


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29 December 1960



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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


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29 DECEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet party presidium members travel to provincial centers to explain outcome of Moscow Communist conference to local party officials.


II. ASIA-AFRICA

Congo--Gizenga's move into Kivu may have given him control over much of province; pressure increased on Mobutu to initiate military action against dissidents.

Yemeni-British relations strained over alleged British support of anti-monarchical Yemenis in Aden.

Mali--Leftward trend in foreign relations likely to increase Mali's susceptibility to blandishments of Sino-Soviet bloc.


Laos--Soviet Premier Khrushchev's private statements suggest Moscow not contemplating open intervention in Laos with identifiable forces under present circumstances; bloc material aid to Phoumi forces to continue.



III. THE WEST

⑥ El Salvadoran Communist-front party leaders to go to Cuba, presumably for Castro-Communist guidance.

⑦ Paraguayan opposition forces reportedly planning new attempt, possibly starting today, to overthrow Stroessner regime; government units alerted.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 December 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: At least nine members of the Soviet party presidium have been dispatched to key provincial centers within the USSR during the last week to explain the outcome of the November conference of world Communist leaders to local party officials. The relatively rare practice of providing authoritative expositions of party policy by top members of the hierarchy has been connected in the past with complicated or controversial issues, such as the Zhukov ouster and this year's troop-reduction announcement. In the present instance, the intention probably is to give second-echelon officials a clearer picture of the Soviet leadership's view of the USSR's relationship with China than emerged in the ambiguous conference documents.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Congo: Gizenga's move into Kivu Province on 25-27 December--accomplished with only a few hundred troops--may have given him control over much of the province. Although some troops in Kivu remain loyal to Mobutu, the dissidents may have broken Mobutu's "economic blockade" of Orientale Province in large measure by gaining control of a major food-producing area. If the dissidents are successful in extending their influence to the Congo interior, this success is likely to impress the independent African states, most of which are sympathetic toward the Gizenga regime while doubtful concerning its long-term prospects. Some African states, which are scheduled to meet in Casablanca in early January, may offer the dissidents material aid or even grant formal diplomatic recognition. Gizenga's move

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will increase pressure on Mobutu to undertake military operations against the dissidents, notwithstanding Hammar-skjold's threat to withdraw UN troops in such an event. In Leopoldville, President Kasavubu has told the Liberian ambassador that he is ready to receive the UN Conciliation Commission and suggested it begin meetings by 3 January.

Yemen-UK: Imam Ahmad has declared the British charge in Taiz persona non grata and is recalling the Yemeni charge from London. The Imam's action is in retaliation for alleged British support of anti-monarchical Yemenis residing in Aden and the Aden Protectorate and believed by the Imam to be responsible for recent bombings in Sana and other towns in Yemen. The Imam probably does not intend a complete break in relations but may hope the UK will take action against such elements.

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Mali: President Modibo Keita, who has been under strong pressure from militant left-wing elements within his regime, is aligning Mali more closely with its radical neighbor, Guinea, where the Sino-Soviet bloc has established a firm foothold. Prior to his recent meeting in Conakry with Guinean President Touré and Ghanaian President Nkrumah during which Mali's adherence to the Ghana-Guinea "union" was announced, Keita indicated in private that Mali considered it had more in common with Guinea than with the other French-speaking African states. This leftward trend, which may be reflected in cabinet changes expected shortly, is likely to increase Mali's susceptibility to the blandishments of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

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(Page 1)

Laos: Soviet Premier Khrushchev's remarks on the situation in Laos during a private conversation with the British ambassador on 26 December provide a possible indication that

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29 Dec 60

DAILY BRIEF

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Moscow regards current bloc activities as a long-term operation and does not contemplate open intervention with identifiable bloc military forces under present circumstances. He said the USSR would continue to aid anti-Phoumi forces and that, while fighting on the present scale could go on for as long as seven years, he felt no major war would result. [redacted]

[redacted] Bloc public statements continue to create an air of tension about developments in Laos. Communist China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in a 28 December letter to the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the USSR and Great Britain, warned that the "war in Laos is pregnant with danger of further expansion" and insisted a solution could be achieved only by accepting Communist terms. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 3)

III. THE WEST

El Salvador: Fourteen leaders of the Communist-front April and May Revolutionary party (PRAM) reportedly have either left or are about to leave for Cuba. The US Embassy at San Salvador comments that the size and composition of the group indicate that El Salvador is about to receive a "massive injection" of Castro-Communist doctrine, guidance, and support. Meanwhile peasant groups reportedly being organized by PRAM and the Communist-dominated labor federation are taking on the character of a "popular militia" and already may control certain strategic points in the country. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 6)

*Paraguay: The Paraguayan government has taken extensive security precautions in anticipation of a new attempt, possibly starting today, to overthrow President Stroessner. [redacted]
[redacted], the regime has information that

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DAILY BRIEF

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opposition forces plan an uprising in Asuncion--reportedly scheduled for 29 December--timed to coincide with an invasion of Paraguay at several points by exile groups now based in Argentina. Between December 1959 and this past August there were a number of small-scale invasions of the country by exile forces, but these did not draw major support within the country. Although Stroessner reportedly retains the loyalty of most of the armed forces, a number of factors, including depressed economic conditions, have increased popular discontent in the country, and have heightened the possibility of more widespread support for any new attempt against the government.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- [REDACTED]
- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.
 - B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future.
 - C. The Communist bloc airlift operations associated with the Laotian situation continue and remain consistent with what we believe to be a decision to provide sufficient support to the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces to prevent establishment of effective control over the country by an anti-Communist Lao government. It still appears unlikely that the Communist bloc has decided to intervene openly with its own identifiable military forces at this time.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

29 Dec 60

DAILY BRIEF

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Mali Moving Toward Closer Alignment With Guinea

President Modibo Keita, who has been under strong pressure from extremist elements within Mali's single-party authoritarian regime, is aligning his country more closely with its radical neighbor, Guinea, where the Sino-Soviet bloc has established a firm foothold. Earlier a distinct coolness had developed in the Mali-Guinea relationship, largely because of indications that Guinean President Touré expected to play a dominant role in a close partnership between the two French states following the disruption in August of the former federation between Mali and Senegal. In October, Mali asked Touré to postpone his proposed state visit to Bamako until January, then pointedly agreed to a similar visit by Ghana's Nkrumah last month.

Since early December, however, when Keita and Touré held a hastily arranged rendezvous at the Guinea-Mali frontier, a rapprochement has been developing. [Keita afforded further evidence of this when he indicated to visiting American dignitaries on 16 December that Mali considered it had more in common with Guinea than with the other French-speaking African states. At the same time, he made it clear that Mali did not look to the pro-Western Ivory Coast for inspiration and political cooperation, despite his own former close ties with Ivory Coast leader Houphouet-Boigny.] A week later the Mali President went to Conakry to affirm Mali's adherence to the Ghana-Guinea "union."

The American Embassy in Bamako believes that while the Congo and Algerian situations have contributed to this rapprochement, Mali's leaders are primarily attracted to Guinea's Marxist-influenced approach to basic political and economic problems.

This leftward trend, (which reportedly will be reflected in cabinet changes to be announced shortly,) seems likely to increase Mali's susceptibility to blandishments from the Sino-Soviet bloc. At present Mali is in the process of establishing

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diplomatic relations with at least four bloc countries--including Communist China and North Vietnam--and has signed preliminary trade and technical assistance agreements with Czechoslovakia. In addition, a Soviet economic mission has been in Mali for some time, studying possible aid projects.



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Situation in Laos

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] Khrushchev [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not think major war would result from events in Laos but that fighting on the present scale could go on for as long as seven years. Khrushchev's remarks are another indication that the Soviet Union regards bloc activities in Laos as a long-term operation and does not contemplate open intervention with identifiable bloc military forces under present circumstances. The Soviet premier also said that Moscow would continue to aid anti-Phoumi forces and that ultimately those who are not now Communist would become so and would win out. Khrushchev's reference to the possibility of protracted civil war in Laos was probably designed to impress the United Kingdom with the necessity of arranging a political settlement in Laos either through reactivation of the ICC or through an international conference such as the USSR has already requested. [REDACTED]

The Soviet leader's observations follow remarks made by Foreign Minister Gromyko concerning Laos in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on 23 December--the first authoritative foreign policy statement since the Moscow conference of Communist leaders. Gromyko claimed that the Laotian people "continue the struggle for the freedom and independence of their country." He characterized events in Laos as "a militant prelude to complete liberation from foreign rule." Soviet propaganda during the past week has also emphasized that the struggle for Laos has not ended with the capture of Vientiane but will continue throughout the countryside. Radio Moscow, meanwhile, continues to detail charges of "US aggression" in Laos and has accused the United States of refusing to take any steps to "normalize the dangerous situation" in Laos.

Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in a 28 December letter to the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference,

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the USSR and Great Britain, warned that the "war in Laos is pregnant with danger of further expansion." Endorsing the 22 December Soviet note to the British, Chen Yi insisted that a reactivated ICC should deal only with the "legal" government of Souvanna Phouma--contacts with the Boun Oum government "would be extremely serious"--and stated that, should it prove impossible to bring back the ICC on these terms, another Geneva conference should be called. Peiping would expect to participate in such a conference.

The Pathet Lao radio on 27 December broadcast a joint statement by Prince Souphannouvong and Quinim Pholsena, on behalf of the Neo Lao Hak Sat party (NLHS) and the "legal government of the Laotian kingdom" respectively, pledging close collaboration in the fight against the "puppet" Boun Oum regime and describing it as a "tool of the aggressors." The statement proclaimed that the "royal army troops" and the Pathet Lao would "combine their forces" in support of the Souvanna Phouma government as the only government recognized by the "Laotian people." Quinim, the extreme leftist minister of information in the Souvanna government, has been in the Pathet Lao stronghold of Sam Neua for several days.


[In Phnom Penh, Souvanna Phouma [redacted] would not return to Laos unless his proposal for a coalition government including the Pathet Lao and General Phoumi's Savannakhet group was accepted, or unless a government was formed which excluded both groups. Souvanna [redacted] had no intention of going to Sam Neua, as suggested by Souphannouvong. He added that he intended to remain in Phnom Penh for several weeks to "await developments" and to discuss the situation with Cambodian Prince Sihanouk.] [redacted]

At least five of the six Soviet AN-12s which arrived in North Vietnam on 27 December have returned to Communist China. A

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seventh was delayed at Canton but was rescheduled for Haiphong on 28 December. Thus far, two AN-12s have been scheduled to return to Moscow and one to Vladivostok, where additional supplies for Laos may be loaded. Two AN-12s which returned to Canton from Haiphong now are scheduled to return to Haiphong on 29 December. Soviet and North Vietnamese transports continued flights to Laos through 28 December.

The five Soviet MI-4 helicopters which entered China from the Soviet Far East on 23 December continued their flight from Shenyang to Tientsin on 28 December. They are probably destined for airlift operations in Laos.



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Salvadoran Communists Reportedly to Seek Cuban Support

Fourteen leaders of the Salvadoran Communist-front April and May Revolutionary party (PRAM) are reported to have left or to be about to leave for Cuba. The US Embassy at San Salvador commented that the size and composition of the group indicate that El Salvador is about to receive a "massive injection" of Castro-Communist doctrine, guidance, and support. The group may hope that it can obscure the real purpose of its trip by timing the visit to coincide with celebrations in Cuba on 1 and 2 January--to be attended by delegations from various Latin American countries--in commemoration of the second anniversary of Fidel Castro's revolutionary victory.

Peasant groups being organized by PRAM and the Communist-dominated labor federation reportedly are taking on the character of a "popular militia" and already may control certain strategic points in the country. The three civilians on the governing six-man junta and several cabinet members suspected of being Communist sympathizers have continued to fill government posts at all levels, particularly in the ministries of labor and justice, with suspected Communists.

A concerted drive led by Mario Castrillo Zeledon, a suspected Communist who is attorney general, to gain control over the internal security functions of the government has resulted in a growing awareness of the Communist threat by some military members of the regime. The military is split by dissension, however, and has given no recent indication that it is about to unite to stem the Communist bid for power.

The junta reportedly has decided to hold congressional elections next May, to be followed by the election in the new Congress of a provisional president to serve until a duly elected president takes office in September 1962. This move may be intended to mollify the military and quiet the fears of the urban citizenry, which along with other segments of the population is becoming increasingly worried over gains being made by Communist and Castro sympathizers. The Communists have already made considerable progress in gaining control over the nation's electoral machinery, however, and PRAM will probably soon be inscribed as a political party and thus be able to compete in the May elections.

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