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
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
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


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 November 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Communist Bloc - Foreign Students: Approximately 300 Iraqi students arrived in Moscow in early November under the recently ratified Soviet-Iraqi cultural agreement. The number is significant, in view of the fact that there was a total of 600 students from all nonbloc countries in Moscow. Most of the Iraqis will begin studies on the undergraduate level and will remain for a period of five years, including six months to one year of Russian-language training. Meanwhile, Soviet and other bloc authorities are plagued by dissatisfaction among foreign students attending bloc schools, and accumulating evidence indicates that the bloc's foreign student programs are falling short of their goal of influencing these students along pro-Communist lines. Indian students now in the USSR reportedly have asked to return home.

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A small number of Iraqi students who arrived recently in Peiping to begin studies are "in a state of utter despair," according to a message of 9 November.

(Page 1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Hammarskjold-Laos: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's recent talks with Laotian officials suggest that he still favors some type of negotiated settlement or at least some gesture by Vientiane toward the Communist bloc which would emphasize Laotian neutrality. According to Laotian Prime Minister Phoui, Hammarskjold specifically mentioned Laotian acceptance of mediation by India, indefinite postponement of the impending trials of pro-Communist leaders, and willingness to accept economic assistance from all UN members.

British policy makers also continue to believe that negotiations between the Communist bloc and Laos could lead toward a settlement of the dissident problem in Laos.

(Page 2)

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Indonesia - Communist China: President Sukarno told the Chinese Communist ambassador on 20 November that Indonesia will implement the ban on alien retailers in rural areas whether the Chinese like it or not, according to Foreign Minister Subandrio. Sukarno stated he would listen to no further objections at this time on this subject. Referring to the Chinese Embassy official who has been particularly active in trying to obstuct the Indonesian decree, Subandrio told the American ambassador that Indonesia planned to find a way to get rid of him without declaring him persona non grata.

(Page 3)

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situation "continues to deteriorate on all planes" in northeastern Algeria.

serious shortages of materiel and the isolation of 3,000 of its troops in Tunisia, factors partly attributable to French border barriers. While the rebels have often shown themselves capable of outlasting French offensives, a progressive deterioration of their military position in Algeria is likely to impair their bargaining position with the French.

The 2nd Military District, recently characterized by the French as the "last remaining" cohesive military district, has lately been subjected to increased French pressure.

(Page 4) (Map)

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Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C02989934 THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Dissatisfaction Among Foreign Students at Communist Bloc Schools

The USSR and other bloc countries continue to be plagued by dissatisfaction among foreign students attending advanced bloc educational institutions. While students from Western countries have expressed their frustrations only to other Westerners, those from underdeveloped countries—notably Africans, followed closely by the Arabs—have voiced their irritation on occasion to bloc educational authorities. The bloc's foreign student programs appear to be falling short of their goal of winning "dedicated adherents" to Communism. Accumulating evidence points to hostility on the part of many students toward their host country, and to the development by some of outright anti-Communist attitudes.

UAR student complaints over conditions in the bloc were partially responsible for Cairo's decision this summer to send about 250 students to Western--especially American--schools. Under the Soviet-UAR cultural agreement for 1960, which was concluded on 21 November, approximately 300 UAR students--about half the total of last year--will attend Soviet schools "at UAR request," according to Radio Moscow.

Resentment among the approximately 15 Indian students in Moscow continues over the political atmosphere, educational restrictions, living conditions, and difficulties in learning Russian, according to an Indian student who has furnished reliable information in the past. He claimed that "every Indian student in Moscow has asked his government to recall him to India."

Some 300 Iraqi students arrived in Moscow in early November under the recently ratified Soviet-Iraqi cultural exchange agreement. Most of the group will begin studies on the undergraduate level after six months to a year of Russian-language training, and are scheduled to spend a total of five years. Fourteen Iraqis arrived concurrently in Communist China,

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Hammarskjold's Plans for Laos

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's recent talks with Laotian officials suggest that he still favors some type of negotiated settlement or at least some gesture by Vientiane toward the Communist bloc which would emphasize Laotian neutrality. According to Laotian Prime Minister Phoui, Hammarskjold would devise an over-all economic development plan to be financed by contributions from "any or all UN members." Phoui fears that this would involve Laotian acceptance of economic assistance from the Soviet bloc and open the country to Communist agents.

Hammarskjold also brought up the question of reactivating the International Control Commission but, in the face of continued opposition from Phoui, asked why Laos could not at least accept mediation by India. The secretary general dwelt constantly on the impending trials of pro-Communist leaders and urged the Laotian Government to postpone the trials indefinitely in order to maintain maximum sympathy of friendly nations.

British policy makers also continue to incline toward negotiations between the Communist bloc and Laos as a means to settlement, despite their desire for Western unity and their recent rejection of the Soviet proposal for an international conference. Foreign Secretary Lloyd has reiterated in Parliament his government's desire for a neutral Laos. The government's rejection of an international conference may be subjected to a more searching Labor attack in Parliament.

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Indonesian President Rejects Further Chinese Communist Protests

President Sukarno underscored Indonesia's firmness in its recent relations with Peiping when he told the Chinese Communist ambassador on 20 November that, despite Peiping's objections, Djakarta will implement its decree banning alien retailers in rural areas. Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, who described the interview to the American ambassador, said Sukarno had not given an inch and had been even tougher than he, Subandrio, had been.

Sukarno told the Chinese ambassador he would listen to no further objections to the Indonesian ban at this time but would consider complaints after a lapse of four months. When the ambassador accused Sukarno of playing into the hands of Western imperialists, the President told him he needed no advice on this subject. He said that Indonesians, when accused by foreigners of making mistakes, were likely to re-examine their actions but were capable of "coming back hard" if no fault were found and the critic persisted.


Sukarno refused to lift restrictions on the movements of Chinese Embassy personnel but agreed to release a Chinese consul general placed under house arrest by the Indonesian Army for obstructing the decree in West Java. Subandrio said the government would find a way to ease him out of the country without declaring him persona non grata.

The Indonesian Communist party, which has been placed in an embarrassing position by Peiping's pressure on the Indonesian Government for repeal of the decree, has charged that the Indonesian Army is responsible for the Sino-Indonesian tension. A party statement of 21 November accused the West Java army command of implementing the decree in a manner which opposed the spirit of the Sino-Indonesian joint communiqué of early October, issued when Subandrio visited Peiping. This criticism of the army may provoke further army measures to limit Communist party activity.

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Algerian Rebel Military Difficulties

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Torces are diminishing from day to day," and that the situation with respect to supplies "continues to grow worse." The rebel commander deplores the immobilization of some 3,000 of his soldiers on the Tunisian side of the Morice Line border barrier and criticizes the rebel high command in Tunis for failing to arrange their return and for failing to deliver promised supplies. In a statement released on 20 November, however, rebel Vice Minister Belkacem Krim insisted that the rebel army was more powerful than ever and fully capable of continuing the war. While the rebels have repeatedly demonstrated a capacity for outlasting French offensives, a gradual erosion of their military capabilities over the past nine months and	The military situation "continues to deteriorate planes" in northeastern Algeria.	e on all
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