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10 June 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

Laos: [The ICC, following the fall of Pa Dong, submitted a request to the three sides at the Namone peace talks that the 9 June session be devoted to the selection of specific points it could visit in connection with reported cease-fire violations. The ICC suggested such areas as Pa Dong, Tchepone, and forward points between the opposing forces south of Van Vieng on Route 13. The government delegation was under orders not to attend any session on the 9th, but can be expected to press for consideration of the ICC proposal at the next session of the Namone talks, probably on Monday.]

[The proposed talks between Souvanna Phouma, Souphannouvong, Boun Oum, and Phoumi are again delayed on the question of where to hold them. Phoumi and Boun Oum are both at Nice ready to hold the talks there, but Souvanna and Souphannouvong are now quoted as wanting the meeting to be held in Geneva.]

[There is little change in the situation in the Pa Dong area, with the Meo units of Lt. Col. Vang Pao continuing their regroupment to the west of Pa Dong; enemy activities are limited to mopping up in the immediate vicinity of Pa Dong. Skirmishes are reported north of Paksane, and enemy guerrilla action continues on Route 13 north of Vientiane.]

Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 10 June.

[\*Indicative of the growing seriousness with which Laotian security authorities view rumors of a possible coup in the absence of General Phoumi is a report that Lt. Col. Siho, charged by Phoumi with responsibility for the security of Vientiane, is laying plans for a counter-coup in the event any of the various coup plots materialize. Such a countercoup would allegedly have two purposes: to reverse any coalition government including the Pathet.]

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[Lao resulting from a coup; and to form a new coalition of all anti-Communist forces in Laos. There had been some indication earlier that Siho himself might undertake a coup, and it is possible that he might use the current rumors of pro - Souvanna Phouma plotting as a pretext for his own takeover. What ideological direction such a coup might take is uncertain, but it would probably not be in favor of Souvanna since Siho would be likely to consider himself too far committed to Phoumi and his extreme anti-Communist position to be able to profit from a relationship with Souvanna and the Pathet Lao.]

[There are probably numerous military officers in Vientiane, however, who share a common dislike for Phoumi and who may feel that Souvanna and the Pathet Lao are the wave of the future in Laos. These elements could unite under some senior officer and attempt to overthrow the Boun Oum government. Possible leaders of such a move include General Ouane, formerly the top man in the army whose position has steadily declined as Phoumi's has risen. Ouane, a northerner, has long been sympathetically disposed toward Souvanna. Another possible source of leadership is General Kouprasith, who is related to the powerful Sananikone clan headed by former Premier Phoumi.] [redacted] (Backup. Page 1) (Map)

[redacted]

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Dominican Republic: John Abbes, symbol of past police brutalities from which Dominican leaders are now trying publicly to dissociate themselves, has applied urgently for Canadian and Jamaican transit visas, according to Canadian and British embassy officials who were told that he had been assigned to the Dominican Embassy in Tokyo. Jose Marti Otero, nominal head of Radio Caribe which disseminated viciously anti-US and pro-Castro propaganda prior to the assassination, is also reportedly being assigned to the embassy in Tokyo. The American Consulate was informed that Abbes plans to travel in Europe, possibly including the Netherlands. This, in the consulate's view, could mean that he may be planning to contact Soviet bloc officials on behalf of the Dominican government. Abbes made similar contacts while in Europe last year through the Dominican diplomatic mission in The Hague.

Although Abbes has generally been identified with the clique around General Ramfis Trujillo, there are some indications of past rivalries between the two. Abbes' departure, even if temporary, will permit Ramfis to strengthen his personal control of the secret police machinery. A rumor heard by the consulate on 8 June that Abbes had signed a statement admitting responsibility for the assassination attempt on Venezuelan President Betancourt last year suggests the regime may be preparing to use Abbes as a scapegoat. The attempt to assassinate Betancourt, in which Abbes almost certainly participated under the direction of the late dictator, was the most important event that led the OAS to impose sanctions against the Trujillo regime last year.

Meanwhile, dissident Dominicans, though basically friendly to the US, are afraid to display friendship toward US officials and newsmen, [redacted] He said they doubt the sincerity of the friendly gestures now being made

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by Dominican officials toward the US and fear that retaliatory measures will be taken against Dominicans in contact with Americans.

[ In conversations on 7 June related to Ambassador Stevenson's visit with President Frondizi, Argentine Foreign Minister Mugica told Ambassador Briggs and Rubottom that his country would oppose any additional OAS sanctions against the Dominican Republic beyond those of an economic nature. Mugica, who gave Ambassador Rubottom an impression that Argentina had little information on the Dominican situation, added that his government would take a "dim view" of armed intervention there in almost any circumstances and expressed concern that Venezuelan President Betancourt might "get too far ahead of the procession." A similar view was recently expressed by the Colombian Government in regard to Betancourt's position.]


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Congo: [redacted]

[redacted] negotiations are in progress with Stanleyville as well as Elisabethville authorities concerning a Congo settlement. [redacted] [The American Embassy, however, reports that in a letter to UN officials Gizenga has insisted that Leopoldville must be "neutralized" before he would attend parliament there. The embassy speculates that when it comes to a real decision, Gizenga may prove reluctant to leave Stanleyville.] *ms*

Countercharges among UN and Katanga officials--stemming from Katanga's reported agreement to permit the substitution of UN for Belgian military advisers--have underscored serious cleavages among Tshombé's political heirs. Sources in Elisabethville reportedly expect a showdown between Munongo, who recently has favored cooperation with the UN, and his rivals in Katanga's ruling triumvirate. [redacted]

[redacted] (Backup, Page 5) (map)

Iran: The Iranian Government's announcement on 8 June that the prime minister had asked the Shah for a decree proclaiming parliamentary elections appears to be an attempt to deprive the National Front of an issue with which to attack the government. *of*  
The announcement gave no indication of when elections would be held, but a regime spokesman said unofficially that the government hoped to hold them within two months. With Amini adopting most of the National Front's program, the Front has been left with little to attack except Amini's delay in calling new elections. The government announced that no new electoral law would be drawn up but that a committee of judges was reviewing the present law to suggest amendments which would make the law more effective. Amini has previously expressed reluctance to hold elections before 1962, and he may attempt to prolong the review of regulations and preliminary arrangements for the election.

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Japan: Leaders of Prime Minister Ikeda's Liberal-Democratic party have recently indicated there is much latent intra-party dissatisfaction with Ikeda for failing to provide vigorous leadership in the Diet session which ended on 8 June. They have expressed without enthusiasm their support for Ikeda "in the present period" but are awaiting the outcome of Ikeda's Washington visit before making decisions on the extent of their future cooperation with him. They point out that the issue of closer Japanese administrative participation in the Ryukyus is coming to the fore in domestic politics but see no urgent issues outstanding between Japan and the US. They admit that Ikeda's prestige following his US visit will depend less on his achievements in Washington than on whether his actions and his reception in Washington create a favorable impression among the Japanese of his personal effectiveness. If his prestige does not rise, party leaders will begin maneuvering to replace him when his term as party president expires in July 1962.

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P of background*

USSR - Communist China: Moscow and Peiping have agreed to a barter deal which will help to relieve the pressure on grain-handling facilities at Chinese ports imposed by heavy shipments from the West. [redacted] the USSR will ship about 300,000 tons of wheat, rye, and flour to China by rail in June and July. In return, the Chinese apparently will supply Canadian grain of equal value to the USSR and East Germany by sea. Chinese-chartered ships currently are loading grain in Eastern Canada and at least some, if not all, of these shipments will probably be routed to the USSR and East Germany. [redacted] SABRE) [redacted]

*no*

Yemen: The Imam, concerned about increased anti-government maneuvering by political and tribal elements opposed to his son, Crown Prince Badr, is trying to re-establish unity within

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the royal family. [redacted]  
 he is pressing for a rapprochement between Badr and the Imam's brother, Prince Hasan, who has long been Badr's chief rival for the succession and who commands considerable support among Yemen's northern tribesmen. The Imam is still recovering from wounds he sustained in the assassination attempt against him last March. [redacted] (Backup, Page 6)

#### WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

[The Watch Committee at a special meeting on 9 June considered recent abnormalities in Soviet air activity and issued the following statement of its findings:]

[A low level of flight activity in the Soviet Long Range Air Force since 4 June, and associated developments such as unusual transport activity, movement of fighters, [redacted] [redacted] have been examined in detail. We are not certain of the implications at this time, but note that some of these activities are consistent with those we would expect to see if the Soviet Long Range Air Force were improving its readiness posture. The abnormalities referred to above appear largely confined to the Soviet Long Range Air Force. We see no significant abnormality in activities of the Soviet Ground Forces and the Soviet Navy, except for the movement of a limited number of Northern and Black Sea fleet BADGER/TU-16s to the Moscow area, probably for participation in an air show. Furthermore, the general political climate does not suggest Soviet preparations for hostilities at this time. Therefore, we conclude that the current activities concern primarily the Soviet Long Range Air Force and are probably in preparation for air exercises and demonstrations.] [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~—KIMBOThe Situation in Laos

Peiping's official People's Daily defends the seizure of Pa Dong as having removed a "powder keg" which might have set off a general war, adding there is good reason to believe the incident will prove to be a positive step toward a stable cease-fire. The Chinese charge that the US had hoped, by air-dropping troops into Pa Dong and other spots, to create "disputed areas" calling for a visit of the ICC. The paper's insistence that the ICC operate in accordance with a cease-fire agreement concluded by the belligerent parties in Laos further attests to Peiping's conviction that the commission must be made virtually subordinate to a tripartite committee of Lao-tians.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] the recent skirmishes in the Luang Prabang area--the subject of the royal government's latest cease-fire violation complaint--were primarily the result of a "spoiling" attack launched by his forces to counteract enemy pressure north of Luang Prabang. This pressure, [redacted] had taken the form of infiltration and regroupment of units by the Pathet Lao to assure a more favorable posture for an offensive. He depreciated earlier reports of a "generalized" offensive against Luang Prabang, although the enemy had been engaged in "aggressive probing" at several points. [redacted] while T-6 aircraft had been employed at his orders in the early phases of the government operation, he was considering moving them back south, where they would be kept in reserve for a real emergency.

[redacted] five helicopters and a number of transports at the Hanoi airport which had previously been seen with Soviet markings were being repainted on 1 June with North Vietnamese markings. This indicates that at least some of the Soviet transports which have been flying airlift missions have been turned over to the North Vietnamese.] [redacted]

[redacted] Local flight activity from Haiphong and Hanoi which

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has been in evidence for the past several months probably represented the training of North Vietnamese crews.

Bloc airlift operations for 8 June involved 4 sorties, 3 of which were into Laos. Preliminary field information indicates that a relatively normal level of operations was scheduled for 9 June. The IL-14 that flew to Hanoi from Moscow on 5 June and returned to Irkutsk on 8 June has been scheduled for another flight to Hanoi from Irkutsk on 9 June.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~The Situation in the Congo

[Efforts by the Leopoldville government to convene parliament and to adopt a new constitution are complicated by internal stresses within the Elisabethville and Stanleyville regimes. Although Katanga and Leopoldville negotiators in Milan reportedly are discussing the terms under which Katanga would rejoin a Congo federation, friction among Tshombé's political heirs poses the threat that any agreement may be disavowed. Moreover, Gizenga's recently conciliatory posture appears to stem in part from weaknesses within his own regime. There continue to be reports of disciplinary problems among his troops, many of whom have not been paid.]

In Katanga, Spaak's efforts to achieve a withdrawal of some Belgian military advisers are being resisted by some Belgians. Although the Belgian consul in Elisabethville has stated that principal political advisers in Katanga are in the process of leaving, a UN official has charged that one senior Belgian is attempting to secure a local university post, and another is trying to stir up local sentiment in favor of his remaining in Katanga.

Reports from both Elisabethville and Leopoldville have alluded to the possibility of an attempt to rescue Tshombé from house arrest near Leopoldville. [redacted]

[redacted] an unknown number of Europeans were in Brazzaville in early June, seeking details concerning the security precautions surrounding Tshombé's residence. [redacted]

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### Japanese Prime Minister's Position

Ikeda's management of the regular Diet session which ended on 8 June revealed his inability to command unity within his Liberal-Democratic party (LDP). This was evident in his handling of the Political Violence Prevention Bill, which provoked leftist groups to stage daily opposition demonstrations from 30 May until the end of the session.

Ikeda was reported reluctant to force the controversial bill through the Diet for fear that a row with the Socialists would mar his prestige just before his US visit. However, he yielded to pressure from conservative faction leaders, most notably Eisaku Sato, whom party leaders consider Ikeda's most likely successor, and former Prime Minister Kishi. After forcing the law through the lower house in the face of Socialist obstructionist tactics in the Diet and demonstrations outside, he was blocked in the upper house by refusal of the president--a member of his own party--to force the bill out of the judiciary committee. The bill has been shelved for possible consideration at a special session later this summer.

Ikeda encountered similar intraparty opposition when he tried to revise five labor laws prior to ratifying International Labor Organization Convention 87, which guarantees freedom of employees to join unions. The same conservative LDP factions blocked the government when it proposed revisions which would draw minimum Socialist opposition, avoid disorders in the Diet, and ensure ratification. Kishi and Sato wanted to include measures for more stringent control of union political activity. Ikeda's compromise efforts failed, and the bills will be carried over to the special session.

Ikeda has justified his administration by conciliation and negotiation on grounds of "normalizing" parliamentary politics and restoring international confidence after the upheavals surrounding ratification of the US-Japanese security treaty last spring. However, his vacillation at the end of the session caused

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the Socialist party on 6 June to declare that it would organize "a powerful popular movement" to demand cancellation of Ikeda's visit to the US. Demonstrations against the visit took place that night.

{ Most LDP faction leaders expect a major cabinet reshuffle this summer and the replacement of Foreign Minister Kosaka. Former Prime Minister Yoshida, LDP elder statesman, has said that Ikeda must include better known figures in his cabinet if he is to stay in office. Sato apparently considers himself a leading candidate for the Foreign Ministry, if he chooses to commit himself to Ikeda's support by joining the cabinet. However, if Ikeda creates an impression of ineffectiveness during his US visit or if Japan's adverse trade balance continues, major party leaders could decide to stay out of the cabinet and begin maneuvering for Ikeda's early fall. }

The Diet session did pass minimum legislation supporting Ikeda's economic program and strengthening Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The budget incorporated Ikeda's campaign pledges for increased spending for social security and public works. An agricultural bill which encourages larger and more efficient family-owned farm units and production cooperatives was passed in the face of strong opposition from the Socialists, whose counterproposal favored eventual collectivization of farm land. Two defense laws increased the authorized strength of uniformed personnel in the SDF from 231,000 to 242,000 and approved reorganization of the Ground Self-Defense Forces.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Imam Attempts to Strengthen Position of Yemeni Royal Family

[ The Imam also appears to be seeking assurances of support for the Yemeni royal family from King Saud. Prince Hasan was recently ordered home from New York, where he was the head of the Yemeni delegation to the UN. He stonned off in Jidda where, [redacted] his mission was to ask King Saud "to intervene to restore the Imam's family." [redacted]

[redacted] Hasan was "seeing King Saud on secret orders of the Imam." Previously the Imam's younger brother, Prince Abdul Rahman, flew to Jidda and at his urgent request had a secret audience with the King.]

[redacted] a rapprochement between Hasan and Badr would be on the basis of an agreement that Badr would become ruler and Hasan prime minister. The move to enlist Saud's support of the reconciliation is apparently based on the idea that Badr would be more willing to cooperate with Hasan if he knew that he had in return the support--financial and political--of King Saud.]

[ It is not at all certain that Saud would be willing to go along with the Imam. Saud has long opposed Badr because of Badr's disposition toward the UAR and the Sino-Soviet bloc. The King reportedly has favored tribal elements opposed to the Imam's selection of Badr as his heir.]

[Cairo has been closely following the development of events in Yemen since the assassination attempt on the Imam, and [redacted] [redacted] have shown a considerable interest in Hasan's return. [redacted]

[redacted] Cairo arrange for the return to Yemen of Abu Zaid, an Egyptian official who in the past was engaged in an effort to further UAR influence over Badr. Abu Zaid returned to Cairo a few weeks ago following indications that the Imam was displeased by Zaid's close relationship with Badr.] [redacted]

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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