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28 February 1961



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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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28 February 1961



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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# Republic of the Congo



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Map Page

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

\*Congo: (A radio address by Kasavubu on 27 February in which he urged resistance to UN "tutelage" may worsen the already tense relations between UN personnel and the Congolese army.)

(The present location of the forward element of Gizenga's column is unknown. In Elisabethville, the situation between UN troops and Katanga forces is explosive, but Belgian official advisers are reportedly increasingly effective in counseling Tshombé to avoid a clash.)

Nasir has now agreed to the opening of a Stanleyville embassy in Cairo and Indonesia has designated a representative to go to Stanleyville; that the USSR has requested Sudanese transit visas for eight diplomats for Stanleyville; and that Gizenga has been notified that a Czech plane, presumably carrying an ambassador, is to arrive on 28 February. Communist China, Bulgaria, and Poland have also agreed to exchange ambassadors with Gizenga.

President Keita of Mali reportedly confirmed on 23 February that his country is sending a diplomatic representative to Stanleyville. (Backup, Page 1)

Laos: (Contrary to previous disclaimers, Laotian military leaders apparently are proceeding with plans to use the Chinese Nationalist irregulars at present in Laos, at least in a defensive capacity.) The Peiping People's Daily on 27 February raised the implicit threat of intervention "if US imperialism dares to incite the Kuomintang bandits to join the Laotian rebel forces." Such a move, said People's Daily, would "seriously menace the security of China's southwestern border"--a menace that "absolutely cannot be tolerated." (Backup, Page 3) (Map)

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West Germany: Adenauer, in his talks with Macmillan in London on 22-23 February, gave the British the impression that he was better briefed and more receptive than a year ago to the proposition that West Germany's international payments imbalances should be corrected by increased foreign aid and arms purchases. He reportedly gave no assurance, however, that West Germany would assume continuing foreign commitments. The chancellor spoke of the need for a more flexible attitude on Berlin; in general, he was described as "relaxed and cautious" on Berlin. He had much to say about "revivifying" NATO, and expressed confidence that De Gaulle would be cooperative while hinting that West Germany had no intention of being frozen out of a major role in NATO by any kind of tripartite directing body in the alliance.

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(Backup, Page 4)

Jordan-UAR: King Husayn has written to Nasir suggesting that efforts be made to minimize their differences. This move, which the King regards as a probing operation, was in response to indications that the UAR would welcome such an overture.

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continuing subversive activities against Syria, and there are indications the UAR may intensify its subversive efforts in Jordan.

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DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in the Congo

Gizenga apparently remains the dominant figure in the Stanleyville regime, and the city is reported calm. Bernard Salumu, formerly Gizenga's representative in Cairo and more recently a leading figure in the Stanleyville regime, is reported to have fled presumably as a result of a struggle for power. [redacted]

Gizenga's supply problem appears still to be precarious. [redacted] his representative in Cairo informed the USSR, Communist China, and Yugoslavia that the Stanleyville government--in order "to face up to the blocks placed actively by the UN and the imperialists and passively by the uncommitted countries around the Congo"--is interested in bartering Congolese goods for four long-range aircraft. [redacted] it was most important that the planes be able to fly non-stop from Accra to Stanleyville. [redacted]

The British chargé in Bamako, who met with President Keita on 23 February, feels that the government of Mali is in agreement with the Soviet position on the UN, including the removal of Hammarskjold and his replacement by a triumvirate. The chargé felt that his vigorous defense of Hammarskjold and the UN made little impression on Keita.


[redacted] In Katanga, Tshombé is apparently being given conflicting advice by his official and unofficial Belgian advisers. The latter reportedly urge him every evening to take strong action against the UN after those sent by the Belgian Government have spent the day trying to calm him. Within the past two weeks, Tshombé has reportedly issued Mauser rifles and ammunition to many members of his Conakat party in Elisabethville and the surrounding villages. However, he appears to be trying to raise morale and to guard against an anti-Conakat uprising, rather than to increase the fighting strength of the Katanga army.

Premier Ileo has protested to the UN against what he alleges to be UN assistance to the Gizenga forces in taking over

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
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Luluabourg on 24 February. Details of what is taking place are still obscure, but Hammarskjold has said that there is little the UN can do in view of the absence of any armed clash and the apparent willingness of the Luluabourg garrison to welcome the Stanleyville units. [redacted]



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~~SECRET~~Chinese Nationalist Forces in Laos

[ ] General Ouane, chief of the general staff, has told an American observer that the Laotian armed forces plan to use the Chinese Nationalist irregulars only for the protection of Namtha Province, where most of them are located. Ouane, who recently returned to Vientiane from consultations with the irregulars, puts their number at 4,000 effectives plus an equal number of dependents. Although Nationalist China has now indicated willingness to withdraw those irregulars "subject to its control" from Burma and Laos, a substantial number may not be in this category. ]

The People's Daily commentary of 27 February drew attention to a joint statement issued in Xieng Khouang on 23 February by Souvanna Phouma and Neo Lao Hak Sat leader Prince Souphannouvong, protesting against "the use of Kuomintang remnant bandits by the United States." The commentary also cited a recent statement by Kong Le warning that if the Nationalists are not withdrawn, "measures similar to those adopted by the Burmese Government" will be taken to get rid of them.

Peiping is using the presence of Nationalist irregulars in Laos to link Communist China's national interests more closely to the Laotian crisis. This issue could be used by Peiping to justify a more active military role in Laos, and the presence of an old enemy on China's southwestern border would become a useful issue for Peiping in any international conference in which it might take part. [ ]

[ ] A Soviet AN-12 heavy transport, presumably en route to North Vietnam, arrived at Peiping from the USSR on 27 February. This aircraft was one of a group of AN-12s which flew to North Vietnam in late December. (The AN-12 which flew to North Vietnam on 21 February apparently remains there. [ ] an AN-12 crashed at Hanoi's Gia Lam airfield on 22 February. Airlift flights into Laos continue to be scheduled. [ ]

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Adenauer and Macmillan Talks

[Although Adenauer's talks with Macmillan produced no important decisions, they were conducted in a constructive and cordial atmosphere and can be viewed as furthering the good relations established by Macmillan's visit to Bonn last August. Adenauer's proposal that the Western European Union be utilized as a means for political consultation between Britain and the six continental Common Market nations is probably viewed by the British as a friendly gesture.]

[Adenauer's failure to give assurances of future foreign aid contributions appears to conflict with the general commitment Foreign Minister von Brentano made in Washington on 17 February for a continuing foreign aid program for underdeveloped countries. Brentano's long-term commitment created great unrest at a caucus of Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Bundestag deputies on 21 February and was sharply attacked by Vice Chancellor and Economics Minister Erhard and Finance Minister Etzel. Over the week end, Erhard continued to stress in speeches in Cologne and Nuremberg that it is only a matter of "luck" that Bonn has nearly a billion-dollar surplus available for a special 1961 aid program and that this cannot be expected every year.]

[Hermann Hoecherl, chairman of the Bundestag faction of the Christian Socialist Union (CSU)--a Bavarian affiliate of the CDU--stated  on 23 February that any advance commitment for annual foreign aid contributions violates the West German constitution and will be opposed by the CDU/CSU members of the Bundestag. He also asserted that a tax increase to finance foreign aid during 1961--an election year--is "totally out of the question" and said he was "just about certain" that the Bundestag will refuse a tax increase even after the elections. Hoecherl further asserted that Brentano's long-term commitment is meaningless since even if funds for the special ad hoc 1961 aid program favored by Erhard are raised, sufficient worthwhile aid projects can hardly be lined up to utilize these funds in 1961 or even in 1962.]

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