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25 August 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Turkey: The Turkish General Staff has notified more than 3,400 field-grade officers in all services of their retirement effective 20 August. This is a substantial proportion, probably more than half, of the total. Nearly 90 percent of general and flag officers were retired in early August.

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STRAR

Cambodia - Communist China: Deputy Premier Nhiek Tioulong, who is heading a Cambodian mission to Peiping in early September, will make "certain purchases,"

has recently threatened to turn to the Communist bloc for arms aid if Western military assistance to his army is not substantially increased. Tioulong's Peiping visit is ostensibly connected with Cambodian technicians currently being trained in China to run Cambodia's new Peiping-sponsored industrial plants, but the question of additional Chinese aid will undoubtedly be discussed. Tioulong recently proposed that he visit the United States to discuss American economic aid.

Congo: Strenuous efforts by Congo Prémier Lumumba to airlift Congolese soldiers to Kasai Province appear designed more to forestall the secessionist trend there than to curb tribal warfare.

tack on Katanga. Dispatch of an estimated 600 troops on 23

August brought a warning from the anti-Lumumba leader of lower Kasai Province that he would resist any "invasion" and would appeal to Katanga or Belgium if necessary.

concern over the presence of an estimated

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60 Soviet and satellite technicians in Leopoldville, some of whom seen in Iraq and Iran. The number of such personnel increased when the Soviet vessel Arkhangelsk arrived at Matadi on 22 August with 100 trucks and an							
unc	sclosed number of technicians. (Page 1)						
	III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS						
Α.	No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.						
В.	No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.						
C.	The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future:)					
	Although Laotian Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi have agreed to broad guidelines for nego- tiating a settlement of military and political problems, the negotiations themselves could break down over any of a						

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Kong Le coup.7

DAILY BRIEF

number of points. The Pathet Lao has called for all Laotians to support the Souvanna Phouma regime and has reportedly strengthened its military position in the Vientiane area. There is still no evidence of Chinese Communist or North Vietnamese intentions to intervene overtly. Communist prospects in Laos have been enhanced since the

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LATE ITEM

*Laos: Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma claims that the agreement he has reached with General Phoumi, leader of the countercoup forces, has the "full" support of Captain Kong Le. If Souvanna's claim is true, the major obstacle to implementation of the Souvanna-Phoumi accord has been removed. Souvanna has provided further details of the agreement to Ambassador Brown indicating that the prime immediate consideration of both parties is to insulate Vientiane from any military threat which might be posed by the Communist Pathet Lao insurgents. Souvanna expects to have the security of Vientiane assured by the weekend, but in this as in other aspects of the situation he may be oversanguine. After the military situation is clarified, Souvanna expects the formation of a "national union" government which would exclude Pathet Lao representation.

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Situation in the Congo

The strenuous efforts which Congo Premier Lumu has made to airlift Congolese soldiers to Kasai Provingear designed more to forestall the secessionist trend than to curb tribal warfare.	ce ap-
	this
troop build-up is for attack on Katanga. The dispatch	
estimated 600 Congolese troops on 23 August has also a warning from Albert Kalonji, the anti-Lumumba lead lower Kasai Province, that he would resist any "invasi and would appeal for aid to Katanga or Belgium, if necessity in the control of the co	brought ler of lon, "
Meanwhile, Moroccan General Kettani, deputy coner of UN forces in the Congo, has obtained the consent UN secretariat to accept Lumumba's invitation to reorg the Congolese forces. Kettani	of the
would begin this task on 26 August with the organiza	tion of
Lumumba's "ministry"presumably defense ministry-his general staff. Lumumba had was "to disband a part of his army, but I dissuaded him." Moroccan general concluded with an urgent plea for moified officers."	-and nted The
The precise role played by Mali troops in clashes ing Belgian troops and anti-Tshombé tribesmen in nort Katanga remains unclear. President Tshombé's charge Mali troops were mutinous may be designed to vindicat earlier opposition to the entry of UN forces into Katang to minimize the extend of pro-Lumumba sentiment amountanga tribesmen. The commander of the Belgian troop tanga has denied any malfeasance on the part of the Matingent and laid the blame for a "confused situation" at ville on demonstrations by the pro-Lumumba Balubakat leading to the postponement of the withdrawal of Belgia from that city. On 24 August, a Katanga spokesman stated order had been restored in Albertville.	thern es that e his ga and ong Ka- s in Ka- li con- Albert- t party n troops

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the presence in Leopoldville								
and Soviet bloc technicians, some	of whom							
seen in Iraq and Iran.	the feeling in							
the Congolese Government is increasingly in favor of ob-								
taining aid from sources other than the United Nations both								
because of the "slow progress of UN programs to date" and								
a desire to demonstrate Congo's independence. The number								
of bloc personnel in the Congo increased on 22 August when								
the Soviet vessel Arkhangelsk arr								
trucks and an undisclosed number of technicians.								
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Situation in Laos

Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma told Ambassador Brown in Vientiane on 24 August that the steps on which he and General Phoumi, leader of the countercoup forces, have agreed to resolve the crisis in Laos have the 'full' support of Captain Kong Le, whose second paratroop battalion triggered the crisis by its takeover of Vientiane two weeks ago. No word has as yet been received directly from Kong Le, but if Souvanna's claim is true, a major obstacle to implementation of his accord with Phoumi has been removed. Souvanna added that Col. Sourith, the respected commander of Laos' airborne troops, would return to Vientiane shortly to resume control over the second paratroop battalion. Sourith would probably be an important influence inclining Kong Le toward acceptance of the agreement, if the latter has not already accepted.

In outlining to the ambassador his version of the understanding with Phoumi, Souvanna indicated that the prime immediate consideration of both sides was to insulate Vientiane from any military threat which might be posed by the Pathet Lao insurgents. General Ouane, the armed forces commander, is said to be reorganizing the command of the forces in the capital and to be establishing defenses against the Pathet Lao. Such defenses, however, would also be effective against the Phoumi forces should the agreement fall through. Meanwhile, the arms previously distributed to civilian partisans by Kong Le are, according to Souvanna, being recovered by the second parachute battalion, after which the unit is supposed to withdraw to its barracks, about ten miles from Vientiane. In addition, normal communications between all military regions have been reestablished.

Pending completion of these security arrangements, Phoumi will retain forces at Paksane, about 100 miles east of Vientiane. Elements in the strength of about two battalions were reported to have arrived there from southern Laos a day or two ago. As soon as Phoumi receives word from Ouane that the security of Vientiane is reestablished, he will withdraw these units to their home bases.



Souvanna expects these security arrangements to be completed by the weekend, but in this as in other aspects of the situation he may be oversanguine.

After the military situation is clarified, Souvanna expects the formation of a "national union" government in which he may or may not be prime minister. He plans to propose in any event that the new government offer the Pathet Lao reintegration in the national community—but not participation in the new government—provided they lay down their arms. He feels that this approach would place the onus on them for any continuation of the civil war, and he claims that Phoumi has agreed to this tactic.

Phoumi appears to be cooperating in the of the accord, and his initial exposition of its	implementation terms
agreed in broad ou	
version Souvanna gave place a somewhat different construction on so the understanding, which might conceivably jumentation.	He may, however ome of the details of eopardize its imple-



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