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
18 January 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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18 JANUARY 1960


**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Chou En-lai again invites Burmese prime minister to Peiping, but in effect turns down Burmese proposals for border settlement. ①


**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Turks being pressed by Moscow for exchange of high-level visits. ②

Laotian Government devising electoral procedures to assure conservative victory this spring; Hanoi cautions against any departure from neutral foreign policy. ③

**III. THE WEST**

④ Dominican Republic--Trujillo trying to counter growing unrest.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

18 January 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - Burma: Premier Chou En-lai on [redacted] renewed his invitation to Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win to visit Peiping for talks, which he said would be "very useful" in promoting an agreement on the Sino-Burmese border issue. Chou again side-stepped acknowledgment of Ne Win's precondition for such a visit--China's acceptance of Burma's June 1959 proposals--and called on Burma to "continue negotiations" on the "relatively small difference" remaining between the two sides. It now is probably clear to Ne Win that the Chinese will not give him a border settlement on his terms. (Page 1)

NO

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Turkey-USSR: [Turkish Prime Minister Menderes has informed Ambassador Warren of his concern over problems posed for his government by the atmosphere of East-West detente and recent exchanges of high-level visits. Soviet representatives in Turkey are actively urging similar visits between Turkey and the USSR. According to Menderes, Turkey does not oppose an East-West detente, but it faces the dilemma of determining how to keep in step with its Western allies without unnerving its Middle Eastern friends. On balance, however, it appears that Ankara will probably accede to Soviet pressure for increased official exchange visits.] (Page 2)

NO

Laos: [The new Laotian Government is devising electoral procedures which it hopes will ensure a conservative victory over the Communists in elections for a new National Assembly, still tentatively scheduled for April or May. The government has also taken pains to make clear to foreign nations that it intends to continue its officially neutral foreign policy. North]

NO

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[Vietnam has greeted the new government with comparative moderation but has indicated that Hanoi might call for increased Communist activity if Vientiane departs from a neutral course.]  
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### III. THE WEST

OK Dominican Republic: Dictator Trujillo, fearful that growing internal unrest may reach insurrectionary proportions, has taken a series of measures in an effort to counter it. In addition to economic concessions such as reduced rents for low-income city dwellers and small farmers, he has removed another source of public irritation by relieving his unpopular son "Ramfis" as chief of the Combined General Staff.

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Peiping Repeats Invitation to Burmese Premier

Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai on 12 January renewed his invitation of 22 December to Burmese Premier Ne Win to visit Peiping for a discussion of the Sino-Burmese border dispute. Ne Win on 3 January rejected the earlier invitation, stating that the work of preparing for the forthcoming elections in Burma ruled out a trip at this time unless he could be assured beforehand that the Chinese would sign a settlement based on Burma's June proposals, its maximum offer.

As in his earlier letter, Chou ignored Ne Win's condition that the Chinese must first accede to the Burmese proposals and suggested further "negotiations." Chou said he felt it would be "very useful" toward promoting a settlement if he were given the chance to explain the Chinese Government's position and to discuss "matters of principle" for eliminating the remaining differences. Although Chou tried to minimize the points of disagreement between the two sides--he said these were "relatively small"--his letter implies Burma's proposals are unacceptable.

The Communists--in maintaining a posture of readiness to negotiate but avoiding agreement to Burmese conditions--are following the same tactics they are using in the border dispute with India. Peiping is unwilling to give a border settlement to the strongly anti-Communist Ne Win, particularly with the prospect of a more sympathetic Burmese Government after the 29 February election. These stalling tactics have probably made it clear to Ne Win that he will not get a settlement on his terms.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Turkey Faces Dilemma in Relations With USSR

[Ankara appears ready to take steps to keep pace with what it regards as a Western movement toward detente with the USSR, but is concerned that any deviation from its basically austere policy toward Moscow may cause apprehension among some of its Middle East neighbors, especially Iran. Prime Minister Menderes, in recently discussing with Ambassador Warren the question of Soviet pressure for an exchange of high-level visits, noted that contrary to the impression gained by some of its Western allies, Turkey is not fundamentally opposed to an East-West detente but merely wants to view the situation realistically.]

[According to Menderes, Soviet representatives in Turkey are actively contacting various ministries, newspapers, and institutions and expounding the theme "we now are friends with the US, why can we not be friends with Turkey as well." Menderes told Warren that the Russians has been insisting on official exchange visits for years, and now want to follow the recent visit of the Turkish minister of health with other high-level visits as a manifestation of improved relations.]

[Menderes' allegations of Soviet pressure concerning diplomatic contacts in which Soviet officials have endeavored to exploit the friendly theme of the Camp David talks. On occasion, Soviet representatives as well as the Soviet press have applied the "stick" principle as well as the "carrot."]

[Moscow's current campaign to expand contacts with Turkish officials is part of its broader effort to exploit the current thaw in East-West relations. The Soviet leaders probably regard Turkey as a major obstacle to the attainment of their objectives in the Middle East.]

[In line with Menderes' expressed views that East-West exchanges are the "order of the day," there probably will be an increase in exchange visits by Turkish and Soviet delegations during the ensuing months. No basic change in Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy is anticipated, however, although such visits may have a marked impact on Turkey's Middle East neighbors.]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Developments in Laos Following Formation of New Government

[The new government of Khou Abhay in Laos is concentrating on devising electoral procedures which it hopes will ensure a conservative victory over the Communists in the National Assembly elections tentatively scheduled for April or May. Among the still unresolved questions in connection with preparations for elections are whether to hold them in one or two stages and whether to have candidates contest for seats on a province-wide or district basis. These issues may well become serious sources of new friction among Laos' anti-Communist elements and frustrate the efforts of moderate Premier Khou and his brother, Deputy Premier Nhouy, to heal the deep divisions in conservative ranks caused by the recent governmental crisis.]

[Premier Khou, who is elderly, says he plans to exercise over-all policy control, but he has delegated a great deal of authority in day-to-day governmental affairs to his younger and more energetic brother. Nhouy is a former interior minister who was closely involved in past government efforts to devise workable electoral procedures.]

[Army leaders claim they can "completely" pacify the country before elections, but this is probably a vain hope. While the Communists insurgents have been relatively quiet in recent weeks, they are believed to retain control of significant areas of the countryside. There have been indications, moreover, that rebel ranks are being increased by young Laotians who have completed courses at Communist training and indoctrination centers reportedly located just across the frontier in North Vietnam.]

[The new government seems to contemplate with as much enthusiasm as the Phoui regime the prospect of substantially increased UN technical assistance under Secretary General Hammar-skjold's scheme to maintain a continuing UN presence in Laos. The government, however, has taken pains to make it clear to both friends and enemies of Laos that it intends to pursue a neutral foreign policy.]

[Hanoi has greeted the new government with comparative moderation but has indicated that it might call for increased Communist activity if Vientiane departs from a neutral course.]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Dominican Dictator Makes Effort to Counter Unrest

Dominican dictator Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, fearful that growing internal unrest may reach insurrectionary proportions, has recently taken a number of actions which, in the opinion of the American Embassy at Ciudad Trujillo, reflect the first clear evidence of good judgment on his part since early in 1958. Recovery of his political objectivity could enable Trujillo to cope more effectively with the dissidents, especially since he has apparently ceased efforts to advance the political career of his unpopular son, General Rafael L. ("Ramfis") Trujillo-

Early this month, the generalissimo removed Ramfis from his post as chief of the Combined General Staff, where he obstructed relations with the United States, and sent him to Europe, reportedly for a protracted stay. The dictator probably realized that strained US-Dominican relations encouraged antiregime elements, many of whom believe that the United States helps Trujillo stay in power.

During the past several weeks Trujillo has enacted several measures designed to frustrate any immediate dissident plans. Rents have been reduced for the low-income city dwellers and small farmers who make up Trujillo's broad political support, an earlier decision denying workers Christmas bonuses has been reversed, scheduled salary decreases for government employees have been canceled, and heavy arms purchases have apparently been reduced or terminated. In addition, Trujillo has announced a grant of \$11,250,000 from the International Monetary Fund to reinforce the Dominican economy.

While these measures may temporarily arrest dissident activity, the apparent decision of the generalissimo to take over the presidency from his brother Hector may indicate a desperate attempt on the dictator's part to retain control.

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Scientific Adviser to the President

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Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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