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17 May 1961




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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DAILY BRIEF

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*Laos: [In Geneva, a ranking Soviet delegate, discussing the conference [redacted] made a point of noting that the USSR and Communist China would present a united front at the conference, "despite the fact there might be some differences of view between them." Apparently reflecting what might be a shift in Soviet thinking on how the conference should proceed, the delegate also stated that the USSR believes the conference should form itself into three 16-member committees: political, military, and control. The Soviet delegate said that if a Laotian coalition government had not yet been formed by the time these committees completed their work, accords could be signed by all three Laotian factions. The USSR had earlier agreed with the British that the first business of the conference should be the formation of a coalition government. The Communists may now have decided that it would be advantageous to delay negotiations on a coalition government. They may believe that their efforts to establish the equality of Pathet Lao representation with those of the Vientiane government and Souvanna Phouma will improve the prospects of eventually achieving a government more heavily weighted in favor of the bloc.

Major operational areas in Laos have remained generally quiet. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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*South Korea: The outcome of the military coup remains in doubt although a major threat to the insurgent cause was eliminated early on 17 May when Lt. General Yi Han-lim, commander of the front-line First Army, ordered his command to remain neutral in the crisis. Some 3,600 army troops and marines executed the coup in Seoul and reserve army units control most major cities. In Taegu, however, insurgent troops have complied with orders from the commanding general of the Second Army to return control to civil authorities. Most military units have remained passive. [redacted] There are as yet no indications in North Korean communications activity to suggest that Communist forces are preparing to initiate action. [redacted]

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[redacted] Army Chief of Staff Lt. General Chang To-yong has cast his lot with the coup leaders and apparently has convinced President Yun Po-sun that, whatever the outcome, the Chang government must not be restored to power. The influence of President Yun, until now a figurehead in the government structure, appears to be a key factor. He is working for a compromise solution involving the withdrawal of troops and the establishment of a suprapartisan government comprised of civilian officials and possibly some military officers. The civilian populace has accepted military control quietly and the Seoul press gives lukewarm support to the coup on the grounds that "something had to be done." [redacted] (Information as of 0400 EDT)
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
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Map of the Congo



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Congo: Gizenga's arrest of several leading moderates on 14 and 15 May was probably prompted by divergent attitudes within the Stanleyville regime concerning negotiations with Leopoldville, as well as long-standing factional rivalries.

[redacted] Tightened security measures in Stanleyville are being accompanied by a tough line from Gizenga in responding to Kasavubu's call for the reconvening of parliament in Leopoldville. [redacted]

Gizenga advised the UAR, USSR, and numerous other bloc and uncommitted nations that he had informed Hammarskjold the Stanleyville regime had chosen Kamina, in Katanga, as the place at which to reconvene parliament. Reaffirming his claim to represent the legal Congo government, Gizenga stated that he had requested Sudan, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and the UAR to take part in the UN contingent which is to guarantee the personal safety of the deputies. [redacted] *No*

[redacted] (Backup, Page 4) (Map)

Iran: Former Prime Minister Eqbal, who had been questioned by the new government in connection with election rigging, has been given permission to leave for Europe "for a rest." Prime Minister Amini has stated that if the Supreme Court finds Eqbal responsible for such rigging, he will be recalled to Iran for trial. Amini also disclosed that Eqbal's pending appointment as ambassador to London has been withdrawn. Three hundred military officers, including 33 generals, were forced to retire on 15 May, and over 40 unnamed civilians have been arrested on charges of corruption. Minister of Interior Amir-Azizi has announced that four provincial governors-general and a number of other provincial officials were slated for replacement. Amini has also stated that new elections for parliament would be held "in about six months." [redacted] *OK*

[redacted] the developments in Tehran are having an unsettling effect in the countryside. [redacted] [redacted] various rumors about the arrests of generals and other persons "have caused anxiety to the people of this

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area." The imminent departure of the Shah is also, [redacted]
[redacted] viewed with concern. [redacted]

Japan: [A decision by Japan's ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) on 15 May calls for a US-Japanese conference on Okinawan welfare. This may increase the pressure on Prime Minister Ikeda to urge enlarging Japanese administrative participation in the Ryukyus when he comes to Washington in mid-June. Two LDP committees, after hearing a delegation of Ryukyuan legislators, adopted a policy statement favoring greater autonomy for the Ryukyuan government and integration of Japanese and Ryukyuan administrative functions. Leftist organizations in both Japan and Okinawa have requested travel permits for their members to make exchange visits to focus public attention on the Okinawan issue prior to Ikeda's departure.] [redacted] (Backup, Page 6)

OK

Australia - United Kingdom: [The Australian Government is apparently reacting unfavorably to a United Kingdom suggestion to establish at Singapore a single supreme Commonwealth command for all UK, Australian, and New Zealand forces in Southeast Asia. This proposal reportedly was made during Lord Mountbatten's February visit to Canberra and will be the major topic of discussion during Australian Defense Minister Townley's current visit to London. Australia and New Zealand, despite their Commonwealth ties, prefer to coordinate their military planning in the Pacific areas with the United States through the ANZUS Pact and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.] [redacted] (Backup, Page 7)

OK

Lebanon: The resignation of Prime Minister Salam and his 17-member cabinet on 16 May gives President Shihab an opportunity to select a smaller, more efficient group less troubled by the internal dissension which handicapped its predecessor. Salam's unwieldy cabinet, which had served since last August, was widely criticized for its lack of accomplishments, and its resignation has been expected for some time. Salam, however, remains a likely candidate for the premiership in the new government. [redacted]

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*Albania: Ten alleged Albanian agents of the US, Greece, and Yugoslavia were put on public trial on 15 May in connection with an abortive attempt last year to overthrow the Hoxha regime, first publicly mentioned at the February congress of the Albanian Workers' (Communist) party [redacted]

[redacted] Summaries of the first day's activities carried by the Albanian domestic radio service dramatized Albanian claims of US, Greek, and Yugoslav hostility and subversion over the last decade against the Tirana government. The regime apparently hopes to use the trial to justify its long-standing anti-Yugoslav position and to demonstrate to the Soviet bloc the error of its current policy of maintaining normal state relations with Yugoslavia. Criticism of Moscow's 1955-57 rapprochement with Belgrade is implicit in the indictment. [redacted]

Ho

*USSR: An ICBM vehicle was launched from Tyura Tam to the Kamchatka impact area at about 1923 GMT (1523 EDT) on 16 May. [redacted]

[redacted] the vehicle successfully reached the Kamchatka Peninsula.

Ho

This is the 11th Soviet ICBM launching this year. Seven of these have been generally successful and four have failed in flight. [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Situation in Laos

[The American Embassy in Phnom Penh, commenting on the Cambodian Government's attitude as it enters the Geneva Conference, states that Sihanouk, as well as other high Cambodian officials, is deeply concerned over the prospects of a Communist takeover in Laos. Sihanouk feels that Souvanna Phouma is so committed to the Sino-Soviet bloc that he can no longer be regarded as a free agent and that in any case he lacks the power to oppose the Pathet Lao. Despite these reservations, Sihanouk apparently considers Souvanna the only Laotian capable of forming or heading a government of national union. Although generally gloomy about Laos, Sihanouk is hopeful that, relying on what he considers his "persona grata" status with both the East and the West, to work out some arrangement at Geneva to prevent or at least postpone Communist domination in Laos]

[General Phoumi, in a bitter mood, told an American Embassy officer on 15 May that the United States "says one thing and does the other." He asserted that for months the United States took a strong position against allowing the ICC to return to Laos; opposed any 14-nation conference; and stood firmly against Pathet Lao participation in the government. He added that only two or three days ago the United States had publicly stated that the Soviet proposal to seat the Pathet Lao at the Geneva Conference was unacceptable. He claimed that he had recently told the King that he was forced to follow blindly the American line but he had no idea where it would lead.]

A source in the South Vietnamese Department of Foreign Affairs, on the eve of the departure of the Diem government's delegation to Geneva, described Saigon's attitude on the conference as follows: it would not agree to any discussion at the conference relating to South Vietnam; it would recognize no other government in Laos than the Boun Oum government; it would not agree to any "false" neutrality which might indirectly bring Laos into the Communist sphere of influence; and it would not agree to any resolution leading to the partition of Laos.

Recent reports suggest considerable tension between the Pathet Lao and the followers of Souvanna Phouma in Xieng

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Khouang Province. Souvanna's daughter, Princess Moun,

[redacted] relations between the Pathet Lao and the "Souvanna forces" in Xieng Khouang were very bad, that the two sides had nearly "come to blows," and that Souvanna was considering withdrawing his forces a few kilometers away from the Pathet Lao in order to prevent an incident. [A] member of the Souvanna delegation at the cease-fire talks is reported to have said that sharp disagreements between the two groups were continuing. He added that there have been strong arguments between the Pathet Lao and Souvanna's neutralist supporters, with the latter contending that neutralism does not mean Communism.] [redacted]

In addition to two Soviet LI-2s scheduled for Xieng Khouang and Vang Vieng, airlift operations scheduled for 16 May included eight IL-14s in round-trip flights from Hanoi to Vinh and Dong Hoi in southern North Vietnam. Flights into southern North Vietnam occurred on 21 April and 11 May. These probably reflect logistical operations in support of pro-Communist forces in southern Laos. Some of the supplies could be destined for Viet Cong guerrilla forces in South Vietnam.

Airlift operations on 15 May involved a total of 19 sorties, 17 by Soviet transports and 2 by North Vietnamese transports. Of this number, 9 Soviet IL-14s and 2 Soviet LI-2s were reflected in flights to Xieng Khouang.

On 16 May, one Soviet IL-14 departed Moscow for Hanoi via Peiping. This aircraft has flown similar missions on two separate occasions--the first in late April and again between 7 and 11 May. Although these missions have been designated "special flights" by the Sino-Soviet civil air authorities, the nature of the cargoes is unknown. [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]The Coup in South Korea (Information as of 0400 EDT)

The Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), nominally headed by Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong but under the actual leadership of Maj. General Pak Chong-hui, has issued a series of proclamations which, in addition to ousting the cabinet, have established martial law throughout the country, dissolved the National Assembly, temporarily named an all-military cabinet, instituted press and radio censorship, and imposed price controls.

The MRC's immediate objective appears to be the formal resignation of the Chang Myon government, presumably to lend an appearance of legality to the change in government. After discussions with MRC leaders on 16 May, President Yun, who is under custody in the presidential mansion, broadcast an appeal to Chang Myon to emerge from hiding and submit his resignation. The MRC has called on Chang and his ministers to attend an emergency State Council meeting late on 17 May and has guaranteed their safety for this purpose. The US chargé in Seoul believes, however, that Chang will not resign as long as he believes his government has official American support.

Military and national police were reported to have suffered eight casualties, including two deaths, while resisting the military takeover in Seoul. The post-coup situation in Seoul and other cities has been quiet and there is general compliance with the MRC's order to continue normal daily activity and observe the 7 p. m. to 5 a. m. curfew. The Seoul radio, however, went off the air without explanation at 1415 hours local time on 17 May.

Communist bloc comment on the coup betrays a lack of first-hand information. Initial North Korean reaction, broadcast six hours after the coup was announced, condemned US Embassy statements backing the Chang Myon government and has fabricated stories of student demonstrations supporting the coup. Peiping has followed a similar line. Initial Soviet reaction pictures the coup as a decision by "reactionary forces" to "sacrifice" Chang Myon in order to strengthen the "dictatorial regime" in South Korea and suppress popular unrest. Soviet commentary notes that the leaders of the coup have declared that they "intend to strengthen friendship with the United States" and Soviet delegation sources in Geneva reportedly have said that "it is evident that the US has organized the coup in South Korea." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
17 May 61. ~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ []The Situation in the Congo

Gizenga, in calling for the convening of parliament at the Kamina base in Katanga, and in emphasizing his claim to head the Congo government, has taken a position which will make an early meeting of parliament unlikely. In particular, his demand that protection be accorded the deputies by several African states not represented in the UN Command appears likely to stimulate protracted negotiations with the UN. Kasavubu will probably resist any dispatch to the Congo of contingents from such African states as Guinea, Mali, and the UAR.

[Gizenga probably wants a meeting of parliament, provided most of his demands can be met. He apparently rejected advice from Nkrumah, who on 12 May urged Gizenga to insist that parliament reassemble only in Stanleyville, "the seat of the legal successor to the Lumumba government." Gizenga's choice of Kamina may have been prompted in part by a desire to reassert the central government's dominance over "independent" Katanga. The Kamina base is occupied by some 3,200 Indian troops. India has long been sympathetic to Stanleyville.] []

Elsewhere, Gizenga's foreign allies continue to seek means of bolstering his regime. The Soviet Red Cross is applying heavy pressure on the Leopoldville representative of the League of Red Cross Societies to send medicines and other relief supplies directly to Stanleyville overland through Sudan or British East Africa. The International Red Cross continues to insist, however, that such gifts be sent to Matadi for forwarding to Stanleyville as required. []

[] Nkrumah continues to explore means of delivering to Gizenga 350 tons of Soviet arms off-loaded in Ghana last April. On 14 May, Gizenga advised Nkrumah that he had at Stanleyville facilities for the clandestine discharge of cargo aircraft, as well as stocks of aviation fuel for their return trip to Ghana. []

[] Indian Charge Rahman in Leopoldville is continuing to furnish financial []

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted] [and other support to groups opposed to the Kasavubu government, although he reportedly is advising Gizenga that his best hope lies in reaching an accommodation with the UN as has Kasavubu. Rahman may be operating largely on his own initiative, since his activities conflict with New Delhi's policy of channeling its efforts exclusively through the UN. Krishna Menon recently noted that Kasavubu's announced intention to reconvene parliament was in line with India's long-standing policy.] [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Okinawan Issue Grows in Japan

[The statement by the Foreign Affairs Research Council and Okinawan Problems Committee of the Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) supports popular election of the Ryukyuan chief executive, now appointed by the US High Commissioner; increased US aid to Okinawa; US-Japanese cooperation to improve a social security system and facilities for economic development in the Ryukyus; and integration of Okinawan and Japanese elections. In its election platform last fall the LDP had confined its policy statement on Okinawa to a general expression of sentiment in favor of US-Japanese cooperation to raise Ryukyuan living standards.]

[Chief Cabinet Secretary Masayoshi Ohira reportedly assured a visiting delegation of Okinawan legislators on 9 May that Ikeda would discuss problems of administrative rights and missile stockpiling in the Ryukyus with US leaders during his visit next month. The legislators, representing the two major Okinawan parties, were appointed by the Ryukyuan legislature to present to Ikeda a resolution calling for Okinawan representation in the Japanese Diet, opposition to bringing Mace short-range missiles to Okinawa, and the continuation of Japanese assistance in teacher training.]

[Officials of the Foreign Ministry continue to maintain they are doing their best to discourage partisan attempts to make Okinawan relations a more active issue in Japan. They have reportedly tried to dissuade the Legislative Secretariat of the Diet from further study of the legality of Okinawan participation in the Diet. However, Foreign Minister Kosaka recently renewed Tokyo's request that a tripartite council be established to handle matters concerning Japan, the US, and the Ryukyus. Popular sentiment for closer relations with Okinawa may reach a point where Ikeda would be expected to report some progress following his return from Washington.]

[Arrangements are being made for a small delegation of Foreign Ministry officials and Diet members representing the three major parties to visit Okinawa as guests of the US High Commissioner before Ikeda leaves for the US.]

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~~SECRET~~Australia Cool to British Defense Suggestions

[Since World War II, when Australia and New Zealand found themselves dependent on the United States rather than the United Kingdom for support of their military effort, the two countries have been reluctant to bind themselves too closely to the United Kingdom in military matters. They have preferred to maintain their military freedom of action in the Pacific area and have looked to the United States as their long-term source of support. Defense relations with the United Kingdom have been maintained largely through the informal 1953 agreement among Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya for the defense of Malaya under which the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve force is maintained in Malaya.]

[Mountbatten's suggestion of a unified Commonwealth command based in Singapore was not the first such proposal. A similar British suggestion in 1957 was rejected by both Australia and New Zealand, but led indirectly to the increase of their forces in Malaya. The Commonwealth Strategic Reserve consists of a brigade group--one battalion each of British, Australian, New Zealand, and Gurkha troops, plus naval and air forces.]

[The British Defense White Paper of February 1961 noted that a unified army-navy-and-air command--such as is now functioning in Cyprus and Aden--was under examination for the Far East. An alternative plan advocated by some British officials is to increase the number of British troops committed to SEATO, despite severe military manpower limitations.]

[Australian experiences with the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve forces in Malaya are likely to have increased the reluctance of Australia and New Zealand to accept Mountbatten's suggestions. In recent weeks, when Australia thought it might need to use its battalion from Malaya in Laos independently of United Kingdom action, it found that its troops would have been unavailable. As a result, Australia would probably accept a unified Commonwealth command only if Canberra had the freedom to use the total force for Australian defense without reference to London.]

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