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16 March 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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16 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

Serial

Laos: The failure of the 14-15 March talks between Souvanna Phouma and a delegation of the Vientiane regime makes it clear that an early political solution of the Laotian crisis is unlikely. Souvanna's insistence on a 14-nation conference as a prerequisite to any settlement for Laos is in sharp contrast to the flexibility that he evidenced in exploring solutions with General Phoumi last week, and is almost certainly conditioned by the uniformly negative reaction of the bloc to the communiqué he issued with Phoumi.

Brief OK

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Ps 2, 3 + 5

of Backup

Indicating that the Communists foresee the possibility of a long struggle in Laos, Peiping on 14 March broadcast a Pathet Lao order of the day calling on Laotians to prepare for a "protracted war of resistance." [redacted]
(Backup, Page 1)

Congo: The UAR mission in Stanleyville reported [redacted] "we think it likely a dispute exists between Gizenga and Lundula which they are trying to conceal, but it has not yet reached the point of Gizenga's losing control." This [redacted] was an answer to a request for information from the office of UAR Commander in Chief Marshal Amir. [redacted] many elements of the population, including the army, had not been paid in February and that the possibility of "general strikes among the civilians and soldiers" is "the most dangerous situation confronting Gizenga." [redacted]

see only

P 2 of Backup

[redacted] Hammarskjold told an American official on 14 March that he is thinking of sending Dayal back to the Congo around the first of April. However, he thought that he might install three [redacted]

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[African assistants in Leopoldville before Dayal's return and that these assistants would perform most of the UN representative's duties. Dayal might then "bow out gracefully" by resigning a few weeks after his return.] [redacted]

[redacted] (Backup, Page 3) (Map)

France-Algeria: The French Government announced yesterday it is ready to begin official political negotiations with the Algerian rebels. The meeting of leaders of the rebel provisional Algerian government, which began in Tunis on 14 March and will probably continue through this week, reportedly is assessing the results of secret preliminary contacts with the French. Both the French and the rebels have attempted to keep secret the content of these talks, held in Geneva, but reports indicate that some progress was made on the status of the French minority and arrangements for a transitional government. The problems of implementing a tacit cease-fire agreement, which Paris appears willing to accept, and determining sovereignty over the Sahara are likely to be especially difficult points during negotiations. [redacted] (Backup, Page 5)

Union of South Africa: [South Africa's decision on 15 March not to seek admittance to the Commonwealth as a republic, and thus in effect to withdraw from that organization following severe condemnation of Pretoria's racial policies, will probably have little immediate effect on the Union's domestic affairs. The English-speaking minority--some forty percent of South Africa's whites--have been politically handcuffed in recent years and are not likely to provoke significant disorders. An eventual loss of the five-percent tariff preference would not affect more than about eight percent of South Africa's total trade. However, Pretoria's action is another major step in the Union's virtual withdrawal from the outside world. Its impact, moreover, may be greater in international African and Asian circles, where the concept of the Commonwealth as a multiracial club will be strengthened. Prime Minister Welensky of the Rhodesian]

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[redacted] Federation may see in the London development a further indication that Britain will not modify its pro-African position in favor of Rhodesia's white settlers, who are talking about setting up an independent state. [redacted]

Portuguese Angola: [redacted]

[redacted] recently captured prisoners have admitted that plans involving "thousands of natives" were being made for an attack on a town near Luanda between 19 and 25 March. Earlier reports have indicated that African nationalist groups outside of Angola and the exclave of Cabinda are intent on fomenting disorders in those territories with the objective of focusing attention there to coincide with the Security Council debate on Angola. [redacted]

[redacted] (Backup, Page 7)

*Saudi Arabia: [redacted] The rivalry between King Saud and Crown Prince Faysal may come to a head during the next few days. Members of the Saudi Government reportedly expect violence between the Saud and Faysal forces, starting in Jidda. Members of the royal cabinet have been threatened with bodily harm unless they resign their posts. [redacted]

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

[redacted] On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

- A. [redacted] No change from last week.]
- B. [redacted] No change from last week.]
- C. [redacted] Continued pressure by the Communist forces has led to a general deterioration in the Lao army's position in the Route 13 area. The Communists apparently intend to press

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[their local advantage, and, unless the Lao army's will-to-fight improves significantly, the Communists may shortly be able to threaten Luang Prabang. The logistical build-up in the Plaine des Jarres continues at a high rate. With their generally improving military situation, the Communists are in a position to press for commensurately increased concessions in whatever discussions may deal with settlement of the Laos problem.]

- D. [The atmosphere generated by the Tananarive conference and Gizenga's continuing difficulty in obtaining military aid give hope that a political rather than a military solution may be in the making. The arrival of Indian UN contingents may touch off local incidents between the UN forces and Congolese army elements] [redacted]
[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~The Situation in Laos

[The retreat of Laotian Army troops from the Phou Khoun junction has at least temporarily been halted. The Pathet Lao, who may for the time being have overextended their supply lines, are maintaining only light pressure at present. Government units which withdrew northward are regrouping and establishing defensive positions about 25 miles south of Luang Prabang. Vientiane's forces are being reinforced by three battalions moved from southern Laos; these troops, however, are raw recruits and their effectiveness is probably low. Morale is also low, and the ability of government units to withstand a concerted Pathet Lao drive on Luang Prabang is highly questionable.]

[Soviet Ambassador Soldatov reaffirmed Soviet support for an international conference and maintained that the 18 February Soviet proposals to reactivate the ICC and convene an international conference were inseparable. The proposals called for the convening of an international conference and suggested the immediate reactivation of the ICC in New Delhi as an interim step to its being sent to Laos.]

[Soldatov probably wanted to make it clear to the British, whose reply to the Soviet proposals is still pending, that the USSR would not accept Western agreement on the ICC plan if it did not call at the same time for an international conference. Soldatov took issue with [opinion that the conference would only provide a forum for acrimonious exchanges. He contended that the 1954 Geneva Conference had worked well and had quickly produced the desired results and that he saw no reason why a new conference should not be similarly successful. The USSR probably feels that by taking a firm position with the UK on the need to call a conference, additional pressure may be brought to bear on the US to acquiesce in the Soviet demand.]

Communist China's ambassador in Cambodia called on Prince Sihanouk on 14 March to "convey details" of Peiping's

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
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views on Laos. These details were not announced, but the ambassador almost certainly took issue with the position Sihanouk recently expressed in a letter to Chou En-lai. In this letter, published in Phnom Penh on 5 March, Sihanouk stated, "There are now two de facto governments in Laos and neither can claim complete legality." Sihanouk proposed "dissolution" of both regimes and creation of a "coalition government." This proposition, coming from a key neutral, undoubtedly disturbed Peiping as it undercuts the bloc position that the Communists are supporting the only "lawful government of Laos."

[redacted]
[redacted] bloc diplomats are concerned lest Cambodian reservations about the legality of the Souvanna "government" will leave the status of the entire Communist aid program in Laos open to question. [redacted]

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Republic of the Congo



~~TOP SECRET~~ []Situation in the Congo

[] [Hammar skjold apparently feels that Dayal's return to the Congo is necessitated by the "question of Indian prestige"; ultimately, however, he hopes to have an African at the head of the operation, with another African and an Asian as deputies. He has stated that Makki Abbas, his interim representative in Leopoldville, is popular with the Congolese--a view which was confirmed by Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko in Leopoldville. However, Abbas is to return to his post as executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa in a few weeks.]

With the exception of Joseph Ileo, whose job as prime minister in the Leopoldville regime apparently was abolished, the participants at the Tananarive conference reportedly are well satisfied with the "Confederation of Central African States" proposed in the conference's final resolution. The Congolese apparently have decided to wait until the confederation's constituent states have been formed before determining its structure. So far four such states, in addition to the eight proposed at the conference, have been proclaimed. Three of the twelve are in Leopoldville Province, and Kasai and Katanga contain two each. Another state reportedly has been formed from parts of Leopoldville, Equateur, and Kasai provinces. In addition, an Orientale "government-in-exile" and the remainder of Equateur have joined the confederation as separate entities. This process of fragmentation is likely to continue. Although this trend is derived from the tribalism which has made the larger political groupings unrealistic, the resulting states almost certainly will be highly unstable. []

Lundula's [] inviting the head of the Orientale "government-in-exile" and another official to come from Tananarive to Stanleyville in order to discuss a "national entente" apparently was devised by Gizenga in an effort to lure the officials into Orientale. []

[] Gizenga told his representative not to worry [] and appears to have stated that he intended to arrest the visitors on their arrival. []

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[redacted]

[redacted] a Polish ship arrived in Alexandria on 21 February with a cargo of light arms for Gizenga. The cargo reportedly was still in Alexandria on 10 March. [redacted]

[redacted] the ship, the Opole, loaded its cargo in Constanza, Rumania, rather than in the Soviet arms port of Nikolaev. Any arms originating from this port are likely to be of World War II vintage and to be untraceable to bloc sources. No reflection of this shipment has been observed [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Taieb Sahbani, secretary general of the Tunisian foreign secretariat, left Tunis on 13 March for Brussels, where he is to be Hammarskjold's representative in talks with the Belgian Government. Sahbani told the American ambassador in Tunis that the timing of his mission is unfortunate, since Belgium is in the midst of an election campaign and cannot be expected to take new initiatives before the formation of a new government.]

[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Prospects for French-Algerian Negotiations

The French announcement on negotiations with the Algerian rebels followed meetings of the government Algerian Affairs Committee and cabinet. It said the cabinet "wished to see the opening of talks on the conditions for the self-determination of the Algerian people as well as on related problems." By using this language Paris apparently opened the way to political negotiations without requiring a prior formal cease-fire agreement. However, any negotiating position formulated by the provisional Algerian government (PAG) during its meeting in Tunis may have to be ratified by the 62-man National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA), the supreme governing body of the rebel movement to which the PAG is at least theoretically responsible. [The CNRA is said to be gathering in Tunis, and reports indicate that some of its key military and civilian members from within Algeria are skeptical that a satisfactory negotiated settlement can be reached without further fighting and significant rebel military successes.]

[redacted] the French representatives at the recent secret talks asked the PAG to agree to a truce, as well as to French retention--with full ownership--of the Mers el-Kebir naval base near Oran, and recognition of French sovereignty over the Sahara. [redacted] the PAG had already decided that the oil-rich Sahara could not be French, and that its future must be worked out within the context of a North African accord. [redacted]

[redacted] the French had first insisted that the Algerian Liberation Army (ALN) lay down its arms before negotiations begin, and then had requested only token disarming of some units. [redacted]

[redacted] the PAG fears a truce would permit the French Army to identify and expose ALN clandestine elements. The rebels apparently made counterproposals, suggesting that the impasse could be solved by agreeing to a de facto cease-fire or by confining]

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[] [troops of both sides to barracks while joint patrols maintained order. Both the French Army and the ALN may be generating pressure on their respective governments not to make concessions on the cease-fire issue.]

[] [] the Algerian representatives at the secret talks felt that the French negotiators had conflicting instructions from Premier Debré and the Foreign Ministry. [] the French negotiators at these talks were irritating in small matters and gave an entirely different impression of the French position from that conveyed to the PAG by President Bourguiba.]

The commander of the Algiers army corps told the US consul general on 11 March that he fears the emotional release which will accompany the ending of Ramadan this week end may produce disorders among the Moslem population, which has been under great strain from fasting and the expectation that peace is at hand. He added that, "unfortunately," there were still European activists in Algiers who might create incidents designed to provoke violent Moslem counteraction. French authorities reportedly have tightened security precautions in Algiers and Oran. []

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Portuguese African Territories May Face Dissidence

The Portuguese are concerned over the activities of two emigré nationalist organizations--the anti-Communist Angolan People's Union (UPA), with headquarters in Leopoldville, and the pro-Communist African Revolutionary Front for the Independence of Portuguese Colonies in Africa (FRAIN), which is based at Conakry. Earlier reports indicated that the UPA planned to launch a series of terrorist attacks against white-owned plantations in northern Angola on 14 March to coincide with the UN Security Council's consideration of a Liberian resolution on Angola. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] no evidence of disturbances in this Portuguese exclave, despite earlier indications that attacks--presumably by the UPA--were to be launched against it in mid-March. While no information has been received that these plans are being carried out, strict Portuguese censorship probably could suppress such information for some time.

FRAIN has devoted much of its attention to Portuguese Guinea. The American Embassy in Dakar reports that while that colony presents an outward picture of complete stability and calm, determined efforts are being made from neighboring Guinea to introduce subversive elements and undermine the present order there. Radio Conakry has been especially active in attempting to incite the inhabitants, who are becoming conscious of the political changes in other African territories. [REDACTED]

In Brazil, the anti-Salazar group which engineered the capture of the Portuguese liner Santa Maria in January still hopes to upset the Portuguese regime by fomenting new disturbances in its African territories [REDACTED]

Portuguese representatives are apparently well informed of the group's activities through close cooperation with Brazilian police. The leader of the Santa Maria mutiny, Henriques Galvao, is involved, as is General Humberto Delgado, the defeated

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candidate in Portugal's last presidential election. The group plans to establish a Portuguese government-in-exile somewhere in Africa.

Delgado recently stated to the press that his object is to "create confusion" in Portugal as a prelude to provoking an eventual military rebellion. [redacted]

[redacted] Galvao hoped to establish himself in one of the Rhodesias. Another mentioned Tangier. [redacted]

[redacted] one of the group plans a trip to Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Guinea to see if the group can establish itself in one of these countries. Portuguese authorities are pressing Brazil to block the group's departure. [redacted]

[redacted]

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The Secretary of the Treasury

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The Secretary of Defense

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