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10 August 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN




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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Iran: The obvious rigging of the current parliamentary elections and reports of disorders in several provincial constituencies suggest that extensive security precautions will be necessary to assure order when elections are held in Tehran. Jentimes In spite of warnings that he should disassociate himself from \mathscr{TP} 2. the election irregularities, the Shah appears determined to continue the arranged election of government-approved candidates. It seems certain that the Shah and the government will be further weakened in consequence. (Page 1)

Turkey: The compulsory retirement of nearly 90 percent of the general and flag officers in the Turkish armed forces has caused some initial disorganization and confusion within the military headquarters. The impact of the program on the armed services and their relations with American military representatives will probably not be fully apparent for some time. The forced retirement program may soon be extended to the civil ministries. (Page 2)

Israel-UAR: A new incident in the dispute over Israeli shipping via the Suez Canal could develop when the West German merchant ship Klostertor, now believed under Israeli charter, leaves Haifa on 10 August and attempts to pass through the canal en route to Japan. UAR sensitivity on this issue was recently reaffirmed by Nasir, who asserted hotly that the UAR alone would determine policy on the canal. (Page 3)

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LATE ITEMS

*The Situation in the Congo: Premier Tshombé's decision not to oppose the entry of UN troops into Katanga probably stemmed from his belief that a Belgian troop withdrawal was inevitable and from indications that sentiment for a Congo confederation such as he had espoused was increasing elsewhere in the Congo. Tshombé has charged the Belgians with "having brought us into all our difficulties, "suggesting that he feels abandoned by Brussels and forced to negotiate with the UN and Leopoldville as best he can.

The Belgian cabinet met on 9 August, reportedly to establish a timetable for a Belgian withdrawal from Katanga. It remains unclear whether Brussels will also evacuate its base at Kamina; Brussels may avoid any explicit statement concerning the status of this base in the hope that the Lumumba government

may fall and be succeeded by a more moderate regime.

A UN occupation of Katanga would serve to mute somewhat the strident criticism of both the Belgians and the UN by Congo Premier Lumumba. On his return to Leopoldville on 8 August, Lumumba declared a state of emergency throughout the Congo, threatened to lead the Congo "army" personally in an invasion of Katanga, and delivered to the Belgian ambassador an ultimatum to leave the Congo. The Belgian emissary had stayed in Leopoldville in a private capacity after Lumumba broke off diplomatic relations with Brussels.

According to the American Embassy in Leopoldville, the endorsement by the Abako of a confederation government on 8 August could presage a coup against the Lumumba regime around 10 to 15 August. The embassy reports that several tribal groups, political parties, and labor groups are united in favoring a Congo confederation, and will attempt to displace Lumumba in favor of a more moderate figure

**Laos: The "revolutionary committee" which appeared at the time of the Second Parachute Battalion's coup in Vientiane has issued a series of statements containing an anti-American undercurrent, calling for an end to the civil war with the Pathet Jentenes Lao insurgents, and indicating willingness to accept economic

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DAILY BRIEF

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and cultural aid from all countries.	
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 tralist former Premier Souvanna Phouma may have been be	hind
the coup and he may soon be named premier.	I
Four members of the ous	sted
Premier Somsanith's government, including Defense Minist	er
General Phoumi, have reportedly arrived in northeast Thai	land
requesting political asylum. However, Somsanith and some	e of
his ministers apparently remain in Luang Prabang. They c	
the continued support of certain army units, but there is no	
confirmation of press reports that loyalist forces are moving	
toward Vientiane from Luang Prabang	

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DAILY BRIEF

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Widespread Election Rigging in Iran Weakens Shah and Government

The Shah's much-publicized plans for "free" election of government-approved candidates during the current parliamentary elections in Iran seem to have broken down. The Melliyun party headed by Prime Minister Eqbal is running well ahead of the nominal opposition Mardom party, as planned, but the obviousness of the rigging and reports of disorders in several provincial constituencies suggest that extensive security precautions will be necessary when elections are held in Tehran.

The Shah blames the collapse of some of the arrangements on the "selfish behavior of certain candidates, who should have realized they were not intended to win." A deputy chief of the Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) blames the prime minister for the fiasco. SAVAK apparently originated the plan, accepted initially by the Shah, of permitting a choice among carefully selected candidates of both parties. This plan seems to have broken down when both Eqbal and the leader of the opposition changed their lists, perhaps fearing they contained too many supporters of the politically powerful SAVAK chief, General Bakhtiar. SAVAK then decided secretly to support specific candidates. Eqbal, learning of this, told local mayors and governors the SAVAK choices. As a result, many hopeful politicians were told outright when they arrived in their constituencies that they might as well return to Tehran.

The clumsiness of the government's efforts to ensure the proper results—about 2 to 1 in favor of the progovernment party—will alienate many who would have been willing to accept limited-choice elections. Increased intriguing against the government and Shah can be expected and will probably find a broader basis of support in the future.

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Turkish Military Retirements

The Turkish revolutionary regime has extended its major military shake-up by announcing the imminent retirement of 70 percent of the colonels and 15-20 percent of the majors and their equivalents in the armed forces. Almost 90 percent of Turkey's general and flag officers were retired with practically no warning on 3 August by decree of the ruling National Unity Committee (NUC). Diplomatic circles in Ankara now are speculating that the "purge" will soon be extended to the civil government, where there have been charges that some ministries lack "dynamic leadership."

The early reaction in Turkey to the forced retirement program has been mostly one of apprehension. Those pensioned have been described by American military representatives as "still in a state of shock."

Field-grade officers--who themselves face an uncertain military future, as approximately 2,000 are soon to be retired--appear jubilant over their chances for promotion. Individually they seem to believe that others will go but not themselves. Civilians for the most part appear doubtful over the true meaning and possible extent of the "purge."

The broad shake-up, which entails major shifts and removal of key personnel, has allowed no period for adjustment and will require wholesale reorganization of some military activities. In the Turkish Map Service, for example, no officer is left who has had previous contact with the US Army Map Service. Future activities involving foreign liaison will be at a standstill in many areas of activity until the air clears.

The general attitude of Turkish leaders in developing and in plementing this program demonstrates the determination of the revolutionary regime to act with greater independence than its predecessor.	1
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Israeli Chartered Ship to Attempt Transit of Suez Canal

A new incident in the dispute over Israeli shipping via the Suez Canal could develop when the West German merchant ship Klostertor, now believed under Israeli charter, leaves Haifa on 10 August and attempts to pass through the canal en route to Japan. The ship may carry some cargo from Haifa which would be subject to confiscation by the UAR.

The Klostertor has been on the Arab blacklist of ships which trade with Israel since 9 March, but such blacklisting, which deprives affected ships of services and facilities at Arab ports, would not necessarily bar it from the canal. If, however, the UAR believes the ship is chartered by an Israeli firm or by any firm in which Israelis own an interest, the ship almost certainly will be prohibited from the canal, in accordance with previous UAR policy. The ship most recently involved in this dispute, the Greek-owned Astypalea, was released on 10 April after nearly five months of detention at Port Said for attempting to carry cement through the canal under Israeli charter.

UAR sensitivity on the issue has recently increased as a result of platform statements by American political parties urging free navigation of the canal. Nasir responded in a speech on 26 July by asserting that the UAR's canal policy will be determined by the UAR alone.

Cairo's press and radio also charged last week that a "new plot" was revealed at the International Transport Workers' Federation conference in Bern, where a resolution was adopted calling for joint measures against the UAR if it does not refrain from interfering with freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. A Cairo newspaper attributes the resolution to American sponsorship, although Swiss sources in Bern say the initiative for it came from the Danish delegation. The Danes apparently are still upset over UAR treatment of the Inge Toft, a Danish ship which was held at Port Said from May 1959 until 9 February 1960, when its Israeli cargo was unloaded and the ship released.

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