


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26 November 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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26 NOVEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


II. ASIA-AFRICA

Congo--UAR efforts to form pro-Lumumba "popular front" intensified. [redacted] ①

Indonesia may plan further small-scale para-military activity in southwest New Guinea. ②

Jordanian-Lebanese relations worsen. ③

Situation in Laos. ④



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 November 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Congo: [redacted]

[redacted] a course of action designed to enlist the support of other African and Asian countries in stimulating a pro-Lumumba nationalist front in the Congo. [redacted]

[redacted] such a coalition would be able to call on foreign allies for material and military assistance, "and it is inevitable that the Soviet Union must bear most of it." He indicated concern, however, that "if Mobutu and the imperialists emerge victorious," Mobutu will expel the embassies of Guinea and the UAR and possibly those of India and Yugoslavia. [redacted]

(Page 1)

Indonesia-Netherlands: A 23-man armed Indonesian force--some of whom were captured by the Dutch shortly after landing in southwest New Guinea about 15 November--may be the first contingent in an accelerated Indonesian paramilitary campaign to create dissension in the area. [redacted] Djakarta apparently believes that such tactics would increase international pressure on the Dutch for cession of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia. [redacted] Dutch fears of a large-scale Indonesian invasion of New Guinea in the near future appear unfounded. [redacted] (Page 2)

Jordan-Lebanon-UAR: Relations between Jordan and Lebanon have become strained because of Jordanian sabotage activities in Syria which have been directed from Lebanon. The recent expulsion of the Jordanian military attaché in Beirut may have resulted from UAR pressure on Lebanon. This move, together with possible further

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Lebanese curtailment of Jordanian intelligence operations, will inhibit but probably not eliminate Jordan's contacts with subversive elements in Syria through Lebanon. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 4)

*Laos: [The extent of the military threat to Luang Prabang is still not clear. Aerial surveillance on 24 November revealed what appeared to be a large truck convoy moving northward toward Muong Kassy, on the Vientiane - Luang Prabang road. A smaller convoy of approximately ten trucks was observed apparently returning to Vientiane. At Muong Kassy some parked trucks and 200 to 250 men were observed. [redacted] No

[redacted] a convoy of 25 vehicles would return from Muong Kassy to Vientiane on 24 November. [redacted]

[An American official in Luang Prabang estimates that troops there could successfully defend against a coordinated attack by a force of up to three battalions. Forty percent of the troops in Luang Prabang are headquarters and service personnel who might be effective in defense of the city but would be of limited value in a counterattack. The key factor in the defense of the city, however, would be the will of the individual soldier to fight. [redacted]

[redacted] troop strength in the city was considered insufficient and requested Savannakhet to send reinforcements. [redacted]

[There is as yet no reaction from the principals who would be involved in Premier Souvanna Phouma's proposal for a Luang Prabang meeting of political leaders to discuss the formation of a national union government. [redacted]

26 Nov 60

DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~The Situation in the Congo

[redacted] a course of action designed to enlist the support of other African and Asian countries in stimulating a pro-Lumumba nationalist front in the Congo. [redacted]

[redacted] the representatives of Guinea, India, and Yugoslavia agreed with him concerning the seriousness of the situation and the necessity for grouping nationalist elements into a united front. He stated that Baluba leader Jason Sendwe may announce the formation of a new pro-Lumumba coalition when the UN Conciliation Commission arrives in Leopoldville.

[redacted] such a pro-Lumumba coalition would be able to call on foreign allies for material and military assistance "and it is inevitable that the Soviet Union must bear most of it." He speculated that recognition of a new Congolese government by pro-Lumumba African states could be followed by "the intervention in strength of the Soviet Union and the Communist camp." [redacted] "This does not mean that we would enter the battle on the side of the Eastern bloc, but that the Eastern bloc is the one which would intervene to assist the independent nations in their policy toward the Congo."

[redacted] notwithstanding their grandiose plans, Lumumba's African allies were concerned over the course of events in the UN, in Leopoldville, and in Orientale Province. After reporting that the position of pro-Lumumba forces in Stanleyville had "improved greatly," he noted that Lumumba and his followers now are interested in "transferring their activity" to areas of the Congo interior other than Orientale Province. He warned that "if Mobutu and the imperialists emerge victorious," Mobutu will expel the embassies of Guinea and the UAR and possibly those of India and Yugoslavia. [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Indonesia May Accelerate Paramilitary Campaign
In New Guinea

A 23-man armed Indonesian force--some of whom were captured by the Dutch shortly after landing in southwest New Guinea about 15 November--may be the first contingent in an accelerated Indonesian paramilitary campaign to create dissension in the area. [Djakarta believes such tactics would increase international pressures on the Dutch for cession of the area to Indonesia.] Captured members of the force claim other infiltration teams will follow. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the New Guinea landing mention supply problems and an operation scheduled for 27 November. [REDACTED]

[The Dutch administration in New Guinea has reported at least a dozen infiltration attempts since 1952. However, Indonesia apparently did not evolve a long-term plan for the infiltration and eventual accession of New Guinea until some time after its last defeat on the issue at the United Nations in November 1957. An apparently authentic Indonesian document dated December 1959 gives details of a three- to five-year plan which calls for infiltration of "territorial cadres" into New Guinea, eventual guerrilla operations, and finally a resort to diplomacy--presumably an appeal to the UN--and possibly to a sea and air offensive.] Indonesia's army chief of staff told Parliament last February that an intensified struggle to "reclaim" New Guinea must be waged on all fronts--economic, political, and military--and that it must be carried on both inside and outside the territory.


Reports that a large-scale rebellion is taking place in the area apparently are inspired by Djakarta, and Dutch fears of an Indonesian invasion of battalion size or larger in the near future appear unfounded.

The Dutch now have about 3,000 troops in New Guinea and are sending approximately 1,000 more army and air force

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personnel. In addition, the territorial mobile force, which functions under the civil administration, comprises some 200 Europeans and 1,400 native Papuans. []



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~~TOP SECRET~~Lebanon Expels Jordanian Military Attaché

Jordanian sabotage activities in Syria, which have been arranged and directed in Lebanon, have strained relations between Jordan and Lebanon. A Lebanese arrested in Damascus, who subsequently was extradited to Lebanon, reportedly confessed that he had been sent by the Jordanian military attaché in Beirut to plant explosives in Syria. UAR pressure on the Lebanese Government resulted in an announcement on 23 November by Lebanese Foreign Minister Taqla that the Jordanian attaché, Major Ghazi al-Khatib, had returned to Jordan at the request of the Lebanese Government and would not be allowed to return to Beirut. The Lebanese also are imposing more stringent controls on the activities of Syrian political exiles in Lebanon.

[King Husayn

was considering withdrawing most of the Jordanian Embassy staff in Beirut following the summoning of Khatib by Lebanese authorities for questioning. Husayn apparently feels that the present Lebanese Government, led by pro-Nasir Prime Minister Saib Salam, is so susceptible to UAR pressure that Jordan cannot hope for much "cooperation" from it.

Khatib's expulsion together with possible further Lebanese curtailment of Jordanian intelligence operations will inhibit but probably not eliminate Jordan's contacts through Lebanon with subversive elements in Syria.

Khatib has directed sabotage operations in Syria, including three explosions in Damascus on 25 October, and has attempted to arrange the assassination of Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, president of the Syrian Executive Council. The Jordanians believe Sarraj was responsible for the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli on 29 August.

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