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29 May 1959

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## CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN



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#### 29 MAY 1959


#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### IL ASIA-AFRICA

Prime Minister Abboud seeks British rockets for possible use against army rebels.

Indonesia -- Vote expected in a few days on return to 1945 constitution. If Parliament rejects it, army may impose it.

Dalai Lama intends to make public statement that Tibetans now are fighting for independence; Nehru



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 May 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### II. ASIA AFRICA

\*Sudan: Prime Minister Abboud, who is also commander in chief of the army, has appealed to the British for aircraft rockets for possible use against rebellious army personnel who took part in the 22 May coup attempt against his government. Abboud's request was made to the British ambassador in Khartoum on 27 May and is reported to have been approved by the British Foreign Office. The rockets, two instructors, and some 250-pound bombs are scheduled to arrive in Khartoum from Aden on 29 and 30 May. Abboud hopes the threatened use of these weapons will force the rebellious officers to come to Khartoum and surrender, since he is not sure of the loyalty of troops which he might send against the dissidents. The rebellious army factions in the Eastern and Northern commands may move toward Khartoum in force at any time. All troops in the capital remain on alert status.

Turkey-Kurds: Several local chiefs of the Kurdish tribes in southeastern Turkey recently held secret meetings for the purpose of establishing a unified policy on "Kurdish aims,"

The Kurdish minority in Turkey totals nearly 2,000,000 out of a total population of over 26,000,000. It is not regarded as presenting a real threat to Turkish security but could become a touchy problem, especially if its activities are coordinated with restive tribes in neighboring countries. (Page 2)

Indonesia: The debate in the Constituent Assembly on President Sukarno's request for a return to the 1945 constitution, which

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would greatly increase the power of the executive, has concluded. A vote is expected within a few days. Although the outcome is still in question, pressures for acceptance have been increasing. Premier Diuanda has made a thinly veiled threat of an army takeover in the event of an unfavorable vote. Army leaders have just ended a national conference which was probably timed to bring pressure on the assembly for a favorable vote as well as to determine the support of regional commanders should extreme measures be required. (Page 3)

India-Tibet: (The Dalai Lama plans to make a public statement on 6 June condemning Peiping's violation of Tibetan autonomy and announcing that Tibetans now are fighting for complete independence. He has been unsuccessful in gaining Indian support for a "positive" stand. He nevertheless intends to make public a declaration, calling for a cease-fire in Tibet and evacuation of Chinese troops. Nehru has urged the Dalai Lama to refrain from controversial statements and probably will put pressure on him to modify his declaration when they meet early in

**(Page 4)** 

## III. THE WEST

Haiti: The gravity of President Duvalier's condition, resulting from a coronary occlusion on 24 May, is not yet widely known, even among members of the government. Under the constitution, executive power passes to the cabinet if the president is temporarily incapacitated. The senior member of the Nupreme Court becomes provisional president if the president M dies or resigns. As the seriousness of Duvalier's illness becomes known, however, a sharp power struggle is likely to preclude any orderly transfer of power. (Page 5)

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Argentina: Violence flared up again in several cities on 26 and 27 May. The continued defiance of various labor unions led by Communists and extreme Peronistas has increased the likelihood that the disturbances will become still more serious. The strike leaders reject any compromise in their economic demands and appear to be using these demands in the hope of undermining the government. Frondizi has the support of the military. He probably will have to resort to strong repressive measures to stop the agitation. (Page 6)

## IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

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Three	Prospect Years.	s for i	North a 63-59.	nd South 26 May	Vietna 1959.	m Over	Next	Two or

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material

## II. ASIA AFRICA

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Prime Minister Abboud, who is also commander in chief of the Sudanese Army, has requested aircraft rockets from Britain in preparation for action against the rebellious army personnel who participated in the 22 May coup attempt against his government. Abboud is doubtful that he can count on the loyalty of troops which he might send against the rebellious army faction in the Eastern Command. He is hoping to use the British weapons, which are scheduled to arrive in Khartoum from Aden on 29 and 30 May, as a threat to force the rebellious officers to come to Khartoum and surrender.

The British are reportedly sending some 250-pound bombs as well and two technicians to instruct in the use of the rockets. The Sudan has no more than four aircraft which could be used for this type of mission and probably not enough qualified pilots to fly them all at the same time.

Abboud, who was initially reluctantito take resolute steps against Brigadier Shannan and his fellow perpetrators of the coup attempt, has the support of a group of senior officers headed by Deputy Commander in Chief Brigadier Hasan Bashir Nasir for his present course of action. Dissidence among junior officers is, however, widespread, especially in the Eastern and Northern Commands, and new movements of these troops toward Khartoum are possible at any time. All troops in the capital remain on alert status, but the number which would remain loyal to the Abboud government in a battle with dissident forces is problematical



## Turkish Kurdish Leaders Hold Secret Meetings Recent secret meetings of Kurdish leaders from Mardin Province in southeastern Turkey may reflect increasing activity by their followers, possibly stimulated by news of sporadic fighting by some Iraqi Kurds against the Qasim government. While the Turkish Government has given asylum to approximately 1,000 Iraqi Kurds, it has insisted that Turkish newspapers refer to such individuals as "Iraqi Turks." Turkey maintains that its two million Kurds have been successfully assimilated, and does not want them reminded of their nationalist aspirations. Some Turkish officials now privately concede that they have a Kurdish problem. They are planning to locate radio transmitters in southern Turkey in order to minimize the effect of foreign broadcasts on the Kurdish minority. The Turks are increasing the effectiveness of security measures on their border with Iraq. They are also attempting to keep Kurds in the extreme southeastern part of Turkey from intervening in the disorders going on in Iraq, Ankara also appears to be alert to the danger that pro-Communist Kurds may enter from Iraq and Syria. While the Kurds constitute a minority receptive to foreign propaganda, there is little prospect that they will engage in any large-scale action against the Turkish Government. Kurdish uprisings were put down in 1925 and 1937, and Turkish Kurds are divided by language and by personal and tribal rivalries.

## Indonesian Prime Minister Makes Thinly Veiled Threat of Army Coup

Indonesia's Constituent Assembly, meeting in Bandung, was warned by Prime Minister Djuanda on 27 May that failure to readopt the 1945 constitution was likely to precipitate an army coup. The 1945 constitution strengthened the executive branch of government at the expense of the legislative, which is in line with Sukarno's concept of "guided democracy." Although the necessary two-thirds majority in the Constituent Assembly is still uncertain, indications are increasing that the substantial and hitherto uncommitted vote--chiefly composed of the Moslem Nahdlatul Ulama--may support the government. A final vote is expected on 29 or 30 May.

In addition to Djuanda's statement, army leaders have hinted throughout the period of debate that if necessary they would take action to impose the constitution. Army Chief of Staff General Nasution held a national military conference during the final stages of debate, presumably to influence the assembly and possibly also to determine the support of regional commanders should extreme measures be required.

The American Embassy notes that most civilian leaders of the government are absent from Djakarta. President Sukarno, Acting President Sartono, the prime minister, all three deputy prime ministers, and more than half a dozen cabinet ministers, including some of the most important, are away on missions, either within Indonesia or abroad. General Nasution and the principal army leaders, however, are on hand.

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## Dalai Lama Plans Public Statement Announcing Fight For Independence

The Dalai Lama apparently has decided he can no longer defer a public statement clarifying his firm opposition to Peiping's action in Tibet. During his first meeting with Prime Minister Nehru in April, the Tibetan leader had agreed to avoid controversial statements pending efforts by New Delhi to intercede with Peiping on behalf of the rebel leaders.

the conditions on which negotiations with the Chinese could be based. These included a cease-fire in Tibet, withdrawal of Chinese military forces, and the sending of an international fact-finding commission to Tibet. By the third week of May, with no further word from Nehru or indication of Indian diplomatic efforts, the Dalai Lama and his advisers apparently agreed that he would soon have to make a "frank, complete, and positive" statement of his position. He decided to hold a press conference on 6 June in which he plans to condemn Peiping's violation of Tibetan autonomy, make public his 7 May proposals to Nehru, and announce that Tibetans now are fighting for complete independence.

Nehru reportedly regards the Dalai Lama's conditions for negotiation as unrealistic. Although he has advocated a peaceful approach to Peiping, aimed at securing recognition of Tibetan internal autonomy, he apparently has little hope that Indian intercession would be acceptable to the Chinese. Nehru is not likely to try to block a press conference for the Dalai Lama, since he has already advised him to deny Chinese charges that he is being held under "duress." He probably will increase pressure on the Tibetan leader, however, to withhold any statement on his future course of action.

Responsible officials of the Indian Central Intelligence
Bureau meanwhile are reported to be advising the Tibetans
--apparently without authorization from Nehru--that resistance activity in Tibet must be kept alive and that their propaganda efforts must be greatly expanded.

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### III. THE WEST

## Haitian President's/IIIness Likely to Touch Off Power Struggle

The grave illness of Haitian President Francois Duvalier, who suffered a coronary occlusion on 24 May, will force him to withdraw at least temporarily from the political scene. The Constitution of 1957 provides that the cabinet assume executive authority if the president is temporarily unable to perform his duties. In the event of the president's death or resignation, the senior member of the Supreme Court automatically becomes provisional president and is charged with holding elections within three months.

The gravity of the 51-year-old President's condition, now known only to a limited number of high government officials, is likely to touch off a sharp power struggle when it becomes general knowledge, and there is little chance for an orderly or constitutional transfer of power. The cabinet has been completely dominated by the President, and is not composed of strong political figures. Theodore Nicoleau, a former minister of justice in Duvalier's first cabinet, is president of the Supreme Court. Neither he nor the cabinet is believed to enjoy sufficient popular support to prevent determined and possibly violent bids for power by opposition groups, dissident elements of the armed forces, or even ambitious officials of Duvalier's administration.

The bitter political and racial tensions which have remained latent during the last several months could rise to the surface, causing a period of violence and political instability similar to that which followed the overthrow of former dictator
Paul Magloire in December 1956



## Argentine Strikers Continue Defiant Attitude

The violence growing out of strikes in several Argentine cities on 26 and 27 May seems part of a pattern of labor defiance led by various Communists and extreme Peronistas in hopes of undermining President Frondizi's government. The strike leaders have rejected any compromise in their demands and threaten further trouble if not satisfied. As demonstrated by the bank strike, now in its eighth week, these leaders do not have the full support of the union rank and file, but they have enough to interrupt business operations, to gain some unwilling compliance by threats against both workers and employers, and to promote riots and unrest.

The recent strike tactics suggest that a major aim has been to provoke politically unpopular repressive measures that would intensify labor discontent with President Frondizi and possibly gain additional support for the Peronista and Communist unions. These unions nominally control slightly more than half of organized labor. Recognizing this motive, Frondizi has relied mainly on tear gas and water hoses to quell agitation. He has also emphasized Communist responsibility which, in the 3 April riots, was clearly evident.

Nevertheless, Frondizi will probably have to stronger measures. The military are supporting probably continue to do so as long as he moves to tation.	him and	will
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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

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Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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