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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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10 SEPTEMBER 1960

Watch Committee conclusions on Jordanian situation. ①

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Ulbricht implies further steps to be taken against West German ties to West Berlin. ②

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Guinea obtains Soviet commitment of aid for large hydroelectric project. ③


Shah said to be convinced further participation in CENTO is useless. ④

General Phoumi claims he is about to begin "revolution" against government. ⑤

France to recognize independence of Senegal on 11 September; later will propose admission to UN. ⑥

LATE ITEM

Situation in Congo. ⑦

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SPECIAL ITEM

Sirah

[At a special meeting of the Watch Committee on 9 September 1960, the following conclusion was reached concerning the Jordan-UAR situation:

There is a likelihood that a coup, initiated by Syrians and supported by Jordan, will be attempted against the UAR rule in Syria in the next few days with the support of some disaffected Syrian military elements. The prospects for the success of the coup are not good in view of the Egyptian dominance of the First Army, the efficiency of Syrian counter-intelligence and the alertness of the Syrian security forces. The attempt itself would seriously aggravate tensions between Jordan and the UAR; an initial success could well bring intervention by Jordanian forces in an effort to protect the coup from UAR counteraction. The failure of the coup after overt Jordanian military intervention could create an intolerable situation for Husayn which the UAR could exploit to bring about his overthrow. UAR military intervention against Husayn in Jordan would bring in Israel to avert the prospect of a UAR-dominated Jordan. A major international crisis would spring out of such a melee.

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(Page 1)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Berlin: Ulbricht's speech of 8 September is designed to define East German as well as Soviet policies toward West Berlin by spelling out the limitations of Khrushchev's commitment to maintain the status quo until "next spring." He warned that this should not be interpreted to mean that the West had been given a free hand to stage "provocations" and implied that further measures against West German ties to West Berlin would be taken. Ulbricht also proposed that the US consider a phased disarmament plan for Germany, including conclusion of a peace treaty at the end of the first phase in 1961. In another effort to assert the regime's claims to sovereignty, he proposed that East German representatives be permitted to address the UN General Assembly meeting. [redacted] (Page 3)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Guinea-Bloc: Guinea's economic ties with the USSR have apparently been strengthened by agreements reached during President Touré's recent talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow. The joint communiqué issued on 8 September announces that Moscow has agreed to participate in the construction of the extensive Konkouré hydroelectric project, Guinea's highest priority development scheme. Soviet participation presumably will involve extension of additional credits to Guinea. A new trade agreement, covering the years 1961-1965, also was signed while Touré was in Moscow, his first stop on a month-long trip which will also include state visits to Ulan Bator, Peiping, and Hanoi. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Page 5)

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Iran: []

[] the Shah is "in a very depressed mood" over Iran's military situation and is convinced that further participation in CENTO is useless. He may decide to withdraw from CENTO and fall back entirely on the Iranian-US bilateral pact. Although the Shah's unhappiness at the level of American aid and CENTO's inactivity is chronic, it might be sufficiently intensified at this time by continuing Soviet pressure, the election crisis, and the consequent upsurge in opposition political activity to convince him that Iran should withdraw from CENTO. []

(Page 6)

*Laos: General Phoumi []

[] he planned to "start a revolution" on 10 September. The details of his plans were not revealed, but he will apparently not go through with a previously mooted plan to set up a rival kingdom in southern Laos. Phoumi's most likely course is the revival of plans to march on Vientiane. The success of such a venture would depend on the degree of support he still enjoys in the army, which is almost certainly considerably less than it was before the compromise agreement which led to the formation of the Souvanna Phouma government on 30 August. []

Phoumi was unswayed by the new concessions offered by Souvanna through a delegation of army officers Souvanna sent to Savannakhet on 9 September. Phoumi also stated that it would be a waste of time for representatives of US Ambassador Brown to come to Savannakhet to persuade him to return to Vientiane. Whatever the ultimate chances of success for Phoumi's "revolution," his apparent final refusal to cooperate with Souvanna will have the immediate effect of seriously weakening the premier's position in the forthcoming peace talks with the Communist Pathet Lao. [] increased Pathet Lao guerrilla activity in four different areas of northern Laos, which presumably represents an effort by the insurgents to strengthen their position in the negotiations. []

10 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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France-Mali: France plans to recognize Senegal as an independent country on 11 September and thereafter to propose its admission to the UN, even though Paris anticipates that such formal acknowledgment of the breakup of the Mali Federation will create difficulties both in Africa and in the UN. As far as Soudan is concerned, France believes its recognition of Mali covers that country and plans no special action. The Soudanese members of the Mali Government, who have proclaimed Bamako the capital of the federation as well as of Soudan, appear determined to implement their threat to break off relations with any nation recognizing Senegal's independence and have already moved to terminate some French activities in Soudan. In addition, special representatives have been sent to New York to push the Soudanese position at the UN, and another Mali envoy was scheduled to depart for Moscow on 9 September.

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LATE ITEM

Congo: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, in a blunt speech to the UN Security Council in which he stated that Kasavubu had the constitutional right to fire Lumumba, affirmed his intention to keep UN forces in the Congo and stated in effect that the UN must govern the Congo until such time as a legal and responsible government is established. Meanwhile, the Tunisian UN delegate is trying to round up support, particularly from African states, for a resolution--drafted by Hammarskjold--which would authorize the secretary general to take any necessary action to restore law and order in the Congo. Action on the resolution is expected when the Security Council reconvenes in the afternoon of 10 September.

In Leopoldville Premier Lumumba has strengthened his control following his unexpected success in winning both Chamber and Senate approval, and the American ambassador is concerned that it will be very difficult for the UN to move against him. The ambassador believes that all attempts to rally moderates to oppose the premier depend on disarming the Force Publique.

10 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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(Further difficulties for the United Nations are likely to arise with President Tshombé of Katanga. On 9 September he defied UN control of three airfields, including that at Elisabethville, to send several small planes to the northern part of Katanga where an invasion by pro-Lumumba forces from Kivu was reported in progress. [REDACTED])

The five Soviet AN-12 cargo planes which landed at Cario on 2 September enroute to the Congo, presumably with supplies for the Lumumba regime, apparently have been ordered to return to the USSR. [REDACTED])

10 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

iv

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Preparations for Jordanian-Supported Coup Attempt
In Syria (as of 1700, 9 September 1960)

Since mid-July King Husayn has been in contact with a group of Syrian conspirators who have been planning a coup to overthrow UAR rule and set up an independent Syrian government. They claim to have the support of key Syrian Army elements, including the Qatana garrison near Damascus, as well as the backing of several prominent Syrian politicians who were former ministers in the UAR Government of the Syrian region.

Following the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli on 29 August--which King Husayn is convinced was directed by the UAR--the King urged the plotters to act as soon as possible. He has provided them with substantial sums of money and has promised direct military support if they should be initially successful and the UAR Government takes military counteraction against them.

The King now has received word that the conspirators intend to launch their planned coup this week end. Some Jordanian military units have been repositioned and others alerted in order either to provide quick military support if the King decides that is necessary, or defend if the UAR reacts militarily against Jordan.

Despite general political and economic conditions in Syria favorable to the coup planners, their chances of success do not appear good. The efficient UAR security and counterintelligence organizations in Syria have long been aware of the danger of disaffection and plotting among Syrian Army officers, and sporadic arrests and discharges have taken place. These security organs have probably stepped up their efforts in view of the increased tension between Jordan and the UAR following the assassination of Majalli. Syrian military strength near the Jordanian border was increased at that time, and UAR authorities are aware of the recent movement of Jordanian armor close to the border.

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(It is possible that the UAR security apparatus already has the conspirators under close scrutiny and is planning to crack down in a way which will demonstrate Husayn's involvement in subversive activity against the UAR. It is even possible that the conspiracy is really a provocation aimed at trapping Husayn. Such UAR action in implicating Husayn would further increase tensions between the two countries, and Nasir might use the occasion as justification for sanctioning an attempt to assassinate the King. Cairo's propaganda, which claims that Husayn is a stooge of the British and Americans, would probably accuse the Western powers of being behind the coup.

Should the coup be successful initially or should Jordan intervene militarily in Syria, the danger of broader hostilities in the area would be acute. This would be especially true if counterattacking UAR troops moved into Jordanian territory; in that case, Israel would be almost certain to take military action rather than run the risk of seeing the creation of a Nasir-controlled Jordan. Israeli armed forces have maintained a very close watch on the Jordanian situation following the assassination of Majalli; the Israeli Government undoubtedly is considering the possibility of intervening should Husayn show signs of losing out. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~Ulbricht Unveils East German Plan for Berlin and Germany

In presenting to the Council of Ministers his regime's memorandum to the United Nations concerning German disarmament, East German party boss Ulbricht on 8 September undertook to define East German policy toward Berlin and Germany. He warned that Khrushchev's pledge--made after the breakup of the summit meeting in May--not to carry out before next spring unilateral measures concerning Berlin, such as the signature of a separate peace treaty with East Germany, does not mean that West German and West Berlin elements are permitted to "aggravate the anomalous situation in West Berlin." He intimated that East Germany will take further measures to weaken West German ties with West Berlin. Ulbricht's speech was published following the regime's announcement that restrictions, apparently permanent, are being placed on the entry of West Germans to East Berlin.

The proposal for a phased disarmament of Germany--evidently intended to back up Khrushchev's over-all proposals at the UN--is designed to present the Ulbricht regime in a posture of reasonableness and perhaps to provide further justification for a possible future move to sign a separate East German - Soviet treaty. The main new point in the current East German proposals, which sum up various past plans, is the provision for signature of a peace treaty with the "two German states" and transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city at the expiration of the first phase in 1961.

Ulbricht also revealed that his regime is addressing a letter to Secretary General Hammarskjold requesting permission for East German representatives to present their views at the UN General Assembly. This request is intended to enhance East German claims to sovereignty and equality with West Germany--which, although not a member of the UN, maintains a permanent observer delegation in New York.

[redacted] Ulbricht
returned from his six-week vacation in the USSR highly satisfied

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with his discussions with Khrushchev. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Khrushchev agreed to sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans--without setting any date. He specified that they were not to interfere with Allied access to West Berlin, presumably at the outset, although apparently they were given a free hand with the West Germans. Both officials forecast further pressures against the city.

The recent East German measures to tie East Berlin more closely to East Germany, by giving the sector border the character of an international frontier in defiance of four-power agreements guaranteeing freedom of movement in the city, probably are motivated in part by the regime's desire to take additional steps to stem the refugee flow to West Berlin. Despite the sharply intensified security measures imposed last week end, more than 3,000 East Germans and East Berliners escaped to the Western sectors of Berlin in the week ending 6 September. More than 126,000 East Germans have fled to West Germany and West Berlin so far this year including almost 21,000 in August. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Guinea Forging New Economic Ties With Sino-Soviet Bloc

Guinea's economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc apparently will become still stronger as a result of President Sekou Touré's visit to several bloc countries. According to the joint communiqué released on 8 September upon the conclusion of Touré's two-day stay in Moscow, the USSR has agreed to participate in the construction of the proposed Konkouré River hydroelectric dam, Guinea's highest priority development project. The project, which is similar to Ghana's Volta River scheme, envisages the establishment of an aluminum industry in Guinea where there are large bauxite deposits, some of which are already being exploited by Western interests.

Although the extent of the Soviet commitment to the Konkouré project was not announced, Moscow presumably will make additional long-term credits available to Conakry. The USSR's present economic aid program in Guinea is covered by a \$35,000,000 credit extended in August 1959.

A new Soviet-Guinean trade pact for the years 1961-1965 also was concluded while Touré was in Moscow, his first stop in a month-long trip which will include state visits to Ulan Bator, Peiping, and Hanoi. Such agreements, which Guinea has concluded with a number of European bloc countries since 1958, are resulting in the diversion of the bulk of Guinea's foreign trade from the French franc zone to the bloc. This trade with the bloc is based largely on barter arrangements which are mortgaging future as well as current Guinean export products, especially bananas. [redacted]

Meanwhile, there is some circumstantial evidence [redacted] [redacted] indicating that a Soviet vessel, the Firyuza, now en route to Conakry is carrying a cargo of military items, possibly arms, loaded at Nikolaev in late August. In July a Polish delegation believed to be on an arms-selling mission visited Conakry. Guinea has received at least two and possibly more shipments of arms from Czechoslovakia since early 1959. [redacted]

[redacted]

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[REDACTED]

Shah Considering Withdrawing Iran From CENTO

The Shah, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is considering withdrawing Iran from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and relying on the bilateral defense agreement with the United States for military security.

The Shah, who again is in a depressed mood regarding the level of US military aid and domestic budget problems, is said to believe that Iran's participation in CENTO is leading the country into greater military expenditures than it can afford. He is discouraged over Turkey's exclusive reliance on NATO for its defense and over lack of progress toward a CENTO command structure, of which he hoped to become commander in chief.

The Shah is also reported disturbed by what he regards as the lack of coordination between CENTO and the American military mission in Iran. He believes this to be a further indication that the United States considers CENTO of no importance. Hedayat claims that if Iran attends the CENTO Ministerial Council meeting in Ankara in February, it will probably be for the last time.

The Shah for years has had periods of discouragement with what he regards as the lack of material and moral support from his allies. At present, however, he is in the middle of a crisis over election scandals and faces the problem of how to hold new elections that give the appearance of being free but are sufficiently controlled to assure an obedient parliament. Domestic opposition elements, realizing his vulnerability, are taking full advantage.

At the same time, the USSR is continuing to offer economic aid in exchange for a written guarantee that no foreign bases will be permitted on Iranian soil. Withdrawal from CENTO would lighten Iran's financial burden and lessen the pressure on the Shah from both the Soviet Union and neutralist-inclined politicians within Iran. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Situation in Laos

General Phoumi [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] planned to start "a revolution" on 10 September. Phoumi was vague as to the precise nature of his revolution but indicated that he was not planning to go through with a previous scheme he had been considering of setting up a rival kingdom in southern Laos. His most likely course of action would be the revival of his plan to march on Vientiane. His chances of success in any such venture would depend on the degree of support he still enjoys in the Lao army, which is almost certainly considerably less than it was before the Luang Prabang compromise agreement which led to the formation of the Souvanna Phouma government on 30 August. Phoumi stated that the first step in setting his revolution in motion had been to blow up the bridges around Pakse, to the south of Savannakhet. This may suggest that Phoumi has no confidence that the Fourth Military Region commander, whose headquarters are at Pakse, will support him.

Even while Phoumi was revealing his intent to resume overt opposition to Souvanna and Captain Kong Le, a delegation of army officers was in Savannakhet bearing Souvanna's "final" offer in his repeated efforts to induce Phoumi to return to Vientiane to take up his duties as deputy premier and interior minister. The delegation was armed with what seemed to be adequate assurances to Phoumi that he could safely return to Vientiane, but Phoumi is described as having a fixed idea that Souvanna wanted to kill him. Phoumi also told the American observer that it would be a waste of time for representatives of US Ambassador Brown to come to Savannakhet. He stated that he "will never go to Vientiane. As it is now I would rather live in Bangkok."

Whatever Phoumi's chances are for ultimate success in his revolution, it will have the immediate effect of seriously weakening Souvanna's position in the forthcoming peace talks with the Pathet Lao insurgents. Former Premier Somsanith [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] considered it essential for Phoumi to return in order to strengthen Souvanna's position in the forthcoming negotiations with the Pathet

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[redacted]

Lao. Somsanith is of the opinion that Souvanna learned how to deal with the Pathet Lao from his experiences in 1957 and 1958, but that without Phoumi's presence the premier might weaken and concede too much. Both Souvanna and Somsanith have stated that a major role for Phoumi had been envisaged in the talks with the Pathet Lao.

There are growing indications that the Pathet Lao is accelerating its guerrilla operations in an apparent effort to strengthen its bargaining position. [redacted] increased insurgent pressure in four widely separated areas in northern Laos. [redacted] The most seriously affected sector appears to be northern Sam Neua Province. [redacted] concern with which the Sam Neua commander views his position. [redacted] he expressed the fear that Sam Neua town itself, with its airfield, might fall unless reinforcements were urgently dispatched. He may have overreacted to sketchy reports from his widely dispersed patrols; however, the area of his responsibility is vulnerable to enemy attack and was the scene of the major fighting in the initial Pathet Lao uprising of last summer. [redacted]

The crisis in Laos continued to have repercussions among Laos' neighbors. Thai Premier Sarit is reliably reported to be deeply disturbed over what he considers the failure of the United States to give adequate support to his nephew, Phoumi, who epitomizes the same strongly anti-Communist position in Laos that Sarit represents in Thailand. Sarit [redacted] and his government were taking a new look at their relations with the United States in view of what he terms American "mishandling and inaction" in the Laotian crisis. Sarit's influence may be an important factor behind Phoumi's decision on remaining in Savannakhet. South Vietnamese leaders are also critical of US actions in Laos. [redacted]

Meanwhile, Cambodian chief of state Prince Sihanouk, [redacted] has offered Phnom Penh as a neutral meeting place for Souvanna and [redacted]

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[redacted]

Prince Souphannouvong, leader of the Pathet Lao and Neo Lao Hak Sat. [redacted] Sihanouk, who feels that the crisis in Laos has created a dangerous political vacuum in Southeast Asia, is seriously considering proposing a Lao-Khmer confederation as a means of developing a neutral zone between China and North Vietnam on the one hand and the Western-oriented countries in the area on the other. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[REDACTED]

Congo Situation

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold told the Security Council on 10 September that the UN must control the Congo until a responsible government is in power. He implied that the UN has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of a country when conflict in that country threatens international peace. Hammarskjold intends to ask the council for authorization to use any action necessary to restore law and order in the Congo. The Tunisian UN delegate, meanwhile, is attempting to round up support, particularly among the African states, for a resolution--drafted by Hammarskjold--which would give the secretary general this authorization. The council is expected to act upon this draft resolution when it reconvenes the afternoon of 10 September. The council earlier had defeated a Soviet proposal to have the council meet in Leopoldville.

[REDACTED]

In Leopoldville Premier Lumumba has strengthened his control following a demagogic speech to the Senate in which he repeated his previous success with the Chamber of Deputies in winning over hostile legislative bodies by a vitriolic attack on the United Nations. The American ambassador is concerned that it will be very difficult for the UN to move against Lumumba who can claim both houses of the Assembly back him against Kasavubu and his supporters. Disarming of the Force Publique will be much harder to justify, and continuance of UN control of airfields and radio station even more difficult. The ambassador believes that all attempts to rally moderates to oppose Lumumba depend on disarming and control of the Force Publique and police, and if this is not soon accomplished Lumumba will be able to consolidate his dictatorship rapidly.

Lumumba publicized an order given earlier to his soldiers stating that he, not President Kasavubu, was commander in chief since Kasavubu had been removed from office. He also announced that he had become chief of state, and that three pro-Kasavubu ministers had been dismissed--Foreign Minister Bomboko, Minister to Belgium Delvaux, and Finance Minister Nkayi. Despite these

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[REDACTED]

pronouncements and the assembly's rejection of Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba, Joseph Ileo--Kasavubu's selection for premier--reportedly was attempting to form a new government which he proposed to submit for legislative ratification next week.

The premier received some international backing in his dispute with the UN when the leaders of Guinea's 750 man force in the Congo asked Sekou Touré to withdraw them from the UN force and leave them free to join Lumumba's forces.

An incursion of a unit of Lumumba's forces in Kivu province--estimated to total about 300 men--across the river at the boundary between Kivu and Katanga on 9 September has aroused fears in Katanga that Lumumba's long heralded invasion was taking place. In this area around Kongolo President Tshombé of Katanga is not popular with the tribes, and a Lumumba attack might receive popular support there. Such an attack would also avoid Katanga's main defenses which are further west along the Kasai frontier and in the vicinity of the big air base at Kamina.

Tshombé's efforts to airlift troops to northern Katanga have been handicapped by UN control of the airport at Elisabethville. Armed Katanga troops, including Belgian officers, however, forced the UN command to allow two planes to take off from the airport, although a later effort to take off men and supplies in a DC-3 was prevented by UN personnel. Both the UN command and the Katanga Government have protested these incidents. The UN command has given orders for the Swedish troops to "stand firm." The Katangan Government has expected the main Lumumba attack to be from Kasai along the railroad via Kamina, but Lumumba's forces there are still tied up battling secessionists around Bakwanga. Katanga has about 1,100 gendarmes with 30 Belgian officers and 1,800 police with 40 Belgian officers to oppose the invasions. These groups are probably relatively well armed, but many personnel lack training.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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The five Soviet AN-12 cargo planes which landed at Cairo on 2 September enroute to the Congo presumably with supplies for the Lumumba regime apparently have been ordered to return to the USSR. The fact that these large military transports did not complete their scheduled flight to the Congo probably is in part the result of the UN takeover of the Congo's major airfields. The unexpected return to the USSR of the AN-12's tends to confirm previous indications that the aircrafts were carrying arms and may have been intended for use in Lumumba's military operations against the secessionists.

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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The Director

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The Director

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