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2 March 1961

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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*Congo: UN representatives in New York say that by the end of 28 February Luluabourg was a "UN city," with all Congolese troops cleared from the town and the airport. Earlier, [] most of the Gizengist force which entered Luluabourg last week was disarmed by Congolese forces there loyal to Leopoldville. []

[] the Gizengist force arrived "hungry and in rags," consisted largely of new recruits, and "gave up without a fight" after failing to swing a majority of the Luluabourg troops over to their cause. Hammerskjold commented to Ambassador Stevenson in New York on 28 February that he felt troop movements such as have recently taken place in the Congo are not bringing about a significant military or political shift in the balance of power among the various factions.] []

no

Gizenga is continuing his demands for outside aid. On 28 February, []

Gizenga said, "I hasten to insist that your republic come to our aid immediately," and reiterated that Stanleyville's request to buy long-range aircraft--in exchange for Congolese goods--is "very important." On 1 March Gizenga's representative in Cairo asked for permission to go to Moscow in order to "settle the question about the airplanes." Gizenga has claimed [] that his regime would supply itself if provided with long-range aircraft. []

[] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

India-Congo: Nehru's reply to Khrushchev's letter of 22 February on the UN and the Congo reaffirms the strong support of the UN which he has previously expressed. []

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[] the reply, which Nehru read to the Indian []

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[cabinet's subcommittee on foreign affairs on the 27th, warns that if the issues of Hammarskjold's status and the Congo are not kept separate, "we shall never find a solution to the Congo problem." Subsequent discussion by the subcommittee indicated that both Nehru and Defense Minister Menon are thinking in terms of sending a brigade-size unit (about 3,000 men) of Indian soldiers to the Congo. A final decision, however, awaits assurances from Hammarskjold that Belgian personnel are in fact being withdrawn from the Congo. In addition, Nehru is awaiting a reply from Nasir to a letter sent on 26 February in which the Indian leader sought to persuade Nasir of the desirability of reinforcing the UN forces in the Congo. Furthermore, Nehru is reported especially concerned about avoiding clashes between Indian troops and any African troops which might be sent unilaterally to support the Gizenga regime.]

*Laos: [Chiang Kai-shek on 28 February ordered the rapid withdrawal of irregulars from the Burma-Laos border area, Taipei will request the cooperation of Thailand and Laos. Chiang Ching-kuo, who has been given responsibility for the operation, said he plans to send a high-level military team early this month to tell the irregular commanders they must withdraw from Burma and return to Taiwan. He believes that most of the 3,000 men in Laos will consent to return but that many of the troops still in Burma will refuse. General Ouane, chief of the Laotian general staff, has reportedly ordered irregulars recruited for special battalions, but except for a battalion of local tribal peoples that had been serving with the Nationalists, no Chinese Nationalist troops have joined the Laotian armed forces.]

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[Rangoon had rejected membership in a neutral nations commission because the plan was unacceptable to Souvanna Phouma. The Foreign Office also expressed doubt that Premier Sihanouk's proposed

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14-nation conference could achieve worthwhile results. [redacted]

[redacted] in Burma's view, the prerequisites for the restoration of stability in Laos were an agreement by all countries not to intervene in any way in Laotian internal affairs and an agreement among all major Laotian factions to hold free elections under the supervision of a neutral commission. [redacted] Burma would be willing to serve on such a commission. [redacted]

France: The fourth French nuclear weapons test in the Sahara is expected to be a tower shot in late March or April. The test will coincide with US-UK-USSR test ban talks which are to be resumed in Geneva beginning 21 March. De Gaulle, determined to obtain "full membership in the atomic club," continues to maintain that France would not agree to a test ban unless it were bound up with agreements on the destruction of nuclear weapons stockpiles. Paris is apparently willing to face the increasingly hostile reaction which is expected from African and Middle Eastern states, including a censure move in the United Nations. The announcement that later French tests will be underground is unlikely to calm this hostile reaction. [redacted]

No

Communist China: Peiping appears to feel the need for a limited liberalization of scientific thought and an increase in freedom of expression among the country's intellectuals. An editorial published in the 28 February issue of the party journal, Red Flag, reviving the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom," states that the findings of scientists should be welcomed even if they lack a "Marxist-Leninist viewpoint." The Chinese Communists have recently released and allowed to appear in public several prominent intellectuals who were arrested in the aftermath of the 1957 liberalization fiasco. Remembering the campaign against those who had expressed themselves too freely before, the intellectuals will be extremely wary about the new invitation to "bloom and contend." [redacted] (Backup, Page 2)

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Brazil-Yugoslavia: The Yugoslav Government, [] has accepted an invitation for Tito to visit Brazil and suggested next August as the most favorable time. Although Yugoslav interests in Latin America are limited, Tito has long wished to tour the western hemisphere. He should have little trouble in arranging visits to some other Latin American countries and can be expected to seek an invitation to the US. [] (Backup, Page 3)

Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga has told an American official that he intends to resign at the cabinet meeting on 3 March, unless President Velasco agrees to change his increasingly favorable policy toward Cuba. Chiriboga's resignation could provoke a cabinet crisis. The foreign minister's stand is directly related to the return from Havana of the pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet former minister of government, Manuel Araujo, a key lieutenant of Velasco who publicly denounced Chiriboga on 21 February as a "State Department servant." Araujo reportedly plans to promote mass unrest and may have gained a dominant influence over Velasco in regard to policies toward both Cuba and the Soviet bloc. [] (Backup, Page 5)

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

- A. No change from last week.
- B. No change from last week.
- C. No significant military activity has occurred in Laos during the last week. There are no indications that the Communist forces in the Plaine des Jarres intend to launch

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[a counter-offensive in the immediate future, although they have the capability to do so. There is an unconfirmed report that the Communists have a plan to initiate operations at an unspecified time in the south of Laos. They have the capability to initiate such action on a small diversionary basis using Pathet Lao - Kong Le resources. Large-scale action would require outside resources such as Viet Minh; we consider this to be unlikely at this time. Meanwhile, the Communist bloc continues its build-up of Souvanna Phouma as the "legal" prime minister and persists in its refusal to negotiate except on its terms.]

- D. [None of the contending factions in the Congo seems able at present to impose a military solution, although the situation appears to favor whichever faction is willing to take the initiative. Out of fear of each other and distrust of the UN, the factions will go as far as they think they can get away with in resisting any UN move to neutralize their forces. Under the impetus of the Kasavubu-Kalonji-Tshombé agreement, the start of political compromise is possible, but there is no evidence Gizenga is willing to enter into nolitical negotiations with the other factions.] [REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in the Congo

[The threat the Gizengist incursion into Luluabourg appeared to pose to Leopoldville reportedly aroused many leaders of Kasavubu's government to the point of being willing, for the first time, to take forceful action. These leaders are said to be urging Mobutu, who is now near Bumba with about 1,500 men, to attack Orientale Province "even if the troops must open fire." It is questionable, however, whether Mobutu's forces would fight even if such an order were given, especially since the threat to Leopoldville has at least temporarily been reduced.]

[Hammaraskjold said that the Luluabourg episode was not a military victory for Stanleyville but that it did show the disintegration of the Congolese Army. He implied that a parallel situation is now shaping up in Equateur Province, where Stanleyville troops easily disarmed the garrison at Ikela and are now moving toward Coquilhatville, which is virtually unguarded by troops of the Leopoldville government because Mobutu has taken most of its garrison to the Bumba area. Press reports on 1 March say that Mobutu forces in Coquilhatville are defecting to Gizenga.]

[Hammaraskjold also questioned where Mobutu stood in relation to recent events, pointing out that he was not particularly loyal to Kasavubu or Ileo, and that he had never broken personally with Lumumba. The secretary general pointed out that Mobutu had started toward Stanleyville with "the most publicized--and slowest--military offensive in history" and then last week told UN Commander McKeown that he was taking up positions only for defense against infiltrators from Stanleyville. Hammaraskjold felt there was a chance, although not a probability, that Mobutu and Lundula, Gizenga's chief of staff, might be planning a military grouping directed against all politicians.]

[An indication that Gizenga is planning to leave Stanleyville appeared on 28 February when Gizenga asked his representative in Cairo to send him "two suits of heavy weight English worsted cloth."]

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Peiping Announces New "100 Flowers" Campaign

Where previously the slogan was "let politics take command," the 28 February issue of Red Flag says that science and politics "are not the same thing" and that however helpful a correct world outlook may be, "Marxism-Leninism cannot replace actual study in the various branches of science."

Scientific work, states Red Flag, must not merely repeat "successes achieved by our predecessors," but should strike out in new fields. The withdrawal of Soviet technicians last summer probably brought home to the Chinese the extent of their dependence on the USSR for scientific and technological information and their pressing need to expand their scientific capabilities. If a modicum of freedom of expression will help achieve this end, Peiping finds the risk worth taking. Red Flag rationalized the acknowledgment that non-Marxists can make valuable contributions to research by stating that such individuals "lean toward materialism" without knowing it.

Peiping admits that the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom" may spill over from the academic into the political sphere but somewhat defensively states that "Marxists-Leninists are not afraid. . . because of that." In 1956-57 when Mao Tse-tung originated "100 flowers," the criticisms voiced by the intellectuals obviously shook the leaders. Mao was termed "hot-tempered, imprudent, reckless, and desiring to be a benevolent god." The anti-rightist campaign which followed saw the arrest and imprisonment of many intellectuals and the creation of a stultifying atmosphere in academic circles. Presumably neither the intellectuals nor the regime desires a repetition of the 1957 excesses.

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Tito to Visit Latin America

The Brazilian ambassador in Belgrade was instructed on 23 February to tell the Yugoslav foreign minister "that the new Brazilian administration is interested in increasing relations with Yugoslavia in all areas, political, economic, and cultural. . . . Proceed at once to make discreet inquiries on the reception which an official invitation for Marshal Tito would receive." The Brazilian ambassador reported a favorable Yugoslav reply on 25 February and advised that the matter "continue to be secret," but Foreign Minister Arinos has publicly suggested a Tito visit to Brazil.

Quadros' invitation to Tito is intended to demonstrate the "truly independent" foreign policy he promised in his inaugural address on 31 January and during his campaign. Before the election Quadros publicly expressed admiration for the independence of Tito and Nasir and during a pre-inauguration visit to Europe apparently hoped to arrange a meeting of neutralist leaders on the Yugoslav island of Brioni.

Yugoslavia's first serious effort to broaden its economic and political relations with Latin America came in mid-1959 when a Yugoslav cabinet officer led a good-will mission to seven Latin American capitals. Several months later, another high regime official visited four other Latin American states, resulting in rumors that Tito would tour the area the following year.

Yugoslavia's relations with the West are generally good; the West is Belgrade's primary source of developmental capital and provides roughly 65 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade. In January, Yugoslavia put into effect a foreign trade and exchange reform which brings its foreign trade practices into closer accord with those of the West. Tito has long wanted to make an official state visit to the United States, but his regime continues publicly to view the West as the chief villain in international affairs.

Tito is currently in Ghana, the first stop on a two-month African tour that will include official visits to Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia and an unofficial call on UAR

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President Nasir. This is the third tour Tito has made to increase Yugoslavia's ties with the uncommitted and underdeveloped countries; trips through the Middle and Far East were made in 1954-55 and 1958-59. Belgrade believes that close identification with the uncommitted states is its best defense against possible future political and economic pressure from East or West and the best possible platform from which to voice its views on international affairs. At the UN session last fall, the UAR's Nasir--long Yugoslavia's closest collaborator--Ghana's Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and India's Nehru worked closely with Tito in an effort to ease East-West tensions. Since then, Belgrade has advocated that the neutrals confer more often, collaborate more closely, and act in concert more frequently.

In contrast to virtually nonexistent party-to-party relations, Belgrade has generally satisfactory relations with the Communist world at the state level, except for Albania and Communist China. Tito and Khrushchev held conversations in New York last fall, [one result of which was an agreement to exchange visits by their foreign ministers.] Moscow and Belgrade hold similar views on most international issues, such as disarmament and colonialism. Albania and Communist China disapprove of close state relations with Yugoslavia and maintain them at a minimal level.

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Violence May Break Out in Ecuador Over the Cuban Issue

Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaum in early February that he was greatly concerned over the Ecuadorean political situation, and predicted another postponement of the eleventh Inter-American Conference now set for Quito on 24 May. He noted President Velasco's desire for closer relations with Cuba, his friendship for Araujo, and his refusal to take action against Communist or Cuban activities in Ecuador.

The potential for violence over the Cuban issue was indicated recently by Communist-backed student unrest in both Quito and Guayaquil which caused demonstrations against Chiriboga and the incumbent minister of government. The Castro regime has cultivated relations with Velasco, particularly by expressing support for Ecuador in its long-standing boundary dispute with Peru.

Chiriboga also stated to an American official on 28 February that a military coup was being planned in Guayaquil. Such an attempt has been considered by a group of about 50 high-ranking officers, under the leadership of the former army commander, who were retired soon after Velasco was inaugurated last September. As minister of government, Araujo accused these officials of treason--a move which touched off a political controversy and helped precipitate his resignation. Although Velasco has a substantial following among the officer corps, he might alienate it if he reappoints Araujo to a top government position and follows a pro-Castro, pro-Soviet policy. Chiriboga said he had information that at a cabinet meeting last Saturday Velasco agreed to repudiate Araujo and threaten him with jail if he continued his activities; but Chiriboga also said he was certain Velasco will not follow through on this.

Araujo recently spent about three weeks in Cuba, and he has reportedly maintained close contact with the Cuban Embassy in Quito. An advocate of close relations with the bloc, he possibly contacted one or more bloc missions while in Havana.

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