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16 June 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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LATE ITEM

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[redacted] *USSR: Preliminary analysis indicates that an attempt to launch an ICBM test vehicle occurred at about 0747 GMT (0347 EDT) this morning. [redacted]

No

[redacted] however, and it is likely that the operation was cancelled at launch time [redacted]

[redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

*USSR-Berlin: Khrushchev used his speech of 15 June, reporting on the Vienna meeting, to emphasize his determination to carry through with his announced policy on Berlin and Germany. He committed himself publicly for the first time to take unilateral action if there is no East-West agreement before the end of 1961 by stating that "a peaceful settlement in Europe must be obtained this year." [Prior to this speech, Khrushchev had made his timetable clear only in private talks with the American and West German ambassadors.] Khrushchev's exposition of the Soviet position on other aspects of the German and Berlin problem and on disarmament and nuclear testing followed closely the line set forth in the two aide-memoire which were handed the US at the conclusion of the Vienna talks.

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Khrushchev's efforts to increase the sense of urgency over an early Berlin settlement have been accompanied by new East German pressures aimed at weakening ties between West Germany and West Berlin. The Ulbricht regime is taking more active steps to split the only remaining All-German organization--the church--by warning that no East German citizen will participate in the Evangelical Church's All-German congress, scheduled to meet in West Berlin 19-23 July.

Laos: [A] ranking official in the Boun Oum government has flown to Luang Prabang to obtain permission from King Savang for Phoumi to propose the King as premier of a coalition government. It is unlikely that Savang would agree to serve in such a capacity despite the face-saving advantages for the principals of the Laotian conflict of such a solution.]

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The military situation remains generally quiet, although a government convoy was ambushed by enemy guerrillas on

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Route 13 about 15 miles north of Vientiane on 14 June. [redacted]

[redacted]

enemy forces there had no food supplies.

Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 16 June. Operations for 14 June involved a total of 10 sorties, six of which were into Laos [redacted]

[redacted]

Dominican Republic - OAS: The Venezuelan Government is likely to continue demanding decisive OAS action against the Trujillo heirs in the Dominican Republic. Foreign Minister Falcon is quoted in the press as threatening Venezuela's withdrawal from the OAS if the sanctions imposed on the Dominican Government are terminated. [redacted]

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Venezuela intends to request a formal OAS foreign ministers' meeting on the Dominican situation, no matter what the findings are of the special OAS subcommittee which returned from the Dominican Republic on 15 June. [redacted]

The Latin American members of this four-nation subcommittee insisted on leaving the Dominican Republic after only a week, saying that their job was finished [and denying they had received any contrary instructions from their governments] They said their continued presence would violate Dominican sovereignty, and that any subsequent return would require new instructions. [redacted]

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The group was unable to secure written assurances from the Dominican Government that it would be free to return at any time. Ambassador Drew, the US member, noted on 14 June that his Latin American colleagues appeared fully persuaded of the good intentions of the Dominican Government. The subcommittee's report is unlikely to justify the strong action demanded by Venezuela. While the necessary two thirds of OAS members may not yet be ready to vote the termination of the Dominican sanctions, the lack of interest in the Dominican situation and the nonintervention position professed by most other OAS members reduce the prospects for significant OAS action on the Dominican Republic. Venezuelan President Betancourt had expressed the wish that strong OAS action on the Dominican situation would establish

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USSR-Cuba: The Soviet merchant ship Leninsky Kom-somol, which arrived in Cuban waters on 15 June, carries on deck 18 large canvas-covered boxes. These could contain the first shipment of MIG-15 or MIG-17 aircraft to Cuba.

No



France-Algeria:

[Redacted] when the Evian talks adjourned, that France found the PAG completely uncompromising in its demands. French spokesmen have publicly insisted that before talks can be resumed "a new element will be needed"-- intimating that this meant a favorable PAG response to the French unilateral cease-fire. [The PAG representative in New York on 14 June expressed eagerness to resume negotiations, but outlined the Algerian rebel stand in terms indicating no change] Neither side is willing to assume responsibility for a complete breakoff, however, as evidenced by conciliatory public statements from both sides.

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[Redacted] (Backup, Page 1)

South Korea: [South Korean security boss Lt. Colonel Kim Chong-pil. has ordered the armed forces purged of all personnel involved in activities opposed to the revolution.]

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[Redacted] Kim reportedly told Army Chief of Staff Lt. General Kim Chong-o that he would be allowed to retain his present post only so long as he did not interfere with the investigation and removal of suspected elements. Kim Chong-pil on 14 June was named director of the recently established South Korean Central Intelligence Agency. The new organization was given responsibility to coordinate government-wide, including military, collection of information, and investigation of all matters at home and abroad related to national security and criminal activity. Kim's appointment and wide mandate is indicative of his importance in the junta inner circle. He is a close associate of Pak Chong-hui and apparent leader of the extremist young colonels [Redacted]

Japan: Leftists have scheduled major demonstrations for 17 June against Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to the US. Radical

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students are organizing an airport demonstration to block his departure on 19 June, the first anniversary of the US-Japanese security treaty's ratification. The same student group wrecked the main building at Tokyo International Airport in January 1960 when it demonstrated against former Prime Minister Kishi's departure for Washington to sign the treaty.

At a press conference on 15 June, Ikeda tried to set the tone for his visit by discouraging any expectation of major developments and describing his purpose as limited to establishing personal contact with President Kennedy. However, last-minute pressures for expanded Japanese rights in the Ryukyu Islands are developing and could strengthen Ikeda's appeal for US concessions. [redacted] (Backup, Page 3)

Sudan: The Abboud government has issued an order dissolving the 25,000-member Sudan Railway Workers Union (SRWU) in an attempt to avert a strike which the union leadership had scheduled for 17 June. The government fears that the strike, which is receiving strong support from the Communist elements in the SRWU, would play into the hands of the coalition of political and religious leaders which has recently been agitating for a return to civilian government. The union has replied to the dissolution order with leaflets calling for a general strike on 17 June to support the railway strike. [redacted] (Backup, Page 5)

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USSR: Analysis of the formations noted during Moscow fly-by rehearsals suggests that some of the older aircraft may, as in the past, be replaced by new types in the actual forthcoming Aviation Day air show. The USSR has often used this annual show for the first public display of new aircraft and equipment. In addition to highlighting air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, this year's show could display one or more new fighters and bombers. The latter may include the new jet medium bomber, the Blinder, and possible a new large Delta-wing bomber. [redacted]

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**SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES**

(Available during the preceding week)

Soviet Capabilities for Long-Range Attack. U.S.I.B. NIE
11-8-61. June 7'61. []

Short-term Prospects in Haiti, With Special Reference to
the Likely Consequences for Haiti of Trujillo's Assassination.
U.S.I.B. SNIE 86. 1-61. June 7'61. []

Outlook For Italy, With Particular Reference to Internal
Political Stability: Fanfani's Position, Roles of the Various
Political Parties, and Economic Factors; Foreign Policy Es-
pecially Toward NATO. U.S.I.B. NIE 24-61. June 13'61.
[]

Soviet and Other Reactions to Various Courses of Action
Regarding Berlin. U.S.I.B. SNIE 2-61. June 13'61. []
[]

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Impasse in Evian Talks

[Joxe reportedly told Mollet that no future conference should be scheduled without assurances that progress would be made. Mollet found Joxe hopeful that pressures to resume talks would be greater on the PAG than on France because the Algerian Moslems have been following the Evian meetings with anticipation of success.]

[Mollet's own views are that the breakdown of the talks is serious and that tensions between left and right in France will be increased. He said the Evian talks had served to keep the lid on potentially explosive social unrest, since many leftist leaders did not wish to undermine the government. In this regard Mollet noted the growing unrest among farmers and labor groups, and also expressed concern over mounting terrorism in both Algeria and France during the negotiations.]

In a press conference at Evian on 13 June Joxe outlined the French position on the key substantive issues--guarantees for the European community in Algeria, treatment of the Sahara as a separate issue, and the discontinuance of rebel terrorism --and noted the failure of progress on any of these. He said that France hoped a "period of reflection" would be useful to find ways out of the deadlock, and that members of the French delegation were still prepared to establish any contact that would "make a more fruitful resumption of negotiations possible." On 15 June Paris announced it was extending the unilateral cease-fire in Algeria beyond the original 20 June deadline and continuing to release Moslem political prisoners.

[In New York, PAG representative Abdelkader Chanderli, purportedly transmitting information from the PAG in Geneva, told American officials that the PAG was uncertain whether the French decision to suspend discussions was a tactical move to placate internal opposition or a firm decision not to compromise. He said that the PAG viewed the initial talks at Evian as exploratory to determine the areas of disagreement, leaving areas of possible compromise to further discussion. The PAG, he said,]

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[had expected that talks would last for several months and saw no reason to be discouraged because the first confrontation had not led to agreement.]

[Chanderli claimed that the PAG was actually holding down rebel offensive action, but insisted that a cease-fire must follow rather than precede political negotiations. He said that the PAG was willing to consider arrangements for French use of Mediterranean bases but that the French concept of sovereignty over military enclaves was unacceptable. Self-determination, Chanderli said, could not be implemented regionally with options for partition. Expressing the hope that influence could be exerted on Paris to resume negotiations promptly, he said that in another year or two, if a settlement is not reached, he and his colleagues will be thrown out and the "boys from the maquis will take over who don't give a damn for De Gaulle, Rousseau, or Voltaire."]

The US consul general in Algiers believes that Moslem reaction to breaking off the talks is one of disappointment and notes some hardening of attitude toward the PAG. Should such feeling seek an outlet in the form of demonstrations, it would exacerbate the already tense security situation reported there. French authorities, who seem more concerned with the prospects of pro-PAG demonstrations, are making extra security deployments in Algiers.

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Demonstrations to Oppose Japanese Prime Minister's US Visit

Ikeda, saying he has "no specific problems" to discuss in Washington, tried at his press conference to undercut recent efforts of elements hoping to unseat him to exaggerate hopes for a major accomplishment, particularly in increasing Japanese participation in Ryukyuan affairs. On 7 June the Japanese news service, Kyodo, quoted Foreign Ministry sources as saying there is still "much room" for increased cooperation with the US in improving Ryukyuan living standards. On Okinawa, members of the Ryukyuan Assembly, leftist demonstrators, the press, and civic groups this week petitioned a visiting Japanese parliamentary delegation to persuade Ikeda to press the US to return the Ryukyus to Japanese administrative control.

Ikeda told the press that his plan to double national income by 1970 would help Japan to expand economic assistance to underdeveloped countries. However, in the face of at least a temporary deterioration in their international balance of payments, it is doubtful that the Japanese are prepared psychologically to increase such assistance. The recently signed commitment to repay \$490,000,000 to the United States for postwar aid, outstanding reparations obligations of \$750,000,000, and an \$800,000,000 debt on international loans are additional deterrents.

Ikeda leaves Tokyo against a background of harsh press criticism for his "ineptness" in managing the Diet session which ended on 8 June after leftist demonstrations against a bill for the prevention of political violence. Major newspapers have also criticized the leftists for resorting to mass action, but they appear more concerned with government failure to enact a number of important bills. Particularly they have pointed out that failure to ratify International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 87, guaranteeing freedom of workers to join unions, will almost certainly provoke a censure from the ILO meeting which began in Geneva on 15 June.

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Jotaro Kawakami, chairman of the Japanese Socialist party (JSP), originally planned to meet with Ikeda and ask him to present the opposition's views in Washington. However, when Ikeda forced the anti-violence bill through the lower house of the Diet, the JSP decided on 6 June to oppose the visit on grounds that it is designed to "consolidate the joint US-Japanese defense system" and will "jeopardize Japan's peace and independence." The Communists, working through a faction of the radical student federation, Zengakuren, have resolved to "block" the visit and are alone in planning demonstrations at the airport against Ikeda's departure.

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Railway Strike Threatens Sudanese Regime

The SRWU last March demanded a 45-percent wage increase. The government rejected the demand as unrealistic, although it has for some time been searching for a way to increase salaries and retirement benefits of the workers. On 1 June the union served notice that it was planning to call a two-week strike beginning 17 June in support of its demand.

In issuing the dissolution order, the government charged that the union was not negotiating the dispute according to the 1960 Trade Union Disputes Act. At the same time it called on railway employees not to cooperate in the strike and threatened disciplinary action against participants. [redacted]

[redacted], the government will also attempt to limit the number of strikers by offering to pay double wages to all employees who will remain on the job. [However, the government's attempt at breaking the strike in this manner may be hampered somewhat by rumors now circulating among civil servants that army and police officers were recently given a 45-percent pay increase.]

Government suppression of the strike could strengthen the Communist party's position within the SRWU. A Labor Ministry official was told by the SRWU president that government action against him would "give the union to the Communists" because they control the secret committees organized to run the union in the event of the arrest of its officers.

Although there is no evidence that the civilian opposition group was directly involved in the strike planning, it is watching the development of events closely and may take action in conjunction with the strike. [redacted]

[redacted] on 6 June Siddiq al-Mahdi, leader of the opposition group and head of the influential Moslem Ansar sect, held a meeting with some 3,000 of his followers. [redacted]

[redacted] since that time the Ansars have been holding political meetings nightly in the homes of various leaders.] [redacted]

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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