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
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
BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

18 November 1959

SIRAB

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

_	
	USSR - Communist China: (Peiping and Moscow have
	disagreed over how the current bloc posture on relaxation
	of tension should be reflected in the tactics of the Western
	Communist parties,
	The Chinese representatives allegedly
	insisted on "sharper lines" between Communists and non-
NO	Communists and declared that Western Communist parties
V	must tighten discipline and increase their aggressiveness
	during the period of international "thaw" to prevent "revision-
	ist softening" within the parties. The Chinese also believed
	the "anticolonial struggle" should be encouraged, while the
	Russians felt such support should be qualified in view of
	broader Soviet foreign policy considerations with respect
	to the UK and France.)
	(Page 1)
	USSR-Turkey:
	evi-
	dence of Soviet diplomatic efforts to exploit the "Camp David
٠.۵	spirit." in light of the im-
No	proved international situation Turkey should respond to Mos-
	cow's desire for friendly relations. Soviet production successes as an additional reason why Ankara should
	"not delay" in establishing friendly relations with the USSR.
	not delay in establishing friendly relations with the OSSR.
	Communist China - Indonesia:
	Communist China will
	break off diplomatic relations if Indonesia persists in carrying
OK	
	areas. The Chinese Embassy in Djakarta is demanding com-
	pensation for Chinese in West Java who were allegedly beaten)

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for resisting resettlement and is	insisting that they be per-	
mitted to return to their homes.		
	government will	
propably be forced in the end to acquiesce in the Indonesian measures, Peiping can be expected to continue its pressures in the hope of obtaining some moderation of the program. (Page 2)		

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim's departure from the hospital on 17 November was greeted by a number of laudatory statements from Radio Baghdad. If demonstrations scheduled to celebrate his release are held, clashes between Communists and anti-Communists are likely despite tight security measures.

Support for the formation of a single political party led by Qasim is growing. All five army divisional commanders, three cabinet ministers, and nine provincial governors have endorsed the idea. The Communist press vigorously opposes the action, charging that it is a violation of "democratic principles." The middle-of-the road National Democrats take the same line, perhaps because they hope to become Qasim's chosen instrument. Its sponsors see the move as a device to limit Communist influence. Qasim has promised the renewal of political party activities by 6 January, and although he has remained silent on the issue, he may feel that a single party would eliminate present political rivalries.

(Page 3)

Guinea - Soviet Bloc: President Sekou Touré of Guinea is extending his current foreign tour, which has included official visits to the US, Britain, and West Germany, to the USSR and possibly to Czechoslovakia and East Germany. His apparently impromptu decision was probably influenced both by practical considerations and by a desire to demonstrate in dramatic fashion his continued adherence to a neutralist foreign policy. Such visits may lead to new bloc aid offers to Guinea.

18 Nov by

DAILY BRIEF

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III, THE WEST

	French Nuclear							
	continued movement of personnel and equipment to							
L	France's Saharan nuclear weapons test center at Reggane.							
	Cooler weather now permits renewed preparations for the							
	first French nuclear test. All components necessary for a							
	successful test are	probably now available, k	out France is					
	likely to wait until I	March or April to allow fo	or installation					
010	of more complete te	st-recording intruments	and possibly to					
NO (NO	conduct a series rat	her than a single test. 7	The first test is					
		kiloton-vield weapon fire	ed from a 300-					
Г	foot tower.)			· .				
	7 A 1 (~ m) D . (ana mha haa					
•		zilian ambassador in Hav						
	been considering a discussion with Castro over some means							
	of bringing about a rapprochement with the US, has reported that he fears "it is the deliberate							
	malian of the Cuben			h				
	policy of the Cuban Government to maintain its relations with the US in a state of agitation." In addition Castro appears to							
NO		agitation. In addition Can Latin American govern						
	cesses.	1 Hatin Hinerican Bovern	President Bet					
		manded the recall of the (
	court personally demanded the recall of the Cuban ambassador for his indiscretion and irresponsibility. The ambassador has							
	since left Caracas.		(Page 4)					
	PITTOU TOTO, OUT WORD!		\— Q /					

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DAILY BRIEF

iii

Communist China and USSR Diverge on Tactics for Western Communist Parties

Communist Parties	
Peiping and Moscow disagree on how the current bloc line on relaxation of tension should be reflected in the tactics of the Western Communist parties.	
soviet and Western delegates favored closer cooperation with non-Communist political parties. The Chinese, however, insisting on "sharper lines" between Communists and non-Communists, declared the Western parties must tighten discipline and increase their aggressiveness during "a period of detente" to prevent "revisionist softening" within their ranks.	_
The Chinese also took issue with the USSR on the nature of support to be given the "anticolonial struggle." Unencumbered by policy commitments in Western Europe, the Chinese advocate support for nationalist movements in underdeveloped areas. The Soviet delegates, on the other hand, felt foreign-policy objective toward Paris and London must be taken into account and that support to "anticolonial struggles" must be qualified by these diplomatic considerations. The Soviet representatives refused to consider a tougher attitude toward Nasir to help the Egyptian para suggestion made by the Chinese and Italian delegates.	es p- rty,
The Italian felt the conference did not resolve the difference between Peiping and Moscow on these basic issues, but it was hopinion that a "limited compromise" would be reached	es is

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Peiping Increases Pressure on Djakarta Over Status Of Overseas Chinese Communist China will break off diplomatic relations if Indonesia persists in removing Overseas Chinese from rural areas. The Chinese Embassy is demanding compensation for Chinese in West Java who were allegedly beaten for resisting resettlement and insists that they be permitted to return to their homes. Peiping will probably make further representations on behalf of the Overseas Chinese. About 300,000 of an estimated three million Chinese in Indonesia will be affected. Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, after an hour's meeting with the Chinese ambassador on 17 November, indicated, however, that both sides want to prevent permanent damage to hitherto friendly relations. Subandrio brought the dispute into the open when he told a press conference the interests of 80,000,000 Indonesians would not be sacrificed for "a small group of alien people." He added, however, that Indonesia would carry through with the resettlement program in areas where it was under way, but in other areas would reconsider its implementation. Subandrio said that the Chinese ambassador, while asking Djakarta to prevent more "excesses" in its implementation, expressed readiness to support the program. Peiping probably will be compelled eventually to acquiesce in the Indonesian measures. During the first week of November, the Indonesian Government was considering the expulsion of a Chinese Embassy

official who had been active among Chinese merchants in West Java. In view of the suggestions of compromise in Subandrio's 17 November statement, however, Indonesia may change its plans and not insist that the official leave.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Support For Qasim-Led Single Iraqi Political Party Growing

The campaign for the formation of a single political party to be led by Prime Minister Qasim continues to gain support from influential Iraqis. The campaign, launched by a newspaper editor close to Qasim, has received the adherence of all five army divisional commanders, three cabinet ministers, and nine of Iraq's fourteen provincial governors. These influential supporters, none of whom are connected with any of the present political parties, probably view the one-party state as a means to curb Communist influence.

The Communists vigorously oppose the single-party concept and charge that it is "undemocratic" and inspired by Nasir's monolithic National Union. The official National Democratic party paper has also taken a stand against the plan, which it declared would not serve "democratic principles." Qasim, who has promised the resumption of party activities by 6 January, may favor the movement as a means of eliminating present political rivalries. He has not, however, given any overt indication that he endorses the single-party movement.

Qasim has resurrected the old fertile crescent plan, originally proposed by Nuri Said in December 1942, which envisions the union of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. Arab nationalists have long attacked this plan as "imperialist," but Qasim has stated that "now this plan is a national one--Iraq has been liberated." This scheme would make Baghdad a center of power in the Middle East rivaling Cairo.

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III. THE WEST

Castro Excesses Apparently Alienating Other Latin American Countries

Brazilian Ambassador Cunha in Havana fears that the Cuban Government intends deliberately to keep its relations with the US in a state of tension and feels that a proposed Brazilian approach to Fidel Castro to discuss a Cuban-US rapprochement would be inopportune. Cunha recently advised Foreign Minister Lafer to refuse Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's invitation to Havana unless the visit would clearly be useful, since he feared it would be used to indicate Brazilian sympathy and to give prestige to the Cuban Government's "irresponsible anti-US tendency." Lafer's apparent decision not to go to Cuba seems indicative of a growing disapproval of Castro's excessive methods which is also apparent in other Latin American countries.

President Betancourt of Venezuela, one of Latin America's most respected democratic leaders, in early November criticized signs of Castro's "authoritarian rule," and told the Cuban Government that a proposed visit to Venezuela of Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara would be "inconvenient." Betancourt personally demanded the recent recall of the Cuban ambassador in Caracas for his "indiscretion and irresponsibility." The Colombian ambassador recently advised the Cuban Foreign Ministry that its toleration of activities by Colombian political exiles could seriously affect good relations between the two countries. In a message to his government, he characterized Castro's accusations against the US as ill-advised and false.

Chile's irritation over the arrival of a planeload of armed Cubans without passports or prior notification during the August meeting of the American foreign ministers in Santiago was heightened by the extradiplomatic propaganda activities of the Cuban ambassador. Guatemalan President Ydigoras was disturbed by the visit of ex-President Arevalos to Cuba at Raul Castro's invitation, and by the financial and other encouragement he believes the Castro regime has given Guatemalan opposition elements.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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