TOP SECRET

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

DOCUMENT NO. 49

MO CHANGE IN CLASS. MO

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 0 0

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 9010

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 6 JUN 1980 REVIEWER

27 February 1960

Copy No. CED-/

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN




TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177884

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177884



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 February 1960

DAILY BRIEF

NB

01	I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Э,	ruary that although he is not optimistic over achieving "practical results" at the summit meeting, he has not given up on reaching an understanding with the West.
	Sponsible for forcing an "unaccommodating" position on the West. The Soviet premier emphasized that in the event of an
οK	impasse on the German and Berlin problems, the USSR would have no choice but to sign a separate peace creaty with East Germany. Soviet propaganda, including an official TASS statement, has seized upon the announcement of the West German and Spanish military talks to further the campaign to isolate and discredit the Adenauer government, alleging that Bonn's policies closely parallel Hitler's. (Page 1)
)K	USSR-Greece: Soviet Ambassador Sergeyev, since returning to Athens in early February from home leave, has been contacting various ministers of the Greek Government to repeat Moscow's desire for closer political, cultural, and economic relations. In a recent meeting with Foreign Minister Averoff, Sergeyev complained of Athens' "indifference" to Moscow's efforts for an international detente and the unwillingness of top Greek leaders to accept an invitation to visit the USSR. Ambassador Briggs believes that Moscow is planning to exploit Greece's present economic difficulties with "some spectacular offer" at the
ηL	Bloc-Iraq: Czechoslovakia has offered Iraq an aid credit of about \$30,000,000. Iraq will probably accept this additional bloc assistance and may use the credit for a series of quick-impact projects designed to impress the populace. (Page 2)
	f i

TOP SECRET

II. ASIA-AFRICA

	II. AMA-AFIMOA
N ⁰	UAR-Israel: Ali Sabri, poor management of the UAR mobilization— was ordered as preparation against an expected Israeli attack on Syria—had created an unanticipated war scare in Egyp Sabri said that the mobilization had caused panic buying and a shortage of food stuffs, that hospitals had been stripped of their doctors, and that the stock market had broken. steps were being taken to ease the situation. Since 24 February, UAR officials and the press and radio have played down the possibility of hostilities. There is no sign that the UAR armed forces have lowered their state of alert.
	(Page 4)
eleter of the service	South Vietnam: The Diem government reports that, according to recently captured documents, the Vietnamese Communists plan intensified terrorist activities in Saigon and the countryside in the immediate future. American personnel in South Vietnam, who are likely targets, have been advised to increase their normal vigilance. While the reported Communist intentions may be exaggerated, the security situation in South Vietnam has deteriorated in recent months. The estimated 3,000 terrorists have become bolder.
	III. THE WEST
NO	Britain - West Germany: The British Government's attitude has recently hardened against strengthening of West German military power above the 1954 Western European treaty restrictions. Britain has been stalling for some weeks on a German request to raise displacement limits on combat ships, and a Foreign Office official on 25 February predicted increased difficulties for the request in view of public indignation over the West German - Spanish military talks. 27 Feb 60 DAILY BRIEF ii
	TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177884

Cuba: The Castro government evidently plans to raise a complaint in the UN against the US if the US reduces Cuba's sugar quota. Foreign Minister Roa has asked the UAR and Yugoslav ambassadors for their governments' opinions on such a complaint, and probably will try to obtain support from the Asian-African neutralist and Soviet bloc countries with which Cuba has increasingly closer relations. The UAR ambassador in Havana has reported to Cairo that,

Castro hopes to visit the USSR, UAR, Yugoslavia, Italy, Ghana, and Guinea in June. (Page 7)

27 Feb 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

TOP SECRET

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

1
Khrushchev Discusses Soviet Policy on Germany With Nehru
Mirushchev Discusses Soviet Policy on Germany with Nehru
Khrushchev told Nehru
that he expected no "practical results" on disarma-
ment or the German question at the summit meeting in May, The Soviet premier added, however, that he had not given up his effort to reach an understanding with the West. Khrushchev em- phasized that the USSR's only alternative, in the event of an
impasse on the German and Berlin problems, would be to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.
Khrushchev's effort to discredit Adenauer in his talks with Nehru has been reflected in an official TASS statement on 25 February which seized upon the announcement of West Germany's military talks with Spain to allege that Bonn's policies "involuntarily bring to mind the military alliance of Hitler and Franco." Stressing that the Soviet Government has constantly warned about the "sinister danger" of German militarism, TASS claimed that Bonn is no longer content with NATO as a military alliance and is seeking collaboration with the "offspring of Hitlerite Nazism and Italian Fascism The statement concluded by declaring that this collusion, aimed at obstructing an East-West agreement, "again underlines the urgent need for a peace settlement with Germany."
Nehru recently has shown growing impatience with Bonn, apparently because he feels that Adenauer personally is obstructing progress toward an East-West detente. West German Foreign Minister Brentano appears to have gained greater appreciation for Bonn's views, however, as a result of his talks in New Delhi with Nehru and Indian officials from 19 to 24 February.

-SECRET

Renewed Soviet Overtures to Greece

Soviet Ambassador Sergeyev, just back from home leave, has continued to emphasize to Greek government ministers Moscow's desire for closer political, cultural, and economic relations. In a recent meeting with Foreign Minister Averoff, Sergeyev complained of Athens' "indifference" to Soviet efforts for an international detente and the unwillingness of top Greek leaders to accept an invitation to visit the USSR. He assured Averoff that the Soviet leaders' desire for friendly, peaceful, and warm relations with all countries was not just a matter of current or temporary policy and cited as evidence of their good faith the recent decision to reduce Soviet armed forces by one third.

Similar arguments last November failed to win Greek approval for Soviet requests for expanded cultural exchanges and air service routes through Athens. Sergeyev also suggested at that time that Averoff and Prime Minister Karamanlis visit the USSR, and angled for an invitation to Khrushchev to stop over for talks in Athens on his Paris trip in March.

While Greek officials have shown little enthusiasm for Moscow's overtures, growing agricultural surpluses, increasing unemployment, and inability to secure admission to the European Common Market make bloc offers increasingly difficult for Athens to reject. In their recent conversation, Averoff told Sergeyev that further trade expansion was difficult, as the USSR insisted on barter agreements but produced few goods that Greece could use. Subsequently, Averoff admitted to Ambassador Briggs that while Greece actually could use many Soviet-produced items, the government had no intention of allowing the USSR to "dig itself into the Greek market."

'playing the	eir cards ca	refully" and a	at the Soviet are planning	to exploit Gre
conomic d	lifficulties w	ith "some spe	ectacular offe	er."

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177884

Czech Economic Aid Offer to Iraq

Czechoslovakia's offer of a \$30,000,000 credit to Iraq will make it possible for Baghdad to carry out quickly several small projects having immediate domestic propaganda value. Sensitive to public disillusionment, Baghdad needs to fulfill soon at least some of its public promises of economic development, and will probably accept the offer. Prague, under the bloc's aid program for underdeveloped countries, has displayed an ability to carry out projects of a light industrial nature quickly and efficiently.

nd long-range projectsfi- \$137,500,000 line of credit implementation. Iraq has re- e Western contractors who have to undertake a number of projects

CONFIDENTIAL

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR-Israeli Situation

Although there has been no indication that the UAR armed forces have lowered their state of alert, UAR officials may be attempting to lessen the tensions created by the recent military movements. Ali Sabri, Nasir's chief aide, stated that on his return to Cairo on 23 February from accompanying Nasir in Syria he was astonished by the effect the mobilization had had on Egypt. Commandeering of civilian trucks had led to a food shortage and 'panic buying,' hospitals were inoperative because of the call-up of doctors, and the stock market had broken. Sabri blamed these results on mismanagement by junior officers, since the senior officers responsible for mobilization were out of the country.

Sabri took the line consistently maintained by other UAR officials that the UAR military preparations were purely defensive and had followed receipt of information that Israel planned to attack Syria as a follow-up to the incidents which had occurred in the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone. He said that steps would now be taken to ease the situation in Egypt and assure the UAR populace that an outbreak of hostilities was not imminent. UAR officials and the press and radio since 24 February have been playing down the possibility of war.

the UAR to the first state of the state of t

take the necessary measures to avoid "provocations." There has been no indication of Cairo's response.

In Israel, Foreign Minister Meir has conducted a series of interviews with members of the diplomatic corps, setting forth Israel's position with regard to the UAR build-up. There is still no indication of a large-scale Israeli counter-mobilization. An Israeli Army spokesman has admitted, however, that approximately 5,000 individual reservists have been called up as a precautionary measure. Units of the Israeli Navy--a destroyer, submarine chaser, and two torpedo boats--were reported leaving Haifa harbor on 26 February and the submarine Tanin is at sea.

SECRET

27 Feb 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 4

Israel rece received from France assembled sections of Mystere fighters by air transport. The total number of aircraf ceived was not specified, but six have already been as bled.)	jet ft re-

SECRET

Communist Terrorism in South Vietnam

Communist plans for an early increase of terrorism in South Vietnam are allegedly revealed in a Communist directive captured recently in a raid on a dissident command post in the southwestern border area. The Diem government apparently is convinced that the document is genuine. Three Communist agents captured subsequently have reportedly confirmed a Communist intent to stage some kind of dramatic incident in Saigon.

(Although the document refers to an "armed coup" to take place sometime in the early future, South Vietnamese officials interpret this to mean a show of force, possibly involving coordinated attacks in widespread areas. Vietnamese Communist guerrilla forces in South Vietnam, augmented in recent months by personnel infiltrated from North Vietnam, are believed to number only about 3,000. There are no specific indications that American personnel are intended targets, but precautions are being taken in view of past Communist attacks on members of the American Military Aid and Advisory Group in 1957 and 1959.7

While the report of Communist intentions may be exaggerated, the security situation--particularly in the southwest--has deteriorated during the past six months, and Communist terrorists have become bolder. Assassinations and kidnappings of local officials and villagers have increased to between 20 and 35 per month, and large Communist bands have been attacking government patrols and security installations.7

-SECRET

III. THE WEST

Cuba May Seek Neutralist Support in United Nations Against United States

The Castro government evidently plans to raise complaints in the UN against the US if Cuba's share of the US
sugar quota is reduced.
because the United States
is trying to isolate Cuba politically from the rest of Latin America, a complaint to the Organization of American
States (OAS) over a lowered quota would be useless.
asked the envoys for their governments opinions on the projected UN appeal and probably will also solicit support from other Asian-African neutralist and Soviet bloc countries, with which Cuba is seeking to establish close rela-
tions.
The Castro regime probably sees the coming UN General Assembly session as an opportunity to cause trouble for the United States and to demonstrate its proclaimed neutralism. Castro's intention to cooperate with the USSR in the UN was expressed in the communique issued following Mikoyan's visit to Havana earlier this month. The Cuban UN delegate is campaigning for a seat on the Security Council without first obtaining the customary endorsement of the Latin American caucus. Castro officials frequently belittle the OAS as "US dominated."
Castro wants to visit the USSR, the UAR, Yugoslavia, Italy, Ghana, and Guinea and had asked him to arrange such a trip for this June. Castro previously has evinced interest in visiting those countries, but no date had been mentioned.
TOP SECRET

THE PRESIDENT Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177884

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177884