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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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23 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Laos: Reports indicate that the government's exploration of possible political solutions is centering on acceptance of Sihanouk's 14-nation conference proposal. The cabinet apparently is also considering the idea of a commission to follow the conference comprised of Cambodia, Burma, Malaya, India, Poland, and Canada.

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[There are tentative indications of a Kong Le - Pathet Lao effort to outflank government forces blocking the approach to Luang Prabang along Route 13. Some government troops have been deployed to counter this threat. Other government forces are being sent to reinforce the Kam Keut area, where skirmishing apparently continues]

[Backup, Page 1) (Map)

*Warsaw Pact: The chief purpose of the Warsaw Pact meeting announced for 28 March in Moscow is to create a forum from which to respond to Western moves on the Laotian situation. This meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee is timed to follow the current meeting in Bangkok of SEATO military advisers and the opening on 27 March of the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers. Moscow probably feels that the Laotian situation is moving into a new and decisive phase which may require high-level coordination of future bloc steps and which in any event makes desirable a new demonstration of bloc solidarity. Yesterday's TASS announcement refers, as did the announcement prior to a similar session last year, to a meeting at the "top level." This suggests that Eastern European party leaders and premiers may again attend along with the foreign and defense ministers, who are specifically mentioned in the

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announcement. Such a meeting could provide an occasion for Khrushchev to break his long public silence on foreign affairs. It is probable that next week's session will cover the Berlin question, at least on a pro forma basis, and possibly in a more threatening context. [redacted]
(Backup, Page 2)

Congo: Tshombé is to leave Elisabethville today for a trip which reportedly will include stops at Leopoldville, Brazzaville, Monrovia, and Abidjan in the Ivory Coast. In his talks with Leopoldville officials he apparently will push his plans for a round of conferences to follow up those at Tananarive. In his international travels he probably hopes to obtain support for his concept of a Congo confederation. He plans to attend the conference of Independent African states tentatively scheduled for early April in Monrovia. Tshombé reportedly believes that if he can gain the confidence of Liberia's President Tubman, he will have the support of the African leader best able to influence United States policy and can thereby counteract what he considers the unsympathetic American attitude toward Katanga. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Backup, Page 3)

Vietnam: North Vietnamese - directed guerrillas in at least one area of South Vietnam have been given a timetable for acts of violence to sabotage the South Vietnamese presidential elections scheduled for 9 April. [redacted]

[redacted] the following timetable to guerrillas in Kien Giang Province, southwest of Saigon on the Cambodian border:

No

- 2 April: Attacks on official buildings; assassination of "wicked people"--presumably village officials; posting of anti-Diem slogans; meetings to organize popular support.
- 4 April: Attacks to disrupt road travel; continuation of attacks on official buildings; and apparently,

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- efforts to surround military and civil guard posts.
- 8 April: Bridges to be destroyed; waterways blocked; large-scale demonstrations to be organized in towns. Instructions for this date also specify: "Bring out the armed forces and have them break the enemy's grip on the outside areas."
- 9 April: (election day): A general strike to be organized in towns and villages.
- 10-15 April: Instructions for this period call for launching "a struggle opposing the fraudulent election," and a "fierce frontal struggle principally aimed at the village authorities."

Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in an interview published in Hungary's party newspaper, has said that it will not be possible for Peiping to enter the UN until the US ends its "occupation" of Taiwan and withdraws its armed forces from the area. Heretofore, Peiping's public statements on UN representation have not gone beyond insistence on the ouster from the UN of the Chinese Nationalists. While Peiping has not issued an official policy statement along these lines, the Chinese Communists may believe that international pressures for their participation in the UN have reached a point that encourages them to press their demands for a US withdrawal from Taiwan with new vigor. (Backup, Page 4)

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Afghanistan-USSR: Afghan Prime Minister Daud, now in Rome for medical treatment, plans to leave for Moscow on 4 April,

He made similar trips to Moscow while returning home from visits to Europe in 1959 and 1960. Daud probably intends to discuss Soviet assistance programs under Afghanistan's Second Five-Year Plan, which is to begin in September. Daud suggested that the Afghan deputy minister of planning come to Rome to discuss possible Italian

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aid for the Second Five-Year Plan. [redacted]
"Then he can go to Moscow with me." Daud will also probably try to learn how the recent limited improvement in Soviet relations with Pakistan might affect Moscow's support for Afghanistan in the Pushtoonistan dispute. [redacted]

Ethiopia: The Emperor on 21 March met a deputation of 500 unarmed enlisted men representing all army units in the Addis Ababa area, following peaceful demonstrations by these troops who were protesting against low pay scales. The troops dispersed peacefully after the Emperor promised to institute a full probe to rectify inequities in army pay scales. They reportedly remained dissatisfied, however, and reconvened into smaller groups to discuss further moves. The Emperor appears reluctant to yield to the soldiers' demands despite warnings from senior army leaders that they will be unable to control the troops unless concessions are forthcoming. The populace in the capital is apparently becoming more sympathetic to demands for reform. [redacted] (Backup, Page 6) OK

Morocco-Spanish Sahara: King Hassan II is exploiting the capture and release of the 11 foreign oil technicians--including three Americans--to further Morocco's claims to Spanish Sahara, in the opinion of the American charge d'affaires and the British ambassador in Rabat. These officials believe that the King's communiqué, issued simultaneously with his theatrical release of the captured men to their respective embassies, contains a clear threat that other oil prospectors in northern Spanish Sahara will get similar treatment. At the same time, Hassan indicated he was willing to negotiate Morocco's claim to the Sahara with Spain and France. OK
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The Spanish command in the Canary Islands claims that Spanish forces in northeastern Spanish Sahara have surrounded an invading Moroccan group and are attacking it from land and air. [redacted] (Backup, Page 8)

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

[]

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

A. No change from last week.

B. No change from last week.

no

C. LAOS

Communist forces, supported by undiminished bloc material assistance by air and road, continue pressure on discouraged Lao Army forces which are in a generally defensive posture on the approaches to Luang Prabang, Vang Vieng, and Tha Thom. Communist forces are probably consolidating their recent advances in the Route 13 area between Vientiane and Luang Prabang in preparation to exploit further opportunities. The Communist attacks in the vicinity of Kham Keut probably are intended to cause further dispersion of Lao Army forces and to extend the areas under Communist control; they probably will be followed by similar attacks in other areas of southern Laos.

Members of the Boun Oum government, discouraged by the continuing improvement in the Communist military position, are tending to desire an early political settlement, perhaps even involving adverse terms. The Bloc nations charge increasing intervention by the US, Thailand, and South Vietnam, but have not embarked on a major campaign stressing threats to their own security; this, combined with a lack of urgency in their diplomatic approaches, may reflect confidence in continued enhancement of the Communist position in Laos.

SOUTH VIETNAM

Viet Cong (Communist) guerrilla groups in South Vietnam will probably engage in a vigorous extensive campaign of

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sabotage and political terrorism in connection with and prior to the 9 April South Vietnamese presidential elections. The Vietnamese security forces are already heavily committed, which will facilitate Viet Cong efforts to undermine governmental authority in the countryside to create widespread chaos and unrest.

CONGO

Continuing efforts by the Stanleyville regime to obtain delivery of promised material assistance from Bloc and Radical African sources have been unsuccessful and, in effective quantities, will remain so as long as the Sudan refuses transit. The continued control of the Matadi area by Congolese troops and the indications by the Government that only non-military cargoes will be allowed to enter suggests that any effort to disembark UN troops at Matadi under these circumstances may create a serious incident, particularly as the first troop ship to arrive will be carrying Indian troops. Dayal's return as UN representative would worsen relations between the UN and the Leopoldville government.

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~~SECRET~~Situation in Laos

[redacted] request for maps showing the various towns between the junction and Luang Prabang. [redacted] maps for this area were unavailable, but that an inquiry was being sent to Hanoi.

[redacted] leaflets be prepared for the purpose of inducing the rallying of former Kong Le paratroopers, now in Luang Prabang, who had gone over to Phoumi's side when Vientiane was recaptured last December. [redacted] these former comrades might desire to return to the Kong Le side if they were sure they would not be shot as deserters. [redacted] Kong Le - Pathet Lao personnel are going to Hanoi for jump training and other specialized instructions. [redacted]

[redacted] all Luang Prabang province east of that city is now under Pathet Lao control.

[redacted] In the tense atmosphere of Vientiane, the possibility of an anti-government coup cannot be excluded. Communist agents are spreading rumors and anti-American propaganda among the population. A morale problem exists among civil servants and garrison troops; recent defections from both groups have been reported. Additionally, there is a growing body of feeling against the continuation and possible expansion of hostilities. While Phoumi maintains in Vientiane several units considered by him to be among his most reliable troops, a determined effort against the government by a relatively small armed group could gain rapid momentum. [redacted]

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Warsaw Pact Meeting

On intra-bloc matters, the Soviet leaders could use next week's meeting as an opportunity to apply new pressures designed to bring Albania back into line with the USSR. In the military field, discussion of a possible reduction in Soviet forces in Hungary might be on the agenda, as might also be plans for Warsaw pact combined-training exercises later this year.

Meetings of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee have been used since the Pact's formation in 1955 as a forum for discussion of a wide range of pressing political matters by Soviet bloc leaders. These meetings have been attended by observers from Communist China; last year's session was attended also by observers from North Vietnam and North Korea. The final communiques of these various meetings have announced a unified bloc position on the questions at issue.

Thus the meeting in February 1960, although marred by sharp Sino-Soviet differences, issued a statement which forcefully restated the Soviet position on the Berlin and German issues and outlined those topics the USSR intended to discuss at the then-forthcoming Big Four "summit" meeting. The communique following the April 1959 meeting was directed toward the issues to be considered at the Big Four foreign ministers' conference that spring. The May 1958 meeting was used to attack the theses issued a month earlier by a congress of the Yugoslav party and to widen the break in party relations between the bloc and Belgrade. The meetings in 1958 and 1960, though not the one in 1959, were attended by Soviet bloc party leaders and chiefs of state, in addition to the foreign and defense ministers.

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~~SECRET~~Situation in the Congo

During his Leopoldville visit Tshombé reportedly hopes to be briefed on the status of negotiations with Gizenga and Lundula. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Leopoldville officials were authorized at the Tananarive conference to make secret contacts with the Stanleyville regime. There have been persistent reports of such contacts and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Leopoldville is at least attempting to maintain communications contact with Stanleyville; however, there is no firm evidence of any negotiations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Tshombé apparently will attempt to convene a meeting in April which would be attended by the Tananarive conferees. He hopes to follow this with a large-scale round-table conference in Elisabethville. [He seems to believe that the Tananarive resolution provided for the complete abolition of the central government machinery--a position at variance with that of most Leopoldville officials, who hope to retain elements of a federal structure.] Ileo and other leaders in Leopoldville expect to persuade Tshombé to modify his proposals at the forthcoming conferences, but their conciliatory posture may be compromised by Mobutu, who has stated [REDACTED] that he considers the Tananarive conference idiotic.

The security situation in outlying areas of the Congo continues to deteriorate. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] intimidation by Congolese armed bands is increasing. As a result, the senior WHO official in Leopoldville has told his headquarters in Geneva that work may soon become impossible in many areas. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Peiping Expands Conditions for UN Seat

[Peiping's reported new demand is a logical expansion of its thesis that "imperialism--especially US imperialism--" is the greatest danger in the world and that the Communist bloc's efforts must be devoted to a no-holds-barred struggle against it. This attitude is reflected in Peiping's current insistence on the withdrawal of US forces and the recognition of its claim to Taiwan as a necessary preliminary to the settlement of all Sino-US problems.]

[Following the 103rd Sino-US ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on 7 March, Peiping said it would be difficult to reach agreement with the US on any matter until the US ends its "occupation" of Taiwan. Peiping now may be seeking to take the issue outside the field of bilateral Sino-US relations and force its consideration in the UN. The Chinese Communists may also intend through this maneuver to make it more difficult for any consideration in the UN of a "two Chinas" solution.]

[The new condition may not reflect a firm policy position. Peiping may be employing the familiar tactic of setting a high price in preparation for bargaining later. Chou En-lai may have been hinting at the nature of a compromise acceptable to Peiping when he told Edgar Snow last November that the US must agree to withdraw its forces but added that as to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, "they are matters for subsequent discussion."]

[Many UN members which now support Peiping's entry into the UN would probably be unwilling to attempt to accommodate the Chinese Communists beyond voting to seat Peiping's representative. These members believe that UN membership is a privilege as well as a right and therefore would consider Peiping's demands demeaning to the organization. Britain's recent announcement that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations has subsequently been amplified by a Foreign Office private view that no conditions]

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[could be attached by Taipei's supporters to the seating of Peiping. On the other hand, the Foreign Office would oppose the Chinese Communists if Peiping advanced such conditions as UN recognition that Taiwan belonged to China or that charges of aggression against Communist China be expunged from UN records.]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~Army Dissidence Threatens Ethiopia

Ambassador Richards indicated on 22 March that while an uneasy calm has returned to Addis Ababa, trouble could break out again unless the Emperor acts quickly to accommodate the army dissidents' demands.

The Emperor's attempts to date to reduce the growing criticism of his regime appear to have failed. He sought to alleviate army discontent on 14 March by announcing a modest increase in its pay scales and to quell dissension among junior and middle-level officers the next day by promoting 73 army officers. The pay increase, however, which is to come from the present army budget, falls considerably short of that promised by the rebel leadership last December. Moreover, air force, police, and navy personnel will be aroused over being denied a pay raise equal to that given the army, while army officers are likely to regard their promotions simply as a counterbalance to those given air force officers last month. Police officials are also displeased because the Emperor recently appointed an army officer instead of a career police official as commissioner of police.

[Government officials are sufficiently alarmed to have ordered precautionary measures, including the construction of breastworks around at least one army installation and the positions of heavy weapons and additional guards at other key places.]


Handbills, which may have originated in the Ministry of Defense, were circulated in the capital on 20 March setting forth the demands of the dissidents. These included--in addition to the pay raise--the dismissal of Chief of Staff Kebede and other high government officials, threatening direct action if they are not complied with.

The American army attaché notes that the dissidents apparently have succeeded in establishing organizational ties through several if not all local army units. A leader capable of directing action against the regime is not yet known to have emerged, however. Although army officers reportedly have

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secured all arms in unit armories, the troops could recover these weapons through mass action if the situation were to get out of hand.



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~~SECRET~~Moroccan Claims to Saharan Territories

Soon after Spain published regulations on 15 June 1959 for the exploitation of petroleum resources in the Spanish Sahara, the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid made known Morocco's claims of sovereignty over the region. The Moroccan economic counselor in Madrid indicated at that time that he thought American oil companies should be advised this was a contested area and that they might subsequently have to renegotiate their status with another government. The following year, nine American firms obtained concessions from the Spanish Government, and by January 1961, 38 American teams were engaged in exploratory work. Emphasis was placed on the northwestern part of the Spanish Sahara because of the availability of supply lines and water. The United Oil Company, whose 11 employees were captured--apparently by Moroccan irregulars at the direction of the Moroccan Army--on 11 March, had recently ceased operations in Latin America to concentrate on exploratory work in Spanish Sahara and Australia.


[Spanish Army Minister Barroso continues to view Moroccan troop movements near the Spanish Saharan border as menacing, and claimed on 21 March that Spanish troops had the previous day captured "300 Moroccan camels" in the Spanish Sahara.] Spanish officials in Paris are reported to have proposed that France join forces with Spain for a systematic cleanup of Moroccan irregulars operating in Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. Such a joint operation early in 1958 suppressed Moroccan irregular activities in the region. Paris purportedly has not responded to this request and is not anxious to become involved in such an expedition.

The Moroccan press, meanwhile, continues to play up charges of Spain's aggressive intentions, reporting on 21 March the arrival of Spanish reinforcements not only in Spanish Sahara but also in the Spanish-held presidios of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco's Mediterranean coast. It also claims that Spanish military aircraft created havoc among the population by flying low over the southern Moroccan town of Tarfaya on 20 March, and

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continues to charge Spanish authorities with kidnaping a team of four Italian oil prospectors operating in the Tarfaya area.



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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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