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27 May 1961

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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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27 May 1961

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 May 1961

## DAILY BRIEF

Serial

(Laos: The Pathet Lao and the Souvanna group agreed in principle at Namone on 26 May to the early formation of a committee to deal with all military questions and work with the ICC. This ostensible concession to the government delegation's position was qualified by the Pathet Lao's insistence that the tripartite conference could only be seized of reports of cease-fire violations by unanimous vote of the military committee. If the government agrees to the unanimity rule, long and difficult negotiations on the formation of a coalition government will follow.

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The intensity of the enemy's artillery shelling in the Pa Dong area continues to increase, and American officials in Vientiane see a strong possibility of an early offensive by Communist forces to capture the government Meo positions there.)

Bloc airlift operations into Laos continue to be scheduled through 27 May. (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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South Korea: Brigadier General Kim Yun-kun, commander of the marine unit which participated in the 16 May coup and one of the leaders of the revolutionary group, has asserted to American Embassy officers that the junta intends to develop a group of young civilian leaders to whom control of the government will be transferred, "possibly after two years." Kim claims that the leaders just ousted were steeped in political thought alien to democratic concepts, while the younger generation, educated in the post-1945 period, is "strongly devoted to the ideas of democracy." He also views the junta as a "shield" which will permit the existing government bureaucracy to carry out its functions free from political pressures, blackmail, and corruption. General Kim has confirmed that dissension exists within the junta, deriving largely from attempts by the younger officers to establish a virtually permanent military dictatorship. [redacted]

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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# Map of the Congo



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Congo: (Ambassador Timberlake believes that Gizenga will try to prevent the convening of parliament by Kasavubu and, if unsuccessful, will seek to delay any parliamentary session while attempting to line up support in the Congo and abroad. The ambassador adds that should parliament nevertheless meet, Gizenga will boycott the session and attempt to discredit its activities. The ambassador observes that any effort by Kasavubu to conciliate Gizenga would probably be fruitless.)

(Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak has told Ambassador MacArthur that he is determined to begin the withdrawal of Belgians from the Congo, and that 49 Belgian advisers--mostly in Katanga--are to be recalled shortly. Spaak reaffirmed that he desired the withdrawal of all Belgian military personnel and "most" political advisers; he insisted, however, that Belgium was responsible for the safety of its nationals, and criticized Hammarskjold for dismissing Belgian fears with the legalistic argument that the UN is now responsible for the maintenance of order in the Congo.)

(Officials of the influential Union Miniere mining firm in Katanga reportedly have appealed to the UN to retain Belgian officers in the Katanga army, or face the immediate closure of local mines and the collapse of the Katanga economy. Such expressions reflect continuing Belgian apprehension regarding a possible breakdown of discipline in the Katanga army.)

North Vietnam: References to "this year's famine" describing conditions in western North Vietnam underscore food shortages throughout North Vietnam.

widespread malnutrition and starvation in the country. Last year's poor harvests, together with excessive work loads and political pressures on the peasantry, have apparently brought an upsurge of demonstrations against the authorities; Hanoi has brutally suppressed several recent food riots.

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Indonesia: (Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, encouraged by recent surrenders of dissidents, believes the three-year provincial rebellion in Celebes and Sumatra will be settled shortly. He told the American ambassador he plans to declare a general amnesty after resistance has collapsed, feeling that this will be an effective gesture toward unifying the nation. Nasution reiterated that he has no intention of attacking Netherlands New Guinea but emphasized that New Guinea is the Communists' strongest card and that the settlement of the issue is vital to the position of anti-Communists in Indonesia.) [redacted] (Backup, Page 7) no

Nepal: (After six months of personal rule by King Mahendra, conditions in Nepal continue to deteriorate, in terms of both economic stability and effectiveness of government. However, recent assessments by the American Embassy at Katmandu and by the Indian Home Ministry in New Delhi suggest that while there is valid cause for concern, the threat to the King's position is neither as great nor as immediate as exiled Nepali Congress party resistance leaders in India have recently portrayed in their discussions with US and Indian officials.) [redacted] (Backup, Page 9) no

Yemen: (The Imam, who was wounded in March in an assassination attempt, is transferring to Crown Prince Badr an increasing number of the duties of his office and is retaining control over only the most important matters, [redacted] [redacted] Badr, however, still is opposed by influential Yemeni elements who prefer Prince Hasan. Badr is working to win over the army and important religious, tribal, and regional leaders in the Sana area.) [redacted] (Backup, Page 10) no

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DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in Laos

(The USSR has rejected a British suggestion that the co-chairmen of the conference specifically authorize the ICC to investigate immediately on-the-spot cease-fire violations. However, the UK delegation apparently intends to work for acceptance of this proposal and to bring the matter up in plenary session on 29 May. The USSR will probably contend that, according to the Geneva co-chairmen's initial instructions to the ICC on 6 May, that Commission does not have the authority to carry out on-the-spot investigations until "the conclusion of an agreement between the belligerent parties on questions connected with the cease-fire.")

(Moscow will probably also contend that only the Geneva Conference in plenary session can furnish further instructions for the ICC operation in Laos. The original directives stipulated that the determination of the ICC's functions following the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement would fall "within the competence of the International Conference on Laos." The Soviet Union would hope thereby to prevent any immediate acceptance of Western proposals to set up two subcommittees at the conference--one to deal with the expansion of the scope and authority of the ICC and the other to concentrate on the international aspects of the Laotian problem. The Communists are seeking to secure the conference's acceptance in principle to the retention of the ICC in its present form. Once the principle of the veto is established, they will probably not oppose subsequent committee sessions to work out the details of ICC functions.)

(The USSR's intransigence on the question of further instructions for the ICC may also reflect its desire to allow time for the Pathet Lao forces to eliminate small pockets of resistance in order to strengthen their bargaining position at Geneva and in the current political talks at Namone or to resume hostilities if the conference negotiations break down.)

Premier Boun Oum and Minister of Education Nhouy Abhay are planning to depart shortly for France for the announced purpose of explaining to Prince Sihanouk the royal government's

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position concerning the Geneva Conference. Boun Oum reportedly hopes to see De Gaulle and may also attempt to meet President Kennedy during his visit to Paris. (General Phoumi had previously indicated a desire for talks in Paris with the President and De Gaulle. Offered little encouragement by the French Government, Phoumi may have decided to send Boun Oum in his place.)

Phoumi, informed his regional commanders of the establishment of three military operational zones with a view toward greater efficiency. The Northern Zone will have its command headquarters located "for the moment" at Ban Houei Sai, near the Thai frontier in Nam Tha Province, and its rear base at Luang Prabang. The Central Zone, including Vientiane, will have its command post and rear base both located at Pak Sane. The Southern Zone's command post will be at Savannakhet. No rear base for this zone is mentioned. All three command headquarters are located at points on the Mekong River, which forms the border with Thailand.

a list of officers recommended for promotions. Most of the requests are for promotions of two or more grades. The rash of promotions in recent months in both the Laotian Army and the Kong Le forces will pose serious problems of rationalization should a negotiated settlement between the two sides lead to a reintegration of their forces.

Meanwhile, Kong Le's headquarters, 'section chiefs' who were to send officers to study at a "school for training intelligence agents" to have them "report immediately because the schedule has been changed. The school has already begun." The advance in the timetable may reflect a desire by the Souvanna group to develop as many assets as possible prior to any negotiated settlement.

Soviet airlift planes flying between Hanoi and Xieng Khouang brought in

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(North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops in addition to military equipment and foodstuffs. All types of food supplies necessary for the North Vietnamese troops in Laos were shipped in by air from Hanoi. By the end of April, Pathet Lao troops, except for regional troops and guerrillas, were receiving the same provisions as the North Vietnamese troops. The Kong Le forces at Khang Khay were also provided with rice from North Vietnam, but other foods such as meat and vegetables were obtained locally. During March, April, and May certain goods, including cigarettes, beer, soap, textiles, and shoes, were flown to Xieng Khouang from Hanoi. These goods were turned over to local merchants in Xieng Khouang and Phong Savan. When the goods were sold, the money received was given to Kong Le to be used to pay his troops. The North Vietnamese reportedly said that the arrival of these goods was only the beginning and that goods would be arriving soon on a continuing basis.)

Bloc airlift operations for 25 May involved a total of 13 sorties, 12 by Soviet transports and one by a North Vietnamese aircraft. Of this number at least two sorties were flown into Laos. One AN-12 is scheduled to leave Irkutsk for North Vietnam on 27 May. This AN-12 has been previously involved in Laotian airlift support operations.

(Chinese Communist merchant ships have offloaded military equipment at North Vietnamese ports. On 5 January 1961, the Nan Hai 104 arrived at Haiphong from Canton and offloaded 600 parachutes of Chinese Communist manufacture. On 21 January, the Nan Hai 107 arrived at Vinh from Canton and unloaded 14 Chinese Communist army trucks and 100 cases of "materiel.")

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### South Korean Situation

Arrests of leftist elements, especially members of teachers' unions, continue to be numerous in the North and South Kyongsang provinces, which have been regarded as hotbeds of subversive elements. Thus far, military courts have convicted 45 civilians for violating the ban against public assembly and imposed sentences ranging from 3 to 12 months. Trials of some 1,200 "hoodlums" have commenced, and it is expected that most will be sentenced to hard labor in the National Construction Service program. Members of former Prime Minister Chang Myon's cabinet were removed from prison to house arrest with the exception of two accused of financial irregularities.

Labor unions have been disbanded by SCNR decree and business conditions remain stagnant because of the stringent measures imposed on the withdrawal of bank deposits. One bank president has commented that the SCNR seems more concerned with denying funds to potential opponents than with curbing illicit accumulations of wealth. Retail grain prices have remained at near pre-coup levels.

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~~SECRET~~North Vietnam's Food Shortage

[redacted]

[redacted] there is considerable evidence of severe shortages and unrest prompted by lack of food. [redacted] food and clothing are in short supply. He cited numerous complaints from North Vietnamese citizens about the difficult conditions in Hanoi this year. [redacted]

[redacted]

In this remote highland region the regime has long experienced difficulties with unruly minority peoples and food shortages could exacerbate these difficulties. [redacted] "an outbreak of raiding by bandits in the border districts"; [redacted] the Laotian situation was "causing large repercussions" in the border area where there may be some tribal contacts with anti-Communist Meos in Laos. [redacted]

North Vietnam's poor agricultural year in 1960 was due primarily to weather, although stepped-up socialization drives in the rural areas contributed to the present food difficulties. Prolonged drought damaged last year's spring harvest, and floods and insects affected the fall harvest, causing a drop in food production of 14 percent from the previous year's level. Per capita consumption of food is currently estimated to be the lowest since 1957, with per capita food availability now believed to be considerably below the prewar level. As is normal

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in a year of bad harvests, food shortages are most severe during the following spring, before the next harvest.

In a press announcement of 24 May, Hanoi expressed optimism over the prospects for the spring harvest now in progress, claiming that this crop will be the best in many years. There have been no reports of bad weather thus far, and acreage in summer crops has been expanded--more than doubled for corn and sweet potatoes--making it likely that this year's early harvest will be considerably better than last year's. Despite these better growing conditions, however, this year's harvests could be reduced if the regime insisted on further social reforms in the rural areas, where collectivization has aroused considerable resistance from the peasants.

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[REDACTED]

Situation in Indonesia

(The rebel movement, which began in 1956 as a protest against Communist influence in Djakarta and against economic and political centralism, shifted to open warfare in February 1958. The rebels then declared a provisional government, and Djakarta replied with forceful suppression. The movement, now called the Federal Republic of Indonesia (RPI), has deteriorated during the past year, largely because the rebels were unable to resupply themselves adequately, and the government has made a new effort during recent months to bring the rebellion to a conclusion. This effort, which shows considerable signs of success, apparently became possible in February when President Sukarno gave Nasution a free hand to negotiate liberal surrender terms with the rebels.)

(In April the army negotiated a settlement with North Celebes elements of the RPI which involved a claimed 8,000 to 10,000 armed and 15,000 unarmed men. Djakarta estimates that only 1,000 rebels are still operating there and has turned its attention to some 9,000 insurgents in Sumatra. An army officer in Medan, Sumatra, has stated that the government will punish no one in the rebel movement except individuals known to be bandits in rebel guise and that even the leaders will be required only to express repentance personally to General Nasution or President Sukarno and will be guaranteed "respectable and useful" positions. Armed dissidents are to be incorporated into the Indonesian Army and unarmed elements will be returned to their villages or resettled.) [REDACTED]

(Sumatran military rebel leaders apparently are ready to take advantage of the government's terms. [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Rebel civilian leaders, however, reportedly prefer to delay surrender until the government offers more definite guarantees.)

(Meanwhile, the army has launched a "grass-roots" anti-Communist campaign in Java under which selected)

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(noncommissioned officers, after an 18-week course in "basic rural development," are being sent to villages as "political cadres" to win over key personnel and to help with village construction projects. Supplementing the program, Nasution has replaced the ineffective army commander in Central Java and the deputy commander in East Java by forceful anti-Communist officers. Former rebel troops from North Celebes are also to be stationed in these areas)

(Nasution has informed the American ambassador that he has representatives in the Netherlands who are in contact with leaders of Dutch political parties as part of an effort to influence the Dutch toward a settlement of the New Guinea issue.)

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Situation in Nepal

(Subarna Shumshere, leader of the Nepali Congress party exiles in India and former deputy prime minister, continues to regard what he interprets as rapidly worsening conditions in his homeland as encouragement for the launching of an early program of active resistance to the regime. He is still reported planning a widespread campaign of agitation in Nepal to coincide with the arrival of the monsoons in late June. Information from non-exile sources, however, does not confirm Subarna's estimates of the strength of his support in the countryside or of the widespread disaffection he claims exists in the army. Localized resistance against Katmandu's authority continues to plague the government and may be exploited by Subarna; however, the bulk of Nepal's illiterate and isolated population seems in fact to be largely unaware of political changes in Katmandu. Some army officers are dissatisfied, but there is little evidence of active plotting against the King.)

(Subarna's chances of success in the immediate future appear limited unless he receives substantial support from the Indian Government. While New Delhi remains concerned over the King's ineffectiveness and is sympathetic toward Subarna, Nehru told Ambassador Galbraith on 24 May that he foresees no immediate rise in Communist influence or imminent fall of the monarch. New Delhi also fears a violent resistance campaign would play into Communist hands)

(The Communists are weak and divided, despite the freedom of movement which most Nepali Communist leaders are permitted by the palace. They never have had mass support on a countrywide basis such as the Nepali Congress built up. In addition, the party leadership is split between those who call for forceful and immediate opposition to the King, in concert with other parties, and those who feel that the party's best interests will be served by maintaining an aloof but alert posture so as to capitalize on the errors which they feel sure the King will make. Subarna maintains he has refused Communist offers of support.)

  
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[REDACTED]

Yemen

[REDACTED]  
the Imam has given authority to Badr, and that "orders have begun to be issued in his name." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Badr has been engaging in "broad activity" in an effort to win over the supporters of the Imam's brother, Prince Hasan, who is returning to Yemen from New York where he is chief of the Yemeni UN delegation. ([REDACTED])

[REDACTED] Many of Yemen's northern tribesmen support Hasan and are opposed to Badr because the Imam named him as heir in violation of the historic custom that Yemeni rulers be chosen by tribal agreement. The UAR would presumably like to see Badr's succession hastened, inasmuch as Badr has been under its influence and the Imam has attempted to lessen this influence.)

(Prince Badr has yet to prove his ability to control Yemen's diverse elements in the forceful manner which has typified the present Imam's rule. In 1959 when the Imam was visiting Europe and Badr was left in control, troops were unpaid and an insurrection followed which was put down only by the Imam's abrupt return. Government and army salaries are reported again to be far in arrears.)

(The Imam probably can retrieve the situation if he resumes full power. [REDACTED] the Imam's health is steadily improving, but adds that nevertheless an "atmosphere of foreboding continues to lie over the country.") [REDACTED]

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Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

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The Director

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