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13 February 1961



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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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13 February 1961


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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LATE ITEM: USSR launches Venus probe and ICBM.
[redacted]

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L A T E I T E M

Scribble

*USSR: [The USSR launched a vehicle, probably a Venus probe, from Tyura Tam about 0035 GMT, 12 February (1935 EST, 11 February). Moscow announced about 18 hours after the launch that the Venus probe, called an "automatic inter-planetary station," had been launched from a sputnik, that it weighed about 1420 pounds, and that communications are effected by command from the earth on a frequency of 922.8 megacycles.]

[Analysis indicates that the hour of the day this probe was launched was optimum insofar as guidance requirements were concerned, but the date was beyond the period, 13-27 January, during which maximum payloads could be delivered to Venus for a given propulsion system.]

[Calculations also indicate the probe transferred, by means of additional propulsion, from an earth orbit to its Venus trajectory about 81 minutes after launch while over the general area of Cyprus. At least two, possibly three, objects incidental to this phase of the operation remain in the original earth orbit. Their identity cannot be ascertained, other than that one is a spent booster stage.]

No

[a pulsating, white, comet-like object" at a time and general location which correlate very well with the calculated time and location at which the transfer from an earth orbit to a Venus trajectory took place.]

[This operation has many similarities to the 4 February launching of Sputnik VII, which was believed to be an earth satellite. However, the announced weight of Sputnik VII, about 14,300 pounds, is of a magnitude which could well contain both a 1420 pound Venus payload and the propulsion system and fuel needed to raise it from an earth orbit velocity to one high enough to get to Venus. It appears now that Sputnik VII probably was an unsuccessful Venus probe, although a possibility exists that the last propulsion stage was deliberately not utilized to its full capability by the Soviets.]

[Less than 30 hours after the Venus probe launching, at about 0459 GMT 13 February (2359 EST 12 February), the USSR launched a test ICBM from Tyura Tam to the usual impact area on Kamchatka. This is the fourth launching from Tyura Tam within the last 12 days, and the fifth this year. Two of these were space program events. Thirty generally successful ICBM program launchings have been conducted to date.]

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Congo: [Hammar-skjold stated on 10 February that if Lumumba is dead--which appears increasingly likely--the UN must temporarily take over in the Congo. He has in mind the placement of airports and all other transport facilities under UN control, the establishment of a protective guard for all Congolese political personalities, and more drastic steps to protect Belgians from reprisals by Lumumba's supporters. Hammar-skjold said he would justify this action to the Security Council as a necessary emergency measure and ask the Council for a new mandate to cover the situation.]

[The uncertainty regarding Lumumba has apparently interrupted at least some of the efforts which had been underway at the UN to formulate a new Security Council resolution aimed at promoting a Congolese settlement. India's representative indicated on 10 February that a meeting which his delegation had had that day with representatives of the neutralist African states was unable to decide what to do in view of the news about Lumumba. The Security Council meeting scheduled for 13 February seems certain to focus mainly on the question of Lumumba's disappearance, with the USSR calling for immediate UN action to establish the facts and for the immediate release of Lumumba if still alive.]

Meanwhile, [redacted]

[redacted] the failure of "the Czechoslovak Red Cross airplanes" to arrive--Khartoum in late January refused a

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Czech request to send "food and medicines" to Orientale Province via Sudan--had produced a "violent reaction, especially in the army." Gizenga was described as being "in a state of great despair" and fearful of a possible revolt by army officers who had recently informed him that "the ammunition on hand was not sufficient even for mere defense." The UAR group asked Cairo for instructions as to what position to take in the event of a "revolt or coup" in Stanleyville. [REDACTED] (Page 1)

USSR-Morocco: Soviet military jet aircraft--consisting of 12 MIG-17 fighters, two MIG-15 trainers, and possibly two IL-28 light bombers--were delivered to Morocco on 10 February. The aircraft apparently were accompanied by Soviet technicians, despite recent informal assurances to American officials by Morocco's top leaders that such personnel would not be admitted. The technicians presumably will assemble the planes and may also establish a training program for Moroccan personnel. However, [REDACTED] Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, Morocco's deputy prime minister, had requested approval to send two Moroccan officers to Cairo "to familiarize themselves with MIG planes" and indicated he would ask the UAR to send two officers and 14 mechanics to train Moroccan personnel when the MIGs arrived. The delivery of the aircraft coincided with Soviet President Brezhnev's visit to Morocco, during which he offered economic assistance to King Mohamed V. [REDACTED]

Poland-Cuba: Poland is negotiating the terms of small-scale economic aid to Cuba despite US warnings that this would jeopardize Poland's chances of receiving continued financial assistance from the United States. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Poland has offered Cuba a steel foundry priced at \$1,959,000, with a 30-percent down payment and the rest payable over a six-year period at 5-percent interest. These terms were arrived at after a \$5,000,000 US

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credit to Poland was held up in January on the basis of an earlier offer of aid Poland reportedly made to Cuba. To date the Poles have responded only unofficially with the argument that their trade with Havana is not aid but is conducted on the same basis as their commercial relations with other underdeveloped countries. [REDACTED]
(Page 3)

Communist China: Peiping's envoys to at least ten bloc and nonbloc countries were absent from their posts in early February, suggesting that they and others of their colleagues may have been recalled to Peiping for an ambassadorial conference. Although no formal meeting has been announced, a conclave at this time would almost certainly take into account the change of administration in the United States, the status of Sino-Soviet relations since the Moscow conference, emergency situations such as Laos, and the regime's domestic problems arising from food shortages and other economic difficulties. [REDACTED]

Japan - South Korea: Japan's expectation that the formation of a new government in South Korea would lead to early establishment of diplomatic relations and abolition of the controversial Rhee Line prohibiting Japanese fishing in international waters has diminished as a result of recent South Korean actions. Among these have been the seizure of a Japanese fishing vessel for violating the Rhee Line, Seoul's cancellation of a visit by a Japanese economic mission, and the unanimous passage of a resolution by the South Korean House of Representatives opposing early normalization of relations and insisting on retention of the Rhee Line. Although there have been mitigating circumstances surrounding these incidents and Chang Myon's government seems genuinely anxious to reach a settlement with Japan, South Korean negotiators have indicated that strong pressures from political opponents and business elements are hindering the government's efforts in this

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direction. Within Japan, the South Korean actions are likely to give added support to the Socialists and other elements which oppose an agreement with Seoul on the grounds that it would be prejudicial to prospective Japanese interests--mostly economic--in North Korea.

[redacted] (Page 4) (Map)

North Vietnam - South Vietnam: North Vietnam has instructed its agents in South Vietnam to undertake special propaganda and terrorist action against the Diem regime during the Vietnamese New Year festival, from 15 to 17 February. [redacted] lists slogans to be used in efforts to subvert South Vietnamese military personnel and directs armed Communists to "assassinate. . . build up guerrilla forces. . . and resist mopping-up operations." Noting that the Saigon government in the past has ordered its troops to fire on demonstrators and has taken other harsh repressive measures, Hanoi warns its agents to "be extremely careful" but exhorts them not to "hold back because the struggle will naturally cause bloodshed." South Vietnamese security forces will probably be on full alert during the holiday period; lax security during last year's celebration contributed to the success of a daring Communist attack on a regimental headquarters, heralding the start of an intensified campaign by North Vietnam to unseat the Diem government. [redacted]

No

Laos: King Savang is scheduled to preside over a full-scale Council of Ministers conference in Vientiane this week to examine possible political and military measures to ease the Laotian crisis; preliminary discussions were held by Premier Boun Oum at a cabinet meeting over the weekend. [The government, meanwhile, is making new overtures to former Premier Souvanna Phouma in Phnom Penh in an effort to woo him back to Vientiane in some official capacity.] While

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there is general agreement among Laotian leaders that Souvanna's inclusion in the government would greatly strengthen its position at home and abroad, there is disagreement over what post he might be offered. Souvanna, however, shows no disposition to return prior to the holding of a new international conference on Laos along the lines of Cambodian Premier Sihanouk's proposal for a 14-nation meeting. There have been no recent reports of significant military activity. [redacted]

Soviet IL-14s and LI-2s continue their airlift into Laos. Some of the LI-2s are also continuing shuttle operations between Hanoi and Haiphong. [redacted]

Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim, although unpopular, continues as the apparently unchallenged leader of the country despite repeated press as well as private criticism of his regime. Pressure is mounting, however, for Qasim to fulfill his promises of a return to constitutional government and the election of a parliament. The regime is actively repressing the Iraqi Communists, many of whose leaders are in jail or in hiding. Condemnation of the Communists, who formerly enjoyed considerable popular prestige, now is reported to be general.

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Iraq's relations with the Soviet bloc, however, remain cordial, and the military advisory group of over 200 Russians is expected to be increased in size. Qasim is catering to popular emotion by emphasizing Arab cooperation and solidarity, especially against Western "imperialism," as in the recent Arab League meeting at Baghdad.

While there is moderate confidence among businessmen and hopes for 1961 harvests are good, the government's

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budgetary situation is still precarious, and it has instituted a series of "austerity" measures. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 6)

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~~TOP SECRET~~The Congo Situation

Although proof is still lacking, the conviction is growing among observers in the Congo that Lumumba and his two fellow prisoners are already dead and that the story of their escape is a fabrication developed by Tshombé's Katanga regime in anticipation of a UN move to force the release of all political prisoners. [Leopoldville's newly designated Premier Ileo reportedly confirmed Lumumba's death on 11 February, while a former Congolese official is said to be claiming to have witnessed the execution of the three prisoners following their transfer to Katanga in mid-January.]

[] Lumumba is dead and that he knew the identity of the person who executed him.] The Katanga government is officially still pressing a search for Lumumba, but the American consul in Elisabethville reports that no Katanga official appears really concerned over the alleged escape. The consul expressed a growing belief that Lumumba will never be found.

Tshombé's regime has cast further suspicion upon itself by indicating it would refuse to cooperate with the mission of inquiry sent to Elisabethville by the UN Command. Tshombé told newsmen on 12 February that the "escape" is "a strictly internal affair and the UN has nothing to do with it."

During a meeting on 10 February with Ambassador Stevenson, Soviet UN delegate Zorin expressed his skepticism over reports of Lumumba's escape and said the situation in the Congo would become "uncontrollable" if he had indeed been killed. In the Security Council meeting on 13 February Zorin may exploit any discussion of Lumumba's fate as further proof of Moscow's charge that Hammarskjold has proved himself untrustworthy and incapable of discharging the Security Council's mandate for the Congo. [] So-

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Sobolev, [] told the UAR ambassador in Moscow that the USSR favored the establishment of a supervisory committee in the Congo, to replace the UN secretary general, formed from the Afro-Asian nations which support the

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nationalist movement in the Congo--meaning Gizenga's Stanleyville regime.

Gizenga, [REDACTED] asked Khrushchev, Nasir, Guinea's President Touré, Mali's President Keita, and Morocco's King Mohamed V to "issue an ultimatum for confirmation of the lives" of Lumumba and his associates, adding that "your direct action for helping us is more than ever recommended." [REDACTED] Gizenga chastised his representative in Cairo for not providing adequate warning that the aid which had been expected would not arrive. The representative was told to ask "our Soviet comrades" to request the UN "vigorously" for permission "to bring us what we need to keep alive." Gizenga said that in the event this permission was denied, he would "undertake measures which will make the entire earth shudder." [REDACTED] he alluded to the Stanleyville military forces' increasing impatience over the inability of their supporters abroad to send in "aid in the form of arms and ammunition." [REDACTED]

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
Poland Negotiating Aid for Cuba

In conversations with US officials over the past two months, Polish representatives have gone to great lengths to play down their relations with Cuba and have stressed that their actions have not been and will not be inimical to US interests.

Poland was reminded in January that under the Mutual Security Act the US will refuse to grant assistance to any country which provides economic or military aid to the Castro regime. The new and less favorable tender made on 7 February apparently was offered in reaction to the US position. The Polish regime evidently feels that the new terms can be more easily defended as falling within the meaning of "normal" commercial transactions.

Possibly in anticipation of US objections, the first Polish-Cuban trade agreement, dated 31 March 1960, provided that separate credit terms would be set for each Polish industrial plant bought by Cuba. The foundry contract may be the precursor of many which the Poles plan to finance with relatively small credits, the aggregate of which could amount to a substantial contribution to the bloc's economic aid program in Cuba. Among other items, Poland is negotiating for the delivery on credit of a complete shipyard, a pig iron foundry, tool factories, copper and iron ore processing plants, television and radio factories, and a meat processing plant.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Japanese - South Korean Relations

Discussions between Japan and South Korea for a post-World War II settlement began in October 1951. Major outstanding issues consist of a basic relations treaty, the status of some 550,000 Koreans living in Japan, claims to vessels of Korean registry which were taken by the Japanese during their withdrawal in 1945, mutual property claims, and fishing rights in international waters around Korea. Behind the issues have been general Korean bitterness toward Japan for its 40-year occupation of the country and, in the past, President Rhee's strong personal hatred for the Japanese.

The negotiations have been stormy and have been suspended frequently by Seoul following refusals by the Japanese to accede to South Korea's "all or nothing" demands. Tokyo usually has made compromise offers, but Seoul's position has been essentially negative. Except for exchanges of captured Japanese fishermen and Korean nationals detained in Japan for illegal entry, there has been little progress. Following the most recent resumption of talks in October 1960, however, the Chang Myon government has demonstrated more interest than the Rhee administration in negotiating in good faith for a settlement.

The most difficult issue is that of fisheries. In January 1952, Rhee unilaterally proclaimed his "peace line" excluding Japanese fishermen from rich fishing grounds adjacent to Korean territorial waters. The line is approximately 1,600 statute miles in length and extends between 20 and 200 miles off the Korean coast. As a precedent, Rhee cited a protected Korean fishing zone established earlier by General MacArthur. Later he asserted that the Sea Defense Zone established by General Clark during the Korean war supported the Korean position.

Since the line was established, South Korea has seized 173 Japanese fishing vessels, of which 150 have been confiscated, 2 have been sunk, and 21 released. Of 2,230 Japanese fishermen captured, most were imprisoned for periods ranging between six months and five years; five died in captivity. Three seizures have occurred since Rhee was ousted in April 1960,

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the most recent on 13 January. In the past, Rhee used the captured fishermen as hostages to extract concessions from Tokyo on issues other than fishing, but Seoul currently is in the process of releasing the last five Japanese fishermen it holds.

The Chang Myon government believes that the South Korean economy would benefit appreciably from the normalization of relations and it is committed to an early settlement of differences. Many Koreans, however, fear that a normalization of relations would eventually lead to Japanese economic and cultural domination of South Korea even though political independence is retained. Opposition political elements and business groups with a vested economic interest in preventing a normalization of trade relations with Japan are attempting to aggravate such public fears.

On 23 January Seoul called off the visit of a private Japanese business mission after police reports indicated that there would be public demonstrations and possible violence. Minor South Korean leftist parties have formed a "National Anti-Japanese Struggle Committee." Conservative opposition members spearheaded passage of a resolution in the House of Representatives on 3 February upholding the continued defense of the Rhee Line and opposing full normalization of relations until all "historical problems" had been settled, including the complex claims issue. The resolution also opposed the normalization of economic relations until after formal diplomatic relations were established.

Japan desires a settlement principally to remove the existing threat to its fishing operations and has proposed a conservation agreement which would restrict Japanese fishing within a broad area covered by the Rhee Line and prohibit it altogether in certain portions. In addition, trade and investment opportunities in South Korea hold considerable attraction. Tokyo, however, is limited in the concessions it feels able to make because of public outrage over the South Korean seizures and leftist arguments that Seoul's inability to speak for all of Korea exposes the Japanese to double jeopardy in the event North Korea presents claims of its own.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]Iraqi Regime Cracks Down on Communists

Moscow radio's broadcast on 11 February of an appeal by the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions to Prime Minister Qasim, urging the release of imprisoned Iraqi Communists, indicates the declining position of the Communist party in Iraq. The appeal followed publication of articles in the Soviet press last week complaining of "persecution" and expressing concern over "cruel and unjust" sentences meted out to those who stood in the "forefront of the July 1958 revolution."

Anti-Communist actions by the Iraqi Government since last November have been extensive. In late December 66 Communists were given long sentences for atrocities perpetrated in Mosul in March 1959; others have been jailed for circulating "false news among the peasants," carrying out unlawful strikes, and publishing articles critical of the regime. Other measures taken against the party include the closure of schools dominated by Communists, dismissal of suspected Communist employees from the railways, forced relocation of a number of prominent Communists, the suspension of several pro-Communist newspapers, and the banning of a number of Communist-front organizations. Warrants have been issued for the arrest of several party leaders who apparently have gone underground. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a close watch is kept on activities of the party, numerous arrests of Communists have been made in the provinces, and party leaders' bank accounts in Lebanon are being investigated. Soviet personnel in Iraq are under surveillance at all times. [REDACTED]

Growing unpopularity of the Communist cause in Iraq is evidenced by the recent, published statements of several labor groups that they would no longer accept "pamphlets, booklets, and journals" sent them by the Soviet Embassy. Anti-Communist articles, including revelations of Communist methods, in the government-controlled press have increased greatly during the past several months. One article charged the Iraqi Communists with trying to "imitate the role of Lenin. . . and with considering Qasim as Kerenski."

Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, Iraq's prominent Kurdish leader who returned in triumph at Qasim's invitation after over ten years

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in exile in the USSR, has fallen from Qasim's favor. Qasim, who is acutely aware of Iraq's position as a nation of religious and linguistic minorities--Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans, and Sunni and Shia Moslems--became suspicious of Barzani's Kurdish nationalist aspirations and threw his support to rival Kurds. Upon Barzani's return from a trip to Moscow in January, he was stripped of many governmental privileges, and several of his followers were arrested. Sporadic fighting between Barzani's tribes and other Kurdish tribes last fall caused the regime considerable concern. Qasim probably fears that any Soviet support for Kurdish nationalists could threaten his regime.

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