


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24 November 1960

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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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24 NOVEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Pravda editorial reiterating Soviet position indicates continuing inability to resolve Sino-Soviet dispute.

①

Incidents on Tibet-Sikkim border, allegedly involving sniping by Chinese troops, to further exacerbate Sino-Indian relations, but probably not deliberately engineered by Peiping.

②

Vietnamese Communists receive belated orders to exploit "advantageous" situation in South Vietnam following the abortive 11 November coup against Diem.

③

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Situation in Laos.


④

Thailand--Premier Sarit investigating wave of coup rumors.

⑤

UAR--Unprecedented display of Syrian friendliness toward the US may reflect a desire for US economic aid.

⑥



III. THE WEST

⑦ Appointment of new top French civil officials in Algeria expected to stiffen rightist opposition there; civil "total disobedience" being planned.

⑧ Haiti--Student strike does not now threaten regime; drastic police action, however, could lead to widespread rioting.

⑨ Bolivian President claims he will hand over presidency to vice president--a leftist labor leader--if US economic aid is not granted.



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 November 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-China: In apparent reply to the 21 November People's Daily editorial which presented the familiar Chinese arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Pravda on 23 November also editorialized on the declaration which followed the meeting of bloc leaders in 1957. It selected for emphasis, however, those aspects of the declaration--for example, on peaceful coexistence and the preventability of war--which correspond to present Soviet positions. This continuation of open discussion between the Soviet and Chinese parties while international Communist leaders are still meeting in Moscow indicates that they have been unable to resolve their disagreements and suggests that they have found it difficult to formulate a communiqué which will satisfy both parties. The moderate tone of the Pravda editorial, however, would appear to presage the probable nature of any communiqué which may result--one placing heaviest emphasis on the majority Soviet view but so worded that the Chinese can sign it and continue to claim that their views are valid. [redacted]

[redacted] Communist China - India: Relations between Peiping and New Delhi will be further exacerbated by several recent incidents in which Indian soldiers were killed or wounded on the Tibet-Sikkim border, allegedly by Chinese Communist snipers. Peiping has been pressing New Delhi for substantive border negotiations, and it seems unlikely that the incidents represent a premeditated effort by Peiping to precipitate new clashes with the Indians. Chinese troops are in the area, however, probably attempting to check the re-entry of Tibetan rebels gathered in Sikkim. New Delhi, apprehensive about its defense position in Sikkim, has recently augmented and alerted Indian troops in the area.] [redacted]

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North - South Vietnam: [redacted]

[redacted] the Communists were slow to react to the 11 November attempt against President Diem and still were not clear on some details nine days later, they indicate that the Communists now hope to capitalize on the post-coup situation. [redacted] North Vietnamese [redacted] interpret the coup as symptomatic of the difficulties besetting Diem and the resulting situation as "very advantageous for us," call for political agitation to exploit dissension in the South, and repeat orders for political assassination of "cruel individuals." In addition [redacted] help be given the escaping participants in the coup--some of whom may still be at large--in the hope that they might be useful in the Communist effort to create a united front of elements dedicated to ousting Diem. [redacted]

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

\*Laos: A mixed force of troops under the control of Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao, consisting of more than six companies, is reported to be advancing along routes leading to Luang Prabang. One column evidently departed from Muong Kassy on 23 November, followed by a larger force on 24 November. Luang Prabang is some 55 miles distant from Muong Kassy, over difficult country, and an unopposed route march might require three or four days.

On 22 November [redacted] military headquarters in Savannakhet ordered the pro-Phoumi force in Luang Prabang to organize the perimeter defenses of the town, including guerrilla activity in the surrounding vicinity. Also Phoumi-controlled forces were ordered to commence pressure operations against Vientiane. [redacted]

Souvanna Phouma, while denying to the American ambassador that he has actually given an order to attack Luang Prabang, has been active on other fronts. On 23 November he announced that within three or four days, the Soviet Union would begin airlifting food and gasoline to Vientiane via Hanoi. On the same day, his government made a formal request to the American ambassador in Vientiane that the United States immediately cease all aid to General Phoumi's Savannakhet regime.

24 Nov 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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[redacted] Souvanna is considering either an appeal for UN intervention or the return of the International Control Commission if the United States does not cease its support of Phoumi. [redacted]

[redacted] the UK, as co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva truce conference, had previously objected to the return of the ICC on the grounds that the Laotian Government was opposed; if Souvanna should now reverse this position, the UK might find it difficult to continue its opposition.

Hanoi and Peiping have seized on Vientiane's 16 November statement that it would seek closer ties with Hanoi and Peiping. North Vietnam on 19 November invited a Laotian delegation to visit Hanoi and discuss "cooperation and mutual aid" proposals. Souvanna Phouma's reply, [redacted]

[redacted] agreed to "barter goods at our common frontier" but did not respond to Hanoi's invitation to send a delegation. An official Chinese Communist statement on 20 November "warmly welcomed" the Vientiane statement on improving relations and said that Peiping "is prepared to take corresponding measures."

Thailand: Many coup rumors, of varying plausibility, are again circulating in Bangkok. The possible participants in such a move and their motivations are by no means clear. Premier Sarit, however, is reliably reported to be considerably concerned over the recent rash of reports and to be actively investigating them. [redacted]

UAR: Syrian officials are displaying an attitude of friendly cooperation toward Americans unprecedented in recent years. The Syrians appear to be taking their lead from Syrian Executive Council President Sarraj, whose recent show of warmth is in marked contrast to his previously hostile, anti-US behavior. Sarraj, now apparently undisputed boss of Syria, has assumed responsibility for reviving Syria's sagging economy and may

24 Nov 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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be counting heavily on American assistance. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

### III. THE WEST

France-Algeria: Rightist opposition to De Gaulle's Algerian policy will probably be further consolidated by his appointment of the relatively liberal Louis Joxe as minister of Algerian affairs, and the selection of Jean Morin as new delegate general in Algeria. Morin is a tough administrator apparently picked for his effectiveness in handling the principal area of rightist concentration in France. There are indications that the Front for French Algeria (FAF) is planning "total disobedience" to paralyze all government services and force the army to take over in Algeria. The government is alert to this possibility as well as to reported plans of General Salan to return clandestinely to Algeria where FAF leaders are said to expect him to lead such activities. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Haiti: The regime does not appear immediately threatened by the student strike that led it to impose martial law throughout Haiti on 22 November. However, drastic police action against the students, likely should there be public demonstrations, could cause a sudden swelling of antigovernment feeling and even widespread rioting threatening the government. President Duvalier's opponents are diverse and poorly organized, but the President is unpopular, particularly in the capital. The primary motivation for the strike is probably resentment over the President's refusal to free a student leader jailed without charges for some weeks. [REDACTED]

Bolivia: President Paz has told US Ambassador Strom he may hand over the presidency "this week" to Vice President Juan Lechin--Bolivia's leftist labor leader who has often displayed an anti-US attitude--if US aid to meet pressing economic problems is not granted. Paz' difficulties are intensified by a pronounced pro-Communist, leftist drift in recent months, widespread labor and peasant unrest, serious

24 Nov 60

DAILY BRIEF

iv

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violence in the Department of Cochabamba this month, and increasing pressure on the bankrupt government to accept bloc offers of aid. Strom believes that Paz' position is gravely threatened. [ ]

#### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Prospects for the Republic of Korea Over the Next Few Years: Likely Future of Chang Government and Leftward Trends, Economic Stability, and Foreign Policy, Especially Toward the US and Japan, Present and Future Status of Armed Forces. NIE 42.1-2-60. 22 November 1960. [ ]

24 Nov 60

DAILY BRIEF

v

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President**

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     Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
     Scientific Adviser to the President  
     Director of the Budget  
     Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization  
     Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
     Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
     Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
     Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy  
     Executive Secretary, National Security Council  
**The Treasury Department**  
     The Secretary of the Treasury  
**The Department of State**  
     The Secretary of State  
     The Under Secretary of State  
     The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
     The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
     The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration  
     The Counselor  
     Director, International Cooperation Administration  
     The Director of Intelligence and Research  
**The Department of Defense**  
     The Secretary of Defense  
     The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
     Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
     The Secretary of the Army  
     The Secretary of the Navy  
     The Secretary of the Air Force  
     The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
     The Director, The Joint Staff  
     Chief of Staff, United States Army  
     Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
     Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
     Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
     Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
     Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
     Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
     Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
     Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
     Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
     Commander in Chief, Pacific  
**The Department of Commerce**  
     The Secretary of Commerce  
**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
     The Director  
**Atomic Energy Commission**  
     The Chairman  
**National Security Agency**  
     The Director  
**National Indications Center**  
     The Director

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