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7 January 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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7 JANUARY 1961

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev reportedly cites need to establish contact with new US administration as reason for postponing Soviet party congress. ①

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nigeria severs diplomatic relations with France. ②

Somali defense officials indicate opposition to proposal for Anglo-Italian military training mission, with preference for UAR assistance. ③



Situation in the Congo. ④

Situation in Laos. ⑤

III. THE WEST

Dominican Republic seeks diplomatic relations with USSR and others of Soviet bloc. ⑥

Panamanian security forces alerted to possible clashes in capital between pro- and anti-Castro factions. ⑦



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 January 1961

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: Khrushchev stated at a reception in Moscow on 2 January that the Soviet party congress scheduled for February will be postponed until later in the year, and he attributed the postponement to the need to establish contact with the new US administration, according to the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow. Khrushchev allegedly said he did not expect to meet with the new US President until perhaps July. The Soviet leaders probably believe that the Chinese Communist challenge makes it imperative that the forthcoming party congress take unequivocal positions on doctrinal as well as foreign-policy questions, and that this will be impossible until the Soviet leaders have an opportunity to assess the character and likely moves of the new US administration. Khrushchev may also feel compelled to achieve some tangible success which can be used to demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of his foreign policy before committing the Soviet party to the kind of authoritative and long-range programs that are enunciated at party congresses. It is also possible that internal Soviet developments may be at least partly responsible for postponement of the party congress.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nigeria: The intensity of Nigeria's reaction to the third French nuclear test--illustrated by the severance of diplomatic relations with Paris on 5 January--imposes a further strain on the disposition of the Nigerian rulers to follow a moderate and basically pro-Western course. Nigerian attitudes toward the West, particularly the US, were already

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being affected by Western support for Kasavubu over Lumumba, who is regarded even by conservative Nigerians as the Congo's legitimate premier. Prime Minister Balewa's recent initial experience with the frustrations of the Algerian situation and Nigeria's exposure this fall, for the first time, to the prevailing currents in the Asian-African bloc at the UN may also be contributing to an erosion of Nigerian good will toward the West. [redacted] (Page 1)

Somali Republic: [An offer by Britain and Italy to establish a joint military advisory mission to train the Somali Army is meeting opposition from Somali defense officials, who favor UAR assistance for the new republic's embryonic military establishment. These officials recently told members of an Anglo-Italian negotiating team that lack of confidence in British and Italian support of Somali nationalist aspirations militated against the joint mission proposal. The Somali Army chief also said that the first shipment of weapons promised by Nasir was "being delivered now," and that UAR instructors were expected. Somali interest in acquiring military aid presumably has been heightened by recent clashes along the ill-defined border with Ethiopia.] [redacted]

No

Congo: The UN Command in Leopoldville has airlifted a team, commanded by an Indian officer, to investigate the 31 December landing in Equateur Province of a UAR IL-14 carrying aid for the Gizenga dissidents. In the Bukavu area, tension appears to have eased, with the dissidents now moving to install a new government in Kivu Province under Lumumba's erstwhile information minister, Anicet Kashamura. [redacted] (Page 4)

No

Laos: The Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces in the Plaine des Jarres area retain the initiative. The government outpost at Ban Ban, northeast of Xieng Khouang town, has apparently fallen. The Soviet airlift into Laos continues, with flights

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scheduled through 7 January. Most of these flights continue to be scheduled to the Vang Vieng area, suggesting Communist intentions to retain this strategic area either as a blocking position or as a staging area for a possible future attack on Vientiane. [redacted]

Detailing a long series of alleged acts of intervention in Laos by the United States and its Asian allies, Hanoi issued a lengthy memorandum on 5 January apparently intended to answer recent Western charges of Communist intervention. The memorandum also "deemed it necessary to emphasize" that a reactivated ICC should deal only with Souvanna Phouma as the "legal government of Laos." [On 3 January Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, in a discussion with the British ambassador, took the position that Souvanna's consent was a prerequisite to reactivation of the ICC.] [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 6) (Map)

III. THE WEST

Dominican Republic: The Dominican UN delegation was instructed on 13 December to notify the Soviet delegation that the Dominican Republic desires to re-establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. The instructions, [redacted] also ordered similar approaches to the Albanian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian delegations. These instructions may be the outgrowth of advice given Generalissimo Trujillo recently by a group of his most bitterly anti-US aides that he align himself with the Sino-Soviet bloc and convert his regime into a "socialist state" as the only effective means of withstanding concerted United States and OAS pressure against him. At this time, however, the Soviet bloc as a whole is unlikely to take any action that would publicly associate it with the unpopular Trujillo dictatorship, although the USSR may have one or more members of the bloc establish relations. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 9)

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Panama: Clashes between pro- and anti-Castro forces may break out soon in Panama City as a result of publication of the government's plan to declare the Cuban ambassador persona non grata for meddling in internal Panamanian affairs. [redacted]

both pro- and anti-Castro factions were preparing rallies in the capital, and that goon squads supporting each faction were coming to Panama City from the Atlantic port of Colon. Panamanian security forces reportedly are on a semialert status. *no*

Castro supporters in other Latin American countries may also stage demonstrations similar to the one which occurred in Uruguay on 5 January as a protest against Washington's break with Havana. [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Nigerian Attitudes Toward West Adversely Affected

The intensity of feeling aroused in Nigeria by the third French nuclear test in the Sahara--reflected in the severance by Prime Minister Balewa's government on 5 January of diplomatic ties with Paris--imposes a further strain on the disposition of the leaders of Africa's most populous state to follow a moderate and essentially pro-Western course. France's two earlier tests also had evoked a strong popular and official reaction and were an important factor in the growth during the past year of sentiment for an "independent" foreign policy which would identify Nigeria closely with Africa-wide interests. The failure of leading Western nations--especially the US and UK--to react more vigorously to South Africa's suppression of native rioting last spring and to its subsequent refusal to abandon its apartheid policy have likewise damaged the general Western image in Nigeria. Such developments were effectively exploited by neutralist-inclined Nigerian elements even before the country became independent on 1 October.

More recently, the Congo situation, especially the arrest of Lumumba by Colonel Mobutu's forces in early December, has provoked unprecedentedly severe press criticism of the US, NATO, the "colonial powers," and the UN, which have been lumped together as instigators of a plot against the Congo's sovereignty. When such attacks were at their height last month the heaviest criticism was directed against the US, while the USSR appeared to gain prestige for its pro-Lumumba position. [While reaction on the official level was much more restrained, top Nigerian leaders--including generally conservative northerners--expressed to American officials strong criticism of Lumumba's arrest and the failure of the UN to insist on his release. Nearly all such Nigerians have little use for the erratic Congolese leader, but they nevertheless regard him as still the legitimate premier and appear to share the general public's increasing tendency to view him as the personification of Africa in its fight against "imperialism."]

Balewa's initial direct experience with the frustrations of the Algerian situation--he recently visited Tunis and London

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in the apparent hope of playing some sort of mediatory role between France and the rebels--and Nigeria's exposure this fall, for the first time, to the prevailing currents in the Asian-African bloc at the UN may also have contributed to the apparent erosion of Nigerian good will toward the West.

[Meanwhile, Balewa's reported invitation to the Soviet ambassador in Ghana to visit Lagos on 11 January to discuss details regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and the USSR suggests that the prime minister now feels he can no longer defer such action. At the time of Nigerian independence celebrations Balewa had rebuffed a bid by Soviet representatives for immediate relations and indicated to US Embassy officials a desire to avoid them as long as possible. Since then, there have been several additional formal Soviet requests for diplomatic ties.]

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~~SECRET~~Somali Army Rebuffs Anglo-Italian Aid

[An offer by Britain and Italy to establish a joint military advisory mission to train the Somali Army is meeting opposition from Somali defense officials who favor UAR assistance for the new republic's embryonic military establishment. These officials recently told members of a joint Anglo-Italian negotiating team, which arrived in Mogadiscio in late December to discuss terms of a military assistance agreement, that lack of confidence in British and Italian support for Somali nationalist aspirations militated against accepting the joint mission proposal.]

[The Somalis reiterated their desire to limit the British and Italian role to rear-echelon training and implied they were considering UAR assistance for training the army's combat elements. The Somali Army chief told the mission that the first consignment of weapons promised by Cairo--presumably under the accords reached by Nasir and Prime Minister Abdircid in Cairo last month--was being delivered and that UAR instructors were expected with the weapons.]

[Somali interest in acquiring military aid presumably has been heightened by a recent flare-up between Somalis and Ethiopian security forces in the disputed Haud region of eastern Ethiopia. Clashes occur sporadically throughout the year between tribes from both sides of the ill-defined border, especially during the seasonal migration of Somali herdsmen into Ethiopia in search of pasturage and water. The present difficulties may have been aggravated by Ethiopian preoccupation with border security in view of the recent abortive coup in Addis Ababa.]

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~~TOP SECRET~~The Situation in the Congo

Tension appears to have eased in the Bukavu area, with the Gizenga dissidents now moving to install a new government in Kivu Province under Lumumba's erstwhile information minister, Anicet Kashamura. [redacted]
Gizenga to his followers in Bukavu authorized them "to pro-

The UN Command in Leopoldville has airlifted a team, commanded by an Indian officer, to investigate the 31 December landing in Equateur Province of a UAR IL-14 carrying aid for the Gizenga dissidents. The extent to which UAR personnel at Gemena are able to conceal the actual purpose of the flight may determine whether further such flights will be attempted.

There are indications that the trend toward political fragmentation in the Congo may continue. [redacted]

[redacted] Jean Bolikango--a leader of the Bangala tribe and a member of Ileo's "shadow cabinet"--approached the Portuguese ambassador in Leopoldville concerning Portuguese support for an independent state in Equateur Province. Although the ambassador was noncommittal concerning Bolikango's request for arms, he observed [redacted] that the trend toward autonomous provinces in the Congo may bring closer relations between the separate provinces and Portuguese Africa. He noted that this tendency had already appeared in the case of Angola's relations with Katanga. [redacted]


On 5 January, Katangan Foreign Minister Kimba expressed "surprise" at Kasavubu's proposal for a Congo round-table conference in Leopoldville on 25 January. Noting that Tshombé had earlier scheduled such a conference for Elisabethville on 15 February, Kimba stated that Katanga would not be represented at Leopoldville.

Tshombé continues to face a major security problem in the form of Baluba depredations in northern Katanga. UN officials have indicated that certain UN forces in Katanga will be transferred


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to Kivu and Orientale provinces; and that Tshombé's militia will have to assume more extensive security responsibilities. Tshombé's Belgian military adviser recently characterized Katanga's 4,500-man militia as undisciplined and increasingly anti-white; he stated that Tshombé has agreed to the recruitment of an all-white company in Europe as a hedge against any army revolt.



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~~SECRET~~Situation in Laos

The Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces retain the initiative in Xieng Khouang Province; the government outpost at Ban Ban, to the northeast of Xieng Khouang town, appears to have fallen after having been under enemy pressure for some days. With the fall of Ban Ban, the enemy would appear to have effective control of the road leading from Nong Het, on the North Vietnamese frontier, westward to the Plaine des Jarres. Government troops remaining in this area, including some 300 paratroopers dropped on 1 January, appear to be dispersed in the jungle. [The bulk of the troops in Xieng Khouang Province at the time of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao offensive which began in late December reportedly have withdrawn to an area about 45 miles southeast of Xieng Khouang town. Estimated to number between 1,200 and 1,500, these elements are said to be equipped with small arms and to have left heavier equipment behind. Many of these troops are Meo tribesmen, who in the past fought the Pathet Lao with considerably greater ardor than did Lao troops. Given proper leadership and equipment, they might at least pose a strong guerrilla threat to the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces.]

The ten Soviet IL-14s based at Hanoi flew logistic support missions into Laos on 6 January and on the 7th were again scheduled for flights into the Vang Vieng area. Three North Vietnamese aircraft were also scheduled for flights into Laos on 7 January.

Continued air support flights over the Vang Vieng area indicate a Communist intention to retain this strategic position on the road between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Vang Vieng could serve either as a blocking position to prevent an overland effort by troops from Vientiane to retake the Plaine des Jarres or as a staging area for a future attack on Vientiane.

Four hitherto unobserved Soviet MI-1 helicopters were noted flying between Haiphong and Hanoi on the 6th; these aircraft probably recently arrived by ship at Haiphong or may have been carried

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aboard the Soviet AN-12s recently in the area. The MI-1 is a small helicopter more suitable for observation than for carrying cargo. The five larger Soviet MI-4 helicopters which entered China on 23 December en route to Hanoi are scheduled to leave Nanning for Hanoi on 7 January. [REDACTED]

While the bloc continues its appeals for the reactivation of the International Control Commission (ICC) in Laos, it has repeatedly asserted that any new commission must deal only with Souvanna Phouma. The bloc has maintained the fiction that Souvanna represents the legal government of Laos to provide a necessary cover for its continuing airlift of supplies to the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. By predicating its appeal for the ICC on the consent of Souvanna, the bloc has made it even more difficult to reach any agreement in principle regarding the reactivation of the ICC and will probably continue to exploit its recent military successes in order to secure control of as much territory as possible before the time comes for international negotiation.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Souvanna Phouma's consent is a prerequisite to reactivation of the ICC. This follows the even stronger declaration by the Chinese Communists on 28 December.] In that statement, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi said categorically that any reconvened ICC "must not have any contact" with the Boun Oum government. This same point was emphasized by Hanoi in a lengthy memorandum issued on 5 January.

This memorandum made North Vietnam the first Communist-bloc nation to give public endorsement to a recent proposal by Prince Sihanouk for an international meeting on Laos. The meeting reportedly would be held in some neutral country and would include representatives from Burma, Thailand, and South Vietnam, along with the 1954 Geneva participants and members of the ICC.

Additional warnings against further US "intervention" in Laos came from Chinese Communist leaders on 6 January. Chou En-lai, speaking in Rangoon, charged that armed intervention in

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Laos "endangered the peace of Indochina and the world." Chu Teh, speaking at a Cuban Embassy reception in Peiping, warned that US actions in Laos "endanger China's security." He said that the US and its allies have "gone far enough on this dangerous road and it would be most dangerous to go farther!" [redacted]



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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]Trujillo Seeks Diplomatic Relations With Soviet Bloc Countries

[REDACTED] the Dominican UN delegation was instructed to notify the Soviet delegation of the desire of the Dominican Republic to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The instructions also called for similar approaches to the Rumanian, Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Albanian delegations. These instructions apparently are the outgrowth of advice recently given Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo by his son Ramfis and a group of bitterly anti-US aides that aligning himself with the Soviet bloc and converting his regime into a "socialistic state" would be the only means of withstanding concerted US and OAS pressure against him. However, the Soviet bloc as a whole is unlikely to take any action at this time that would publicly associate it with the unpopular Trujillo dictatorship, although the USSR may have one or more members of the bloc establish relations.

[REDACTED] the Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) recommended that Dominican exiles, many of whom are pro-Communists and Castro sympathizers, be invited to return in order that they may be used in "approaching the Russians." [REDACTED] SIM has made several proposals aimed at terrorizing the local Catholic hierarchy and at liquidating the pro-US underground, made up primarily of members of the small Dominican middle class. Trujillo, in anticipation of such economic sanctions as were approved by the OAS on 4 January, has been attempting to develop commercial and more active diplomatic relations with neutralist and Middle Eastern nations. [REDACTED]

The regime reacted to the new OAS sanctions by accusing the US consul general of being a spy. The Trujillo-controlled Radio Caribe urged that the US Consulate be picketed, and later

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in the day about 25 persons gathered around the consulate carrying signs "Imperialist Yankees Get Out." The rubber-stamp Dominican Congress reportedly has shelved temporarily a law recently drafted to expel all US citizens and to end consular relations with the US.

The consulate reported on 4 January that no organized uprising by anti-Trujillo elements is in sight, but that assassination plotters are increasingly active in the underground.

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