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10 March 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C02001967


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# DAILY BRIEF

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Congo: Following India's decision to commit troops to the UN Command in the Congo, Indonesia has stated that its battalion will be rotated rather than withdrawn, and Ceylon reportedly has agreed to contribute a battalion. In Leopold-ville, acting Premier Delvaux, apparently with considerable popular support but without the agreement of many of the other members of the government, is attempting to establish controls over the UN Command's operations, and UN representative Dayal expects a Congolese artillery attack on Kitona.

No


\*The US Ambassador in Leopoldville reports that feeling is running high against Dayal and that arrival of Indian troops next week might touch off violence. The Indian brigade is now scheduled to remain at least temporarily in Leopoldville.

(Backup,

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forces following the recent occupation by the Pathet Lao of the Phou Khoun road junction, to the north of Muong Kassy.

Vientiane's troops in the Phou Khoun area, who had been scattered by the Pathet Lao breakthrough, have re-established themselves in two groups a few miles north and south of the junction along the Vientiane - Luang Prabang highway.

(Backup, Page 2) (Map)

\*USSR: The TASS announcement of a successful recovery of the Sputnik IX capsule on 9 March 1961 is supported According to this data, de-orbiting apparently occurred after the vehicle completed one revolution around the earth, and the recovery was made in an area northeast of Kuybyshev. In the case of Sputnik V (19 Aug 60) the only other successful Soviet recovery of a satellite capsule, de-orbiting occurred on the 16th orbit, with recovery in the Orak area. Sputnik IV (15 May 60) and Sputnik VI (1 Dec 60) were not successfully recovered. The low altitude of the Sputnik IX orbit and early recovery of the capsule would be desirable features in an initial attempt to recover a man from orbit.

West Germany: (West German Defense Minister Strauss told American officials in Bonn on 6 March he is afraid of a change in US defense strategy which would result in increased reliance on conventional forces at the expense of nuclear capabilities. Stressing that his views are shared by Chancellor Adenauer, Strauss repeated "again and again" his conviction that there must be no differentiation between troops with nuclear capability and conventional forces and that the nuclear deterrent must exist and begin on the eastern border of West Germany. Strauss also reiterated earlier complaints that

no

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Bonn is not being treated as a full and equal member of NATO, (Backup, Page 3)

Afghanistan-Pakistan: Kabul, in anticipation of difficulties among the Pushtoon tribes along its frontier with Pakistan, has sent two brigades to strengthen its forces in this area. This move follows punitive action taken recently by Pakistan's air force in bombarding the headquarters of one Afghan-supported tribal opposition group on the Pakistani side of the border. Afghan propaganda contends that Pakistan's use of American-supplied arms makes the United States an accessory to Pakistan's "action against the people of Pushtoonistan." While the two governments hope to avoid hostilities between their regular forces, they have intensified their traditional competition for influence among the Pushtoon tribes, and there is some possibility of a clash occurring.

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\*Argentina:/Several recent reports suggest that extremist Peronista groups, with some Communist support, may shortly stage an uprising, possibly similar to the outbreaks in three provincial localities on 30 November. There have been a number of other reports of plotting and arms smuggling by Peronistas and Communists over the past few months. These groups seem intent on keeping the country in a state of unrest. The bulk of the armed forces would support President Frondizi in repressing any Peronista uprising despite their dislike of some of his policies.

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# SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

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Outlook in Indonesia With Special Reference to Djakarta's Intentions Toward West New Guinea: Domestic Politics Including Role of PKI and Army, the Economy, and Foreign Policy. Tables. U.S.I.B. SNIE 55-61. 7 March 1961.

Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in Underdeveloped Areas, 1 July 31 December 1960: Patterns and Prospects, Credits, and Grants, Technical Assistance, and Trade. Graphs, maps, tables. E.I.C. Economic Intelligence Report EIC-R14-S10. 134 pp. 28 February 1961.

A ten-page summary is published separately under same series number and date.

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DAILY BRIEF

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# Situation in the Congo

The situation remains "highly explosive" in the Lower Congo area, according to the American ambassador in Leopoldville. Officials in both the UN Command and the Leopoldville government are jittery and distrustful of each other, and individuals in both authorities are apparently acting at cross purposes. In contrast to Delvaux's actions, Foreign Minister Bomboko, in conjunction with UN Commanding General McKeown, is trying to keep the situation under control. Despite the continuing tension, Hammarskjold reportedly plans to stall on all demands being made by Delvaux pending the augmentation of the UN force and the return of Kasavubu from Tananarive.

Kibwe reportedly has been Colonel Trinquier's chief supporter in the government. Although he ostensibly is the acting president in Tshombé's absence, real power reportedly is being exercised by a quadrumvirate which includes Kibwe and three Tshombé supporters--an arrangement set up by Tshombé before he left for Tananarive. The Katanga president apparently believes that Kibwe was involved in a plot to oust him with Trinquier's aid. Trinquier does not appear to have complied with the order to leave Elisabethville.

In a vaguely worded communique issued on 9 March, the Tananarive conference of Congolese leaders called for the creation of "new states" within the Congo, an apparent expression of recognition of existing de facto divisions. The conditions under which these new political entities are to be formed will be discussed at a future conference to be held in Elisabethville. The Tananarive discussions will now take up the questions of maintenance of order in the Congo and the Congolese position regarding the UN and foreign countries.

Situation in Laos		
rugged frontier region of Cambodia and South Viet Vietnamese elements—p units—were sent to the a uary to engage in sabota guerrillas for use in Lac	small guerrilla warfare teams tnamese Army are operating in the f southern Laos where it borders tnam. The report states these North possibly on the order of special forces area in late December and early Jange and subversion and to recruit os and South Vietnam, where Communitative been reported building up for s spring.	
the "government" in Xie and North Vietnam, acco	ral missions will be exchanged between the second to the second to the communist Chine ording to a 9 March announcement in fered aid to pro-Communist Laotians.	a
bassador Trimble, said arrive at a solution thro hanouk said the only alte be a division of the coun	scussing the Laotian crisis with Amhe feels that it may be too late to bugh an international conference. Signative to an early settlement would stry. He deplores this prospect, fearto a Communist state on Cambodia's	•

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
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# Bonn Defense Minister Fears Change in NATO Defense Strategy

(Pursuant to his complaint that Bonn is not being treated as a full and equal member of NATO, Strauss cited a "US refusal" of his offer to provide an Honest John missile unit as part of a West German contribution to the proposed mobile NATO fire brigade. He also cited a "rejection" of Bonn's offer to pay for two Polaris submarines as part of a NATO nuclear force even though the United States had been prepared to offer two each to France and Italy. Strauss remarked that although all NATO members continually call for strengthening NATO, "these platitudes do not commit the person who makes them to action." Strauss has been critical of the inaction on Bonn's long-standing request that the provisions in the 1954 Brussels treaty which restrict the size of German destroyers to 3,000 tons be lifted to enable construction of heavier ships capable of firing intermediate-range missiles. Pending authorization of larger ships, Bonn will construct no more than four of the twelve originally planned)

Strauss has repeatedly insisted that West German armed forces should possess weapons comparable to those of the USSR. He has warned that atomic weapons cannot be withdrawn from the NATO shield forces without undermining the NATO deterrent. On 2 March the Defense Ministry press chief issued a public statement strongly rejecting the concept that "brushfire" wars should be waged only with conventional weapons in order to avoid a widening of such wars into a nuclear conflict. Last November a German Foreign Ministry official stated that any plan that might deprive NATO forces of tactical atomic weapons would be an open invitation to the Communists to overrun Europe.

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# Growing Danger of Afghan-Pakistani Border Clashes

Since 1947, when Pakistan received its independence, Afghanistan has demanded that the Pushtoon tribes living on the Pakistani side of the border be given the right of self-determination. The Pakistani Government, however, has rejected these demands as interference in its internal affairs, and the resultant Pushtoonistan dispute has been the chief cause of the bad relations that exist between the two countries.

Both Kabul and Rawalpindi are trying to improve their positions in anticipation of the increased friction that usually accompanies the seasonal tribal migrations. The Afghans feel compelled to recoup some of the prestige they lost last September when their tribal irregulars were driven back from Pakistani tribal territory. They probably feel that their position in the Pushtoonistan dispute has been further weakened as a result of the recent improvement in Pakistan's relations with the USSR and consider it all the more necessary to make a show of strength and determination. Kabul apparently calculates that it can encourage tribal unrest across the border and prepare for possible Pakistani retaliation by building up its regular and irregular forces along the border. Pakistani leaders have threatened that if they are forced to take major countermeasures, they may send regular forces into Afghan territory.

The Afghans, who have long objected to American military assistance to Pakistan, have complained bitterly about Pakistan's recent use of US-supplied aircraft. Legally, Pakistan is entitled to use such weapons to maintain internal security. Radio Kabul attacks the United States as giving "hollow assurances that arms aid which was being given to Pakistan would not be used against anybody else except against the enemies of America in case of a world war. . . . The US rulers are also responsible for the annihilation of Pushtoonistan and martyrdom of the Pushtoons."

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

### The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

## The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

#### The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

#### The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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