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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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TOP SECRET 6 AUGUST 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR negotiating building of gift hospitals in Libya; proposal involves Soviet training of Libyan medical personnel. USSR fires unusual missile from Kapustin Yar rangehead. ② Khrushchev's latest letter to Macmillan reflects tougher, more militant, So-(3) viet policy line. II. ASIA-AFRICA Republic of Congo--Hammarskjold's request for immediate meeting of UN Security Council is effort to bring all possible international pressure on Tshombé to permit peaceable entry of UN troops into Katanga. African nationalists plan new disorders on 8 August in Salisbury area of Southern Rhodesia; may spread to other Rhodesian cities. South Vietnamese Communist guerrillas continue widespread attacks. 7 Moroccan Government rejects Spain's offer to withdraw troops by December. 1961. III. THE WEST 8 Dominican Republic -- Trujillo may stage fake coup on 7 August. TOP SECRET

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

6 August 1960

#### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Libya: A Soviet delegation arrived in Tripoli and began formal discussion on 31 July of a revised offer by Moscow to construct and equip two gift hospitals in Libya. Earlier negotiations dating back to early 1958 were stymied by the USSR's insistence that it furnish staff personnel; according to a Libyan health official, however, the new proposal involves Soviet training of Libyan medical personnel. Such an arrangement would apparently provide a way of side-stepping the issue of a permanent Soviet staff, but presumably would re-

quire the presence in Libya of Soviet medical personnel during an extended training period.

tics was fired on 3 August from Kapustin Yar possibly to an extended range. Preliminary analysis of available data indicates that the missile was apparently launched on an azimuth about 30 degrees north of the normal line of flight and traveled between 1,000 and 2,500 nautical miles. The area of impact is currently unknown. The pattern of associated practices at Kapustin Yar during July and the fact that the missile was not destroyed in flight suggest that the deviation from the normal azimuth of Kapustin Yar launch was intentional. The missile was considerably more heavily instrumented with telemetry equipment than has been customary in Kapustin Yar firings.

(See map on reverse of page.)

\*USSR-Britain: In his letter of 4 August to Prime Minister Macmillan, Khrushchev dropped the deferential treatment he previously has accorded the prime minister and sharply attacked British foreign and colonial policies. Khrushchev's letter, which reflects the tougher, more militant line that has come to dominate the conduct of Soviet policy since the collapse of the summit meeting, is intended to embarrass Macmillan and to advance broader


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objectives of weakening Allied confidence in US leadership and generating opposition to American overseas bases.

Khrushchev reaffirmed his early postsummit commitment that unilateral action on Germany and Berlin would be deferred until these questions could be discussed at another summit meeting. He recognized that such a meeting could not be convened before the American election but warned that if the West should subsequently refuse a meeting and prevent agreement, the USSR would sign a separate treaty with East Germany.

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

\*Congo-UN: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's request for an immediate meeting of the Security Council--now scheduled for 7 August--is an effort to bring all possible international pressure on Katanga Premier Tshombé to permit peaceable entry of UN forces into that province. In addition to Tshombé's threats to resist by force the UN entry, Hammarskjold was also probably influenced by reported British and Belgian advice not to push the Katanga situation "so hard." His postponement of UN troop entry pending council action will, however, subject him to increased attacks by the USSR and Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba. Meanwhile, the Belgian Government, apparently under strong pressure from both public opinion and Belgian financial interests, is hardening its support for Tshombé.

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Southern Rhodesia: African nationalists plan renewed disorders in the Salisbury area on 8 August as a protest against the trial of National Democratic party president Mawema,

Although the

demonstrations are to be centered in the African townships adjacent to Salisbury, disorders may spread to other Rhodesian cities as happened in the rioting late in July. (Page 1)

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South Vietnam: Communist guerrilla bands continue their widespread attacks. In the past few weeks bands of 400 or more have engaged regular Vietnamese army units, and on 30 July overran a village east of Saigon defended by Civil Guard and Self-Defense forces. The Vietnamese Government recently warned of the insecurity of certain key routes and has been studying the recommendations of a Malayan mission for strengthening antiterrorist operations. (Page 2)

Morocco-Spain: The Moroccan Government has rejected Spain's offer to withdraw its 3,000 troops remaining in Moroccan territory by December 1961 and insists they be pulled out by 7 April 1961,

Moroccans argue that the Republic of the Congo is demanding and obtaining immediate complete evacuation of foreign military forces. Rabat can be expected to press even more strongly than heretofore for the evacuation of French forces and demand an accelerated evacuation of the American air bases in Morocco, now scheduled to be completed in December 1963. (Page 3)

#### III. THE WEST

Dominican Republic:

a simulated coup may occur on 7 August, a date when all Dominicans have already been told to remain home to await census takers. Such a maneuver,

would be consistent with his past tactics. It would be designed to convince other Latin American governments that the regime had fallen, but the "revolutionaries" would be expected later to restore full powers to "The Benefactor." The maneuver might backfire, however, since anti-Trujillo sentiment is at an unprecedented high in the country and is believed even to be shared by key military figures.

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## Nationalist Demonstrations Threatened in Southern Rhodesia

| African nationalist disorders are planned for 8 August in the African townships adjacent to Salisbury,   |
|--|
| On that date the president of Southern Rhodesia's leading native organization, the National Democratic party, is being brought to trial on a charge of violating the Unlawful Organizations Act. It was the arrest of this leader, Michael Mawema, and several others that triggered the disturbances in July in Salisbury and Bulawayo. The rioting at that time resulted in widespread property damage in the African townships and led to about a dozen African deaths—the first caused by racial violence in Southern Rhodesia since 1896. |
| Nationalists are organizing a city-wide strike of African employees, and they plan that school children will play an important role in inciting disorders within the townships. Agitators are collecting riot funds by canvassing homes and stores.  |
| The government's Native Education Department, which discovered the plans, advised the teachers on 2 August that they would be fired if the African children did not attend school on 8 August. They were also warned that the schools would be closed indefinitely. However, the teachers responded that the fear of nationalist reprisals and pressure from nationalist-minded parents made them cooperate.   |
| African opponents of the planned disorders say that it is too late to stop the disorders; moreover, the government's ban on public meetings makes it impossible for them to address African crowds and urge moderation. The police are preparing for trouble on 8 August and intend to provide maximum security for all African townships. However, if violence breaks out in Salisbury, it is likely to spread to other areas where the National Democratic party (NDP) has branches.   |
| On 5 August, the NDP asked London to send British troops to Southern Bhodesia to ease "an explosive situation"   |
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#### Security Situation in South Vietnam

The size of Communist guerrilla bands operating in South Vietnam seems to be increasing after some tapering off of large-scale assaults with the advent of the rainy season in late March. Engagements with regular army units by guerrilla bands of up to 400 men have been reported in the past few weeks. Most recently, on 30 July, three guerrilla companies totaling 300 to 400 men, together with about 100 armed mountaineers, seized a government district office in Binh Tuy Province 70 miles east of Saigon, killing a small number of the defending Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps forces and kidnaping 34 Defense Corps members and all civilians in the village. An attack on army units in an area about 40 miles north of Saigon by an estimated 100-200 guerrillas occurred on 27 July. This activity north and east of Saigon may reflect a Communist design to relieve pressure by the Vietnamese Army on the principal areas of guerrilla activity in the southwest.]

Pravel on main roads near Saigon continues to be uncertain. Prior to the anniversary of the Geneva accords on 20 July, Vietnamese security officials warned American motorists against travel on a major route north of Saigon, as well as in certain southwestern provinces.

President Diem is reported recently to have held meetings with his top civilian and military advisers to study recommendations for strengthening antiterrorist operations submitted by the Malayan defense mission which visited South Vietnam in April. Diem has indicated particular interest in proposals to improve the army's communications network and to centralize intelligence collection. The mission also recommended that military operations be coordinated with psychological warfare and rural development programs.

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### Morocco Presses for Spanish Troop Withdrawal by April

|   | The Moroccan Government has rejected Spain's offer to withdraw its 3,000 troops from Moroccan territory by the end of 1961 and is demanding that these forces be pulled out by 7 April, fifth anniversary of Spain's agreement to Moroccan unity and independence,  The Spanish foreign minister had claimed on 2 August that Madrid had Morocco's consent to the offer, which would not have included the 23,000 Spanish troops now stationed in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The Moroccans argue,  that because the Republic of the Congo is demanding and obtaining immediate complete evacuation of foreign military forces, Morocco can accept no   |
|---|--|
|   | less than total evacuation at a very early date.   |
|   | the Moroccan Government has in effect embargoed trade with Spain by refusing in recent weeks to grant any import permits. Although Spain has responded in kind, it will be more difficult for Madrid to restore normal trade when the embargo is lifted because Spain imports only phosphates and iron ore from Morocco, whereas the latter imports a wide variety of Spanish commodities. Under a 1957 commercial agreement, Morocco is obligated to import annually for four years \$13,500,000 more in Spanish goods than the value of Moroccan products sold to Spain in order to provide capital for Spanish investment in Morocco. Morocco has not lived up to this agreement, however, in fact maintaining a credit with Spain in both 1958 and 1959. |
| 1 | In view of Morocco's adamant stand with regard to Spanish evacuation, Rabat can be expected to intensify its efforts to seek the early withdrawal of the [15,000 to 20,000] French troops now in Morocco. It will probably also seek to accelerate the withdrawal of American troops, now slated to be completed in December 1963.   |
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# Simulated Coup Against Trujillo Reportedly Planned For 7 August

| Dominican dictator Trujillo may be planning a                   |   |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|
| coup on 7 August to convince other Latin American               |   |  |  |  |  |
| that his regime has fallen. Dominicans have been                | told to remain  |  |  |  |  |
| home on that date to await census takers. Such a                | plan,   |  |  |  |  |
| would be consistent with Trujillo's                             |   |  |  |  |  |
|   | past tactics. A group of army officers would oust newly installed |  |  |  |  |
| President Balaguer and seize power, perhaps prev                |   |  |  |  |  |
| member of the clergy to participate in the resulting junta. The |   |  |  |  |  |
| "revolutionary" government would send delegates                 | to the OAS  |  |  |  |  |
| foreign ministers' meeting claiming that the Trujillo regime    |   |  |  |  |  |
| had been overthrown. In reality, however, Trujillo would hope   |   |  |  |  |  |
| to maintain control of the government from behind the scenes,   |   |  |  |  |  |
| resuming full powers openly at a time of his choose             |   |  |  |  |  |
|   | 91118   |  |  |  |  |
|   |   |  |  |  |  |
| 2   | coup was  |  |  |  |  |
| imminent. Preparations for such a ma                            |   |  |  |  |  |
| suggested Treparations for such a ma                            | meuver are  |  |  |  |  |
| warning commanders to int                                       | condify patrolling  |  |  |  |  |
| of coastal sectors and to maintain a state of alert             |   |  |  |  |  |
| from 4 to 9 August.   | uay and night   |  |  |  |  |
| chiefs of all radio stations to maintain p                      |   |  |  |  |  |
| service until further orders.                                   | per manent  |  |  |  |  |
| service until further orders.                                   |   |  |  |  |  |
| A "controlled coup" might backfire, since anti                  | -Truiillo conti-  |  |  |  |  |
| ment is at an unprecedented high in the country an              |   |  |  |  |  |
|   | u is believed   |  |  |  |  |
| even to have reached key military figures.                      |   |  |  |  |  |
| Thuisillala annointerant on 4 Assesset to be a 14b              | Damidalaa   |  |  |  |  |
| Trujillo's appointment on 4 August to head the                  |   |  |  |  |  |
| delegation to the United Nations' session beginning             | 20 September  |  |  |  |  |
| does not necessarily mean his loss of control. Tr               | ujillo has  |  |  |  |  |
| gone abroad before and on one occasion his depart               |   |  |  |  |  |
| lowed by a particularly bloody period of repression             | n. The date   |  |  |  |  |
| of his departure has not been announced.                        |   |  |  |  |  |
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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

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