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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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20 NOVEMBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

TASS reiterates threat Moscow will sign separate German peace treaty. ①


USSR attempting to gain credit with India for any conciliatory moves made by Peiping in the border dispute. ②

Poland--Gomulka may be faced with a threat to his control if extent of reported appointments of Stalinists to key positions is confirmed. ③

II. ASIA-AFRICA


Nasir comments on UAR foreign policy. ④

Ceylon--Government's prospects for defeating forthcoming no-confidence motions against several ministers jeopardized by recent arrests. ⑤



III. THE WEST

⑥ UK implementing military cooperation agreement reached last July with Kuwait.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 November 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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*USSR: Moscow has used a TASS statement on 18 November attacking some of Chancellor Adenauer's statements in London to remind the West that the USSR still intends to sign a separate peace treaty if the Western powers do not agree to conclude a peace settlement with both German states. This is the first specific authoritative reference to a separate peace treaty since Khrushchev's letter to Adenauer on 18 August. The statement charged Adenauer with distorting the Berlin issue in an effort to obstruct the current improvement in international relations and stressed that a peace treaty will be the subject of "cardinal discussions" at a summit meeting. There was no suggestion, however, that action on a separate treaty is imminent or directly linked to the outcome of an East-West meeting; Moscow probably will use this issue intermittently to exert pressure on the West.

USSR-India-China: (The USSR apparently wishes to gain credit with the Indian Government for any ostensibly conciliatory moves the Chinese Communists make in the Sino-Indian border dispute.

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the Soviet cultural counselor in New Delhi has claimed that Chou En-lai's renewed offer on 7 November to negotiate the dispute was sent as a result of Soviet advice. The USSR had made the Chinese "more aware of real Indian feelings." The Indian ambassador to Peiping has also informed his government that the offer was sent under "Soviet pressure." (Page 1)

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Poland: Various reports that former prominent Polish Stalinists are being appointed to key positions in the regime suggest that the political orientation of Poland's leadership

is taking on a more Stalinist complexion. While Gomulka might be making some of these personnel changes as a temporary measure to ensure more effective implementation of what he probably regards as necessary harder line policies, the reported naming of a number of old-line Stalinists to important military and security posts would seem to be out of character for the Polish leader. If these appointments are confirmed, Gomulka would be faced with a serious threat to his continued control over the party. Possibly related to these developments is a report from a reliable source that Gomulka suffered a mild stroke in October. #

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR: Nasir stated on 13 November that he has become more "hopeful" regarding the strength of Iraqi "nationalists" vis-a-vis the Communists and repeated his awareness of the dangers of any UAR intervention in Iraq, adding, however, that circumstances might make this necessary. He also repeated his fear of Israeli counteraction in such an event. Regarding UAR-USSR relations, Nasir again indicated that Moscow has stiffened its attitude. He said that Khrushchev recently implied Cairo could not expect special favors unless it softened its anti-Communist stand. Nasir added that he felt the British were not yet ready for a diplomatic rapprochement with Cairo, but he expected resumption of official cultural and commercial relations with France by the end of the year.

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(Page 3)

Ceylon: Widespread suspicion in Ceylon that leading officials were involved in Bandaranaike's assassination will be

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given further credence by the arrests on 19 November of the finance minister's brother and of a cabinet minister recently expelled in connection with the assassination case. The repercussions will jeopardize the government's prospects for defeating no-confidence motions to be introduced against several ministers on 27 November. Bandaranaike's assassin reportedly has made a statement confirming the implication of a high government party official closely identified with several ministers. Prime Minister Dahanayake has warned dissident government members backing the no-confidence motions that he will resign should the finance minister be ousted by Parliament.) [redacted] (Page 4)

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Britain-Kuwait: (Britain is implementing the military cooperation agreement reached last July with Kuwait as a result of Kuwaiti fears of Communist activity in Iraq. Sixteen tanks, half of them secretly earmarked for British use in case of a threat to Kuwait's security, are en route to Kuwait, and 11 armored cars are scheduled for January delivery. Britain's relations with Kuwait, its major oil source, have become increasingly cordial in the political as well as military field.) [redacted]
 [redacted] (Page 5)

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China.
 NIE 43-59. 17 Nov 59. [redacted]

20 Nov 59

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Tries to Impress Indians With Friendliness

The USSR is attempting to gain credit with the Indian Government for any ostensibly conciliatory moves the Chinese Communists make in the Sino-Indian border dispute.

[redacted], Soviet cultural counselor Efimov has claimed that Chou En-lai's renewed offer on 7 November to negotiate the dispute was sent on Soviet advice. When pressed, however, on how his government had exerted itself, Efimov stated, "I would not say we have directly intervened, but we have made them more aware of real Indian feelings."

While Moscow has probably been counseling moderation to the Chinese, it is doubtful that at this stage its "advice" is either a determining factor or at variance with Peiping's own views on the desirability of negotiating without losing any of the advantages it has gained.

Throughout the dispute, Soviet propaganda has tried to maintain an appearance of impartiality so as to avoid jeopardizing relations with India. On 10 November, in discussing an earlier exchange of notes between Peiping and New Delhi, Pravda led off with Peiping's position, while Izvestia led off with New Delhi's. The USSR has apparently succeeded in confirming Nehru's view that it is sympathetic with his stand and that it is making every effort to bring the Chinese to a reasonable position.)

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Reports Suggest Changing Political Orientation in Poland

Various reports--some of which remain unconfirmed--that former prominent Polish Stalinists have been appointed to key positions in the Polish regime, including the military and security organizations, suggest that the political orientation of Poland's leadership is taking on a more Stalinist complexion.

Two notorious members of the Bierut regime, former politburo member Frandiszek Mazur and General Witaszewski, ex-political commissar of the Polish armed forces and most recently the military attaché in Prague, are reported to be returning to Poland to take up important positions. Mazur, ambassador to Prague, will reportedly become head of the secret police (UB). Witaszewski, popularly nicknamed Gazrurka (Gaspipe) for the weapon he widely advocated in October 1956 against students and intellectuals, [redacted]

[redacted] slated to become head of Polish Army intelligence and [redacted] to be an adviser to Cyrankiewicz. [redacted] Deputy Foreign Minister Naszkowski, a Stalinist, will replace the liberal-minded Gomulka supporter, General Zarzycki, as the Polish armed forces' political commissar.

If these reports are confirmed, six liberals have been removed or transferred and six Stalinists appointed in the past month.

While Gomulka could be making these personnel changes as temporary measures designed to ensure more effective implementation of the harder policies he now considers necessary, the naming of a number of arch-Stalinists to military and security posts would constitute a serious threat to his continued control over the party and regime. Another factor which may have played a part in these developments is Gomulka's health, which is said to be deteriorating; [redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nasir Reviews UAR Foreign Relations

Nasir on 13 November reviewed the UAR position regarding Iraq and the Middle East, the USSR, and the West in an interview He stated he had become more hopeful of the "nationalists'" ability to assume control in Iraq and felt that in any showdown these forces and pro-Western elements would join against the Communists. He remains aware of the risks involved in UAR intervention in Iraq, but still thinks circumstances might make it necessary.

Nasir also continues concerned over Israeli intentions, and he is anxious about the superiority of Israel's French-made Super Mystere aircraft over his own MIG-17s. He said that Moscow had refused to grant the usual discount when he attempted to obtain MIG-19s. Nasir commented that Moscow is making it clear that he must halt his attacks on the Communists if he expects to receive any special favors. Nasir also apparently tried to give the impression that Khrushchev was not as cordial in his 4 November interview with Egyptian editor Salah Salim as published accounts have suggested.

Nasir went on to say that he planned to resume official cultural and commercial relations with France before Christmas, despite continued French assistance to Israel. De Gaulle, according to Nasir, seems to be making an effort to keep him informed of French policy. The UAR will not resume diplomatic relations with Britain, however, on the ground that an alleged British propaganda effort to injure Nasir's position in Syria proves London is not in "the right frame of mind."

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~~SECRET~~New Charges Implicating Ceylonese Officials
In Bandaranaike's Assassination

Widespread rumors in Ceylon implicating leading officials in the late Prime Minister Bandaranaike's assassination probably will be considered by the Ceylonese public as verified by the arrests on 19 November of the finance minister's brother and of a former cabinet minister.

Bandaranaike's assassin, a Buddhist monk apprehended during the shooting on 25 September, in a recent statement to investigators confirmed suspicions that he was encouraged to shoot Bandaranaike by an official of the ruling party, a high Buddhist priest who was arrested in mid-October in connection with the case. This charge triggered the arrest of former Local Government Minister Vimala Wijewardene, earlier expelled from the cabinet because of her close association with the priest. The assassin also said that one of Finance Minister de Zoysa's brothers participated in the "target practice" said to have occurred in preparation for the assassination.

The assassin's statement, which reportedly has been leaked to a leading Ceylonese editor, will intensify the campaign to remove both the finance minister and a second brother--a high police official charged with obstructing the current investigations and associated with a rumored coup plot exposed in late 1958. The reported statement by police officials that a third arrest is planned may refer to either of the two, although the finance minister is presently absent from Ceylon.

The government until now appeared likely to defeat by a narrow margin the no-confidence motions to be introduced against several cabinet ministers on 27 November, but the new charges against the de Zoysas may reverse the position of Tamil opposition members who reportedly are loyal to the finance minister. Prime Minister Dahanayake has warned dissident government members spearheading the campaign against de Zoysa that he will resign if the minister is ousted by Parliament.

Governor General Goonetilleke appears increasingly worried over this possibility, and has tried to sound out United National party leader Senanayake on forming an interim government.)

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III. THE WEST

British-Kuwaiti Relations Become Increasingly Cordial

Sixteen British tanks are en route to Kuwait under the military cooperation agreement reached last July as a result of Kuwaiti fears of Communist activity in Iraq. Kuwaiti crews for the tanks were trained in Britain. The Ruler has agreed that armament purchased by the Kuwaiti Army can be used by the British if Kuwait's security is threatened. Half of the tanks will secretly be earmarked for British use, as will 1,000 of the 3,000 antitank mines also being delivered.

Eleven armored cars are scheduled for January delivery. Previous British arms deliveries beginning on November 1958 included 12 armored cars, 12 antitank vehicular mounts, 50 rocket launchers with ammunition, and 300 hand grenades. Kuwait has expressed interest in patrol boats.

Britain's relations with Kuwait--its major oil source--have become increasingly cordial in the last year. Abdulla Mubarrak, head of the Kuwaiti Army and Britain's candidate for the succession to the rulership--visited London from 13 to 15 October and expressed himself as fully satisfied with current relations. The Kuwaitis remain sensitive, however, about publicity on their relationship with Britain, and Mubarrak has so far refused to permit more than two British soldiers in mufti to be stationed in Kuwait for maintenance of the equipment.

London is making every effort to accede to Kuwait's desires for independence in the political and economic fields in order to continue the cooperative trend. With British acquiescence, Kuwait now has its own postal system and will shortly have its own currency.)

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

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