


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7 December 1960



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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7 DECEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Chinese Communist troops reportedly attacked and seized Chinese Nationalist outposts inside Burmese territory. ①

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia--President Sukarno's intention to include domestic Communist party in Djakarta government strengthened by his increasingly cordial relations with Soviet bloc. ②

Moroccan relations with West deteriorating as result of contrasting Western and Soviet positions on the Mauritania issue. ③

Congo--Lumumba's supporters continue efforts to control Orientale Province; Sudan apparently refuses transit privilege for foreign aid to Stanleyville. ④

III. THE WEST

France--Lagaillarde flight increases concern in France over possible coup attempt in Algeria. ⑤



LATE ITEM

⑥ Situation in Laos.



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 December 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - Burma: [Chinese Communist troops in late November attacked and seized Chinese Nationalist outposts inside Burmese territory, ]

[ ] Limited Burmese involvement in the action was suggested [ ]

[ ] referring to "joint efforts with the Red Chinese to fight the KMTs." The Communist troops involved are apparently those cooperating with Burmese forces to clear the border area of Nationalist guerrillas who might harass joint Sino-Burmese boundary-demarcation teams. The Nationalists may consider that the encounters with the Communists justify greater efforts to build up the irregular forces in Burma.]

(Page 1)

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia: [The increasingly cordial relations between President Sukarno and the Soviet bloc during the past six months appear to have strengthened Sukarno's intention to include the domestic Communist party in the Djakarta government. According to the US ambassador in Djakarta, factors influencing Sukarno are his belief that the United States is opposed to him personally, the Soviet Union's cultivation of him as a leader of the Afro-Asian bloc, massive Soviet economic and military aid, and his views of socialism and Western colonialism. The army leaders, when unified, have the power and the will to resist Sukarno on a sharply defined issue of Communist representation in the cabinet, but the President, by clouding this issue, may successfully outmaneuver the army.]

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Morocco: Moroccan relations with the West are deteriorating as a result of the Western position on Morocco's claims to Mauritania in contrast with the USSR's support of Rabat's position in vetoing Mauritania's application for UN membership. Morocco can be expected to intensify its effort to annex Mauritania and may be preparing to abrogate its 1 September military evacuation and base agreement with France by drawing up a long list of French "violations" of the agreements. [redacted]  
(Page 3)

Congo: Followers of ex-Premier Lumumba continue their efforts to solidify control of Orientale Province as Moscow has directed scathing criticism of Mobutu and of Western activities in the Congo. [redacted]

[redacted] "control without pity" of activities of Belgian politicians and ordered the detention of any Belgian attempting to leave the province "before the liberation of Prime Minister Lumumba." There are indications, however, that the Stanleyville Lumumbists may face difficulties in arranging delivery of large-scale foreign aid. [redacted]

[redacted] "it is not possible to guarantee the arrival (in Stanleyville) of any material or military aid via Sudan." [redacted]  
(Page 4)

### III. THE WEST

France-Algeria: Concern over a possible coup attempt, perhaps timed to coincide with President de Gaulle's scheduled arrival in Algeria on 9 December, has increased in France following the flight of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagaille to Spain. Retired Air Force Chief of Staff Edmond Jouhaud, already in Algeria, is reported linked with Lagaille as military leader of a coup. Several other generals were reported to have left their posts in France, presumably en route to Algeria; however, the only two cited by name have since reported in [redacted]. French security officials are aware of many of the rightists' plans, but they have failed to apprehend Lagaille or the four other defendants missing from the Paris trial of leaders of the January uprising in Algiers. [redacted]  
(Page 6)

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DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

LATE ITEM

[redacted]

\*Laos: Plans for a pro-Phoumi coup in Vientiane against Souvanna Phouma apparently are going ahead. General Phoumi has given his approval to the intention of Col. Kouprasith, 5th Military Region Commander in Vientiane, to move against the Souvanna Phouma regime. In addition, another group of plotters apparently is coordinating its plans for similar action with Kouprasith's adherents. [redacted] such a move is imminent. *no*

Meanwhile, Phoumi's troops are reportedly pressing their offensive again and may have reestablished a position in the Pak Ca Dinh area. [redacted]

[redacted]

7 Dec 60

DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]Chinese Communists Attack Chinese Nationalist Forces in Burma

Chinese Communist troops, perhaps in collaboration with Burmese forces, in late November attacked and seized Chinese Nationalist outposts in Burma. [REDACTED] Communist groups totaling 1,700 men penetrated as deep as 13 miles into Burma in the Burma-China-Laos border area. The Nationalists are reported to have fled without resisting. [REDACTED]

Limited Burmese involvement in the Communist action was suggested [REDACTED] joint efforts with the Red Chinese to fight the irregulars. The Chinese Communists, in any event, would probably act only with Rangoon's permission, as it is unlikely they would forfeit the propaganda advantages of the recent border treaty with Burma by taking unilateral action. [REDACTED]

The Communist troops involved are apparently those cooperating with Burmese forces to clear the border area of Nationalist guerrillas who might harass joint Sino-Burmese boundary demarcation teams. [REDACTED] Nationalist bands have in the past hampered the work of these teams, and last summer the Burmese gave Chinese Communist security forces permission to go as far as six miles inside Burma in pursuit of Nationalists. [REDACTED]

Taipei has been resupplying its irregular forces in the Burma border area with weapons and other equipment and is attempting to reorganize them into an effective military force capable of tactical missions. The Nationalists may consider that the encounters with the Communists justify greater efforts to build up the irregular forces. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Indonesian-Soviet Relations Influence Sukarno's Domestic Policy [redacted]

[The increasingly cordial relations between President Sukarno and the Soviet bloc during the past six months appear to have strengthened Sukarno's intentions to include the domestic Communist party in the cabinet, according to the American ambassador in Djakarta.]

[Sukarno's cordiality appears largely based on Khrushchev's cultivation of him as a leader of the Afro-Asian bloc and the potential head of a third force. Sukarno has accepted Khrushchev's latest invitation to visit the USSR and is expected to go there in March or April. A further influence on Sukarno has been the bloc's support for Djakarta's claim to Netherlands New Guinea and bloc credit arrangements for economic and military aid, which now total approximately \$700 million and may soon include another \$300 million. Sukarno's own views of Marxism and Western colonialism and his concept of "Indonesian socialism" are factors in his tendency to accept Moscow's flattery and general propaganda line. In contrast to his attitude toward Moscow, Sukarno appears to believe that the United States opposes him personally.]

[The army has been the principal deterrent to Sukarno's domestic maneuvers to protect and use the Communist party. The American ambassador feels that the army may have both the power and the will to resist Sukarno on this latest aspect of the Communist issue. The ambassador fears, however, that the President may blur the issue of Communist participation in the cabinet by presenting it as identical with aspects of "Indonesian socialism" which the army has already accepted. He could also weaken the army's position by rallying the country behind him on the highly charged nationalistic claim to Netherlands New Guinea and under cover of such a campaign proceed to reorganize the cabinet.] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Morocco Likely to Adhere More Closely to  
Its Nonalignment Policy

[Redacted]  
Morocco's relations with the West are deteriorating markedly as Rabat moves toward a stricter implementation of its professed policy of nonalignment. This development is partially the result of the negative Western attitude toward Morocco's claims to Mauritania as contrasted with Communist bloc support, particularly the USSR's veto of Mauritania's application for UN membership. Morocco can be expected to intensify its efforts to annex Mauritania.]

[At the same time, Morocco may be preparing to abrogate its 1 September military evacuation and base agreement with France. This agreement has been sharply criticized by the leftist opposition, which has pointedly contrasted the presence of foreign military forces in Morocco with the Congo's success in ridding its territory of Belgian forces. The first step toward a possible repudiation of the agreement is the compilation of a long list of French "violations" of the agreement. Among other things, the Moroccans claim that France maintains large stocks of munitions at their basic flight training schools and uses these schools to repair bombers engaged in Algerian operations. Although the crown prince, and presumably also the King, has approved the transfer of French military headquarters from Rabat-Salé to the jointly operated French-American naval air facility at Kenitra [Redacted]

[Redacted] there is "absolutely" no necessity for France to retain a headquarters in Morocco beyond 1 March, when all French military personnel except those connected with the operation of training facilities at six specified bases are to have been withdrawn.]

[While both the crown prince and the King have explicitly stated they would honor the King's 22 December 1959 agreement that the US might retain some forces in Morocco until the end of 1963, they may also--in line with their tougher posture toward the West--renew overtures initiated last May that American withdrawal be expedited.] [Redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~The Situation in the Congo

Followers of ex-Premier Lumumba continue their efforts to solidify control of Orientale Province, and Moscow has launched vigorous criticism of Mobutu and of Western activities in the Congo. [redacted]

[redacted] ordered the detention of any Belgian attempting to leave the province "before the liberation of Prime Minister Lumumba." Continuing its anti-Belgian line, [redacted] recipients "control without pity the activities of Belgian politicians remaining in your district. [redacted]

Press reports of raids into neighboring Equateur Province by Lumumbists in Orientale tend to confirm indications that Lumumba's adherents will attempt to expand their influence outside Orientale Province. There are other indications, however, that the Stanleyville Lumumbists may face difficulties in arranging delivery of large-scale foreign aid. [redacted] Sudanese Premier Abboud, in the course of his talks with Nasir in late November, stated that he did not favor allowing Lumumba's forces to ship material to Stanleyville through the Sudan. [redacted]

[redacted] "it is not possible to guarantee the arrival (in Stanleyville) of any material or military aid via Sudan." [redacted]

On 5 December the USSR issued an official statement on the Congo--the second in three days--which scathingly attacked NATO, Hammarskjold and the UN Command, and the "large colonial powers." Asserting that the situation has entered a new and more acute state, Moscow laid the blame entirely on alleged US interference in internal Congolese affairs. The Soviet statement voiced displeasure with those African and Asian states which "have not preserved the requisite unity" on the Congo issue and demanded that order

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

be restored in the Congo by releasing "Premier Lumumba, reinstating his legitimate government, and disarming Mo-butu's "terrorist" forces.

Despite Soviet UN delegate Zorin's insistence yesterday on a meeting of the Security Council last night, a majority of the eleven council members agreed to meet this morning to discuss Lumumba's arrest and treatment.

UN officials in New York, who lately have shown a disposition to blame UN military commander Von Horn for the shortcomings of the Congo operation, have indicated that he will be replaced shortly. Meanwhile, [redacted] Nasir may be sounding out various African nations concerning a possible troop withdrawal from the Congo. [redacted] Nasir has sent a letter dealing with "the critical Congo situation" to seven Asian-African countries with troops in the UN Congo force. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~Lagaille Flight Stirs Concern Over Imminent Coup Attempt

[Concern over a possible coup attempt has increased in France following the disappearance of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagaille, who apparently crossed the border into Spain and may be on his way to Algeria. Warrants have been issued for the arrest of Lagaille and four other defendants missing from the Paris trial of leaders of the January uprising in Algiers, but French security forces have failed to apprehend any of them. Lagaille is reported to have escaped through Spain with the aid of former Algerian commander Raoul Salan, who has been in Spain for over a month. Salan had been reported planning to go to Algeria to organize opposition to De Gaulle's referendum. Both Salan and Lagaille have been reported to be members of a group of rightists planning to set up a provisional Algerian government pledged to the integration of Algeria with France.]

[Also reported missing were several French generals--presumably en route to Algeria. Only two of these, however, Jacques Faure and Henri Mirambeau, were cited by name, and they have since reported in [redacted] as being at their posts. Another military figure linked with Lagaille is retired Air Force Chief of Staff Edmond Jouhaud, who played an important role in the May 1958 revolt and who, especially since his retirement, has openly aligned himself with the rightist forces in Algeria. Jouhaud, who now lives in Oran, is reportedly ready to assume military leadership of a coup.]

[Lagaille was released on bail almost three weeks ago. His decision to take advantage of his freedom suggests that the accelerated pace of De Gaulle's program for a referendum in Algeria may be precipitating action by opponents of the regime. Either the opening of debate on De Gaulle's Algerian program in the National Assembly on 7 December or the arrival of De Gaulle in Algeria on 9 December could spark rightist action.]

[French security forces are aware of many of the rightist plans, but have apparently been unable to restrict the activities of key plotters. The transfer of large numbers of metropolitan security and police personnel to Algeria in anticipation of rightist-initiated trouble there probably has reduced police effectiveness in France.]

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

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**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

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