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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C02000189

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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7 February 1961

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USSR: Moscow's first critical comments on the President's State of the Union message appeared in authoritative articles in Izvestia and Pravda on 4 and 5 February. Having permitted publication of the full text of the address, the Soviet leaders probably felt those passages dealing with the bloc and specific East-West issues called for a critical response. Both articles contained a general criticism of the address for repeating "cold war echoes" and for "failing to last Prenounce old, worn-out ideas." The main criticism was directed against the defense measures announced by the President and the statements on arms control which Izvestia described as avoiding the questions of "effective disarmament." Both Pravda and Izvestia attacked the statements on the aspirations of world Communism and the references to the situation in Cuba. The articles, however, do not represent a significant departure from general Soviet and Eastern European propaganda since the inauguration, which has maintained a cautious and skeptical approach toward the US

the East German party issued orders to district newspapers on 31 January to emphasize "positive" aspects of the address but "without fostering any illusions about future American policy." (Backup, Page 1)

USSR: The assignment of Averky Aristov, a full member of the party presidium since 1957, as ambassador to Poland deprives him of a place in the Kremlin inner circle. Although still formally a member of the presidium, Aristov has lost his key post as Khrushchev's deputy in the central committee's Bureau for the Russian Republic (RSFSR), which

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supervises party affairs in the USSR's largest republic. Compared with some other Soviet republics, the RSFSR had a satisfactory agricultural year in 1960 and there has been no indication of executive failures on Aristov's part. His demotion appears to be the outcome of a competition for authority among Khrushchev's lieutenants. His removal from the RSFSR post, in which he has been replaced by a newcomer to the central command, appears likely both to strengthen the grip of Frol Kozlov, as Khrushchev's principal party aide on the RSFSR party organization and to enhance the position of Dmitry Polyansky, the RSFSR premier. (Backup, Page 3)

Laos: Government forces are preparing to put into effect plans for the recapture of the Plaine des Jarres.

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be committed are adequate for their mission.

delete st rent The Pathet Lao radio has broadcast a statement attributed to the "legal government of the Laotian kingdom" warning that if the United States and Thailand do not stop their "overt armed interference" in Laos, the "government" would be "obliged to appeal for help from friendly countries." The statement, signed by "acting premier" Khamsouk Keola and others claiming to be acting in behalf of the Souvanna "government" in Xieng Khouang, was dated 2 February, the same day that Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi announced in Peiping that his government was prepared to give aid if requested. (Backup, Page 4) (Map) \

Congo: Britain, France, and Belgium have now expressed reservations concerning Hammarskjold's recent proposals that the Congolese Army be neutralized. The British believe that the military situation in the Congo currently favors Kasavubu and that his position would be undermined if the troops in the Leopoldville area were disarmed. French and Belgian representatives have also stated that the proposal would be

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detrimental to Kasavubu's legal position, and might result in the early restoration to power of Lumumba. (Backup, Page 6)]

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Burma: General Ne Win appears to have staved off a potential challenge to his control of the Burmese Army. On 3 February, he reportedly accepted the resignation of Brigadier Maung Maung, as well as the resignations of several other senior officers, and ordered five of Burma's 13 brigade commanders to attaché posts abroad. These actions would eliminate those who have argued most strongly for a resumption of military government and against Prime Minister Nu's policy of rapprochement with Peiping.

(Backup, Page 7)

Iran: The Shah is reported to be discouraged by election difficulties, problems in Iranian-Soviet relations, and uncertainty over future American policy toward Iran. The fear of resurgent nationalists has led him to impose almost complete control over the current parliamentary elections. This in turn has brought an increase in antiregime activity of nationalist groups. While the Shah has given earlier assurances to the United States that he would not make any significant political concessions to the USSR, he has instructed his prime minister not to be "totally antagonistic" toward the USSR but to find out what the Soviet Union would be willing to do for Iran.

(Backup, Page 8)

*Angola: Although Portuguese authorities in Angola reacted delete quickly and firmly to the outbreaks of nationalist rioting in Lu-last 2 anda on 4 and 5 February, disorders and gunfire are reported sent of to have broken out again early this morning. The government P = 2 and will probably be able to control the situation, but, despite heavy government repression, nationalism is likely to become a significant force over the next few years. (Backup, Page 9)

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Western Europe: De Gaulle, Adenauer, and the four other heads of government of the European Common Market countries are due to meet in Paris on 10 February to discuss De Gaulle's plan for a six-nation European "confederation," and other measures proposed to strengthen Western European unity. Avowed opposition to the De Gaulle proposals has abated in the last six months, although there is still concern over De Gaulle's suspected desire to establish a French-led continent as the basis for advancing French national interests. A preliminary Adenauer - De Gaulle meeting is scheduled for 9 February. (Backup, Page 11)

Brazil: President Quadros has ordered his foreign minister to take immediate steps toward establishing diplomatic relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria; to cancel the credentials of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian diplomatic representatives, and to initiate an evaluation of Brazil's present relations with Taiwan. Quadros was probably motivated partly by a desire to assert his government's independence in foreign affairs and partly by a desire to conciliate leftist-nationalist groups in anticipation of their dissatisfaction with "harsh" economic recovery measures that may follow. Negotiations with the USSR may also be under way, as reportedly stated by a member of the Chamber of Deputies on 3 February. Brazil has long had diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland.

(Backup, Page 13)

Colombia: Pressures for a diplomatic break with Cuba have been increased by a demand of the right-wing faction of the Conservative party for such action and by charges that Cuban agitation may be partly responsible for the rising violence in rural areas. The Colombian Communist party is reported to be making plans for demonstrations against US business and diplomatic establishments if Colombia does break relations with Cuba. (Backup, Page 14)

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Soviet Press Criticism of President's State Of the Union Address

The critical tone of "Observer" articles in <u>Pravda</u> and <u>Izvestia</u> and of a commentary on the State of the Union message by the Soviet weekly <u>Life Abroad</u> probably is designed to convey the impression that the Soviet leaders believe the US has failed to respond adequately to their initial overtures for improving Soviet-American relations. Bloc spokesmen have taken a similar line in private conversations by stressing that the next move is up to the US. <u>Izvestia</u> comments that although the President's message reflected a "passing" awareness of the crucial stage in international relations, the US must now draw the "appropriate conclusions." <u>Pravda</u> cautions, however, against any judgment of US policies on the basis of the "first steps" and asserts that only "the near future" will tell whether the new administration intends to embark on a new course in US foreign policy.

The propaganda pattern developed by the USSR and the European satellites since the inauguration features relatively factual coverage of statements by US officials, some indications of optimism over future Soviet-American relations, and a generally skeptical over-all tone. This combination reflects the conflicting pressures on the Soviet leaders to create a favorable climate for the advancement of their objectives through negotiations with the West, on the one hand, and to maintain bloc unity on the other, by avoiding an overly favorable estimate of US intentions which might intensify the dispute with the Chinese Communists. Such an approach suggests that Moscow will continue to take a conciliatory position on the official level in such matters as the release of the RB-47 crew members and the agreement to postpone the resumption of talks on banning nuclear tests. At the same time, the Soviet leaders will probably feel compelled to respond critically to statements by US officials on the bloc's international posture and on specific East-West issues. In contrast to the Izvestia editorial of 4 February, the Soviet note on the same date, agreeing to a postponement of the Geneva talks, omitted the standard Soviet position that the USSR preferred to expedite matters and was agreeing only as a concession to the US. Instead Moscow noted the US desire to reach a successful conclusion to the talks.

The continued caution in commenting on the new US administration

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district newspapers to stress the President's references to disarmament and coexistence, but called attention, "in contrast to these positive tendencies," to the President's statements on US defense policy, his alleged disapproval of "peoples' fighting for their independence," and his "interpretation of the freedom of the East European countries as the hope of American policy." The commission commented that the President's line on Eastern Europe "would signify the practical continuation of a policy which could offset the favorable beginning of a relaxation of tensions on the part of the United States."

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Soviet Party Leader Demoted

Averky Aristov as early as October 1952 had worked his way into the inner party circle around Stalin, but he lost out in the shake-up in March 1953 following Stalin's death and was exiled to a remote provincial post. He was recalled to Moscow in 1955 as a party secretary and in June 1957, when Khrushchev won his victory over Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, was again made a member of the ruling party presidium. By December 1958 he had become Khrushchev's only deputy on the important party Bureau for the RSFSR (Russian Republic), which supervises party affairs in the Soviet Union's largest republic. In the May 1960 reshuffle of the Soviet top leadership Aristov, in what now appears to have been a prelude to his current demotion, was relieved as party secretary "to devote full time to his duties as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau."

Aristov continued active in RSFSR affairs through last fall, and the RSFSR was credited at the recent party central committee plenum with relative success in the agricultural field as compared with other republics. There have been no signs of dissatisfaction with his work on the RSFSR Bureau.


His demotion to the post of ambassador in Warsaw appears to be the outcome of competition among Khrushchev's lieutenants. The removal of Aristov from Moscow appears to strengthen the authority of party secretary Frol Kozlov, apparently marked to succeed Khrushchev in the event of the latter's death or disability, and to give RSFSR Premier Dmitry Polyansky a dominant voice in that republic's affairs. Polyansky has been increasingly in the public eye, visiting the provinces and acting as principal spokesman for the republic, and he may have resented sharing authority with Aristov.

Gennady Voronov, one of the new candidate members elected to the party presidium at the central committee plenum in January, replaced Aristov as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau. As a newcomer, he probably will be in no position to challenge Polyansky's authority in the RSFSR.

Petr Abrasimov, who had been ambassador to Warsaw since September 1957, was recalled last week. On his farewell visit he told US Ambassador Beam that he was returning to a ministerial job or to "party work." and added that his successor had not been chosen.

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Situation in Laos

The Pathet Lao radio announced on 4 February that the "legal (Souvanna Phouma) government" and the Pathet Lao had established a joint "administrative committee" for Luang Prabang Province. This brings to three the number of provinces nominally under "joint" administration by elements claiming to be acting in behalf of the Souvanna "government" and the Pathet Lao. Sam Neua Province has been under Pathet Lao control since last September, and a coalition provincial government was established in Xieng Khouang last month, shortly after the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces captured the Plaine des Jarres and Xieng Khouang town.

Phong Saly Province may be the next to receive an "administrative committee" in the continuing elaboration by the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces of the legal and administrative mantle with which they are cloaking their drive to gain control of Laos. Colonel Khamouane, the provincial strong man of Phong Saly, has been sitting on the fence in the struggle between the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces and the Boun Oum government, but he may be induced to throw in his lot with the antigovernment movement--particularly now that the Souvanna "government" in Xieng Khouang has been given more apparent substance with the designation of Khamsouk Keola as "acting premier."

The Boun Oum government's symbolic take-over of the French-held Seno base near Savannakhet apparently proceeded without incident, despite prior indications that clashes might arise between the French garrison there and Laotian Army elements. Although the French offered no resistance to Vientiane's action, Paris refuses to recognize the legality of the move; Seno's status may become the subject of protracted negotiations between Laos and France. French Ambassador Falaize has acted with restraint in the face of General Phoumi's various anti-French moves in the past six weeks; however, feelings are becoming increasingly bitter between Vientiane government officials and local French, and incidents could occur at any time.

Soviet airlift operations into Laos continue to be scheduled. A recently recovered shell casing

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indicates that the Pathet Lao are in possession of Soviet 85mm. guns. The casing, recovered at Phou Khoun by a US PEO adviser on 4 February, had Russian markings and was tentatively identified as an 85-mm. high-velocity type. This is the first indication that the Pathet Lao have been supplied with this weapon, although they are known to have 105-mm. artillery pieces and 120-mm. mortars.

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Congo Situation

A British Foreign Office official has indicated that Britain has some reservations concerning the recent United States initiative in the Congo. The American Embassy in London believes that the British will ask for a further review of the proposals before they are willing to support them. Representatives of the French and Belgian governments have also raised questions concerning the plan.

(The British believe that the military situation in the Congo currently favors Kasavubu and that his position would be compromised by a neutralization of the Congolese forces, as the United States plan suggests. Moreover, they question whether Kasavubu will accept the plan and doubt that many UN members would be willing to make the necessary sacrifices to carry it out if it is accepted. They reportedly favor a more gradual approach to the problem, waiting to bring forward the proposals at least until the end of February, when the UN's conciliation commission is scheduled to publish its report. The commission, which is now completing its investigations in the Congo, is expected to make a report generally favorable to Kasavubu and the moderates.)

(Nehru, in a conversation with the US ambassador in New Delhi, welcomed the new plan and expressed complete agreement with many of its elements. He reiterated, however, his belief that political prisoners, including Lumumba, should be released earlier than new proposals envisage.

Meanwhile, Mobutu appears to be planning a military operation against Gizenga's forces. He stated recently that he had reports of disaffection among Gizenga's troops in eastern Kivu Province and that he was ready to move into the area in the near future. Preparations for the move apparently are being made with the assistance of Mobutu's Belgian military advisers. However, any operation will be hampered by logistics difficulties and by the unreliability of Mobutu's troops.

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Burmese Army Shake-up

[In his purge of senior officers in the Burmese Army, Ne Win considered the advantages accruing to Burma through the Sino-Burmese border demarcation to outweigh the liabilities imposed by Nu's ineffectual administration and rapprochement with Peiping. Some of these officers were his strongest supporters during his 18-month military government. Brigadier Aung Shwe, commander of the southern military region, is one of Ne Win's proteges and has been considered a counterweight to the political and military ambitions of Deputy Chief of Staff Brigadier Aung Gyi. Colonel Tun Sein, although not considered a policy maker, has been one of Burma's most effective field commanders and administrators. Brigadier Maung Maung, whose resignation was announced earlier, has been one of Ne Win's closest advisers. All others ousted have held responsible army commands.

Ne Win

acted on information that the officers involved, other than Maung Maung, were planning to oust him from command and to stage a coup d'etat during the current commanding officers' conference. As has been his practice where the integrity and unity of the army are at stake, Ne Win acted with finality and the affected officers have little hope of appeal.

Ne Win's army shake-up does not rule out the possibility of an eventual military move against U Nu. Ne Win's patience with the civilian government has been reported wearing thin and, when the border demarcation is completed, he may actually oust Nu. He probably would not take such action, however, unless he was convinced of popular support for the move.

Iran May Improve Relations With USSR

(The Shah feels that there has been some change in Soviet policy toward Iran and that Tehran now should take a more moderate attitude toward the USSR. Prime Minister Sharif-Emami will head a good-will mission to Moscow, probably in April. The Shah has been anxious to end the barrage of hostile Soviet propaganda which, after a four-month lull, has intensified in recent weeks. The propaganda, keyed to corruption in the current Iranian parliamentary elections, probably has found a wide and sympathetic audience in urban areas.)

(Nationalist groups, long quiet, have made a display of strength in protest against the rigged elections. Progovernment groups, on the other hand, have attracted little popular interest. Antigovernment demonstrations by students drew large crowds at the university in Tehran, and on 5 February the students succeeded in closing the bazaar. Classes have now been suspended at the university. Demonstrations are drawing fewer participants in the face of strong, but so far apparently bloodless, police action.

The government's official line is that the nationalist activity is Communist inspired. The extent of Communist participation is unclear, but the more extreme nationalists are probably cooperating with local Communists. Sharif-Emami has deplored the fact that extremist elements gained the upper hand and that the moderates, whom he was encouraging, refused to take any part in the elections. He hopes to be able to control nationalist activity by normal police methods, but the Shah has ordered the army to take action if the police appear to be wavering. The army, untrained in riot control, might unwittingly precipitate a clash that would give the nationalists martyrs for their cause.

The Shah frequently alternates between periods of confidence and depression. Basically weak and insecure, he has attempted in recent years to imitate his father's strong approach. In these periods of uncertainty he is apt to make a rash move similar to that of two years ago when the Soviet Union was invited to discuss a nonaggression pact.

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Disorders in Angola

Authorities in Lisbon attribute the disorders in Angola to the "subversive plan" of General Delgado and Enrique Galvao.

that pamphlets of the Iberian Liberation Movement were found on some of the 100-odd Africans taking part in the assault on central police headquarters, the civil jail, and the military jail. ______ the attackers were armed with pistols and managed to take possession of two machine guns belonging to the police as well. Three Europeans involved in the disturbances were believed captured.

Official allegations of Communist involvement remain unsubstantiated. ______) The Communist-influenced Movement of the People for the Liberation of Angola --one of the two known Angolan nationalist movements--apparently had no such plans as of 28 January. On that date its office in Leopoldville queried headquarters in Conakry about the organization's position in the Santa Maria affair and any measures in connection with Angola.

Nationalists in Angola probably hoped to capitalize on the world publicity concerning the Santa Maria incident and the presence of a dozen foreign journalists in Luanda to dramatize resistance to Portuguese rule. These disorders have been the most serious to occur in recent years in Angola, but opposition to the Portuguese is unlikely to be effective unless it is supported by significant elements of the military and police. Portugal has been reinforcing its troops in the province since the Congo's independence last summer, and now has about 10,000 army troops and several thousand police there.

Most African agitation has occurred along the northern border, where as recently as 27 January, according to the governor general's report to the overseas minister in Lisbon, natives were claiming allegiance to President Kasavubu of the Congo and might have to be subdued by force. The Angola administration has also been trying to curtail the smuggling

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of arms from Congo sources across this northern border. Such smuggling is probably now being carried out on a limited basis but might in the future become a significant factor in the development of Angolan nationalism.

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(De Gaulle's plan for a European "confederation" was first advanced to Adenauer in mid-1960 and has been the subject of numerous bilateral exchanges since. The plan has never been committed to writing, but in general it calls for the establishment of ministerial-level committees to promote six-nation cooperation in political, cultural, economic, and defense affairs, probably to be serviced by a permanent political secretariat. In addition, there would be periodic meetings of heads of governments.

When initially proposed, the plan evoked strong opposition from most of the other EEC countries, partly on the grounds that it would weaken the supranational powers of existing European Community institutions and would involve a major departure from the eventual goal of a federally organized Europe. This opposition has moderated considerably in recent months, however, partly because of apparent assurances from De Gaulle that the EEC would not be weakened, and partly because even ardent federalists like Jean Monnet have come to feel that confederation is at present the only feasible approach to political unity. Others evidently also feel that if the Six accepts parts of De Gaulle's plan, he might be persuaded to agree to simultaneous steps to strengthen Community institutions.

(Continuing opposition was demonstrated, however, in a Dutch request on 31 January that the US issue a "strong statement" prior to the 10 February meeting in "support of NATO." The Dutch expect De Gaulle to argue that the US will "inevitably leave the Continent" and will accordingly press for "formalization of political consultations among the Six"--which, the Dutch feel, will be "divisive in NATO."

The 10 February meeting was initially scheduled for 5 December but postponed because of Adenauer's illness. The private meeting between Adenauer and De Gaulle on the preceding day is expected to set the tone of the plenary talks, and the Dutch believe Adenauer will join in urging definite action at the 10 February session. While there is doubt



that concrete decisions will be reached, the concept of frequent top-level meetings of the Six may be endorsed and some kind of committee set up to prepare a detailed agreement. From this could emerge serious discussions of various approaches to closer political ties in the Community to match the degree of economic integration which is rapidly being achieved.

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Brazilian President Orders Expansion of Relations With Soviet Bloc

During his election campaign Brazilian President Janio Quadros promised to expand trade and diplomatic relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Brazil maintains diplomatic relations only with Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose legations were raised to embassies shortly before President Kubitschek's term expired. In his acceptance speech on 31 January, Foreign Minister Arinos stated that Brazil intends to "establish diplomatic and commercial relations with all states of the world that desire pacific interchange with us, with respect for our juridical and social organization.... This orientation cannot and ought not to be interpreted as directed against anyone."

There has been growing speculation that Brazil would renew diplomatic relations with the USSR--which Brazil broke in 1947. Vice President Goulart may have discussed the matter when he visited Moscow unofficially in December 1960. Direct trade with the USSR was initiated last year after the two countries signed a trade agreement in December 1959. Trade with the Soviet bloc amounted to 4 percent of Brazil's total trade in 1959 and by 31 August 1960 had reached 5.3 percent. Former President Kubitschek's development program attracted considerable interest within the bloc, and the eventual fulfillment of outstanding contracts for industrial and other goods may increase bloc participation in Brazil's trade.

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Colombian-Cuban relations have been strained for over six months, and the two countries do not now exchange ambassadors. President Alberto Lleras may be forced to a formal break of diplomatic relations in the near future because of increasing pressure from both factions of the Conservative party and a majority of the Liberal party, as well as from the right and moderate press, business circles, and Colombia's influential labor organization, the Confederation of Colombian Workers.

President Lleras, who is a former secretary general of the OAS, apparently opposes such action since he fears it might jeopardize Colombia's chance to mediate or lead in solving the Cuban problem and because he prefers multilateral action.

armed banditry has increased greatly and that "it is thought there has been intervention by Castro agents." Previously reported intervention includes dissemination of Cuban and Communist propaganda, smuggling arms to sympathetic guerrilla bands, and training pro-Castro Colombians in guerrilla warfare tactics.

Rural violence--springing mainly from a complex of agrarian grievances, regional rivalries, and sharp party antagonisms--has cost the lives of over 250,000 people in the past 13 years--over 2,600 last year. Its recent upward swing is increasing tension at local levels between the political parties which make up the National Front coalition government.

Latin American nations which have either broken or suspended relations with Cuba are Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Paraguay. The status of Cuban - El Salvadoran relations is not clear.



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