

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

FD

3.5(c)

10 October 1960

Copy No. C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 34
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 702
10 JUN 1980
DATE: REVIEWED:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



10 OCTOBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Cairo's claim that King Husayn's uncle shot Syrian pilot adds to Jordanian-UAR tension. ①

UAR continues its aid to Lumumba ②
[redacted]; rumors in Ghana of forthcoming Ghana-backed move to restore Lumumba.

Burma--Discontented senior army officers planning takeover from politicians. ③

Laos--Phoumi continues to rebuff Vientiane's truce proposals; Souvanna Phouma to begin talks with Pathet Lao on Tuesday. ④

III. THE WEST

Berlin--West German Social Democratic leaders pessimistic about Berlin situation and possibilities for Western countermeasures; some privately urge negotiating with the USSR. ⑤

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 October 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR-Jordan: Tensions between the UAR and Jordan remain high, even though the situation along the Syrian-Jordanian border has eased somewhat. The propaganda battle between the two countries has again become intense, with the UAR's Middle East News Agency now accusing King Husayn's uncle of shooting to death a Syrian pilot whose plane crash-landed in Jordanian territory on 28 September. The UAR is likely to sanction new subversive efforts aimed at the overthrow of Husayn's regime, and Jordan may seek Iraqi cooperation in attempts to further secessionist tendencies in Syria. [redacted] (Page 1)

Surah
OK
d. late last
P

Congo: [redacted] the UAR ambassador in Leopoldville, he is still in regular contact with Lumumba, to whom he has transferred more funds believed primarily for the purchase of parliamentary support. On 6 October, Lumumba told the ambassador about the new cabinet that he announced the following day, which included anti-Lumumba leaders and was intended to put the "opposition in a dilemma." Lumumba's maneuver failed when Mobutu arrested 12 Lumumba followers--most of whom were named to the new "cabinet"--immediately after it was announced. [redacted]

Post P
OK

Meanwhile, rumors are circulating in Ghana that attempts, supported by Ghanaian troops, to restore Lumumba as premier will be made "in about a week." [redacted] (Page 2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Burma: There are continued rumblings of discontent with U Nu's administration among senior officers in the Burmese Army.]

they are "waiting, planning, and will be ready" to take over again when the government "makes a mistake." These officers, who probably represent the military faction which argued against the surrender of power in the fall of 1959, feel that General Ne Win made a major error in turning the country back to the politicians after the February elections.] (Page 3)

[Laos: Renewed attempts by the Souvanna Phouma regime to arrange some form of truce with General Phoumi's Revolutionary Committee have been rebuffed. Souvanna Phouma has announced that his negotiations with the Pathet Lao are to begin 11 October.] (Page 4)

III. THE WEST

[Berlin: At a meeting of the Executive Council of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) on 29 September, Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin, the party's chancellor candidate in the 1961 national elections, indicated his pessimism about the Berlin situation.]

Brandt was skeptical of the value of possible Western countermeasures, but on the following day publicly supported denunciation of the interzonal trade agreement. Deputy SPD chairman Wehner agreed with Brandt that the Berlin situation would probably get worse and saw no possibility of hindering this from the Western side. One SPD leader urged the party to revert to a position of advocating negotiation with the USSR. Although Brandt also favored negotiations, he warned against saying anything publicly because Chancellor Adenauer would use such a statement to open a political attack on the SPD.]

(Page 5)

10 Oct 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~Tensions Still High Between UAR and Jordan

The situation on the Jordanian-Syrian border has eased somewhat. The Jordanian Royal Guards Brigade has been moved from the frontier area back to Amman, and sabotage in Syria by Jordanian infiltrators has decreased. The state of alert of Syrian military and internal security forces reportedly has been reduced.

The propaganda battle between the two countries, however, has again intensified. The UAR is making a martyr of a Syrian pilot who crash-landed his MIG-17 south of Amman on 28 September. The Jordanians claim that he was a defector ready to denounce the Nasir regime; on 4 October they announced that he had committed suicide. The UAR initially declared that he was either murdered or driven to suicide by Jordanian torture. On 8 October Cairo's Middle East News Agency went a step farther by alleging that, when he refused to break under torture, he was shot by Sharif Nasir, the uncle of King Husayn.

[Sharif Nasir was reported to be one of the targets of the UAR-supported assassination plot which killed Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli on 29 August.] It appears likely that the UAR now will sanction new assassination attempts against Jordanian leaders, in further subversive efforts aimed at overthrowing Husayn.

Jordan's recognition of the Qasim regime in Iraq has laid the groundwork for possible cooperation between the two countries in subversive activities in Syria. Both have a strong interest in encouraging those elements in Syria eager to secede from the UAR.

Cairo's belief that the object of recognition was to isolate the Syrian region, and it warns of possible attempts "to win friends for the Baghdad-Amman axis."

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Situation in the Congo

[redacted] Cairo's ambassador in Leopoldville continues to maintain regular contact with Patrice Lumumba. On 6 October when the ambassador turned over to Lumumba "three fifths of the amount sent," he found Lumumba "more cheerful than on the previous occasion." Lumumba apparently discussed with the ambassador his intention of announcing a new cabinet to include anti-Lumumba leaders in order to place the "opposition in a dilemma." [redacted]
 [redacted] This maneuver was thwarted, however, by the arrest of 12 Lumumba followers--most of whom were among those named to the cabinet--immediately after the announcement was made on 7 October. [redacted]

Lumumba assured the UAR ambassador that he would immediately both resume publication of his newspaper and dismiss an Egyptian Jew who served as a press aide and had been useful because of his linguistic ability. The ambassador assured Cairo he would see that the dismissal was effected within two days.

Also on 6 October the UAR ambassador pressed UN representative Dayal to strengthen the guard on Lumumba and to pay the salaries of the members of the Congolese parliament. [redacted]
 [redacted] the ambassador had cited the danger that members of parliament loyal to Lumumba might be bought off because their salaries had been denied them. The ambassador estimated on 6 October that the Congolese Army was more strongly armed than UN forces, pointing out that it was equipped with armored cars, many bazookas, mortars, and light guns. He added that "any soldier would be able, by himself, to gain complete control of the situation." [redacted]

Meanwhile, rumors are circulating in Ghana that an attempt with Ghanaian support will be made "in a week" to restore Lumumba as premier. One such report claims that Ghanaian troops in Kasai will be flown by IL-18s to take over Leopoldville. Although admitting that the Leopoldville airport could be closed to such a flight, the Belgian ambassador in Accra claimed that such a plan could explain the disappearance of 40 Soviet technicians not seen in Accra since 4 October. [redacted] The Soviet ambassador to the Congo is reported to have returned to Accra, after consultations in Moscow, with the full intention of returning to Leopoldville. [redacted]

[redacted] the USSR is supporting Ghana completely in the move to restore Lumumba. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

Discontent Continues in Burmese Army

Senior officers, apparently from among those who opposed General Ne Win's decision to return the government to U Nu, continue to be dissatisfied with the way Burma is being administered. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] they are "unhappy," too, with General Ne Win and are "waiting, planning, and will be ready" to take over when the government "makes a mistake." They appear to hope for popular support in case they take action. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] "The Burmese people realize things are getting bad and remember the good things the military government did for them."

With the exception of the boundary treaty with China, which was almost entirely an army venture, the Nu government has accomplished little in the six months in office, and administration has deteriorated markedly. Rangoon's leading newspaper recently observed that, unless there is a marked improvement in the government leadership, "Burma will have the distinction of having one of the best prime ministers and one of the worst administrations in the world." Discontent is not yet widespread, however, and both Prime Minister Nu and General Ne Win appear to retain their popularity. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

The Situation Laos

Premier Souvanna Phouma has informed Ambassador Brown that his most recent attempt to arrive at some kind of concord with General Phoumi's Revolutionary Committee was rebuffed. Souvanna said he had sent a note to Savannakhet asking that the committee be dissolved on the basis of no reprisals. Phoumi had countered with the suggestion that both his committee and the Souvanna cabinet resign, after which the King could name a new government. Souvanna commented that Phoumi's reply put the two camps back to 30 August, when the King appointed the present government and Phoumi refused to participate.

Phoumi's determination to have nothing to do with the Souvanna regime may be strengthened by reports of a Meo tribal uprising, details of which are still fragmentary, in the Second Military Region, which has jurisdiction over Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang Provinces. This region was declared loyal to the Vientiane regime by a regional subcommander on 28 September following a revolt in the internal command structure which formerly had supported Phoumi. It is possible that Meo tribesmen have been armed by pro-Phoumi officers in the area in an attempt to redress the situation, or at least to cause further difficulties for the Vientiane regime.

Souvanna Phouma may be in for trouble from another quarter. General Ouane, armed forces commander, and some of his subordinates in Vientiane are reported to be considering plans for mounting a coup against the Souvanna government.

General Ouane stated on 9 October that he and other officers would carry out a coup if Souvanna's negotiations with the Pathet Lao, which now are scheduled to begin 11 October, do not "go well" for the royal government. Ouane has information that the Pathet Lao will demand, among other things, a reintegration of their civil functionaries and the regrouping of their forces in specified areas. The reasons for Ouane's reported change of attitude would appear to bring him considerably closer to an alignment, at least in political objectives, with Phoumi.

Meanwhile, there are reports of a sizable attack by Pathet Lao forces on a government post in Phong Saly Province of the First Military Region. A significant upsurge of Communist military activity there could be an additional persuasion for Ouane to take some action. The loyalty of the regional military commander and of his officers to the Vientiane regime has also been reported as wavering.

~~SECRET~~

West German Socialist Leaders Pessimistic Over Berlin

At a meeting of the Executive Council of the Social Democratic party (SPD) on 29 September, Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin, the party's chancellor candidate in the 1961 national elections, indicated his pessimism about the Berlin situation. [redacted]

[redacted] Brandt was skeptical of the value of possible Western countermeasures. On the following day, however, he publicly supported Bonn's denunciation of its trade agreement with East Germany. Brandt also stated at the meeting that he had persuaded leaders of several veterans' organizations to abandon plans for a mid-October meeting in West Berlin because such a gathering would make the situation worse.

SPD Deputy Chairman Herbert Wehner agreed with Brandt that the Berlin situation would probably get worse and saw no possibility of hindering this from the Western side. One SPD leader urged a reversion to a position of advocating new negotiations with the USSR. Although he specified no details, he may be thinking along the lines of the party's 1959 "Germany plan," which advocated the military neutralization of Germany. Wehner, however, took the view that the SPD would be certain to lose the 1961 elections if it should move away from its endorsement of Germany's membership in NATO--which the SPD indicated during the Bundestag foreign policy debate last June.

Although Brandt, apparently with general support, also favored negotiations, he cautioned against saying anything publicly because Chancellor Adenauer would use such a statement to accuse the SPD of "defeatism" and "softness on Communism"--charges which have hurt the party in the past. Brandt noted, however, that the "big front of neutral countries" is forming in the UN and that this group might exert enough pressure to place the German problem within the framework of international considerations again. For this reason, Brandt said he would conduct himself in such a way during the present crisis that the door will always stand open for negotiations. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~