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12 June 1961


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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*USSR: It now is clear that the previously reported abnormalities in activity of the Soviet Long Range Air Force were in preparation for a large-scale air exercise. The exercise which began on 9 June involves all three of the Soviet Long Range Air Armies in out-of-area flights. Unprecedented numbers of Long Range bombers have been deployed to the Arctic and to airfields in the European satellites. It now is estimated that 111 Badgers (TU-16s) have deployed to East Germany and Hungary and 75 to Arctic bases. In addition, bomber movements in the western USSR have been noted, and bombers have been deployed to the Far East from the European USSR. Several movements of fighter aircraft have been reflected, indicating that large numbers of jet fighters may participate in the exercise.


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West Germany - USSR - Berlin: Despite Soviet protest notes over Bonn's "provocative" activities in West Berlin, Bonn has announced that Chancellor Adenauer will visit West Berlin in early July and that a meeting of the Bundesrat--the upper house of the West German parliament--in West Berlin is still under consideration. Last fall Adenauer refused to support a Bundestag meeting in West Berlin because of his belief that it might increase East-West tensions. His visit to the city next month will serve to answer West German Socialist campaign accusations that he lacks sympathy for Berlin. Adenauer's last visit to West Berlin was in January 1960. East

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Germany has already attacked the proposed Bundesrat meeting as "fresh, deliberate provocation," and Adenauer's projected visit as the "climax of Bonn's provocations."

Moscow's latest notes contended that Bonn wished to keep international tension high by aggravating the West Berlin issue but avoided any threat to take specific action if the Bundesrat meets. Moscow's current aim probably is to maintain a state of tension over the Berlin question while the West considers a reply to the Soviet aide-memoire on Berlin given to the US after the Vienna meeting.

Laos: Boun Oum, Souvanna Phouma, and Souphannouvong appear to be moving toward their long-anticipated Laotian "summit" talks at a compromise location. Boun Oum has dropped his insistence on Nice, and agreement is now said to have been reached on holding the meeting in Zurich. Boun Oum and General Phoumi in the meantime are consulting with various political party leaders at Nice on the line the government side should take in the projected talks.

The military situation remains generally quiet.

the situation in the area was quiet and that the reconnaissance patrol sent out to ascertain the locations of the new government Meo positions had not yet reported back.

Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 12 June. (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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Dominican Republic: The Dominican Government is continuing its efforts to present itself in the most favorable light to influence world opinion and the OAS investigating commission. [President Balaguer] [redacted] is determined to work toward elections, will permit exiles to return to participate in them, and will make "every effort" to clean up the secret police. [redacted]

"Ramfis" Trujillo would remain as head of the armed forces.

The arrest of Maj. Gen. Roman, secretary of the armed forces, was announced on 9 June. His replacement, Maj. Gen. Santos Melido Marte, is described by the US Consulate as being a poorly educated strong-arm thug, but trusted by the Trujillo family. The incumbent of this office is constitutionally first in line of succession to the presidency, as long as the vice presidency is unoccupied.

Although agents of the Military Intelligence Service (SIM) are said to have virtually disappeared from sight since 7 June, there are indications that steps are being taken to hide them rather than to abolish or reform the organization. [redacted]

[redacted] the SIM had put in storage its fleet of 400 Volkswagen cars--they are dreaded by Dominicans as symbols of terror--and purchased almost all the US-made cars available from Dominican used-car dealers. A "great number" of political prisoners have reportedly been transferred to four outlying towns so that they would not be detected by the OAS committee. [redacted]

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*Turkey: [High-level personnel changes now occurring within the ruling Committee for National Union (CNU) and the Turkish armed forces are apparently part of a power struggle within the CNU over the role that body should play in the future and over the timing of a return to civil government. The CNU is the leading body of the military regime which ousted the Menderes government in May 1960. The changes have reportedly involved the ouster and subsequent reinstatement of the chief of the air force, Lt. Gen. Irfan Tansel, and the resignation of General Madanoglu, one of the leading members of the CNU, from his post as troop commander of the Ankara garrison. Several other top-level military changes are also apparently being made.]

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[General Tansel, in a possible overstatement of his case, claims to have the support of the commanders of the ground and naval forces and the gendarmerie, as well as support from the younger members of the CNU. He is apparently opposed by senior officers on the CNU. He told the US air attaché on 10 June that his group was in control and that he would direct Turkey "on the Western road to democracy." The CNU, following a meeting attended by the General Staff chief, issued a statement on 11 June playing down the significance of the personnel changes and declaring its determination to hold "democratic and honest elections" before 29 October, as previously announced.]

[The situation remains confused and a general interservice struggle for power could develop.]

[in the event of a showdown, the navy and gendarmerie would support the army.] admitting the possibility of a major clash between elements of the army and air force, believe it is too soon for allegiances to have crystallized to a point where it can be assumed that either the air force or army would act as a unified service. Tansel's control of the air force, however, is probably firm as a result of major changes which he has made in his staff officers.]


[According to Tansel, some members of the CNU wanted to perpetuate strong military influence in the regime, even after]

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elections. He told the US air attaché that the CNU would continue to function but with no voice in military affairs. He noted that all CNU members would be allowed political careers following elections. Tansel claimed Madanoglu was on his way out and reiterated that the strength of the country now lay with the commanders of the military forces. When questioned regarding the status of the General Staff, Tansel remarked that it would function as before but under the control of the minister of defense.

The American Embassy tends to view Tansel's explanation as an oversimplification of the forces at work and believes there may well be more serious strains both within the CNU and within the armed forces.

Congo: Gizenga, secretly and through an intermediary, has presented a plan to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold under which representatives of Gizenga and Kasavubu would attempt to work out an agreed basis for a meeting of parliament and formation of a new government. He suggested Lulua-bourg as a possible site for such discussions. Gizenga agreed to consider the post of deputy premier for himself but insisted on parity with Kasavubu in the number of cabinet posts. Under Gizenga's proposal, Kasavubu would cease to act as chief of state until cleared of complicity in the death of Patrice Lumumba. Dissatisfied with the help he has received from the Soviet bloc, Gizenga reportedly said he was willing to "cut loose from them and throw in his lot with the real African nationalists." Kasavubu can be expected to resist the proposals for parity in the cabinet and restrictions on his powers. The United Nations, however, is likely to bring pressure to bear on Kasavubu to enter such negotiations.

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were made by Cuban Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Olivares, while on a "good-will" trip to these countries during the last half of May. [redacted], Olivares reiterated Cuba's unwillingness to use the machinery of the six-nation ad hoc good offices committee set up by the OAS foreign ministers last August. The presidents of Mexico, Brazil, and Ecuador all told Olivares that they favored the use of this committee but would consider other methods of conciliation, not involving the OAS, if such other methods offered a chance of success. Cuba's refusal to use the OAS is based on Havana's oft-repeated charge that the OAS is a "tool of US imperialism."

[redacted] (Backup, Page 5)

Brazil: Student unrest in Recife, capital of the state of Pernambuco in northeastern Brazil, has created a tense situation which could spread to other parts of the country and touch off nationwide political repercussions. Military forces in the area are on the alert; 400 to 600 troop reinforcements were airlifted to Recife from Rio de Janeiro on 7 June, and naval units--a cruiser and two destroyers--have also been ordered there. The unrest developed when the director of the Recife law school in early June refused to permit the mother of Cuban leader Che Guevara to speak on the university campus. The Brazilian Army is reported to have insisted on strong measures in Recife to prevent the unrest from threatening national security. President Quadros, already confronted with serious discontent among a segment of the officer corps, is taking a firm stand against the student agitators. [redacted] (Backup, Page 6) OK

South Korea: The dominant position of Major General Pak Chong-hui, strong man of the military regime, is emphasized by the announcement that he will head the standing committee of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), which is expected to become the policy-making group in South Korea. The standing committee, established under the terms of an SCNR law announced on 9 June, will consist of the chairmen OK
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of seven committees covering the general areas of government administration and will probably handle most of the business of the somewhat unwieldy 32-man SCNR. Pak told the American chargé on 9 June that "things were going smoothly" now that Americans had a better understanding of the revolution and that he hoped to see a gradual "deepening" of relationships between South Korea and the United States.

(Backup, Page 8)

UAR-USSR: Other Arab states have joined the UAR in its dispute with the USSR, and Cairo radio on 10 June quoted Saudi Arabian, Lebanese, Yemeni, and Jordanian officials at an Arab League meeting in Cairo as expressing opposition to Soviet propaganda criticism of the UAR. A Baghdad newspaper and an Iraqi lawyers' association have also denounced Moscow's "intervention" in UAR and Iraqi affairs. Iraq has been an intermittent target of Moscow because of Prime Minister Qasim's suppression of local Communists. Soviet commentary on the dispute has been muted since 7-8 June, when the Moscow press reiterated the charge of UAR mistreatment of imprisoned Communists.

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The Situation in Laos

[General Phoumi reportedly hopes to achieve three things in any talks among Boun Oum, Souvanna Phouma, and Souphanouvong: a firm cease-fire, a declaration of neutrality to which all three princes can adhere, and agreement on the composition of a coalition government. With regard to the latter question, Phoumi reportedly will not accept any new government except one in which he would remain as minister of national security and in which only a trusted associate would be allowed the interior portfolio. He would be willing, however, to let either the Neo Lao Hak Sat or the Souvanna group have the ministries of foreign affairs and information. Phoumi would prefer that none of the three princes be premier.]

[Souvanna and Souphannouvong would be bound to reject Phoumi's demand for the national security portfolio, and Phoumi is almost certainly aware of this. His plan to make this demand as well as to demand control of the interior ministry through a trusted associate may thus merely represent his maximum bargaining position. On the other hand, it may reflect his intention to make the talks fail by setting terms for a settlement he knows are unacceptable to the other sides.]

Peiping's People's Daily on 11 June contended that if a Laotian coalition government is not formed by the time some agreement is reached at Geneva, Souvanna Phouma has the right to sign that agreement on behalf of Laos.

however, Communist China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi, during a conversation with the Indonesian foreign minister, reflected little optimism about the possibilities of an early East-West agreement on Laos.

the airfield was in usable condition and capable of handling a "small plane."

equipment left by the retreating government units at

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Pa Dong included "three 57-mm. cannon, four 75-mm. cannon, and four 106-mm. mortars." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the enemy is establishing a redoubt for war materiel and troops about ten miles north of the Plaine des Jarres. An airfield capable of handling twin-engined aircraft is said to be under construction there. Another such redoubt is being established in Sam Neua Province, about 15 miles east of Sam Neua town. This base will also have barracks for troops and an airfield. [REDACTED]

Airlift operations on 10 June included at least six flights by Soviet IL-14s from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang and return. Preliminary information indicates that only a relatively few flights were scheduled for 11 June. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Developments in Dominican Republic

President Balaguer has virtually no backing among the dissidents or exiles, although many of them probably would accept a transition government under him if they believed he could free himself from the control of the Trujillo family. The leaders of the anti-Communist and oldest exile group, the Dominican Revolutionary party (PRD), reportedly believed Balaguer could provide the means for transition toward a democratic government. [REDACTED]

the PRD leaders intend to test Balaguer's sincerity by seeking guarantees from the government and the OAS permitting them to come to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of organizing their party there in preparation for democratic government.

It was reliably reported on 10 June that the Dominican Government recently promised Maximo Lopez that his small pro-Castro Dominican Popular Movement party--inside the country--would have freedom to campaign for support. The slain dictator on occasions permitted Communists and extreme leftists to operate in the Dominican Republic in order to "prove" that political freedom existed in large degree. He used the same device to prove that there was danger of a Communist takeover there and, after making his point with the foreign public, either murdered, imprisoned, or re-exiled his opponents. Ramfis may hope to convince foreign observers that a genuine pro-Castro or Communist movement exists in the Dominican Republic in order to justify strong police measures that he almost surely will have to use eventually to remain in power. [REDACTED]

There are indications that Ramfis may be intent upon following up his father's efforts to kill Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ramfis was interested in contacting Oscar Tamayo Suarez, a former Venezuelan Army officer who has been working for some time with the Trujillo regime in plots against

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Betancourt. Tamayo may have been a participant in the assassination plot that almost resulted in Betancourt's death on 24 June 1960.

The US Consulate again reported on 10 June that the Dominican government may be planning to use confessions extracted from Dominicans involved in the Trujillo assassination in an attempt to implicate Venezuela or the United States in the plot.

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Cuba Seeks Three-Nation Mediation Efforts

The special diplomatic delegation headed by Olivares--who is generally considered the Foreign Ministry's most powerful figure--was one of two Cuban groups officially billed as a goodwill mission to Latin America. The Olivares group met with Mexican President Lopez Mateos on 18 May, with Brazilian President Quadros on 24 May, and with Ecuadorean President Velasco on 28 May.

The second delegation, headed by special ambassador Ramon Aja Castro, has been visiting the other eight Latin American countries with which Cuba still maintains diplomatic relations. Details of the discussions between the Cubans and the Latin American leaders they visited were not publicized, giving rise to speculation and press reports in some countries that Cuba was seeking to establish a new Latin American organization to supplant the Organization of American States (OAS).

The governments of Mexico, Brazil, and Ecuador for some time have been regarded by the Castro regime as its best friends in Latin America. All three countries have previously offered their good offices in an attempt to ease what they have apparently regarded as a fundamentally bilateral problem between Cuba and the United States. The current Cuban approach to these governments--along with the secondary conversations held with other Latin American governments by the Aja Castro group--is seen as an effort to impress them that Cuba seeks only to live in peace with its neighbors and to reduce any possibilities of a firm Latin American stand against Castro. Further evidence of Olivares' efforts to emphasize Cuba's "reasonableness" is seen in [redacted] his statements to the three governments he visited that Cuba was anxious to listen to and follow their advice on the problem. [redacted]

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Student Unrest in Northeastern Brazil

In addition to military precautions, Quadros sent his minister of education to Recife on 5 June with instructions to evict --with force if necessary--the striking students who had occupied university buildings there, an action which was carried out two days later. The minister was also instructed to demand that the students return to classes as a prerequisite to any consideration of their complaints. Moreover, during an interpellation about student unrest, the minister of justice advised Congress on 9 June that the government would uphold the law without compromise. Although Recife was reported relatively quiet yesterday, the strike was still unsettled and a number of students were still being held under arrest.

Quadros probably will take into account fully the attitude of the military in meeting any crisis in order not to further compound his current difficulties with the army. Friction between the President and the military was revealed most recently when Minister of War Denys resisted a presidential order to arrest Marshal Lott, defeated candidate in the 1960 presidential election. Lott had granted a press interview in which he sharply criticized Quadros personally and also the President's favorable policy toward Cuba.

There are indications that student sympathy strikes may break out in the neighboring state of Paraiba, in Sao Paulo, and possibly in other areas. Labor groups in Recife have considered supporting the strikers, and labor unions elsewhere may join, particularly the Communist and pro-Castro sectors under the influence of Vice President Goulart, an unprincipled politician and head of the Labor party who is at odds with Quadros.

The pro-Castro Peasant Leagues, headed by pro-Communist Francisco Juliao--who was recently in Cuba and visited the Sino-Soviet bloc in late 1960--have headquarters in Recife and can be expected to give some kind of support to the student strikes there. The leagues are pressing for radical agrarian reform in the economically depressed northeastern area of Brazil, which is frequently subject to drought.

The Recife unrest could become Quadros' first confrontation with the subversive potential of pro-Castro forces in the

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country. Castro apparently considers the Brazilian Government, along with those of Ecuador and Mexico, his strongest supporters in the hemisphere to thwart the possibility of OAS joint action against his regime.

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~~SECRET~~South Korean Situation

[In his meeting with American Chargé Green on 9 June, Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui was reticent but revealed strong sensitivity over his past record of Communist association. He said the United States appeared to have "some misunderstanding" about him and attributed this to "certain unsavory Americans" who had spread rumors and made it more difficult for him to achieve the objectives of the revolution.]

[Pak said that the present cabinet was weaker than that under the Chang Myon administration and was limited to carrying out policy as set by the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR). He said decisions were made by the SCNR as a body and not by any single person.]

[Green commented that Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil, director of the Central Intelligence Bureau, is a major power in the regime; Kim was present but did not participate in the discussion with Pak.]

[Kim Chong-pil recommended the appointment of Lt. Gen Kim Chong-o to his present position as army chief of staff. The army chief is reported to have agreed to coordinate future key army personnel assignments and other important matters with the intelligence chief.]

[Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong would be allowed to retain his positions as chairman of the SCNR and chief of cabinet for the time being. Pak Chong-hui flatly refused to become cabinet chief, and the SCNR decided there was no other person suitable for the position. Approximately two thirds of the members of the council reportedly favor making Pak its chairman.]

[The acting minister of defense on 9 June emphasized the danger of indirect Communist invasion through disturbances and irregular warfare. This attempt to link opposition to the regime or counterrevolutionary actions with Communism suggests that opponents of the military junta will be charged with]

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[] antistate activities and subjected to the severe penalties of the National Security Law. []

[] the regime is moving to develop a popular support organization. The provincial governors, who are to meet at Seoul on 12 June, were informed that "strengthening the organization of the people and developing a movement among all people" would be a major agenda item and that proposals for the formation and management of a citizens' organization would be discussed. The governors and the provincial affairs bureau chiefs accompanying them were directed to bring to the meeting administrative plans for May to December.

[] efforts to control students, whose attitudes and possible opposition have been a continuing concern of the military regime. []

[] the arrest of a "considerable number" of high school students who had engaged in antistate activities following the 1960 revolution that ousted Rhee. The arrested students were to be made examples to assure academic discipline and as a warning to students "who blindly followed others." The police, however, were directed to make the arrests outside educational institutions, probably to avoid inciting mass student action. []

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The Director of the Budget

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