

#### 7 NOVEMBER 1960

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq--Leftist mob and police clash in Baghdad on 5 November; riot area still under heavy guard on 6 November.

Opposition to Sudanese military regime continuing to spread, with dissident army elements rumored planning an early coup.(2)

3

Situation in the Congo.

#### III. THE WEST

De Gaulle's 4 November speech deepens rightist apprehension, tempers leftist impatience over Algerian issue.


Argentine general strike scheduled to begin today may produce some disturbances.(5)

El Salvador--Army officers, apprehensive over leftist gains in provisional government, reportedly plan early countercoup.



#### LATE ITEM

Soviet and Chinese spokesmen on eve of October Revolution anniversary celebrations indicate neither side has retreated from its positions in Sino-Soviet dispute.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

JTOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806

7 November 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq: A clash between a pro-Communist mob and Iraqi police and army units took place in central Baghdad on the afternoon and evening of 5 November. The incident grew out of protest demonstrations by trade unionists, leftist student groups, and other Communist sympathizers--elements which have become increasingly disposed to challenge any government actions not in their favor. The area was still under firm military control on the morning of 6 November; concentrations of troops, tanks, and armored cars were the largest noted in Baghdad since the 14 July anniversary celebration of the Qasim revolution. This new display of Communist militancy may be a further stimulus to an early move by anti-Communist army officer and civilian groups who have been plotting Qasim's overthrow.

Sudan: Opposition to the Abboud military regime has continued to spread among influential civilian groups, and reports are circulating in Khartoum that dissident army elements will soon attempt a coup. The government is intensifying its domestic security precautions. In a special effort to assure the safety of UAR President Nasir, who is scheduled to begin a ten-day state visit on 15 November, the regime, is ac-

ceding to Cairo's request that anti-Nasir agents from Jordan and other Middle East states be prevented from entering the Sudan. (Page 1)

i

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806

TOP SECRET

Republic of the Congo: The debate in the United Nations debte with the this week on an eight-nation Afro-Asian resolution to seat a borradari Lumumba's delegation may be expanded by African delegates to Jun P & (from usual to

3rd sent in P3

0K

Jinah

OK

Linclude the entire Congo issue. The presence of President Kasavubu, the only Congolese leader whose position is acknowledged by all parties, may help resolve the seating issue.

Meanwhile, tension is increasing in Orientale Province, where Lumumba's Deputy Premier Gizenga has been organizing pro-Lumumba forces. Press reports say that Gizenga has gone underground and that troops loyal to Mobutu will be sent to Stanleyville, the provincial capital.

Lumumba forces	in t	he	area	may	have	received	arms	from
Czechoslovakia.						(Page	2)	

#### III. THE WEST

France: The initial reaction in France to De Gaulle's 4 November speech has followed established patterns, with a slight tempering of leftist impatience and a definite deepening of rightist apprehension. There is some speculation that De Gaulle's reference to a possible unilateral cease-fire means he may tacitly accede to discussions of political guarantees with the rebels. The hostility of the majority of the European community in Algeria, has been reinforced, but Moslems, though reluctant to comment, seemed generally satisfied. The military found comfort in De Gaulle's renewed assurance that the army would remain in Algeria during a self-determination referendum. No official reaction is expected from the rebels before the Algerian provisional government's plenary session, scheduled to open in Tunis on 7 November. (Page 4)

Argentina: The general strike scheduled to begin on 7 November to protest President Frondizi's veto of a law increasing severance pay will be the first endorsed by all sectors of the Argentine labor movement since Peron's ouster in

7 Nov 60

#### DAILY BRIEF

ii

OK

NU

<u>TOP SECRET</u>

1955. Although Frondizi and Economy Minister Alsogaray believe the strike will be orderly and limited to 24 hours, there may be some disturbances. There are still unresolved problems growing out of the mid-October political crisis, and in late October there was labor violence in Cordoba. (Page 5)

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806

**TOP SECRET** 

OK delete. El Salvador: The army is becoming increasingly appre-PI, last sent, hensive over the failure of ex-President Osorio, who masterminded the coup that ousted the Lemus regime on 26 October, to head off a strong bid for power by Communists and "fr other pro-Castro leftists in the new provisional government. Osorio, whose control over the situation appears to have weak-TP 2. C ened, told a US Embassy officer on 3 November that he cannot consider restrictive action against the extreme left--he de-t nies Communists are in the government--lest the unity the pro-up to visional regime needs to implement urgent social and economic' most changes be disrupted.] A group of officers claiming a large arappearintly my following reportedly is considering an early countercoup. Most Latin American countries have not recognized the provi-Dolete sional government and apparently are delaying action pending  $\mathcal{P}_{3,4} \mathcal{P}^4$ further developments. (Page 6)

#### LATE ITEM


\*Communist Bloc: Statements by Soviet and Chinese leaders on the eve of the October Revolution anniversary indicate that neither side has retreated from its previously held positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Soviet presidium member Kozlov, in his keynote address yesterday for the celebrations in Moscow, advanced the usual Soviet claims of achievements both at home and abroad, with no new departures from standard Soviet policy positions. Stressing the validity of Moscow's peaceful coexistence line, Kozlov reaffirmed, in moderate terms, the Soviet stand on points at issue with China and claimed that the USSR's position had been "confirmed by the course of events." In a statement

7 Nov 60

#### DAILY BRIEF

iii

CK-



evidently directed at the Chinese, he declared the Soviet party remained "irreconcilable to any revisionist distortion or dogmatic deadening" of Communist theory. Probably prefiguring the position the Soviet party will take in the inter-party discussions, Kozlov stressed the need for bloc unity, but asserted that unity depended on the ability of all parties to understand and apply doctrine in the "new historical situation." Since the USSR has been claiming it has been successful, and China has failed, in "creatively applying" Marxism-Leninism, Kozlov appeared to be implying that Chinese willingness to drop "dogmatic" thinking and accept Soviet changes in doctrine is vital for preserving "unity."

On the same day in Peiping, Chinese spokesmen also reaffirmed their commitment to bloc unity and peaceful coexistence, but coupled these affirmations with statements that underscored their differences with Moscow. Foreign Minister Chen I, in a major speech, characterized as "the most important universal truth of Marxism-Leninism" the assertion that Communism can come to power only through "revolutionary means." In an article published on 6 November, Madame Sun Yat-sen, chairman of China's Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, also stated "we must preserve the purity of Marism-Leninism against the assaults of modern revisionists" and the Communists must "mainly rely" on struggle to defeat the West. These strong statements suggest that Peiping will hold to its dogmatic positions during the discussions held by the Communist leaders now meeting in Moscow. The Chinese stress on bloc unity, however, suggests the Chinese may yet hope for agreement in Moscow on a communiqué, at least one such as that arrived at in Bucharest in June which left the points at issue still unresolved.

7 Nov 60

#### DAILY BRIEF

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806

 $\tau \partial P$ 

iv

Influential Sudanese political and religious groups are attempting to spread and unify their opposition to the Abboud military regime. They are exploiting the regime's highly unpopular decision, announced on 23 October, on the resettlement of some 50,000 residents of the Wadi Halfa area, which will be flooded when construction on the UAR's Aswan High Dam reaches an advanced stage. During the past two weeks, army and police units have been called on to put down riots or break up demonstrations in most of the larger cities and towns:

Reports are circulating in Khartoum that dissident army elements plan a coup attempt soon. The source of one such report is the colonel who commands the important Gordon's Tree garrison in Khartoum.

The regime continues to maintain the police and army alert instituted in late October. As in a similar situation some months ago, army headquarters has informed subordinate commands that no officer with the rank of major or above is to come to Khartoum without giving notification at least 24 hours in advance.

Hasan Bashir Nasir, deputy commander in chief of the army,

suggesting he advance his scheduled arrival time at Khartoum airport--presumably to avoid the possibility of an incident.

UAR authorities, as well as the Sudanese regime, are extremely concerned over the security problems connected with UAR President Nasir's tenday state visit, scheduled to begin on 15 November. Cairo has suggestions for avoiding demonstrations and for holding down the size of receptions for him. The Sudanese Government, moreover, is cooperating with the UAR to prevent entry into the Sudan of suspected anti-Nasir agents from Jordan and other Middle Eastern states.



7 Nov 60 Clapproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806Page 1

#### Republic of the Congo

There is a strong likelihood that the United Nations debate this week, originally intended to deal only with an eight-power Afro-Asian resolution to seat Lumumba's "delegation," will develop into a debate on UN special representative Dayal's report on the Congo situation. Such an expanded debate could result in a strong attack on Belgium.

The presence of President Kasavubu may facilitate a solution of the seating issue;

Kasavubu, the only Congolese political leader whose position is acknowledged by everyone, might create a good impression as a quiet, sensible man. In view of Kasavubu's past proclivity toward inaction, however, he may not be effective in the UN climate.

Recent events in the Congo, meanwhile, have tended to increase the confusion, and there is rising apprehension among Congolese leaders that the UN intends to form a trusteeship. Tension is increasing in Orientale Province, where Lumumba's deputy premier, Antoine Gizenga, has been organizing pro-Lumumba forces--reportedly with considerable success.

There is increasing evidence that supplies from Czechoslovakia, possibly including arms, have reached Lumumba supporters in Stanleyville. Press reports state that Gizenga has gone underground and that troops loyal to Mobutu will be sent to Stanleyville.

Eleven deputies and senators, held under arrest by pro-Lumumba forces in Stanleyville since 15 October, have reportedly been seriously mistreated.

the UN's inability to effect their release casts doubt on the argument that parliament can be made to function in an atmosphere free from intimidation.

A UN spokesman in Leopoldville announced on 5 November that Baluba tribal leader Jason Sendwe met with "great success"

-SECRET fOP

7 Nov 60

CENTRAL INTELLICENCE BILLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806

Page 2

during his trip last week to Katanga Province, where he hoped to "pacify" Baluba terrorists and thereby weaken the support of Katangan President Tshombé. The trip was made under UN escort, and Tshombé had threatened to use force to prevent it. So far, however, there has been little real evidence that Sendwe was successful in any action that would lead to tribal peace.

-<del>SECRET</del> <del>TOP</del>

7 Nov 60

CEApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806 Page 3

# Reactions to r-Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806

The initial reaction in France to De Gaulle's 4 November speech on Algeria has followed established patterns, with a slight tempering of leftist impatience and a definite deepening of rightist apprehension. George Bidault summed up the rightist reaction: "Unacceptable!" On the left, the most noteworthy reaction is Guy Mollet's basically favorable comment. Parliamentary spokesmen have expressed alarm over De Gaulle's reference to wider presidential powers, but the American Embassy in Paris expects the clear relationship he established between the need for national unity and the solution of the Algerian problem to calm most of the deputies.

There is some speculation that De Gaulle's reference to a possible unilateral cease-fire by France means he may tacitly accede to discussions of political guarantees with the rebels. He continues to insist that hostilities must cease before political negotiations can begin, but he probably hopes the rebels will respond. The Algerian provisional government will probably insist on some concrete evidence of good faith before accepting French assurances of political concessions. French rightist extremists will be alert to any ceasefire initiative, and any coup now in prospect might follow such an initiative.

While the French military found comfort in De Gaulle's renewed assurance that the army would remain in Algeria for a referendum on self-determination, "activist" officers can be expected to take an increasingly antagonistic attitude toward De Gaulle.

The hostility of the majority of the European community in Algeria has been reinforced, but Moslems, who were reluctant to comment, seemed generally satisfied. No official reaction to De Gaulle's speech is expected from the rebels before the plenary session which the provisional government has scheduled opens in Tunis on 7 November. The rebels are expected to stick to the hard line they have adopted, in view of the more favorable international position promises of bloc support have provided. They will be under some pressure from Morocco and Tunisia to explore any French overtures, however, because of the apprehension of all North African states over the threat of Communist influence in the area.

## -CONFIDENTIAL

7 Nov 60

CEApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806 Page 4

### Argentine General Strike Called for 7 November

A general strike, to begin on 7 November in protest of President Frondizi's veto of a law passed on 30 September increasing severance pay, will be the first strike to be endorsed by all sectors of the Argentine labor movement since Peron's ouster in 1955. Anti-Peronista labor leaders have called strikes on their own since 1955, but they have refused to cooperate in the Peronistas' strikes, which frequently were called for political reasons.

The vetoed law would have raised severance payments from the current maximum of about \$12 for a year of service to between \$30 and \$60, depending on skill. Both government and business officials consider this too large an increase for the economic recovery program to support; labor leaders, however, protest that it is too small.

Although Frondizi and Economy Minister Alsogaray believe the strike will be orderly and limited to 24 hours, some disturbances may occur. There are still unresolved problems growing out of the mid-October crisis, which was precipitated by army complaints over certain of Frondizi's advisers and policies. Frondizi is trying to keep his economic program intact, but he has agreed to some recommendations by the military, including the recent request that Soviet bloc diplomatic missions in Buenos Aires reduce their personnel to the level maintained by Argentina in the bloc.

Other unrest stems from the recent brief strikes in Cordoba and Mar del Plata, which were considered the worst labor violence the Frondizi administration has encountered. The government, however, is empowered to use a state of siege and other special security measures to maintain order.

## <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>

Military Plans to Counter Communist Bid for bewer

## In El Salvador

The Salvadoran Army is becoming increasingly apprehensive over the failure of ex-President Oscar Osorio, who masterminded the coup that ousted the Lemus regime on 26 October, to head off a strong bid for power by Communists and other pro-Castro leftists in the new provisional government. It is reliably reported that Osorio has lost control over the situation and that the growing number of leftists in government jobs will make it difficult "to clean house" without strong military measures. A group of officers claiming widespread support from army units is preparing a countercoup, which may be attempted immediately.

Several leftist cabinet members and the three civilians on the six-man junta moved quickly to consolidate their positions by appointing numerous pro-Communists and suspected Communists to key subordinate posts. A military member of the junta told a US Embassy officer on 3 November that most of the initiative in political matters had been conceded to the civilians, who are probably not responsive to Osorio's direction.

Osorio said restrictive measures against the extreme left--he denies there are Communists in the government--cannot be considered at this time, since such action would disrupt the unity the provisional government must have in order to implement urgently needed social and economic changes.

The new government already has been recognized by Spain, Ecuador, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala However, President Villeda Morales of Honduras, where Fidel Castro has a small but vocal following, indicated his concern on 4 November to the US Embassy at Tegucigalpa.] A pro-Communist takeover in El Salvador would also have very serious implication for the stability of Guatemala--where Communists reportedly are plotting a coup with other leftist groups against President Ydigoras--as well as for the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. Most other Latin American countries appear to be delaying recognition pending further developments.

7 Nov 60 CEApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806 Page 6

#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman


National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

#### CONFIDENTIAL



Release: 2020/03/13 C02977806