


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22 June 1961

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CENTRAL

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
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
22 June 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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USSR-Cuba: Photographs of the 23 crates delivered to Cuba on or about 16 June by the Leninsky Komsomol indicate that the vessel carried aircraft and suggest that at least some of the crates could contain MIG-19 supersonic jet fighters. Only two other nonbloc countries--the UAR and Iraq--have received this type of aircraft. In addition, an unknown number of MIG-15 and/or -17 aircraft were being assembled at San Antonio de los Banos on 15 June. About 60 Cubans reportedly are to return from military training in Czechoslovakia by 26 June; some or all of these personnel may be pilots who are known to have been receiving flight instruction there during the past year.

OK

Laos: South Vietnam is reliably reported to be constructing five enclaves in Laos along the common border for the dual purpose of strengthening defenses against known concentrations of Communist troops in the area and of providing safe havens for any South Vietnamese special forces operating within southern Laos. Each enclave is to be manned by South Vietnamese troops and is to have a landing strip capable of handling twin-engined transport aircraft.

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The tripartite working group at Zurich, composed of General Phoumi, Quinim Pholsena, and Phoumi Vongvichit, claims to have come closer to agreement on some of the points at issue. However, no progress is discernible on the fundamental question of forming a coalition government.

Small-scale enemy actions continue at scattered points in northern Laos, but no new major actions have been reported.

) Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 22 June. Fourteen sorties were flown on 20 June, 8 of which were into Laos.

*The USSR is trying to obtain British agreement to a draft message from the Geneva co-chairmen appealing to both the US

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[and South Vietnam to abandon implementation of military measures in South Vietnam which the USSR contends were agreed upon during Vice President Johnson's Saigon visit. While the UK has already indicated its intention to reject the Soviet draft appeal, Moscow probably feels it would be able to cite this overture as a matter of record if the bloc decides to demand that the Geneva Conference should be expanded to the Vietnamese question.] [redacted]

(Map)

[The Watch Committee at its meeting on 21 June reached the following conclusion on Laos:]

[The Communists continue to delay implementation of an effective cease-fire in Laos while their forces proceed with efforts to eliminate pro-government forces in Communist-dominated areas and to improve their already strong military position. They apparently believe that these tactics will eventually result in the establishment of a "neutral" Laotian government satisfactory to them. The ability of the Royal Laotian Government to maintain its cohesion and determination to resist is increasingly uncertain.] [redacted]


*USSR: Soviet leaders took advantage of the public rally marking the 20th anniversary of the German invasion to blame the Western democracies for encouraging Hitler and to draw parallels with the current situation in Germany. Khrushchev's speech and an address by Marshal Malinovsky were generally anti-Western in tone and stressed that, in comparison with 1941, the USSR has the military capability to meet any Western challenge which might grow out of the situation in Germany and Berlin. A notable aspect of Khrushchev's speech was his categorical statement that the USSR, in the absence of an agreement with the West, would conclude a peace treaty with East Germany at the end of this year. Khrushchev also indicated that the Soviet reply to the US note of 17 June on a nuclear test ban would maintain the known Soviet positions; he warned that "as soon as" the US resumes nuclear tests, the USSR would do so. [redacted]

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*Iran: Recent reports on the attitude of General Teimur Bakhtiar, former chief of intelligence and security, indicate that he has become more dissatisfied with the performance of the Amini government and may be reviving plans for a military-backed takeover. Various reports suggest that the Shah has not yet made up his mind on whether or not to oust Amini. The Shah would probably prefer a weaker personality than Bakhtiar to head any new government? no

Congo: UN Congo administrator Linner says the meeting of the Congolese parliament set for 25 June will probably be postponed until mid-July because of technical difficulties and the desire of Congolese politicians for further discussions before they convene formally at Lovanium University. Linner notes a changed attitude on the part of both the Leopoldville and Stanleyville groups. The Kasavubu regime, aware that its own coalition comprises many small and undisciplined groups, is "running scared." Gizenga, however, has become more confident and will probably play the role of a "true nationalist" and Lumumba's legal successor with the advantage that his own forces are based on only a few major parties. OK

*Katanga's participation appears more likely now that the provincial leaders are playing down their earlier insistence on acceptance of the confederal accords drafted at Tananarive in March. They have centered their demands on release of Tshombé, and may be satisfied by the promise that he will be released when Katangan deputies reach Leopoldville to take part in the parliamentary meeting. Kasavubu's interior minister, Adoula, gave this assurance to UN officials on 21 June. (Map)

Dominican Republic:


President Balaguer stressed the importance of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between his government and OAS members and indicated that the Panamanian and Uruguayan representatives on the OAS team recently in the Dominican Republic were encouraging on this prospect. Balaguer no

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[was apparently trying to intimate that the presence of US and other hemisphere ambassadors would strengthen his hand against elements in the regime opposed to liberalization. Hill said he is not altogether convinced that the President was sincere in his comments and, in any event, doubts that the President has the power to restrain the Trujillo group. The consul got the impression that Balaguer himself may doubt that he is in real control of the situation.)

[Meanwhile the foreign minister of El Salvador, [redacted] suggested that when the OAS considers the subcommittee report on the Dominican situation it merely "note" the report and thus avoid the question, for the time being, of relaxing present OAS sanctions. Such a tactic would probably appeal to a number of other Latin American governments.] [redacted]

Bolivia: The firm anti-Communist position adopted by President Paz in early June has been weakened by his release of two of the Communist labor leaders arrested at that time. Leftist Vice President Lechin's demand for the release of all of the imprisoned Communists is reported to have provoked a violent dispute between Paz and Lechin. The US Embassy believes Paz may back down still further to avoid an open break with Lechin. Strikes backing the demands for release of the prisoners have been tapering off, however, and most of the mines on which the Bolivian economy depends now are operating. [redacted]

no

Israel-UAR: Four instances of firing at two separate locations on Israel's Syrian border occurred on 19 June, and another took place on 21 June, interrupting several months of relative quiet along Israeli-Arab borders. In one of the flare-ups, according to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), one Israeli was killed and two were wounded by Syrian infiltrators. The incident occurred just north of Lake Tiberias, near the

OK in brief delete by Syrian agitators in 1st sent. para + 1st 2 lines of 2nd. para.

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area in which Israel is working on the Jordan River diversion project which has aroused Arab hostility.

The UNTSO is fearful of a resumption of border violence. The Israelis are reported to be "much agitated," and the possibility of retaliatory action may be somewhat greater than usual in view of the Israeli elections scheduled for August. If he wishes, Ben-Gurion probably could recover some of the prestige he lost during Israel's recent domestic crisis by re-instituting his "reprisal" policy against Arab incursions. This would dramatize again his popular image--which remains his principal political asset--as chief protector of Israeli security. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

Zanzibar: [redacted]

extremists in the Arab-dominated Zanzibar Nationalist party (ZNP) are retaliating against African supporters of the opposition Afro-Shirazi party (ASP) which used violence against the Arabs during the recent elections. The extremists reportedly are pressuring Arab employers and landlords on the island to discharge African employees and evict African squatters who supported the ASP. [redacted] further violence on Zanzibar appears "inevitable" unless a reconciliation can be effected between the two major parties--an unlikely development. The British are, however, believed to have enough troops available to contain any disorders [redacted]

[redacted] (Backup, Page 2)

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

- A. No change from last week.
- B. No change from last week.
- C. LAOS: Carried on Page i of Daily Brief. [redacted]

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Israeli-Syrian Border Violence

Ben-Gurion's Mapai party has been emphasizing campaign themes which present Ben-Gurion and the party as successful defenders of Israel's security over the past 13 years. This emphasis presumably also is designed to vitiate criticism of the prime minister and his party for their handling of the recent "Lavon affair," which was related to security issues. Ben-Gurion said in April that the border tranquillity at the time was illusory.

Israel's plans to divert Jordan River waters to the arid Negev in southern Israel--initially by pumping water from Lake Tiberias--were a prime consideration at the Arab Defense Council meeting held last week in Cairo. The Israeli project has provided impetus to Arab proposals for coordinated military planning. The Arab states have indicated that they will consider diversion of the Jordan by Israel a cause for war.

The question of a joint Arab command, which would be headed by a UAR general in accordance with terms of the 1950 Arab collective security pact, was discussed at the conference. However, final agreement on the subject apparently has yet to be achieved, largely because of Jordanian suspicions. King Husayn fears that a UAR-dominated joint command structure would pose a serious threat to Jordanian internal security, since UAR troops would probably be stationed in Jordan and this would afford Nasir opportunities for subverting the Jordanian Army and the civilian population.

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~~SECRET~~Zanzibar Faces New Violence

[The Afro-Shirazi party (ASP), which claims to represent the protectorate's 225,000 African inhabitants--composed principally of Bantu immigrants from the mainland and the Shirazis, who trace their origin to Persia--had a majority of about 13,000 votes on Zanzibar island. The Zanzibar Nationalist party (ZNP) and its ally the Zanzibar and Pemba People's party (ZPPP), however, proved sufficiently dominant on the nearby island of Pemba--which together with Zanzibar island comprises the Zanzibar protectorate--to win 13 of 23 seats in the protectorate's legislative council.]

[The ZNP and ZPPP subsequently formed a coalition government nominally headed by the latter party's president, Sheik Muhammed Shamte--an illiterate Shirazi who was named chief minister. ZNP President Ali Muhsin, leader of the protectorate's 50,000-member Arab community, is believed to be the real power behind Shamte, however.]

[ASP members, reluctant to believe that Africans or Shirazis would voluntarily vote for the Arab-led ZNP, precipitated the recent disorders by attempting to "rescue" Africans and Shirazis who allegedly were being forced to vote for the ZNP. In the disorders which followed over 60 Arabs were killed, while the Afro-Shirazi death toll numbered only two.]

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The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

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