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9 May 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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9 MAY 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Khrushchev visit prior to summit rumored in Prague.

II. ASIA-AFRICA


Turkey--Ruling party reported split over further "abnormal" measures against opposition; Menderes may fire interior minister and police chief.

South Korea--Arguments continue over proposed political reforms.

Ethiopia asks USSR to condition UN membership for Somali union on guarantee of Ethiopian borders.

III. THE WEST

Portuguese official says Portugal would leave NATO, refuse Azores bases if US should side with Congo in any dispute with Lisbon.



- 6 Betancourt says Venezuela will leave OAS if US does not take positive stand against Trujillo.
- © Cuba resumes relations with USSR, will reportedly also establish relations with Communist China in due course.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 May 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Czechoslovakia: Khrushchev was persuaded by Czechoslovak party boss Novotny, during the latter's visit to Moscow from 2 to 4 May, to put in an appearance at the Prague liberation celebrations which began on 7 May, according to rumors again circulating in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet ambassador in Prague told the French ambassador there was a good possibility that Khrushchev would appear in Prague before the summit meetings. The personal attention which Novotny received from the Soviet leader during his Moscow stay also suggests that reported differences between the two countries—including Czech opposition to the policy of detente—have been resolved, and that Khrushchev might visit Prague prior to the summit to demonstrate unanimity of views.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Turkey: Local security forces reinforced by army units are maintaining order in Turkish cities, but the political atmosphere remains tense and new disorders could break out. A majority of the governing Democratic party's parliamentary deputies is reported opposed to the further use of "abnormal" methods to suppress the opposition Republican People's party. Premier Menderes is believed to be seeking a meeting with opposition leader Ismet Inonu in an attempt to reduce tension. He is also reported considering the dismissal of the minister of interior and the general director of the Turkish National Police.

nK

South Korea: The various elements in the National Assembly, maneuvering for partisan advantage as well as assurance of assembly control over the proposed new form of government, are divided over means of satisfying public demands for political reforms. The assembly is expected to proceed slowly toward establishing a responsible cabinet system headed by a prime minister. There are reports of Communist subversive activities as well as of a revival of the leftist Progressive party outlawed by the Rhee government in 1958. A dispute is reported developing between the army martial law commander, who is intent on suppressing future demonstrations, and the new defense minister, who believes they should not be dealt with harshly.

Ethiopia-Somalia: In an intercepted message of 4 May, Ethiopia has asked the USSR, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to obtain guarantees of Ethiopia's borders when neighboring Somali territories unite and apply for UN membership. British Somaliland and the Italian trust territory of Somalia are scheduled to become independent and form a Somali union by 1 July. Addis Ababa, increasingly concerned that its southeastern province, largely populated by Somalis, will be attracted to a "Greater Somaliland," wants UN membership conditioned on formal assurances that the Somali union will not seek to expand its borders.

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III. THE WEST

Portugal:

Portugal will pull out of NATO and cancel the Azores base agreement with the United States if Washington supports the Congolese in any dispute with Portugal after the Congo becomes independent on 1 July, or if the US publicly disapproves of repressive Portuguese action to halt Congolese infiltration of Angola and Cabinda. Portugal, expecting trouble with the Congolese, has strengthened border patrols and given them orders to shoot any natives trying to cross the border.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Venezuela-Caribbean: President Betancourt has threatened to withdraw from the Organization of American States (OAS) if the US does not take a positive stand in the organization against Dominican dictator Trujillo. Withdrawal could severely damage the prestige of the OAS, long an object of attack by Cuban Prime Minister Castro and by the Communists as an instrument of "US imperialism." Betancourt has become increasingly frustrated with OAS "ineffectiveness" against his long-standing enemy Trujillo, but he plans to file a complaint with the OAS charging Trujillo with intervention in connection with the 20-21 April military uprising in Venezuela. Although Betancourt is completely disenchanted with Castro, he believes that the approach to the Cuban problem is through the electoral process.

aK

Cuba-USSR: The 7 May announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Castro regime and the Soviet Union formalizes increasingly close economic and political ties since Mikoyan's visit to Cuba last February, when a five-year trade pact and a \$100,000,000 Soviet credit were announced. (A staff member of the Cuban Communist party newspaper is reported to have said on 7 May that Cuba will also establish diplomatic relations with Communist China in due course.) The Soviet Embassy in Havana will be the fourth in Latin America for the USSR, which now has diplomatic missions in Mexico. Uruguay. and Argentina.

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev Reportedly to Visit Czechoslovakia

Khrushchev was persuaded by Czechoslovak party boss Novotny during the latter's visit to Moscow from 2-4 May, according to the latest in a series of rumors circulating in Czechoslovakia, to put in an appearance at the Prague liberation celebrations which began on 7 May. The plausibility of the rumors was somewhat enhanced by the Soviet ambassador's statement to the French ambassador that there is a good possibility Khrushchev will appear in Prague before the summit meetings, which are scheduled to begin on 16 May. A major aim of such a visit probably would be to counteract Western reports of differences between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and give the appearance of a unanimity of views.

The cordial treatment accorded Novotny last week was in sharp contrast to the snub he received in Moscow during the Warsaw Pact meetings in February, when for unknown reasons Khrushchev failed to receive him for a private interview, although he received leaders of all the other East European delegations. Khrushchev reportedly also failed to honor an invitation to visit Prague on his return from Paris in April.

There have been indications that Czechoslovak-Soviet relations have been troubled by Czech misgivings about the Soviet policy of East-West detente and by Czech support for certain Chinese Communist policies distasteful to Khrushchev. Czechoslovakia generally has taken a negative line toward international detente.

The highest ranking satellite leader to attend the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations in September 1959, Novotny praised Chinese progress—in spite of Khrushchev's reserved comments—and said that China should serve as an example for underdeveloped nations on the way to Communism.

A long delay in appointing a successor to the former Soviet ambassador in Prague led to wide speculation that the ambassador

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had been withdrawn at Czech request as a r tween the two countries. Novotny's recent a slovakia was, in effect, just behind the USS as well as his reaffirmation of this stand wi during his latest Moscow visit, may indicat the ambitious but harried Czech party boss.	announcement that Czecho-R in building Communism, ith apparent Soviet approval e a Soviet concession to

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Internal Turkish Situation Improves

Istanbul and Ankara, scenes of the most violent demonstrations against the government between 28 April and 5 May, are quiet, and curfew restrictions have been reduced. Security forces, backed up by army troops, appear to have the situation well under control. Many student leaders in the demonstrations remain under detention; the others appear disorganized. The political situation in Turkey remains tense, however, and new violence could occur at any time--possibly in the smaller cities, to which many students have returned following the closing of the universities in Istanbul and Ankara.

Recent meetings of the governing Democratic party's parliamentary group have demonstrated the existence of a split in party ranks between the moderates and those favoring a more extreme policy toward the opposition Republican People's party (RPP). The extremists have proposed the lifting of parliamentary immunity and arrest of RPP leaders for instigating the recent riots, the suppression of that party, and the establishment of "people's courts" to try RPP leaders. The moderates, reportedly a majority of the parliamentary group and possibly including Premier Menderes, have opposed these moves. Several moderates have called for the abolition of the investigating commission set up by the National Assembly on 18 April to examine the "illegal and subversive" acts of the RPP--an act which led directly to the present unstable political situation.

Menderes may have authorized feelers to RPP leader Ismet Inonu to determine if the latter will meet with him in an effort to reduce tensions. It appears doubtful that Inonu would meet with Menderes while the parliamentary investigation--repeatedly denounced by him as illegal--continues.

Menderes is also reported considering the dismissal of Minister of Interior Gedik and the removal of Cemal Goktan from his position

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as general director of the National Police. Both men are associated in the popular mind with repressive acts and the death of students in the recent riots. As both are generally considered close to President Bayar, their removal by Menderes could be interpreted as another blow at Bayar in the long-rumored struggle for power between the two men.	

Political Unrest Continues in South Korea

Contending elements in the South Korean National Assembly, maneuvering for partisan advantage as well as assurance of assembly control over the proposed new form of government, are divided on measures aimed at satisfying public demands for political reforms.

Public representatives who appeared at assembly hearings on 5 May generally approved the establishment of a responsible cabinet system headed by a prime minister, supported election by the assembly of a president with drastically restricted powers, and agreed that the present assembly need not be dissolved prior to amendment of the constitution. They objected, however, to the assembly's draft constitutional provisions restricting freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, as well as to proposed emergency powers. The chairman of the assembly committee which drafted the proposals insisted that such controls are necessary.

A small group of students who demonstrated in Seoul on 7 May to demand the resignation of school officials connected with Syngman Rhee's Liberal party clashed with army troops but were quelled by tear gas and bayonets.

members of the leftist Progressive party, which was banned by the Rhee government in 1958, have aligned with college professors to instigate student demonstrations in the Pusan area in southeastern Korea. Acting Head of State Huh Chung stated on 6 May that he had evidence of increased Communist infiltration from North Korea, but that he was taking countermeasures that "would handle the situation."

A dispute is reported develop	oing between Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan,
army chief of staff and martial la	w commander, and Lt. Gen. Yi
Chong-chan, the new minister of	national defense, over means of
coping with reported subversion a	nd with student disorders. Song re-
portedly is intent on suppressing	all demonstrations by whatever means
necessary.	He fears a major uprising in the Pu-
san area and has instructed polic	e officials throughout the country to
determine if the recent appearance	ce of "seditious posters has any con-
nection with the enemy fifth colum	an and spies, whose numbers have

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greatly increased lately." [Yi, on the other hand, believes that the threats are not serious, is insisting that demonstrations be permitted, and has ordered troops not to fire on participants. He has countermanded Song's orders sending marines to Pusan to enforce martial law and allegedly favors relying on the police and procuratorial authorities to maintain public order.
Meanwhile, commenting on foreign affairs, Huh Chung announced on 6 May that his caretaker government would not resume negotiations with Japan unless the latter terminated its program of repatriating Korean residents to North Korea, and that South Korea would continue to enforce the Rhee line. he might ac-
cept repatriation on an individual, private basis without mass shipments aboard specially chartered ships, as is now the case. Vice Foreign Minister Choe Kyu-ha told the ambassador on 5 May that the Office of Marine Affairs had been advised to avoid further seizures of Japanese fishing vessels.

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Ethiopia Seeks UN Backing Against Somali Territorial Designs

The Ethiopian Government apparently is seeking United Nations action to forestall any demands for Ethiopian territory by the Somali union to be created when the Italian trusteeship of Somalia and the British protectorate of Somaliland become independent on 1 July. The Ethiopian ambassador in Moscow was instructed on 4 May to request the USSR, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to seek guarantees from Somalia before the union is admitted to UN membership that it has no territorial designs against its neighbors. The Soviet ambassador in Addis Ababa had also been requested to press the issue, Similar approaches may also be made to some other Security Council members.	
[Addis Ababa has long feared the appeal a Somali union would hold for the nomadic Somalis of southeastern Ethiopia's Ogaden region. During the past year Ethiopia has substantially increased its security forces in the Somali border areas and sought commitments of international support for its opposition to the Greater Somalia concept advanced by Somali nationalists.]	_
A strongly worded editorial in the controlled Ethiopian press recently called the Somali union "neo-imperialistic" and designed	
only to serve the purposes of the former "colonial masters" of the areai. e., Britain and Italy.	

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III. THE WEST

Portugal Might Break Military Ties With the West

Alberto Franco Nogueira, director general of political affairs in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry,

his country will withdraw from NATO and cancel the Azores base agreement if the United States supports the Congolese--presumably meaning in any dispute with Portugal--after they achieve independence, or if Washington publicly disapproves of stern action Lisbon is prepared to take to prevent Congolese infiltration of Angola and adjacent Cabinda. He justified a possible break of the base agreement on the grounds that Portugal could not afford to "spend one third of its budget to support so-called allies when they refused to support Portugal."

Nogueira emphasized that Portugal expects trouble from the Congolese after 1 July, in view of alleged Communist infiltration of the Congo and border crossings by agents sent to subvert the natives in Angola and Cabinda. Portuguese troops were being readied in Lisbon in mid-April to sail to these two areas, and they will police the borders with orders to shoot any natives crossing over. He also said that Portugal is determined not to give up "one foot" of territory and will "kill 1,000 Congolese," if necessary, to prove it,]

Nogueira's threats regarding NATO and the Azores bases are probably in part a pressure tactic to enlist greater US support for Portugal's position in Africa. Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence of Lisbon's resolve to hang on to its African provinces at all costs. Aside from reasons of prestige, the Portuguese are reluctant to give up these provinces because of their important contribution to the metropole's favorable balance of payments. Lisbon also fears that concessions in Africa would aggravate nationalist pressure on Goa and Timor.

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Venezuelan President Urges US Stand Against Trujillo

Venezuelan President Betancourt has threatened to withdraw from the Organization of American States (OAS) if the United States does not take a positive stand against Dominican dictator Trujillo in that organization. Such a withdrawal could severely damage the prestige of the OAS, long an object of attack by Cuban Prime Minister Castro and Communists in the hemisphere as an instrument of 'US imperialism.' Moscow and Peiping radios have consistently supported this propaganda theme.

Betancourt advised Ambassador Sparks that he is under pressure from the military for direct retaliation against the Dominican Republic, charging that three Dominican planes are standing by for an air strike against Venezuela. Top Venezuelan government officials have previously indicated that military action against Trujillo's regime is a strong possibility.

Betancourt, who has become increasingly frustrated with OAS "ineffectiveness" against his long-standing enemy Trujillo, is nevertheless planning to file a complaint with the OAS charging the Dominican dictator with intervention in Venezuelan affairs, in connection with Dominican involvement in the 20-21 April military uprising in Venezuela. Betancourt has invited Colombia, which recently broke relations with the Dominican regime, to join him in this move, and he believes other Latin American countries will soon follow suit. The Peruvian government on 7 May suspended diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, and described this move as "an act of solidarity with the sister republics of Venezuela and Colombia in defense of representative democracy."

Although Betancourt is completely disenchanted with Castro, he is of the opinion that the approach to the Cuban problem is to build up pressure on Castro to hold elections. His contention is that Castro would have to govern democratically after elections or expose himself as a dictator.

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Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

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Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

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The Director

National Indications Center

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