language broadcasts. A clandestine station--the "National Voice of Iran"--which is probably Soviet inspired if not actually in the USSR, attacked the Shah's tribal policy in its first broadcasts about 27 April. (The principal Qashqai chief, currently in Switzerland, claims he recently received renewed Soviet offers of support, including arms.) (Page 1)

Poland: A well-planned offensive recently initiated by the Gomulka regime against the Catholic Church is potentially a serious threat to the church's financial position. New tax regulations have been enacted and old ones revived which, if riglations have been enacted and one officer. ordered the funds needed orously enforced, would deprive the church of the funds needed to continue most of its social, educational, and charitable activities and force the closing of some religious orders and convents. (Page 2)

Watch Committee conclusion -- Berlin: No significant changes bearing on the possibility of hostilities.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

publicly that events in Tibet indicate that Indicate that Indicate militarily in meeting any threat Pakistan-India: Top Pakistani leaders have recently stated publicly that events in Tibet indicate that India

i

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163330

from the outside. The expression of this view, at a time when India is concerned about the security of its Tibetan border, is probably designed to reduce India's opposition to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, to facilitate a settlement of the canal waters and Kashmir disputes, and to strengthen Pakistan's position in requesting a continued flow of US arms aid. The Indian army chief of staff recently told an American official that now is the time to consider a rapprochement with Pakistan to facilitate joint defense. Considerable progress in resolving outstanding disputes would be necessary, however, before the two countries are ready to engage in joint planning. (Page 3)

Jordan-UAR: Syrian Interior Minister Sarraj wants to use fedayeen terrorists against Jordan in retaliation for a border interior on 23 April. the decision on reprisal has been referred to Nasir

King Husayn will find an atmosphere of intense political intrigue in Amman when he returns on 2 May. (Efforts by Bedouin army officers to discredit and oust Jordan's army chief of staff may also be aimed at Premier Rifai. Two leading candidates for the premiership are seeking popular favor by proclaiming their intention to seek better relations with Nasir.)

Yemen-UAR: The arrival of a 32-man Egyptian economic mission in Yemen on 25 April and the impending arrival of an agricultural mission from Cairo indicate increased Egyptian support for Crown Prince Badr during the Imam's absence. These moves are also probably intended to reduce Badr's dependence on Soviet bloc aid.

Watch Committee conclusion—Middle—

Watch Committee conclusion—Middle—

Ceptible of direct

Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.)

Iraq: (The Communists are progressively achieving control in Iraq, although for the present they may prefer not to move to take power in their own name.)

30 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

The Philippines: The coalition agreement between the opposition Liberal and Progressive parties should significantly strengthen their prospects in the November senatorial and provincial elections. The parties may be planning an actual merger, looking to the 1961 general elections, when they would challenge Nacionalista party control of the government.

(Page 7)

The Netherlands - Indonesia: (Foreign Minister Luns, who is again seeking arms aid for West New Guinea from the United States, says that the Dutch have unobtrusively taken a number of measures to strengthen West New Guinea's defenses. The Indonesian Government, when these measures come to its knowledge, is likely to regard the Dutch actions as a threat to its security and may request more arms aid from the West, the Communist bloc, or both.)

(Page 8)

III. THE WEST

France--Summit tactics: De Gaulle is likely to insist that his proposal to invite the USSR to join the West in providing aid to underdeveloped countries be on the agenda for any summit conference. He is particularly interested in such a plan for Africa, and has told Secretary Herter that he believes

France--Nuclear weapons: (The first French nuclear weapons test is now reliably reported planned for February or March 1960, in southern Algeria. This would be from six months to a year later than most previous reports had suggested. Postponement of the first test may be due to technical difficulties, or possibly to plans for testing several devices of varying size.)

(Page 9)

30 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

SECRET

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow Attempts to Foster Tribal Unrest in Iran

Radio Moscow on 27 April gave its first specific support to the Iranian Kurds and the traditionally antiregime Qashqai tribes in Persian-language broadcasts to Iran. About the same date, a new clandestine station—"The National Voice of Iran"—which is probably Soviet inspired if not actually in the USSR, began attacking the Shah's tribal policies.

These broadcasts charged that "the Qashqai tribes and the Iranian Kurds are being deprived of their elementary democratic rights," and that Tehran is trying to place the Kurdish tribal areas of Iran under military control in order to transform them into a base for "destructive activities" against Iraq. Moscow contrasted the "unfortunate lot" of Kurds in Iran with the example in Iraq of Arab-Kurdish cooperation under Qasim. Strong personal attacks on the Shah continue in bloc broadcasts in Persian--currently at a level of about 68 program-hours a week.

(The principal tribal chief, Nasr Khan, who is now in Switzer-
land, claimed on 20 April that he recently received renewed Soviet
offers for support, including arms,
He implied that although he is pro-American, he may ac-
cept Soviet support. Realizing that Tehran is already concerned
about the loyalties of its estimated 750,000 Kurds, Nasr Khan may
be attempting to obtain prompt settlement of his property claims
from the Iranian Government by threatening to cause unrest among
the estimated 300,000 Qashqai tribesmen in southern Iran. He
says the Iranian colony in Europe is expecting "something to hap-
pen in Iran this summer," and that wealthy Iranians are withdraw-
ing their assets from Iran and depositing them in Switzerland.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

SECRET

Polish Regime Institutes New Offensive Against Catholic Church

The Polish regime's new offensive against the Catholic Church is potentially the most serious threat to the church since the detente established by the 1956 Church-State Agreement.

The state has issued a stringent reinterpretation of the law exempting from taxation church funds used for religious purposes, virtually eliminating the church's social welfare activities and its construction program.

The regime initially is concentrating its attack on the religious orders which are not under the direct control of Cardinal Wyszynski. Many of them have less contact with the people than the regular parish clergy, and the regime apparently hopes thereby to avoid arousing extensive popular opposition. Action has already been taken against one group of Jesuits who have been accused of large-scale tax evasions and, as a result, had their property confiscated by the state. Some church authorities believe that this action signals the beginning of a general offensive against the Jesuits. Other religious orders and the regular clergy also are being subjected to less drastic financial pressures, which the regime apparently plans to extend.

At the third party congress in March, Gomulka stated that "we do not want a war with the church" but stressed that the church must accept a purely passive role in Polish society. He has long had the aim of strengthening the party's hold over the population at the expense of the church, which is its principal rival. In contrast to tactics used against the church before 1956, the regime is not tampering with matters of faith. The new offensive can seriously decrease church influence and force the population to become dependent upon the party for welfare services previously supplied by the church.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET II. ASIA-AFRICA

<u>High Pakistani Officials Stress Need for Collective Defense</u> <u>With India</u>

	Pakistani President Ayub, the foreign minister, the ambassador in Washington, the director of the Pakistani intelligence services, and military officers in West Pakistan have all recently stated in public that Tibetan events indicate India and Pakistan should join together in defending the subcontinent in the event of a threat from the outside.
	In spite of their more direct concern with the possibility of hostilities between India and Pakistan, the military leaders of both countries have long considered that joint defense of the subcontinent would be necessary in the event of outside aggression. Pakistan's military leaders now may feel that the growth of Chinese Communist military power along the Indo-Tibetan border and the recent deterioration in Sino-Indian relations make the question of joint defense of more immediate interest. The Pakistanis probably believe that emphasizing the concept of collective defense while India is involved in strengthening the security of its Tibetan border will reduce India's opposition to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. In addition, Karachi may intend by demonstrating its reasonableness to offset the effects of the recent downing of an Indian Air Force Canberra by the Pakistani Air Force. Ayub's government desires to create an atmosphere conducive to a settlement of the canal-waters and Kashmir disputes with India.
;	Karachi probably believes that by playing down its disputes with India and emphasizing its interest in regional defense, including cooperation with India, it will strengthen its position in requesting a continued flow of US arms aid)
•	General Thimayya, chief of staff of the Indian Army, stated that now is the time to consider a rapprochement with Pakistan to facilitate joint defense. Considerable progress in set- tling major disputes will be necessary, however, before the two countries will be ready to engage in joint defense planning.

-SECRET

Jordan-Syrian Border Incident Adds to Problems Awaiting Husayn

Syrian Interior Minister Sarraj has urged that the UAR Government use fedayeen terrorists against Jordan in reprisal for a
border incident on 23 April,
The final decision on reprisal has been referred to Nasir. Each side has blamed the other for the incident, which may have arisen from poor definition of the frontier. Efforts to undertake a joint investigation of the clash failed because each side insisted that the inquiry be held in its territory.
In addition to tension with the UAR, King Husayn will find an atmosphere of intensified political intrigue in Amman when he returns on 2 May from his world tour. He will probably be compelled to resolve a serious factional dispute in the army, and may be forced to choose a new prime minister. Originally, Premier Samir Rifai had planned to resign shortly after the King's return in order to form a new cabinet. Maneuvering by a powerful clique of Bedouin officers in the army, however, aimed at discrediting and removing Army Chief of Staff Sadiq Shara, could force Rifai's resignation earlier and block his reappointment. General Shara has been Rifai's protegé in the army. Rifai will probably seek to transfer the leader of the Bedouin clique, Colonel Abdullah Majalli, from his present influential post as chief of operations to one of less importance.)
Should Rifai resign, the Bedouin will seek the appointment of Hazza Majalli, who probably also has British support. Two other former Premiers, Fawzi Mulqi and Said Mufti, are also currently mentioned in Amman political circles as possible replacements. Both have recently bid for popular support by announcing their intent to seek improved relations with the UAR.

TOP SECRET

Yemeni Regent Receiving Increased Support From Nasir

The arrival of a 32-man Egyptian economic mission in Yemen on 25 April, and the impending arrival of an agricultural mission from Cairo, indicate increased Egyptian support for Crown Prince Badr during the absence of the Imam, who is abroad for medical treatment. The economic mission is to conduct a two-week survey in connection with an agreement signed by Badr in Cairo on 6 April providing for the formation of a UAR-Yemen trade company. At the same time Badr also signed another agreement establishing a joint "agricultural company" for the purpose of increasing Yemen's agricultural production and modernizing Yemeni agriculture. These moves are probably also intended to reduce Badr's dependence on aid from the Soviet bloc.

cultural production and modernizing Yemeni agriculture. Thes	Э
moves are probably also intended to reduce Badr's dependence	
on aid from the Soviet bloc.	
the UAR has	
also loaned Badr two IL-14 transport aircraft which are being	
used to facilitate the movement of Badr's representatives and	
security officials.	
the UAR planned to activate a clandestine radio transmitter	
in Yemen about 25 April. It was to be linked with Jidda and	
Cairo, and the Egyptian relay station in Jidda was asked to mon	-
itor the frequency of the new station, which was to be considered	
"Top Secret." The UAR may be setting up this secret communi-	
cations link with its missions in Yemen in preparation for imple	
mentation of Badr's recent order that most foreign diplomatic	
missions stop sending enciphered telegrams. Cairo might also	
wish to have the emergency radio channel to ensure rapid as-	
sistance to Badr if rebellion were to break out against him.	
biblance to Dadi it repetition were to break out against mini	
Badr is also continuing to look to the Sino-Soviet bloc mis-	
sions in Yemen for assistance.	
Badr send 'the remaining Soviet experts,' including	┙
the expert on armored vehicles, to Sana. This suggests that	
•	
units of Badr's bodyguard deployed in the northern capital to up	-

the expert on armored vehicles,		
units of Badr's bodyguard deploye		
hold his authority are being advis	sed by Soviet pers	onnel.
/Meanwhile,	¬	
	doubt that an imp	nediate move
-SECRET		,

had agreed to such ac would be conducted in Arab States, the fede	Cairo through th	ie machinery <u>of t</u>	ation
Arap Blates, the reac	222		
			•

SECRET

Principal Philippine Opposition Parties Agree on Coalition (The coalition agreement between the Philippine Liberal and Progressive parties poses a significant long-range threat to President Garcia's incumbent Nacionalista party. The text of the parties' communiqué, signed by Vice President Macapagal for the Liberals and Manuel Manahan for the Progressives, provides for a common ticket in the November elections, in which one third of the senate's 24 seats and various provincial governorships and other offices will be contested.
this coalition is to be followed by a merger of the two parties by June of 1960 at the latest, This merger would have as its goal the upsetting of Nacionalista control of the government in 1961. Such a party would have considerable assets in the persons of Macapagal, who polled more votes in the 1957 elections than any other candidate, and Manahan, who made an impressive showing in 1957 as the Progressive candidate for president in his first campaign for elective office. The new party would combine the superior organization and financial backing of the Liberals and the Progressives' identification with the goals of ex-President Magsaysay, whose supporters formed the party.
Against these assets, however, must be placed the powerful, well-entrenched political machine of the Nacionalistas and the possibility that discipline within the new grouping may be difficult to maintain. Negotiations for a coalition or merger began as early as 1957 and encountered many stumbling blocks, particularly from the Liberal party's old guard.

SECRET

- Deuke i

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163330

Netherlands Reports West New Guinea Defenses Strengthened

Dutch Foreign Minister Luns, in again seeking arms aid for West New Guinea, told United States Ambassador Young in The Hague that the Dutch have unobtrusively taken a number of measures designed to strengthen West New Guinea defenses. He mentioned shipment of new radar equipment, 400 additional marines, increased ground personnel, more ammunition, and "the like."

The Dutch, unhappy about US arms aid to Indonesia and the subsequent "chain reaction" of sales by other NATO countries, recently threatened to divert NATO-committed military equipment to West New Guinea if US arms aid is not forthcoming. The Dutch cabinet, impatient with US delay in responding to a "shopping list" of military items submitted to the United States last December, decided in March to improve the Biak airfield for use by jet fighters and to station 100 fully equipped marines at Hollandia. Dutch forces in New Guinea, as of the end of 1958, included 250 to 400 army troops, 1,200 marines, 751 naval personnel, and 175 naval air personnel.

The Indonesian Government, on learning of the reinforcements, is likely to seek some means of retaliating, and may also advance the Dutch action as justification for making new requests for arms. Any government failure to react to a Dutch build-up would be exploited by the Indonesian Communist party, now robably the strongest party in Indonesia.

-SECRET

III. THE WEST
French Nuclear Weapons Test Now Reported Planned For Early 1960
the first French nuclear weapons test now is planned for February or March 1960 in southern Algeria. The first test will probably involve a nominal-yield (20-40 kiloton) device. esting of a series of smaller devices, possibly including an underground test, is expected to follow the initial explosion. The testing will take place in the general area of Reggane Casis, previously reported as the probable French nuclear test site.
Previous reports had suggested that the initial French test might occur as early as the first quarter of 1959, and France is estimated to have accumulated enough plutonium as of 1 January 1959 to explode at least one nuclear device at any time. The reported delay is probably due partially to the French desire to test devices of varying sizes in series. Other factors affecting the timing may include the need to complete procurement and installation of range instrumentation and possibly difficulties in solving problems of weapons design and fabrication.
In recent weeks the French press has repeated the government's earlier warnings that Paris will not be bound by any agreement on test cessation which might be reached by the US.
USSR, and UK at the Geneva talks now under way.)

TOP SECRET

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163330

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163330 TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163330'