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17 June 1961

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
INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

Laos: The Namone tripartite talks continue to be stalled over the role of the ICC. The scheduled 16 June session was never formally convened because of the dispute over the participation of ICC representatives in the meetings. The government delegation walked out when the Pathet Lao and the Souvanna Phouma group refused to seat the ICC as observers in either the political committee or the military subcommittee.

[King Savang has rejected, apparently on constitutional grounds, Phoumi's suggestion that the King's name be advanced at the upcoming Zurich talks as premier in a government of national union. Meanwhile, ]

it has prepared itself inadequately for the meeting with Souvanna and Souphannouvong. ]

certain political party chiefs in the Boun Oum party may maneuver for personal deals once the talks get under way.]


[Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces have resumed mortar fire on government positions to the south of Ban Hat Bo, about 25 miles northeast of Pak Sane. Ban Hat Bo and another nearby post fell to the enemy on 13 June. Scattered skirmishing continues to be reported elsewhere in the country.]

Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 17 June. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) *Savanna*:

USSR: [Analysis of additional data on the ICBM test operation conducted at Tyura Tam early on 16 June (reported in yesterday's bulletin), indicates that either the launching may have been canceled at the last moment, or the vehicle may have been launched but failed in flight shortly afterwards. If in-flight failure is confirmed, it was the seventh failure in Soviet ICBM test launches to Kamchatka this year. During this period there have ]

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# Republic of the Congo



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[been 10 successful ICBM tests. In addition there have been three operations, the results of which are undetermined.]

Dominican Republic: President Balaguer is evidently already succumbing to pressures from Trujillo elements, who now may feel strong enough to override him if he should commit himself to a course of action desired by the United States. Trujillo aides urged the special OAS subcommittee to leave the country after only one week, in the face of known US desires for a longer investigation. In addition, the Dominican foreign minister reneged on Balaguer's commitment that the subcommittee could return at any time. The President on 13 June had instructed the foreign minister, in the presence of the subcommittee chairman, to provide such assurances in writing. The next day, however, the foreign minister refused to give even an oral assurance. The American consul also notes that, at least for the moment, the government has abated the efforts it had been making to establish better contacts with the consulate.

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Congo: Ambassador Timberlake believes that Gizenga has further moderated his security demands for reconvening parliament and now insists primarily on the evacuation of Leopoldville proper by central government forces and a build-up of UN forces there to 10,000 men. Gizenga originally had demanded a "neutral" site, and subsequently insisted that wherever parliament meets, all Congolese forces must be cleared from an extensive surrounding area. The US Embassy now believes a compromise acceptable to both Kasavubu and Gizenga is possible.

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Reports of concessions by Gizenga coincide with evidence of new resistance to his regime. Tribal clashes have recurred in Bakavu, Kivu Province, where more than 100 anti-regime

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Bashi tribesmen were killed by Gizenga soldiers early this month, and indications of anti-Gizenga activity have appeared in northern Kasai. [redacted]

[ The Ghanaian Foreign Ministry on 12 June instructed its UN representative to advise Hammarskjold that a Ghanaian aircraft en route to Uganda would land at Stanleyville during the week of 19 June carrying medical supplies and personnel to staff a Ghanaian embassy at Stanleyville. Although the UN has insisted that all aid to the Congo be channeled through its headquarters in Leopoldville, a Yugoslav transport--apparently carrying relief supplies--reached Stanleyville via Khartoum on 5 June and was unloaded after a UN examination limited to inspecting the markings on unopened crates.] [redacted]

Britain: [Britain's gradual movement toward a formal bid for membership in the Common Market may be delayed. Macmillan has announced that in coming weeks cabinet members will be sent to consult with Commonwealth countries on the problems such membership would pose for them. London may feel that recent expressions of alarm from New Zealand, Canada, and Australia could reverse the apparently favorable trend of British public opinion regarding British membership. There may be renewed Commonwealth demands for special ministerial meetings or even for postponement of any decision until after the regular fall meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers.] [redacted]

[redacted] (Backup, Page 3)

Philippines: [Recent remarks of Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Serrano suggest that he may be seriously considering the advisability of a neutralist foreign policy. On 13 June he implied to Ambassador Hickerson that in the absence of firmer US action in the Far East, anti-Communist Asians might have to consider some measure of neutralism as the only means of protecting their own interests. Serrano, who has expressed concern over a softening of American policy in the Laotian crisis, apparently is interpreting US moves toward recognition of Mongolia as a step toward a broader shift of policy.] [redacted]

[redacted] (Backup, Page 4)

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~~SECRET~~Developments on Laos

The Boun Oum delegation to the Zurich talks is composed of various members of the government, whose most influential spokesman will be General Phoumi, and the heads of the five political parties which have been endeavoring to get seats at the Geneva conference on a basis of parity with the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) and the Souvanna group. These are the party for Democracy and Social Progress, headed by former Premier Tiao Somsanith and controlling about 35 votes in the 59-member national assembly; former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People, with about 10 assembly votes; the Democratic party, a small regional party organized around the Voravong family of southern Laos; the National Union party, which is largely the personal vehicle of Bong Souvannavong, an old-time politician whose affiliations have frequently shifted; and the Committee for the Defense of the Fatherland, a new name for Phoumi's civic action group, the Committee for Defense of National Interests.

These groupings are essentially artificial and tentative, and once the Zurich talks get under way, the facade of unity in the Boun Oum camp could quickly disintegrate. Many of Laos' politicians now nominally supporting Boun Oum and Phoumi would probably feel more comfortable supporting Souvanna, particularly if Souvanna can convince them that he remains a free agent and has not been taken over by the Communists. [Phoumi, therefore, may find himself increasingly isolated if he persists in his professed intention to charge a high price for agreement on a coalition government; in that case he would be faced with the choice of making substantial concessions or of bearing the onus for breaking off the talks.]

units in southern Laos cite reports of the presence of from two to three North Vietnamese battalions in the Mahaxav area to the east of Thakhek. Savannakhet and the nearby French Seno military base as the objective of these forces, their intention is to invade South Vietnam. There have been frequent reports of the presence

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of North Vietnamese elements in Pathet Lao - Kong Le - controlled territory in this area. [redacted]

[redacted]

There were 16 airlift and airlift-associated sorties on 15 June, of which 10 were into Laos. One of these flights may have been to Pa Dong; [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[REDACTED]

## Britain and the Common Market

[Adjustment of Commonwealth tariff preferences to British membership in the Common Market has loomed as an increasingly large problem in recent weeks, as other difficulties have receded. Several of Britain's partners in the Outer Seven have indicated their readiness to make the necessary adjustments if Britain decides to bid for membership, and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] British farm groups have reacted relatively mildly to government suggestions that other devices might protect domestic agriculture just as well as the present deficiency payments.]

[The Commonwealth issue has been brought to the fore by New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake's warnings of disastrous consequences to his country's economy, Australian predictions of possible ruin to certain exports, the Canadian finance minister's threat of possible retaliation against British goods, and Prime Minister Diefenbaker's call for a Commonwealth prime ministers' conference on the subject. Although British officials for some time have judged that specific Commonwealth trading problems could be solved, they fear that the old Commonwealth countries' pleas for special consideration may so stir the British public as to force the government to take so extreme a position on Commonwealth preferences as to prevent negotiations with the Common Market from getting started. A recent opinion poll showed the British public more interested in maintaining Commonwealth ties than strengthening ties with Europe, even though it overwhelmingly endorsed joining the Common Market.]

[Macmillan apparently hopes that by dealing with the Commonwealth countries individually, he can keep their pressures from growing into a complete roadblock to British participation in the Common Market. The delays involved in consultation, however, and the continued British uncertainty regarding France's attitude toward Britain's joining, suggest that a clear announcement of the government's intentions may not be made before Parliament adjourns for the summer in early August.] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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### Philippine Concern Over Western Policy in Asia

[Secretary Serrano's expressions of "deepest concern" over the possibility of US recognition of Mongolia and its admission to the United Nations apparently followed diplomatic consultations with Nationalist China. This demarche is nonetheless consistent with Philippine views that any US accommodation with Communist Asia would make Philippine policy against diplomatic and commercial relations with bloc countries untenable. Serrano stated that while he is not unalterably opposed to admission of Communist China to the UN, he opposed any piecemeal approach to a major shift of policy without prior consultation and in the absence of a general disarmament agreement.]

[Serrano in recent months has expressed increasing alarm over the trend of events in Laos and particularly over the inability of the SEATO alliance to influence the situation. He attributes this primarily to the weakness of the British and French in Asia, which he believes is prompting them to follow a policy of disengagement. A meeting of four anti-Communist Asian foreign ministers held in Manila in January was called by Serrano primarily to create pressure for a firmer US posture in Asia, through bilateral arrangements if not through SEATO.]

[In recent weeks, Serrano's concern over a possible relaxation of US commitments in Asia has been echoed by prominent Philippine legislators as well as by President Garcia. In a press conference in late May, Garcia urged the US to stand firm "before it is too late," stating that "if we give up Asia by default, it will only speed up the Communist seizure."]

[Although expressions of concern over US intentions and of the desirability of a more neutralist policy have long been used to back up demands for greater material assistance, Philippine officials appear to be increasingly concerned over Philippine vulnerability and possible changes in American policy.]

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

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The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

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