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30 June 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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DAILY BRIEF

[The Watch Committee at a special meeting on 29 June considered the Iraqi threat to Kuwait and issued the following statement of its findings:]


[Premier Qasim of Iraq laid claim to the newly independent Sheikdom of Kuwait on 25 June. Kuwait has responded by declaring an emergency, alerting its troops and announcing its determination to defend its territory. The UK Ambassador in Baghdad has warned Iraq of British determination to honor its commitment to defend Kuwait if requested. Saudi Arabia had declared that any aggression against Kuwait will be considered an aggression against Saudi Arabia and is moving troops to its borders with Iraq. Iran, the UAR and other Arab States have declared their support for Kuwait. Public Soviet reaction has been limited to a factual report of Qasim's 25 June statement, and there is no evidence of any Soviet or other Bloc support or encouragement of Qasim's position.]

[An Iraqi military buildup of sufficient size for an attack on Kuwait is planned and may be underway around Basra about 40 miles from the Kuwait border. Qasim's forces could be in position to launch sudden military action against Kuwait at any time after 30 June. Qasim may attack Kuwait despite opposition from the rest of the Arab world if he feels he can occupy Kuwait city before effective British support can reach the area. In this case, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly become involved, and the possibility exists that other Arab states and Iran may become embroiled as well. Dissident groups in Iraq may seize this occasion to launch a coup or attempt to assassinate Qasim.]

[Soviet military intervention in this situation is highly unlikely.]

(Map)

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Congo: Tshombé's return to Elisabethville and his subsequent statements denouncing accords reached earlier with the Ileo government appear to have convinced his followers that Katangan "independence" can be successfully maintained. This attitude in Elisabethville will pose a problem to the UN, which hopes for Katanga's participation in the Congo parliament but does not regard Katanga as entitled to as large a role in any new government as either the Leopoldville or Stanleyville faction. [redacted]

[redacted] a preference for a government led by Cyrille Adoula, comprising five ministers from Leopoldville, five from Stanleyville, and five others to be drawn from Kasai, Katanga, and other areas

Forays into northern Katanga by Congo Army soldiers nominally loyal to Gizenga have lately become more frequent. [redacted] 150 Katanga Army troops were flown to Kongolo on 28 June to meet an "invasion threat" from the north. While there is no evidence that the Stanleyville regime is encouraging such forays at this time, they pose a continuing threat of clashes involving UN or Katanga forces. [redacted] (Man)

Jordan: A new cabinet appointed by King Husayn on 28 June may serve only in an interim capacity pending general elections, [redacted] The King has been undecided, however, about whether to hold elections in the near future because he fears that Nasir, who interfered effectively in the Jordanian elections of 1956, would again attempt to subvert Husayn's regime. Husayn has eliminated three of the most reactionary, corrupt, and unpopular members of the previous cabinet. [redacted]

[redacted] (Backup, Page 1)

Venezuela: [redacted]

[redacted] the pocket revolt of rightist military dissidents which occurred in the provincial city of [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Barcelona on 26 June "has larger extension and strength." [REDACTED] other conspirators "may act again" soon. The Barcelona uprising is illustrative of the continuing political unrest, which is compounded by Venezuela's acute economic problems.

The quickly suppressed Barcelona uprising was led by two exiled officers who had re-entered the country clandestinely. Two other prominent rightist officers, long connected with Dominican-supported plotting against the Betancourt regime, are known to be still at large in the country.

[REDACTED]

**SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES**

(Available during the preceding week)

Nasser and the future of Arab nationalism: outlook for Arab nationalism generally; problems and prospects of the UAR leader and his country including its political and economic conditions and foreign policy. U.S.I.B. NIE 36-61. June 27'61. (S)

Outlook for retention of US Azores base rights in the event of certain courses of US action, i. e., continued pressure on Portugal to make reforms in its African territories. U.S.I.B. SNIE 27.2-2-61. June 27'61. (S)

Likelihood of major Communist military intentions in mainland Southeast Asia. U.S.I.B. SNIE 10-2-61. June 27'61. 0036930. (TS)

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DAILY BRIEF

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~~SECRET~~New Jordanian Cabinet

[For some time King Husayn has been planning to reorganize the cabinet to give it a **more** progressive and liberal appearance in hopes of inspiring greater popular support for his regime. The elimination of the corrupt Faleh Madadha as interior minister, of Muhammed Amin Shanqiti, also widely regarded as corrupt, as education minister, and of the arch-conservative Mohammed Ali Jabari as justice minister is at least a step in that direction. The omission of former Foreign Minister Musa Nasir from the new cabinet presumably reflects Husayn's reservations about the enthusiasm with which Nasir, a Palestinian, would expound Husayn's views on the Palestine issues currently prominent in inter-Arab relations.]

[The prime minister will again be Bahjat Talhuni, who will also hold the foreign minister's portfolio. When Talhuni succeeded Hazza Majalli after the latter's assassination in August 1960, there were indications he would serve only in an interim capacity. Husayn, who functions to some extent as his own prime minister, apparently has decided to retain Talhuni at least until parliamentary elections are held.]

[Elections were to have been held in October 1960, but they were postponed after Majalli was assassinated. The King has expressed a desire to reschedule them for this summer, as further evidence of his liberal intentions, but Talhuni has opposed him on this. The prime minister reportedly sees no prospect of getting a parliament which would be any more subservient to the government's wishes and he believes there is a good chance that any new parliament would be less manageable.]

[] Husayn wants to overhaul and improve the efficiency of certain ministries before undertaking general elections. One of these is the Ministry of Interior which Madadha headed and which is especially important during an election. The King's choice of the popular and capable former mayor of Jerusalem, Hasan Katib, for this post seems well designed to further this objective. []

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

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