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27 OCTOBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sudanese military regime under increasing pressures for return to civilian government; Khartoum security forces in "highest state of alert."

Situation in Laos.

III. THE WEST

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Salvadoran President ousted by national guardsmen yesterday and six-man militarycivilian junta established; military may call back to power ex-President Osorio. 3





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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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IL ASIA-AFRICA

Sudan: Influential political and religious groups are increasing their pressures for a return to civilian government by exploiting the military regime's inept handling of resettlement plans for some 50,000 inhabitants of the Wadi Halfa area, which will be flooded when the UAR's new Aswan Dam is completed. Sudanese security forces have restored order following serious riots in the town of Wadi Halfa and have put down small sympathy demonstrations in Khartoum. Government officials are particularly concerned that further turmoil may occur during Nasir's ten-day state visit to the Sudan scheduled to begin on 15 November.

leaves have been canceled for radio operators until 17 November and that security forces in Khartoum are in the "highest (Page 1) (Map) state of alert."

Laos: Reports of renewed fighting in Phong Saly Province may reflect implementation of previously reported government plans to retake certain posts there lost to the Pathet Lao in recent weeks.

reports of a build-up for a renewed offensive by elements loyal to Vientiane against General Phoumi's forces southeast of Pathet Lao ele-Pak Sane: ments with the capability of taking independent action against Phoumi.



*Captain Kong Le, meanwhile, reportedly now is planning a new coup in Vientiane to oust Souvanna Phouma with the help of the Pathet Lao and to install Pathet Leader Prince Souphannouvong as premier. Souvanna would be offered a place in the new government.

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but could well be true. (Page 2)

III. THE WEST

*El Salvador: The ouster of President Lemus by national guardsmen early on 26 October probably was engineered by followers of ex-President Osorio. The widely popular Osorio, a retired army officer who appears to have strong backing in the armed forces, seems likely to be called back to power by the military, which had been critical of Lemus for failure to act effectively against Communist and pro-Castro elements. Osorio would almost certainly call elections to legalize the regime and attempt to implement drastic reforms to alleviate the country's deep-seated social and economic problems.

The inclusion of three civilians, among them the leftist university rector Fortin Magana, in the present six-man militarycivilian junta is probably an attempt by an essentially militaryled group to secure initial support from leftist elements that have sparked unrest in recent months. (Page 4)

IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that

A. LNo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.

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(B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.)

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C. Situations offering opportunities for continuing and increased exploitation by Communist hostile action exist in Laos and South Vietnam.

D. While there is as yet no indication that an armed attack against US military facilities in Cuba is imminent, the Cuban Government is receiving military aid from the Soviet bloc; recent Communist propaganda and Cuban actions against US interests further indicate that the Communist world regards its position in the Cuban situation with growing confidence.

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New Unrest in Sudan

Influential political and religious groups which have long been seeking a return to civilian government in the Sudan are exploiting a new issue: the military regime's inept handling of resettlement planning for some 50,000 inhabitants of the Wadi Halfa area. The UAR's new Aswan Dam, as it reaches advanced stages of construction, will turn this area into a vast reservoir; the UAR-Sudanese Nile Waters' Agreement calls for evacuation of the Wadi Halfa area by 1 July 1963.

The people of Wadi Halfa, naturally perturbed about having to leave their homes, have been even more aroused by rumors that the Abboud government would insist on moving them to Khashm el Girba in Kassala Province where a new dam and irrigation project is planned on the Atbara River. Most of them would much prefer to resettle at Wadi el Khowi, an area which would also require a substantial irrigation project but is located along the Nile some 200 miles south of Wadi Halfa. Many would be equally satisfied to move to the northern Gezira area.

On 23 October, when a delegation of Sudanese cabinet members went to Wadi Halfa and announced that its residents would indeed be resettled at Khashm el Girba, serious riots ensued. Government security forces managed to restore order by the next day, however, and also put down small sympathy demonstrations in Khartoum. Government officials are particularly concerned that further turmoil may occur during Nasir's ten-day visit to the Sudan, scheduled to begin on 15 November, just prior to celebrations of the anniversary of the Abboud regime's assumption of power.

a partial communications alert had been ordered, that leaves for radio operators had been canceled until 17 November, and that security forces in Khartoum had been placed in the ''highest state of alert. ''

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The Situation in Laos

Reports of new clashes in the southeastern portion of Phong Saly Province may reflect initiation of previously reported government plans to retake two posts recently lost to the Pathet Lao.

he was ready to begin such action soon.

Colonel Kouprasith, the Fifth Region commander in Vientiane, has denied persistent rumors that his troops were about to engage those of General Phoumi southeast of Pak Sane. The government forces which would be involved in such an operation, however, probably are more responsive to Captain Kong Le and his lieutenants and could already be moving forward without Kouprasith's knowledge. Kouprasith credited Pathet Lao elements in the area, who reportedly cooperated with Kong Le's paratroopers in previous engagements with Phoumi's troops, with the capability to mount attacks independently against Phoumi.

the Pathet Lao in a nearby locale had been instructed to offer facilities to a company of Phoumi's troops which wished to defect to the Vientiane forces. best evidence to date of collusion between the Pathet

Lao and Kong Le's forces in that area.

[Pressures are mounting on Premier Souvanna Phouma to reach an early accommodation with Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee.]

unless he reached an agreement with Phoumi within a reasonably short time, they would lead the First Military Region into open opposition to his regime. Ouane claims Souvanna intends to send a committee to Savannakhet in the near future to discuss

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Cterms with Phoumi. The King also apparently indicated to Souvanna the necessity of coming to terms with Phoumi.7

Kong Le is planning a coup to be carried out with the help of the Pathet Lao against Souvanna Phouma with the objective of installing Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong as premier. While this report lacks confirmation, Kong Le probably retains the capability to carry out such a coup and has in the past warned that he would push Souvanna aside if he pursued the wrong policies.

The acute shortage of petroleum supplies in Vientiane as the result of the unofficial Thai blockade has caused Souvanna to threaten,

to turn to the Soviet ambassador for such products. He stated that if the Thais maintained their blockade, he would obtain what he needed from wherever he could find it and would raise "this act of aggression" in the UN Security Council.

In Tokyo, former Premier Phoui Sananikone intention to return to Laos shortly to try his hand at resolving the crisis. In his view, the situation must be stabilized by the creation on an urgent basis of a new government at Luang Prabang under the auspices of the King. Phoui is presumably not without hope that he might be called on to head such a government.

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President Lemus of El Salvador Ousted

The ouster of Salvadoran President Jose Maria Lemus by national guardsmen early on 26 October probably was engineered by followers of ex-President Oscar Osorio,

The US Embassy reports that a combined civilian-military junta consisting of three military men and three civilians has taken power. Press reports that Lemus is now in Guatemala are unconfirmed.

The appointment of three civilians, including a former university rector who has extreme leftist tendencies, probably is an attempt by the essentially military-led groups to secure initial support from leftist elements. It seems likely that the junta will soon call the widely popular Osorio to power. Colonel Alberto Escamilla, who was chief of staff of the army during Osorio's administration, reportedly has been appointed minister of interior in the new government. Osorio, a retired army officer, appears to have strong backing in the armed forces, which began to consider ousting Lemus after he revealed himself as a weak and inept executive in dealing with pro-Communist and pro-Castro demonstrators who threatened the government during August and September.

Osorio, if called to power, would almost certainly call elections to legalize the regime and attempt to implement reforms to alleviate the country's deep-seated social and economic problems. (While Osorio is known to be strongly anti-Communist, he might attempt to apply some Castro-type reform measures. The US Embassy stated last month that as president he probably would not be as openly pro-US or as amenable to US suggestions as Lemus has been.)



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