



Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174710

- . .

#### 42 JANUARY 1961

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet nuclear submarine probably at Vladivostok for final fitting out and trials.

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Congo--Tshombé preparing to resist Gizenga elements in Katanga.

Cyprus--Increasing activities of extreme rightist group causing concern.

Situation in Laos.



<del>TOP SECRET</del>

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174710

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

12 January 1961

# DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Sirab

USSR:

a nuclear submarine is at Vladivostok for final fitting out and trials.

na

Three classes of submarines, believed to be nuclear, are under construction at the Komsomolsk shipyard in the Far East,

at least one unit would be transferred to Vladivostok during the summer of 1960 for final fitting out and trials.

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

<u>Congo</u>: Tshombe is preparing to resist Gizenga elements who are entering Katanga, and is mobilizing Europeans for service in his forces. Twenty-five Belgian "paracommandos" reportedly arrived in Elisabethville by commercial airline on 9 January, and 42 more are expected on 16 January.] Meanwhile, the Gizenga forces have been sighted heading southwest into Katanga from Manono, and their advance apparently has been welcomed by anti-Tshombé Baluba tribesmen.

In Leopoldville, Mobutu's position has been further shaken by a police mutiny over pay. The Congolese Army meanwhile continues restive concerning the recent dissident

i

0K

TOP SECRET

<sup>•</sup>Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174710

# TOP SECRET

successes, and irritated over Mobutu's alleged favoritism toward certain Congolese Army units. (Page 1)

<u>Cyprus:</u> The Cyprus Government is showing some concern over increasing activities of the Pancyprian Fighters Association, an extremist, right-wing opposition group of former members of EOKA--the Greek Cypriot underground organization against the British. Leaders of the group are calling for repudiation of the Cyprus settlement, demanding union with Greece, and denouncing President Makarios as a "traitor." The government expects some trouble during a patriotic celebration on 15 January. (Page 2)

\*Laos: Premier Khrushchev's letter to Prince Sihanouk endorsing his 1 January proposal to convene a 14-nation 0 Kconference on the Laotian situation was probably intended to capitalize on growing Asian concern over the future course *dulute* of events in Laos as well as to encourage what the USSR claims/?'s 5,6,7 are increasing signs of disagreement among the Western allies concerning a policy toward Laos. Recent bloc propaganda has highlighted Pathet Lao claims to widespread victories in Laos. The Pathet Lao radio stresses the need for continuing the armed struggle. A North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman on 11 January denounced as a "fresh provocation" the delivery to the Phoumi forces of US "fighter" planes and helicopters.

### **III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS**

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities '*No-*) against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.)

12 Jan 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

TOP SECRET

- B. (No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future.]
- C. (With continuing substantial bloc logistic support, particularly airlift, the Communist forces in Laos will consolidate their hold on the vital Xieng Khouang/Plaine des Jarres area and will maintain pressure on Phoumi's forces elsewhere in Laos. There are as yet no indications of bloc military reaction to the arrival of armed T-6 aircraft in Vientiane, but their successful employment would probably lead to increased bloc military commitments in Laos, possibly including similar aircraft.]
- D. While there are no reliable indications that the Castro regime intends any hostile military action against Guantanamo Naval Base, the possibility of such action, given Castro's rashness and instability, cannot be completely discounted. There is evidence of a substantial increase in Cuba's military capabilities, and the current campaign to convince the populace that the US intends armed action against Cuba has resulted in a high state of military alert throughout Cuba.

12 Jan 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

<del>TOP SECRET</del>

TOP SECRET

# The Situation in the Congo

**(Tshombé is preparing to resist Gizenga elements that** have entered Katanga and is mobilizing some Europeans for service in his forces,

Twenty-five Belgian "paracommandos" reportedly arrived in Elisabethville by commercial aircraft on 9 January, and 42 more are expected on 16 January. Although the reasons for engaging the "paracommandos" are not known, there have been reports that Tshombé had reservations concerning the loyalty of his Katanga militia and hoped to recruit an allwhite bodyguard battalion in Europe.

Meanwhile, the Gizenga forces have been sighted heading southwest into Katanga from Manono, and their advance apparently has been welcomed by anti-Tshombé Baluba tribesmen. There are unconfirmed reports that the dissidents plan shortly to move into Equateur Province, into areas controlled by the UAR battalion. In such an event, the Gizenga forces would receive tacit if not active support from the Egyptian unit.

concerned over the economic situation in Stanleyville and fearful of a possible paratroop drop by Mobutu into Stanleyville. Gizenga, while displaying pleasure with respect to the planeload of aid provided him by the UAR, reportedly reiterated his need for further assistance in the areas of training, weapons, gasoline, vehicles, and food, "in order of importance."

the presence of an Ethiopian UN force at the Stanleyville airport precluded an airlift direct to Stanleyville, and it recommended the use of the field of Buta, 150 miles north of Stanleyville.

In Leopoldville, Mobutu's position has been further shaken by a police mutiny over pay. The Congolese Army meanwhile continues restive concerning the recent dissident successes, and irritated over Mobutu's alleged favoritism toward certain units.



12 Jan 61

### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1

# Cyprus Government Concerned by Actions of Extremist Group

Archbishop Makarios and other officials of the Cypriot Government are showing some concern over the extremist right-wing opposition Pancyprian Fighters Association, whose increasing activities since mid-December they regard as more dangerous than those of the Cypriot Communists. The first meeting of the Fighters Association, held in July 1960, reportedly was attended by 93 former members of EOKA--the Greek Cypriot underground organization which fought against the British. The group made a rather futile effort to oppose the candidates of the conservative Patriotic Front and the Communist AKEL in parliamentary elections in early August.

Little was heard of the organization from then until mid-December, when reports indicated that it intended to use the annual 15 January celebration of a 1950 plebiscite on "enosis"--union of Cyprus with Greece--to circulate petitions urging enosis and to stage a parade protesting the London-Zurich Agreements, which provided for Cypriot independence. The government expects trouble at that time. Two hundred persons reportedly attended a Fighters Association meeting in Nicosia on 7 January at which speakers urged renewal of the demand for enosis and repudiation of the Cyprus settlement, and denounced Makarios as a "traitor."

The organization does not now appear to be a serious threat to the moderate government, but its emphasis on enosis could add serious strains to the tenuous and largely artificial ties tending to bind together the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

SECRET

12 Jan 61

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2

SECRET

Situation in Laos

Khrushchev's letter endorsing Prince Sihanouk's 1 January call for a 14-nation conference to deal with the Laotian situation was published in Phnom Penh on 11 January. Hanoi had endorsed Sihanouk's proposal on 5 January. This latest maneuver may be intended to capitalize on growing Asian concern over the course of events in Laos. The bloc probably also feels that by endorsing Sihanouk's general proposals to reconvene a new conference along the lines of the 1954 Geneva Conference it will maintain its posture of seeking a political settlement to the Laos crisis and offset any proposal for renewing the ICC on Western terms.

The Communists probably also feel that endorsement of the proposal will encourage what the bloc claims is increasing evidence of disagreement among the Western allies concerning a policy toward Laos. Recent Soviet propaganda has attempted to exploit this theme, and TASS claimed on 10 January that US efforts to "demonstrate Western unity and the effectiveness of SEATO in Laos have completely failed." Although bloc propagandists continue to call for reactivation of the ICC, a 7 January Soviet broadcast reiterated Moscow's opposition to any plan which would entail recognition of the Boun Oum government.

Terming the arrival of the T-6 aircraft in Laos a "fresh provocation," a North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman on 11 January stated that "US imperialists and their satellites should bear full responsibility for the grave consequences."

The relative lull in the fighting in Laos continues.

SECRET

12 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3

All 10 Soviet IL-14s were active on 11 January, and both Soviet and North Vietnamese transports continue to be scheduled for flights into Laos on 12 January.

The five MI-4 helicopters delayed at Nanning by weather conditions flew to North Vietnam on 11 January. There are now at least eight MI-4s in North Vietnam, three of which were previously procured by North Vietnam from Communist China and the USSR. Five MI-1 helicopters, four of which were first detected on 6 January, are scheduled for training flights in the Haiphong area on 12 January.



# 12 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

<del>ONFIDENTIAL</del>

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174710

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

**Director**, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Detense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

