



25 NOVEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

<u>Pravda</u> editorial reiterating Soviet position indicates continuing inability to resolve Sino-Soviet dispute.

Incidents on Tibet-Sikkim border, allegedly involving sniping by Chinese troops, will further exacerbate Sino-Indian relations, but probably not deliberately engineered by Peiping. (2)


Vietnamese Communists receive belated orders to exploit "advantageous" situation in South Vietnam following the abortive 11 November coup against Diem.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Situation in Laos.

Thailand--Premier Sarit investigating wave of coup rumors.

UAR--Unprecedented display of Syrian friendliness toward the US may reflect a desire for US economic aid.



III. THE WEST

- (7) Appointment of new top French civil officials in Algeria expected to stiffen rightist opposition there; civil "total disobedience" reportedly being planned.
- Bolivian President claims he will hand over presidency to vice president--a leftist labor leader--if US economic aid is not granted.

Haiti--Student strike does not now threaten regime; drastic police action, however, could lead to widespread rioting.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-China: In apparent reply to the 21 November People's Daily editorial which presented the familiar Chinese arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Pravda on 23 November also editorialized on the declaration which followed the meeting of bloc leaders in 1957. It selected for emphasis, however, those aspects of the declaration--for example, on peaceful coexistence and the preventability of war--which correspond to present Soviet positions. This continuation of open discussion between the Soviet and Chinese parties while international Communist leaders are still meeting in Moscow indicates that they have been unable to resolve their disagreements and suggests that they have found it difficult to formulate a communique which will satisfy both parties. The moderate tone of the Pravda editorial, however, would appear to presage the probable nature of any communique which may result--one placing heaviest emphasis on the majority Soviet view but so worded that the Chinese can sign it and continue to claim that their views (Page 1) are valid.

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<u>Communist China - India</u>: Relations between Peiping and New Delhi will be further exacerbated by several recent incidents in which Indian soldiers were killed or wounded on the Tibet-Sikkim border, allegedly by Chinese Communist snipers. Peiping has been pressing New Delhi for substantive border negotiations, and it seems unlikely that the incidents represent a premediated effort by Peiping to precipitate new clashes with the Indians. Chinese troops are in the area, however, probably attempting to check the re-entry of Tibetan rebels gathered in Sikkim. New Delhi, apprehensive about its defense position in Sikkim, has recently augmented and alerted Indian troops in the area. 7 (Page 3)



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North - South Vietnam:

the Communists were slow to react to the 11 November attempt against President Diem and still were not clear on some details nine days later, the

Communists now hope to capitalize on the post-coup situation. recent North

Vietnamese directives, interpret the coup as symptomatic of the difficulties besetting Diem and the resulting situation as "very advantageous for us," call for political agitation to exploit dissension in the South, and repeat orders for political assassination of "cruel individuals." In addition they directed that help be given the escaping participants in the coup--some of whom may still be at large--in the hope that they might be useful in the Communist effort to create a united front of elements dedicated to ousting Diem. (Page 4)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

*Laos: A mixed force of troops under the control of Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao, consisting of more than six companies, is reported to be advancing along routes leading to Luang Prabang. One column evidently departed from Muong Kassy on 23 November, followed by a larger force on 24 November. Luang Prabang is some 55 miles distant from Muong Kassy, over difficult country, and an unopposed route march might require about four days.

itary headquarters in Savannakhet ordered the pro-Phoumi force in Luang Prabang to organize the perimeter defenses of the town, including guerrilla activity in the surrounding vicinity. Also Phoumi-controlled forces were ordered to commence pressure operations against Vientiane.

Souvanna Phouma, while he denied to the American ambassador on 23 November that he had actually given an order to attack Luang Prabang, has been active on other fronts. On 23 November he announced that within three or four days, the Soviet Union would begin airlifting food and gasoline to Vientiane 7

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via Hanoi. On the same day, his government made a formal request to the American ambassador in Vientiane that the United States immediately cease all aid to General Phoumi's Savannakhet regime. Souvanna has also continued his efforts to persuade the King to convene a meeting of all factions in Luang Prabang for a last try at forming a coalition government.

Souvanna

is considering either an appeal for UN intervention or the return of the International Control Commission if the United States does not cease its support of Phoumi.

the UK, as co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva truce conference, had previously objected to the return of the ICC on the grounds that the Laotian Government was opposed; if Souvanna should now reverse this position, the UK might find it difficult to continue its opposition.

[Hanoi and Peiping have seized on Vientiane's 16 November statement that it would seek closer ties with Hanoi and Peiping. North Vietnam on 19 November invited a Laotian delegation to visit Hanoi and discuss "cooperation and mutual aid" proposals. Souvanna Phouma's reply, released on 22 November by Vientiane

agreed to "barter goods at our common frontier" but did not respond to Hanoi's invitation to send a delegation. An official Chinese Communist statement on 20 November "warmly welcomed" the Vientiane statement on improving relations and said that Peiping "is prepared to take corresponding measures."

<u>Thailand:</u> Many coup rumors, of varying plausibility, are again circulating in Bangkok. The possible participants in such a move and their motivations are by no means clear. Premier Sarit, however, is reliably reported to be considerably concerned over the recent rash of reports and to be actively investigating them.

[UAR: Syrian officials are displaying an attitude of friendly cooperation toward Americans unprecedented in recent years. The Syrians appear to be taking their lead from Syrian Executive Council President Sarraj, whose recent show of warmth is]

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in marked contrast to his previously hostile, anti-US behavior. Sarraj, now apparently undisputed boss of Syria, has assumed responsibility for reviving Syria's sagging economy and may be counting heavily on American assistance. (Page 5)

III. THE WEST

France-Algeria: Rightist opposition to De Gaulle's Algerian policy will probably be further consolidated by his appointment of the relatively liberal Louis Joxe as minister of Algerian affairs, and the selection of Jean Morin as new delegate general in Algeria. Morin is a tough administrator apparently picked for his effectiveness in handling the principal area of rightist concentration in France. /There are indications that the Front for French Algeria (FAF) is planning "total disobedience" to paralyze all government services and force the army to take over in Algeria. /The government is alert to this possibility as well as to reported plans of General Salan to return clandestinely to Algeria where FAF leaders are said to expect him to lead such activities.) (Page 6)

Bolivia: President Paz has told US Ambassador Strom on 22 November he may hand over the presidency "this week" to Vice President Juan Lechin--Bolivia's leftist labor leader who has often displayed an anti-US attitude -- if US aid to meet pressing economic problems is not granted. Paz' difficulties are intensified by a pronounced pro-Communist, leftist drift in recent months, widespread labor and peasant unrest, serious violence in the Department of Cochabamba this month, and increasing pressure on the bankrupt government to accept bloc offers of aid. Strom believes that Paz' position is gravely threatened. (Page 7)

Hall: The regime does not appear immediately threatened by the student strike that led it to impose martial law throughout Haiti on 22 November. However, drastic police action

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against the students, likely should there be public demonstrations, could cause a sudden swelling of antigovernment feeling and even widespread rioting threatening the government. President Duvalier's opponents are diverse and poorly organized, but the President is unpopular, particularly in the capital. The primary motivation for the strike is probably resentment over the President's refusal to free a student leader jailed without charges for some weeks. (Page 8)

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Prospects for the Republic of Korea Over the Next Few Years: Likely Future of Chang Government and Leftward Trends, Economic Stability, and Foreign Policy, Especially Toward the US and Japan, Present and Future Status of Armed Forces. NIE 42.1-2-60. 22 November 1960.

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Moscow and Peiping Reopen Public Dispute

In apparent reply to the 21 November <u>People's Daily</u> editorial which presented the familiar Chinese arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, <u>Pravda</u> on 23 November also editorlialized on the declaration which followed the meeting of bloc leaders in 1957. That declaration was issued on 22 November, and the use both Peiping and Moscow are making of the third anniversary of its appearance suggests that their current discussions, like the talks in Bucharest in June 1960, have taken them back to the 1957 manifesto as the only possible basis for a new pronouncement which, while making another ritualistic assertion of bloc unity, will in fact register failure to make any progress toward resolving the basic issues in dispute.

The 1957 manifesto was itself a compromise document, carefully formulated to reflect differing views on the policies to be pursued by international Communism. The document emphasized Soviet views, but it included Chinese additions which made it possible for each party to claim that the declaration upheld its own views.

Throughout the course of the controversy, the Chinese have heavily stressed only those elements which correspond to their positions, and the burden of the argument presented in the most recent <u>People's Daily</u> editorial seems to be that the declaration remains valid and that they are faithful to it. In a separate comment on the declaration, the Albanian regime's major paper has added its voice in support of the Chinese positions.

The <u>Pravda</u> editorial, in contrast, has selected for emphasis those aspects of the declaration which elaborate the Soviet positions, while acknowledging, in brief, some of the views stressed by the Chinese. While maintaining that the Soviet party regards the "Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence" as the correct line for Communist foreign

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policy, it adds that this does "not deny the struggle of classes; does not mean the conciliation of socialism and capitalism."

Emphasizing that war can now be prevented by the strength of the "socialist" forces, the editorial notes that "as long as imperialism exists. . . there will exist threats to the cause of peace." Reiterating the conclusion of the 1957 declaration that the main danger to Communism is "revisionism," the editorial nevertheless pointedly observes that "dogmatism and sectarianism" could also represent a "basic danger at individual stages of development of one party or another."

Moscow's reply to the Chinese, then, while remaining firm on the basic issues, treats the doctrinal difficulties much as the 1957 declaration did. The continuation of open discussion between the Soviet and Chinese parties while the meetings in Moscow are still in progress indicates that they have been unable to resolve their disagreements and suggests that they have found it difficult to formulate a communiqué which will satisfy both parties. The moderate tone of the <u>Pravda</u> editorial, however, would appear to presage the probable nature of any communiqué which may result-one placing the heaviest emphasis on the majority Soviet view but so worded that the Chinese can sign it and continue to claim that their views are valid.

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Indian Troops Fired On in Tibet-Sikkim Border Area

At least five indian soldiers have been wounded and several possibly killed in the border state of Sikkim during the past two weeks by rifle fire which allegedly came from Chinese snipers in Tibet. The firing may actually have come from armed Tibetan rebels who were forced out of their country following the rebellion in 1958 and are now attempting to re-enter it by way of Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal.

If Chinese troops were, in fact, involved, they probably were not acting on specific orders from Peiping to provoke clashes with the Indians. The Chinese have lately gone to great lengths in promoting their "peacefulness" to repair the damage done to their Asian reputation by the Sino-Indian border clashes of 1959. Chinese forces now on the Sikkim border are probably interested primarily in preventing the re-entry of rebels into Tibet.

It is unlikely that the activities of the Chinese and Indian teams, now in Rangoon drafting a final report to pinpoint the border claims of both sides, will be affected by the new incidents.

[Rumors of increased activity opposite Sikkim and continuing reports of sniping activity along the Sikkim-Tibet frontier have caused India to augment its forces in the Sikkim-Darjeeling area to more than three brigades and to order an alert among all Indian forces in the vicinity.]

[India's quick reaction to the events in Sikkim, which will almost certainly further strain Sino-Indian relations, underscores New Delhi's concern over the defense of this strategic border area. Should the reports of sniping activity continue, it is likely that New Delhi will lift its current restriction on Indian counterfire.

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Vietnamese Con Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160576 Developments for South

Vietnamese Communists, at first slow to react to the uprising against President Diem on 11 November, apparently are now acting on the orders of North Vietnam in the hope of exploiting the situation. Even though the Communists had no hand in the coup and no sympathy for its objectives.

caping members of the coup group. Communist cadres were told to keep an eye open for escapees who could be useful in the effort to form a united front of elements dedicated to ousting Diem.

the Communists were still uncertain--nine days after the coup--just which South Vietnamese military units had been involved and what had happened to them.

the Communists were antagonized by the anti-Communist statements made by the coup group and had no sympathy for the plotters, despite their possible value in the Communist drive to topple Diem.

In terms duplicating Hanoi's public statements, the coup had failed because it was anti-Communist and "did not rely on the people."

difficulties besetting Diem and the resulting political situation as "very advantageous for us." Proceeding from this point,

outlined a program of combined violence and political action designed to culminate in a revolt more to Hanoi's liking. The efforts of this program will be directed toward stimulating opposition against Diem's agrovilles, where large groups of South Vietnamese farmers have been relocated for security reasons; exhorting peasants to demand an end to anti-Communist military operations; and attempting to suborn the South Vietnamese Army. The guerrillas were told again to assassinate "cruel individuals" who get in the way.

Although the Diem government is attempting to tone down the more extreme demands of a quasi-official "People's Committee against Rebels and Communists" for reprisals against the coup instigators, Diem remains under pressure to crack down on his political opponents. Any such campaign of repression would lead to increased public dissatisfaction and play into Communist hands. Syrians Appear to, Be Seeking Improved Relations With US

The American consul general in Damascus has noted a series of recent incidents indicating an official Syrian effort to improve the heretofore cool relations with the United States. The effort has been most noticeable in Syrian dealings with both private and official Americans on economic, technical, and cultural matters. The Syrian director of technical assistance, for example, recently stated that "the opportunity for expanding American cooperation was unprecedented," and representatives of American business firms and other American visitors have remarked on the favorable reception they have received.

Syrian Executive Council President Abd al-Hamid Sarraj startled American officials recently by his friendly attitude during the farewell call of the former American consul. Sarraj had been considered perhaps the most ardently anti-American member of the Nasir regime.

since achieving what appears to be near absolute authority in Syria, following Nasir's cabinet reshuffle in September, Sarraj has put on a new face and is generally accepted by Syrian officials as the one who can cut red tape and bring administrative order and effectiveness.

Sarraj's future may be tied to the Nasir regime's development program in Syria, for which foreign aid is indispensable. Soviet bloc economic aid to the UAR has so far been channeled to Egypt for the most part. Western and especially American assistance, long favored by lesser Syrian officials, now may be sought on a considerably larger scale.

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De Gaulle Appointments May Add to Rightist Discontent

The appointment of Louis Joxe as minister of Algerian affairs and Jean Morin as delegate general in Algeria will probably further consolidate rightist opposition to De Gaulle's Algerian policy. Joxe is a career civil servant with liberal views who has been ambassador to both Bonn and Moscow and, until his new appointment, was minister of education. Considered completely loyal to De Gaulle, he will probably have strong support from French political elements which favor a liberal solution.

To replace the previous delegate general, Paul Delouvrier, who was selected primarily for his ability as an economist and manager, De Gaulle has sent to Algeria one of the ranking civil and police administrators in France. As superprefect of the Toulouse region since mid-1958, Morin is experienced in dealing with the heavy concentration of rightist elements in southwest France--including the paratroop training camp at Pau.

Administratively, the personnel changes will strengthen De Gaulle's hand prior to his visit to Algeria early next month and to the national referendum on Algerian policy--now set for the first two weeks of January. However, the changes will also emphasize the gulf between De Gaulle and the rightists, will probably encourage them to close ranks, and may occasion further rightist demonstrations.

[There are indications that the Front for French Algeria (FAF) is planning "total disobedience" in Algeria in the immediate future. The civilian population will be encouraged to ignore the curfew, to refuse to pay taxes, and--with the cooperation of civil servants--to bring about a complete breakdown of postal, sanitary, electric, and police services in order to force the army to take over supervision of these public services.] The delegate general's office is reportedly prepared to requisition workers to maintain essential services. The government also knows that FAF leaders expect General Salan, the retired former commander in chief in Algeria who has been criticizing De Gaulle's policies from Spain, to return clandestinely and lead FAF activities.



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Bolivian President Threatens to Step Down

Bolivian President Paz told Ambassador Strom on 22 November that he may hand over his office "this week" to Vice President Juan Lechin--the leftist labor leader who has often displayed anti-US attitudes--if US aid is not granted to meet his pressing economic problems. Paz asserted that he himself opposed aid from the Communist bloc, which was readily available, but that Lechin would not hesitate to go "to the other side." Strom believes that Paz' position is gravely threatened, especially by current overdue government obligations, and that a credit of about \$5,000,000 would be required to support him through an interim period.

Paz' difficulties are complicated by a pronounced pro-Communist, leftist trend in recent months--particularly within the ruling Nationalist Revolutionary Movement party --widespread labor and peasant unrest, and violence this month in the Department of Cochabamba, leading to the promulgation of a state of siege there on 19 November. Demonstrations were conducted against Strom during his visit to the city of Cochabamba on 14 November, and further anti-US outbreaks are possible.)

Pressures are also mounting on the bankrupt administration to accept bloc offers of aid, especially a Soviet offer to build a tin smelter in Bolivia. The government announced recently that a commercial mission would leave shortly for Western Europe, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR to seek credits for Comibol, the national mining corporation, and Paz has indicated that it will also investigate a rumored Soviet credit offer of \$60,000,000 to Bolivia's national petroleum agency. Czechoslovakia, the only bloc country with which Bolivia exchanges diplomatic missions, has also been discussing arrangements with Bolivia for supplying equipment and supplies to Comibol.



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Student Strike Prompts Martial Law in Haiti

The Duvalier government on 22 November imposed martial law throughout Haiti as a reaction to the calling of a longthreatened student strike which the government described as politically motivated and Communist-controlled. The strike is believed to have been touched off chiefly by resentment over President Duvalier's refusal to free a student leader who has been in jail without charges since 1 September. Leaders of the principal student organization, which encompasses university and high school students, are apparently sympathetic to the Castro regime in nearby Cuba, and the possibility of Cuban influence in the strike cannot be eliminated. Yesterday, as the strike continued, the government ordered all schools in the country closed until after Christmas and summarily expelled from Haiti French-born Archbishop Poirier--who was threatened with arrest last year when he critized the regime--accusing him of giving \$7,000 to aid the students.

There apparently is no immediate threat to the regime, as the opposition is poorly organized and made up of diverse elements. Businessmen and government employees yesterday staged a demonstration in Port au Prince in support of Duvalier. The President is generally unpopular, however, particularly in the capital, and any drastic police action to break up student demonstrations might lead to widespread rioting that could bring the government down.

the student strike might spread to other groups in the capital and said the students had been promised the "sympathy" of the taxi drivers' and dockworkers' unions. I an unidentified army officer had told the students that "half of the army" is opposed to the President. There is no evidence to support the latter statement; loyal officers are believed to retain a tight rein on the military, which has been cleverly manipulated into rival elements which are unlikely to work in concert and no one of which is believed capable of a successful move against the President at this time.

LUS officials in Port au Prince, who commented on 23 November that the government was exhibiting an attitude of confidence, also reported local speculation that the regime had



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deliberately encouraged the strike to provide pretext for ar- resting political opponents and to try to convince the United States that Haiti has a large Communist problem and will require massive aid.					
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