


•



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160557

TOP SECRET

29 July 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

No

ND

<u>Saudi Arabia</u>: Although the Saudi Government apparently is aware of current plotting among officers of the regular Saudi Army, there has been no sign of government action to suppress the threat. The strength of the conspirators, in the Taif area, is believed to be great enough to seize control of that area. King Saud's reported intention to visit Taif beginning 10 August--Crown Prince Faysal is also expected to be there--could provide the plotters with an unusual opportunity to strike. Their tentative planning calls for sudden action to assassinate key members of the royal family, followed by simultaneous seizures of control in Taif, Jidda, and Mecca, the three key cities in western Saudi Arabia. (Page 1)]

South Africa – Portugal: The South African defense minister has suggested that Portugal and the Union of South Africa draw up joint plans to defend southern Africa from African incursions from the north,

The suggestion reflects growing South African concern over the ability of white-controlled territories to ward off the southward spread of African nationalism. Portugal may hesitate to enter a formal alliance, since it is unwilling to associate itself too closely with the Union's racial policies. However, military discussions between the two countries might lead the Portuguese to step up their plans--already being implemented--to reinforce their garrisons in Angola and Mozambique.

(Page 2)

i

Japan: The Liberal-Democratic party's victory in the gubernatorial election in Gumma Prefecture near Tokyo on 27 July is its third in succession since the May-June political crisis. The Socialists, who campaigned hard on the security treaty issue, had not expected to win in this strongly conservative prefecture, but they have expressed disappointment over the wide margin of their defeat. It seems apparent that in rural areas at least the electorate will not be impressed by Socialist efforts to gain votes on the security treaty issue, since the conservative victory (about two-to-one) was almost unchanged from previous elections. (Page 3)

III. THE WEST

<u>Venezuela</u> – Dominican Republic: Dominican dictator Trujillo is reported to have asserted within the past few days that he has "sworn to kill" President Betancourt and that his agents are in Caracas now to carry out the action.

the Venezuelan Government is seriously concerned with continuing Dominican plotting against Betancourt, who narrowly escaped death in the Dominican-backed assassination attempt of 24 June. Any further Dominican intervention in Venezuela possibility in view of Trujillo's hatred of Betancourt and increasingly irrational actions -- could touch off military action between the two countries. (Page 4)

Cuba: Foreign Minister Roa announced on 27 July the indefinite postponement of the Conference of Underdeveloped Nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which Cuba had hoped to convene in Havana next September. His clarification of President Dorticos' similar but vaguer statement of 2 June was apparently necessitated by recent inquiries by Afro-Asian countries that had been invited to the conference. Postponement was attributed by Roa to the "revival of the cold war"; lack of official international support was the primary reason. (Page 5)

29 July 60

NO

DAILY BRIEF

TOP SECRET

ii

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160557

(Available during the preceding week)

France and the Algerian Problem: NIE 71-60. July 60.

29 July 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Military Plotting Against Saudi Monarchy

The Saudi Government presumably is aware of current plotting among officers of the regular army, but it appears to be having difficulty in deciding what action to take to suppress the threat. The conspirators may now have enough strength in the Taif area to seize control of that area. They reportedly control the 900-man training group in Taif, which is one of the best units in the Saudi Army, and expect the support of other units in the immediate area comprising some 1,300 to 1,500 men. They have in their possession considerable quantities of arms and ammunition provided for use in summer training exercises.

Initiation of resolute government countermeasures may also be impeded by mutual suspicion within the royal family itself. A group of influential "liberal" princes is pressing for immediate changes in government policy, and the running quarrel between King Saud and Prime Minister Crown Prince Faysal has not been resolved. Faysal, still a sick man, has recently seemed particularly tense and is reportedly finding it difficult to conduct official business from Taif while the King remains in Riyadh.

The King's reported intention to visit Taif beginning 10 August, when Faysal and other senior princes are expected still to be there, could provide an unusual opportunity for the army plotters to strike if the government has not moved against them by that time. Their tentative plans call for sudden action to assassinate leading members of the royal family, followed by seizure of control of Taif, Jidda, and Mecca--the three key cities in western Saudi Arabia. It is possible that the conspirators also have an elaborate plan to obtain arms from outside the country, should they secure control of Jidda or some other port. A UAR official in Syria is reported to be acting as middleman for an unnamed Saudi principal--certainly not the Saudi Government--in attempting to negotiate the purchase in Eastern Europe of at least \$1,000,000 worth of military equipment for deliverv to Saudi Arabia by sea.

TOP SECRET

29 July 60

1¥

Ň

CApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160557 Page 1

South African Minister Proposes Military Cooperation With Portugal

South African Defense Minister Fouché has suggested that Portugal and the Union of South Africa draw up joint plans to defend southern Africa from African incursions from the north, Fouché proposed that he visit Portugal--possibly in June 1961 after the recess of the South African parliament--to discuss plans for cooperation with Portuguese Defense Minister Botelho Moniz. Portugal's ambassador in Pretoria comments that events elsewhere in Africa may lead the Union to request earlier discussions.

Fouche's suggestion reflects growing South African concern over the southward spread of African nationalism and over the ability of the white-controlled territories to ward it off. With the Congo and Tanganyika receiving self-government, officials in the Union apparently are attempting to develop a "fortress southern Africa" in which South Africa, the Rhodesias, and the Portuguese territories would form a united front in opposition to the further advance of the independent movement.

Portugal may hesitate to enter a formal alliance with South Africa. Its ambassador in Pretoria has repeatedly expressed the view that Portugal should not become too closely associated with the Union. However, any computcions in Lisbon about a military alliance with South Africa may lessen if the security situation along the Congo-Angola border should deteriorate.

Portugal's concern over the northern borders of its African territory has recently increased.

growing signs of alarm in Portuguese military and civilian circles over the threat of incursions from newly independent African states. On 15 July the military commander in Luanda recommended that troops in battalion strength be sent to Angola to prevent a possible spill-over of violence from the Congo. These troops apparently would be in addition to the reinforcements being sent to augment the 20,000 troops now in Angola and Mozambique. Talks with South African military officials might lead to a further augmentation of this program.

TOP SECRET

Japanese Conservatives Register Third Successive Gubernatorial Victory

The Liberal-Democratic party's decisive victory in the 27 July gubernatorial election in Gumma Prefecture, 80 miles northwest of Tokyo, is its third in succession since the May-June political crisis.

Although the Socialists had not expected to win in this strongly conservative prefecture, they have publicly expressed disappointment at the margin of their defeat--almost two-toone among 615,000 votes cast. After campaigning especially hard in this prefecture on the US-Japanese security treaty issue, both during the nationwide united-front campaign earlier and in the election campaign itself, the Socialists polled fewer votes than in previous gubernatorial elections there.

The Socialist party propaganda chief reportedly has stated that the results show that the treaty is not a profitable issue. In addition, however, it seems apparent that the Socialists' use of strong-arm tactics in the Diet prior to the lower-house vote on the security treaty, while excused by the large national dailies, has not received the support of a large portion of the electorate. Moreover, cooperation with the Communists in the united-front movement and open acceptance of Communist party support in the Gumma election probably hurt the Socialists.

Nevertheless, the results of the gubernatorial elections are not definitive indicators for general elections which are expected this fall or early in 1961.

as a consequence of these defeats, the Socialists intend to switch their tactics and to concentrate on fears that the government's program to liberalize trade import controls will cause a drop in the price of domestic farm produce, jeopardize local industry, and seriously damage the national economy.



29 July 60

Possible New Dominican Attempts to Assassinate Venezuelan President

Dominican dictator

Trujillo has asserted within the past few days that he has "sworn to kill" Venezuelan President Betancourt and has agents in Caracas now working on a plan to carry out the action.

the VenezuelanGovernment is concerned over a possible repetition of theTrujillo-instigated attempt on President Betancourt's life on24 June.the Venezuelan

ambassador in Madrid warned his government of possible assassination attempts set for 26 June and during the period 20 to 25 July. He also noted that Martin Parada, a key Venezuelan opposition leader, was meeting with other dissidents in exile who were organizing a Dominican-supported coup.

the Venezuelan ambassador in Rome informed his government of a Dominican plot to infiltrate Europeans into Venezuela to carry out subversive action. He also noted that "a general action is probably anticipated for August."

the Venezuelan Ministry of Interior and the Venezuelan Consulate in Madrid, which refer to "Operation Cherry," suggest that the Venezuelan Government has penetrated a network of Dominican agents plotting against the Betancourt regime.

Any further Dominican intervention in Venezuelan affairs could touch off military action between the two countries.

Venezuela, which is awaiting an OAS foreign ministers' meeting to consider its charges against the Dominican Republic, is attempting to acquire large numbers of jet aircraft "as soon as possible."

TOP SECRET

29 July 60 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160557 **Page 4**

Cuba Postpones Underdeveloped Nations Conference Indefinitely

Foreign Minister Raul Roa announced on 27 July the indefinite postponement of the Conference of Underdeveloped Nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which Cuba had hoped to convene in Havana next September. He blamed the "recent revival of the cold war," but the real reason for abandoning the conference, a major objective of recent Cuban foreign policy, was lack of official interest outside Cuba. The rapid development of Cuban ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc since the project was proposed last December makes a Cuban- sponsored conference increasingly unattractive to many of the governments Cuba had approached earlier this year.

Roa's clarification of President Dorticos' statement on 2 June, also indicating that the conference would not be held, was apparently necessitated by recent inquiries by Afro-Asian countries. [Earlier this month, Indian, Pakistani, and Iraqi officials had told American Embassy officers that their governments had heard nothing from Cuba on the proposed conference for some months.] A Ceylonese Foreign Ministry official indicated on 4 July that his government might be influenced to send delegates if India does.

The Castro regime continues to seek support from the Afro-Asian bloc, and the Cuban delegation at the next UN General Assembly is likely to seek to identify itself with the spokesmen of "neutralism." Raul Castro is now on a "good-will" visit in Cairo with a large entourage. Press reports from Cairo state that President Nasir is to visit Cuba next March, and that the UAR has decided to ship benzine to Cuba to help that country "face imperialist plots."



29 July 60

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160557

Page 5

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160557 CONFIDENTIAL

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160557 TOP SECRET

.

.

میند. این می از این از این می این می از ای این می از ا