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23 May 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

# INTELLIGENCE


# BULLETIN



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23 MAY 1960

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Khrushchev's failure to make customary major speech at a "welcome-home" rally probably reflects decision to take further political soundings before making any new moves. ①


Bloc now may be prepared to supply Cuba at least token deliveries of arms. ②

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Djakarta demands Peiping stop anti-Indonesian broadcasts; Indonesian intercepts show Djakarta considering withdrawing its consul from Shanghai. (TOP SECRET DAUNT) ③

Ceylon's United National party faces stiff fight with three-party united front in elections scheduled for 20 July. ④

Nasir apparently inviting showdown with present Baathist leaders by sponsoring formation of new international Baathist organization. ⑤



⑥ Protest march by Turkish cadets may mark beginning of more serious new phase in Turkish internal situation.

⑦ Mali officials reportedly discover network involving French officers for smuggling arms from Mali to opponents of Touré in Guinea.

**III. THE WEST**

⑧ Icelandic cabinet minister says Iceland will withdraw from NATO if British naval vessels again enter country's 12-mile limit.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 May 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: Khrushchev's failure to make the customary major speech to a "welcome-home" rally in Moscow probably reflects a decision to take further political soundings both inside and outside the bloc before making any new moves. Soviet propaganda has echoed his generally moderate speech in Berlin, while the Chinese Communists--who have not disguised their opposition to a moderate policy--have not yet reacted to it.

Mikoyan's continued absence from Moscow seems a further indication of his loss of influence. [redacted]

Czechoslovakia-Cuba: The Soviet bloc now may be prepared to supply Cuba with at least token deliveries of arms. On 12 May the head of the Technical Directorate of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Trade which handles Czech exports of military equipment and which is involved in the bloc's arms deals with nonbloc countries was issued Cuban visas for himself and several other Czech trade officials. These Czechs may participate in the talks now being held in Havana between a Czech commercial delegation and the Cuban Government.

[redacted] (Page 1)

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia - Communist China: Indonesia's stiff protest note of 21 May to Communist China, demanding the cessation of anti-Indonesian broadcasts over Radio Peiping, follows on the heels of Djakarta's request that two Chinese Communist consuls be withdrawn from Sumatra and Borneo because of interference with the Chinese repatriation program. The Chinese leaders, who show no inclination to end their intervention in the repatriation program, will probably reject the protest and

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continue their propaganda attacks on Djakarta for its "persecution" of Overseas Chinese. [redacted]

[redacted] Diakarta is considering withdrawing its consul in Shanghai. [redacted]

Ceylon: The united front formed by three important parties for the national elections scheduled for 20 July will make it difficult for Ceylon's relatively conservative United National party (UNP) to retain even the plurality it won in the elections this past March. Candidate statistics released on 20 May confirm the existence of a previously reported no-contest agreement between these three parties, two of which are leftist. The UNP faces a straight contest with the front for over a third of the 151 elective seats. In many constituencies, the combined vote of the front parties last March was greater than that given the UNP.

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[redacted] (Page 2)

UAR: Nasir appears to have invited a showdown with the present leadership of the influential, pan-Arab Baathist party by openly sponsoring the formation of a new international Baathist organization. The Damascus press last week announced the formation of a new "provisional" Baathist organization headed by a Jordanian, Abdallah al-Rimawi, who was expelled from the older Baathist party last year. Nasir apparently feels confident that despite his suppression of the older Baathist party's activity in the UAR, he retains sufficient following among the party's membership to gain control of its nationalist activities elsewhere in the Arab world. [redacted] (Page 3)

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Turkey: [The situation in Turkey appears to have entered a more serious new phase with the protest march of military cadets in Ankara on 21 May. This demonstration, the first by a military unit since the initial outbreaks last month, was sparked by reports of police brutality against army officers. Other reports have emphasized a growing antagonism between the police and the army in both Ankara and Istanbul. It seems certain that the pressure on Premier Menderes will increase, even from within his own party.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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[for the removal of certain officials and even for his own resignation. Menderes, however, appears confident that he continues to enjoy the support of the rural population, and he may misjudge the extent of opposition to his government in the cities and within the military.] (Page 4)

Mali-Guinea-France: [Officials of the Mali Government reportedly have discovered a network organized by French military officers and African elements for smuggling arms from Mali to opponents of President Touré in Guinea. Mali officials are likely to regard such a discovery as confirmation of Touré's charges of a French-controlled plot against Guinea, and the sympathy of moderate Malians for France may be seriously weakened.]

In Guinea, pro-Soviet elements are reported exploiting the alleged plot in an effort to draw Guinea closer to the bloc.]

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### III. THE WEST

Iceland-Britain: [Iceland's Justice Minister Benediktsson has categorically declared to US Ambassador Thompson that Iceland will withdraw from NATO if British naval vessels re-enter the 12-mile fishing limit established by Reykjavik in 1958. Because of Benediktsson's influential position and his straightforwardness in past dealings with the US Embassy, Thompson believes his statement must be taken seriously. The British Trawler Federation announced on 12 May that it would respect the 12-mile limit for the next three months. A British Foreign Office official has privately stated London would find it difficult to deny the trawlers Royal Navy protection should they return within the 12-mile limit.]

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Bloc May Be Preparing to Provide Military Aid to Cuba

[redacted] the Soviet bloc may be prepared to supply Cuba with at least token deliveries of arms. On 11 May, soon after talks opened in Havana between a Czech commercial mission and the Cuban Government, the head of the Chief Technical Directorate of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Trade requested Cuban visas for himself and several other Czech trade officials. The Technical Directorate handles Czech exports of military equipment and is involved in the bloc's arms deals with nonbloc countries. On 12 May the Cuban Foreign Ministry issued the visas, and presumably the Czechs will be available to participate in the negotiations now under way in Havana for a trade and credit agreement.

Castro's intense desire to obtain jet aircraft led to earlier Cuban attempts to procure military equipment from the bloc, but so far all such efforts have been unsuccessful. The visit of the Czech delegation at this time suggests the bloc now may be willing to provide military items not available from Western sources.

Since Mikoyan's visit to Cuba last February, bloc activity in Cuba has increased sharply. Total bloc sugar purchases for 1960 have risen to 1,340,000 tons, Soviet oil and other raw materials have begun to arrive in Cuba, and new commercial agreements have been signed with Poland and East Germany, in addition to the trade and credit pacts with the USSR. [redacted]

[redacted] ten Soviet technicians are en route to Cuba, probably to begin preliminary planning for projects under the \$100,000,000 Soviet line of credit. [redacted]

[redacted]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Conservative Party in Ceylon Faces Hard Election Fight Against United Front

The electoral agreement among three of Ceylon's major political parties for the parliamentary elections on 20 July will make it difficult for the relatively conservative United National party (UNP) to retain even the slight plurality it won in the national elections in March. The list of candidates released on 20 May indicates that 57 of the UNP's 128 candidates will face straight contests in the balloting for 151 elective seats. In March, when the UNP won 50 seats, the vote was divided among at least three contestants in all but one constituency. The number of candidates then totaled 898, compared with approximately 393 nominated for the new elections.

The second-ranking Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP), a moderately socialist group which won 46 seats in March, on 6 May entered into a no-contest agreement with the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj party (LSSP), holder of ten seats in the present Parliament. The nominations now published confirm that the SLFP will be uncontested by the LSSP in 98 constituencies and will not run against the LSSP in 21. The Communist party, which also participated in the no-contest agreement, apparently will not be opposed by the other two parties in most of the seven seats it is contesting.

Only two of the remaining ten parties are represented by a substantial number of candidates. The Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, led by leftist politician Philip Gunawardena, is entering 55, and the Federal party, leading organization of the Tamil minority, is putting up 21 candidates.

The threat posed for the UNP by the new electoral alignment is underscored by the fact that in most of the constituencies where either the SLFP, LSSP, or Communist party placed second to the winning UNP candidate in the March election, the combined vote of these parties was considerably larger than that of the UNP.

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## Nasir Challenges Leadership of Baathists

UAR President Nasir appears to have challenged the traditional leadership of the strong, pan-Arab Baathist party for control of the party's activities throughout the Arab world. A new top-level "provisional" group for reorganization of the party was announced in Damascus on 18 May--a move which almost certainly had Nasir's approval. The Damascus group, composed of pro-Nasir Baathists and headed by former party leader Abdallah al-Rimawi, a Jordanian who was expelled from the party last fall, reportedly was chosen by delegates from various Arab countries. Its objective apparently is to displace the old leadership in Beirut.

[redacted] the initiation of a press campaign against Michel Aflaq, Syrian head of the party and its top theoretician, who is in virtual exile in Beirut. [redacted]

After its founding in 1954, the Baathist (Arab Socialist Renaissance) party strongly backed Nasir's Arab nationalist policies. Its top leadership, however, became divided over the issue of continued cooperation with the UAR President when party activities in Egypt and Syria were banned following union of the two regions in 1958. The ban was the direct cause of the alienation between Nasir and former UAR Vice President Akram Hawrani, one of the party's founders whose activities now are closely watched by Syrian security men.

Nasir apparently feels that, despite his suppression of the older Baathist party's activity in the UAR, he still retains sufficient international following among the party's membership to gain control of its nationalist activities elsewhere in the Arab world. [redacted]

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Turkish Internal Situation 

[The march of Turkish military cadets through the streets of Ankara on 21 May, apparently in support of the recent student demonstrations against the government's repressive policies, is a blow to Premier Menderes' regime. This development, the most serious so far in the current political unrest, is the first open indication of dissatisfaction among army elements and will encourage both students and other opposition groups. Recent reports have also indicated that lower and middle-grade army officers are taking an increasingly active role in civilian-directed street demonstrations.]

[The 21 May demonstration followed reports that an army colonel, father of one of the cadets, had been beaten by police while watching a student demonstration against the government on 20 May. There have been other reports in recent days of minor brushes between the police and army which probably have resulted in the growth of considerable hostility. The participants in antigovernment demonstrations repeatedly have shown respect and even friendship toward army troops sent to disperse them but have indicated open hostility toward the police.]

[A crowd of civilians who followed the cadets in their march also demonstrated later and called for the resignation of Minister of Interior Namik Gedik and Director General of the National Police Cemal Goktan. Premier Menderes previously has been reported contemplating the removal of both men, and the pressure within his own Democratic party (DP) for such a step will probably increase. The participation of elements of the armed forces in demonstrations may give anti-Menderes leaders within the DP the incentive to demand that the premier also step down.]

[Menderes, however, is reported reassured of popular support by his recent trip through Turkey's Aegean provinces. It now appears likely that he will misjudge this basically rural support for nationwide endorsement of his policies and refuse to compromise with his opposition both within and outside his party. It is doubtful that his recent promises of "early" elections will be enough to prevent continued demonstrations against his government despite stringent preventive measures such as those taken in Ankara on 22 May; these banned the congregation of more than five persons without written license.]

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Arms-Smuggling Network Directed Against Guinea Regime Reported Exposed in Mali

[African authorities in Mali--the federation of Senegal and Soudan which is scheduled to become sovereign within the French Community next month--reportedly have uncovered in Senegal an arms-smuggling network aimed at the overthrow of Guinea President Sekou Touré's authoritarian regime. ]

[French military, Senegalese, and dissident Guinean elements all are involved in the network which has been engaged in infiltrating by truck into northern Guinea arms from French Army depots in Senegal. The arms are said to have been distributed among anti-Touré Guineans who formerly served in the French Army and were repatriated after Guinea became independent in 1958. ]

[pro-Touré Guinean students in Dakar who are in close touch with Conakry were largely responsible for the exposure of the network.]

[Since last month Touré has been preoccupied with the suppression of antiregime elements. Some of these elements appear merely to have favored the establishment of an overt opposition party, while others--reportedly including local Lebanese and non-official French residents--apparently hoped to launch a coup. Touré's public response to the situation has from the beginning been designed to distract attention from the discontent which has been growing in Guinea for some time by concentrating on allegations that France and "African traitors" had mounted a counter-revolutionary plot against his regime from neighboring Senegal and Ivory Coast. On 3 May, Radio Guinea announced that 25 persons had been arrested in connection with the seizure of a cache of arms and munitions in Guinea near the Senegalese border; subsequently, Senegalese authorities disclosed the discovery of other caches in two villages on the Senegalese side of the frontier.]

[Leading members of the influential pro-Soviet clique in the regime's hierarchy are reported to be exploiting the alleged plot in an effort to induce Touré to establish closer ties with the bloc.]

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[The government-controlled news media, whose output may be influenced by bloc "advisers" in Guinea, already have embarked on a campaign which appears designed to arouse the masses against the West in general, including the United States.]

[In Mali, meanwhile, officials are likely to regard the reported arms network as confirmation of Touré's charges against the French. As a result, Senegalese leaders, most of whom have heretofore favored close ties with France after Mali becomes independent, now may be more inclined to yield to influential Soudanese elements who already have a predilection for ties with the bloc.]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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## III. THE WEST

Icelandic Official Threatens Withdrawal From NATO If British Navy Resumes Fisheries Patrol

[During an informal discussion of the Icelandic-British fisheries dispute, Iceland's Minister of Justice Benediktsson told US Ambassador Thompson that the Icelandic Government "with his support and on his initiative" would withdraw from NATO if British naval vessels resume patrolling within Iceland's 12-mile fishing limits. The ambassador comments that Benediktsson's statement must be taken seriously in view of his influential position within both the government and the governing Conservative party and his straightforwardness in past dealings with the embassy.]

[Benediktsson's remarks reflect the concern of the Conservative - Social Democratic government that it would not be able to resist the public clamor for drastic steps if the dispute resumes, particularly since Iceland's efforts to enforce respect for the 12-mile fishing limits, which it proclaimed unilaterally in 1958, have not been notably successful. Furthermore, the government, which already is somewhat on the defensive with the implementation of its sweeping economic reform program, is increasingly being forced to compete with the Communists and other groups which accuse it of selling out Iceland's interests on this important issue.]

[Britain seeks to avoid recurrence of the situation under which British trawlers for 18 months operated in the disputed waters under naval protection, and hopes that a compromise settlement can be negotiated. On 12 May the British Trawler Federation announced that it would respect Iceland's 12-mile fishing limit for three months, as it had been doing since mid-March when the Law of the Sea Conference convened in what proved to be an unsuccessful effort to reach international agreement on territorial waters and fishing limits. There remains considerable pressure within the British fishing industry for assertion of British rights on the high seas, however, and a Foreign Office official has stated that if the trawlers return within the 12-mile limit, it would be difficult to deny them naval protection.]

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