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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03157414

10 March 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR:

SIPAR the USSR has been equipping and training its fighter forces with air-to-air missiles, possibly guided by a heat-seeking (infrared) or by a beam-rider (radar) system. at least seven Soviet Farmer (MIG-19) aircraft from units in the Murmansk area engaged in probable air-to-air missile firing on both 23 October and 17 November 1959. This firing furnishes further evidence that operational units are equipped with the missiles and are being trained in their use; since last summer MIG-19 fighters in East Germany have been equipped with four externally mounted missiles, two under each wing. (Page 1)

> Sino-Indian Border: Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai will suggest the formation of a joint Sino-Indian border commission when he meets Indian Prime Minister Nehru in April,

border talks must be kept going until a solution is reached and therefore no time limit should be imposed on any such commission. Peiping, which found a similar tactic useful in easing its dispute with Burma, apparently hopes to ascertain Indian reaction to the possibility of a Sino-Indian commission and to broaden the effort to convince New Delhi that Communist China is prepared to be cooperative in border talks.) (Page 2)

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Watch Committee Conclusion--Middle East: (There has been an easing of tensions between the UAR and Israel. Although the withdrawal of some UAR military forces from the Sinai has begun, serious incidents continue possible as long as UAR forces remain near the Israeli border areas in reinforced strength.)

Morocco: The cabinet crisis pending since December and halted by the Agadir disaster of 1 March may come to a head within another week,

Most members of the cabinet took practically no part in dealing with the disaster, thus demonstrating the moribund state of the government. (Page 3)

### III. THE WEST

<u>Cuba:</u> The US Embassy in Havana sees no hope that the US will ever be able to establish a satisfactory relationship with any Cuban government dominated by Fidel Castro or his close associates. The embassy believes that the government's charges of US responsibility for the explosion in Havana harbor and the mounting anti-US frenzy in government-controlled media indicate a deliberate attempt to precipitate a crisis and force the US to take drastic measures. There have also been reports that Cubans who previously were cool to Castro's anti-American diatribes seem increasingly resentful of the US, and a minor incident could cause an outbreak of violence against US personnel or interests.7

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DAILY BRIEF

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### Initial Air-to-Air Missile Firing From Soviet Fighters Indicated

The probable firing of air-to-air missiles by at least seven Soviet MIG-19 fighters of the Northern Fleet naval regiment based at Murmansk on 23 October and again on 17 November 1959 is the best indication to date of the operational employment of these weapons. Available evidence on Soviet development of at least two guided air-to-air missiles suggests they were of a heat-seeking (infrared) or beam-rider (radar) type.

On 23 October, seven aircraft entering singly a ''combat run'' at an approximate altitude of 37,000 feet.

The air-

craft reversing heading, descending to 20,000 feet and apparently returning to base.

The 17 November activity duplicated that in October except

suggesting the fighters may have released two missiles with the first one possibly serving as the target for the second.

This regiment may have been re-equipped with missile launchers in the spring of 1959. It was inactive for six weeks prior to 2 June, and when flying resumed, the pilots engaged in intensive take-off and landing exercises--an unusual practice for a trained operational unit.

The limited tracking capability of the airborne radar installed on the MIG-19 suggests that an infrared heat-seeking type of missile rather than a beam-rider was used in this exercise. The more advanced fighters now beginning to appear at several key areas of the USSR are believed adaptable to the use of air-to-air guided missiles.

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CENTPAL INTELLICENCE BULLETINI Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03157414 Chou En-Lai May Propose Sino-Indian Border Commission

Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai will propose a joint Sino-Indian boundary commission when he visits New Delhi in April,

Repeating Peiping's current propaganda line that nothing must stand in the way of friendship between the two countries,

no time limit should be set on the work of such a commission.

Peiping found the establishment of a boundary commission a useful device for easing its dispute with Burma and one which could be used to prolong "friendly negotiations indefinitely." Peiping's willingness to present this proposal

strong-

ly suggests an attempt to gauge Indian reaction and its probable influence on Nehru. comments also seem intended to broaden Peiping's effort to convince New Delhi the Chinese will be cooperative in border talks. He said China 'might" agree to demilitarizing "certain portions" of the disputed territory if India accepts the fact that China has a claim to such territory. The Chinese may hope this remark will be interpreted as a veiled hint that some accommodation can be reached on "neutralizing" portions of Ladakh.]

Nehru reportedly has speculated that Chou may point to China's recent border agreement with Burma and possibly one with Nepal by the time of his visit and suggest that a precedent has been set for India.7



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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

### **Replacement of Moroccan Cabinet Again Seems Imminent**

The Moroccan cabinet crisis--halted by the Agadir disaster of 1 March--may come to a head within another week,

members of the cabinet, including Premier Abdallah Ibrahim and Vice Premier Abderrahim Bouabid, took little part in dealing with the disaster. Most prominent in directing disaster relief were Crown Prince Moulay Hassan and Director of National Security Mohamed Laghzaoui, who have long pressed King Mohamed V to revamp his government and have for the past three months directed the police repression of left-wing supporters of Ibrahim and Bouabid.

Premier Ibrahim, who in the past few months appeared to have lost the King's confidence, was reported to have offered his resignation. Just prior to the Agadir disaster, the King appeared ready to accept the resignation and to name Si Mohamed M'Barek Bekkai, who was premier from December 1955 until May 1958, to head a caretaker government to serve until after local elections are held in May.

Meanwhile, security forces continue to move against veterans of the Moroccan resistance group and alleged terrorists said to be involved in a plot to assassinate the crown prince. Leftwing political and labor leaders contend that the only plot is one invented by the government as an excuse to suppress Ibrahim's supporters to the benefit of Moroccan rightist groups.



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### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Inteiligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director



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