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APO 757 US ARMYCI INTERMEDIATE INTERROGATION REPORT (CI-IIR) No 57

Prisoner: Obst/Lt DERNBACH, Friedrich

Leiter III-F Ast ANGERS,  
S France, CO Abw Leit Trupp  
351, and CO FAK 313

DERNBACH was one of the leading men in German counterintelligence in France from the early days of the occupation until the German armies were driven out in August 1944, and after that was active in Western Germany until March 1945. The report presents a fund of information about GIS activities in the West, as observed by him.

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REPORT

When Ast ANGERS was set up after the French collapse in the Summer of 1940, DERNBACH was called from OSLO to become Leiter III-F. In that position he organized III-F activities in the subordinate region (Brittany, Anjou and Normandy West of the Seine) and achieved considerable success in combatting Allied intelligence (particularly that of the British and de GAULLE).

In February 1943, three months after the occupation of unoccupied France, Ast LYON was established to cover this new area. DERNBACH was transferred to LYON to become not only Ast Leiter III-F but also Leiter III-F for all Southern France.

When CATARIS was dismissed in February 1944 the Abw. to prevent absorption by the RSHA, put most III-F personnel in France into Abw Kommandos, Leit Trupps and Trupps. DERNBACH was put in charge of Abw Leit Trupp 351, the successor of III-F Southern France, which carried on the latter's activities with virtually unchanged personnel.

At the time of the German withdrawal from Southern France in August 1944, Abw Leit Trupp 351 was sent to Lorraine. In September it received additional personnel and was converted into FAK 313, with DERNBACH still in command. The operations of this FAK against the Allied Intelligence Services were very ambitious and extensive (as compared to other FAK's). DERNBACH remained CO until 11 Mar 45, when he was arrested and court martialled on spurious charges.

The various annexes of this report provide a detailed account of the organizations with which DERNBACH was most closely connected, and of their relations with other agencies such as the SD, combat units, higher intelligence HQs, etc. The methods and scope of operations are described, as are those cases involving foreign intelligence services which directly or indirectly came to subject's attention.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After some hesitation DERNBACH answered questions freely. His information is considered reliable, although he fails to recall the names of a number of agents. An attempt to contact some of his immediate associates in order to complete the picture was not successful.

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A final report will be issued on DERNBACH which will describe his activities as III-F OSLO and supply administrative details.

MG/JF/

For the Commanding Officer:

*John Heinig*  
JOHN HEINIG  
Capt AUS  
Chief, CI Section

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ANNEX IIII-F ANGERS

Prisoner: DERNBACH, Friedrich

Obst/Lt in Abwehr

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**1. ORGANIZATION**

After the France-German armistice, occupied France was divided into four military administrative districts, in each of which an Ast was set up. District B, comprising Brittany, Anjou and Normandy West of the Seine, was under the command of Gen/Lt NEUMANN-NEURODE, with HQ in ANGERS. In August 1940 Ast ANGERS was established under the command of Korv Kptn WISCHNER. DERNBACH was brought from III-F OSLO to become Leiter III-F ANGERS.

Administratively Ast ANGERS came under the jurisdiction of District B HQ, while operationally it was responsible to Ast PARIS and Abw HQ, BERLIN.

All counterintelligence operations in District B were controlled directly by III-F ANGERS because the two Posts of Ast ANGERS (BREST and NANTES) had no III-F section, although in 1942 a III-F Hilfs Off was assigned to BREST temporarily and the CO of Post NANTES backed up III-F activities to a certain degree.

III-F ANGERS was divided into three sections; registry, card index, and evaluation. Mechanical facilities, such as telephone, teletype, and telegraph, were supplied by the Ast. In the course of time, KW's were established in the following places: ANGERS (1-2), LA BAULE, NANTES (2-3), TOURS, QUIMPER, RENNES, ST MALO-DINARD, LE MANS, PARIS, CHATEAUBRIANT, and BREST.

**2. FUNCTIONS**

The general missions assigned to III-F were as follows:

- a. Discovery and identification of enemy intelligence in District B.
- b. Discovery and identification of enemy intelligence in unoccupied France and Switzerland.
- c. Uncovering of the former French Intelligence Service.
- d. Penetration of enemy intelligence by single and double agents.
- e. Dispatch of agents to England.
- f. Discovery of munitions depots.

In the beginning the executive power was in the hands of the GFP Gruppe subordinate to the Ast. But in June 1942 the SD was given this executive power, leaving the GFP with merely a police role. Under the authority of the Nacht und Nebel Erlass, which permitted the SD to send to Germany all persons whom it deemed of interest to the RSHA, 1200 suspects were removed. In many instances this meant for III-F that contacts with enemy intelligence were broken, cases could neither be pursued nor closed, and the usefulness of any remaining agent connected with the one taken by the SD would be destroyed, because silence from the latter would cause the enemy to become suspicious of all members of the operation involved.

**3. PERSONNEL****a. III-F Ast ANGERS**

DERNBACH, Friedrich, Obst/Lt, CO

BONIN, von, Hptm, Hilfs Off III-F

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Career: Summer 1942 sent to III-F for training.  
Autumn 1942 transferred to OSLO to join his brother-in-law  
Kptn S von BONIN.

ECK, Dr, O/Lt, Hilfs Off III-F (Evaluation)

Career: Author. Autumn 1941 transferred from Ast MUNICH  
to Ast ANGERS. September 1942 returned to MUNICH because  
of illness and advanced age.

HALAMA, Rittm, Hilfs Off III-F (Evaluation)

Career: O/Reg Rdt VIENNA. Summer 1941 was found un-  
qualified and sent to Alst PARIS. Later left Abw.

LEIBROCK, Rittm, Hilfs Off III-F (Evaluation)

Career: Beginning 1942 brought from Ast WIESBADEN to III-F  
ANGERS. Sent back to WIESBADEN middle 1943. Reported to  
have left Abw.

PALKOWSKI, O/Lt, III-F Hilfs Off (Evaluation)

Career: Autumn 1941 transferred from Alst PARIS to III-F  
ANGERS. Found unsuitable and assigned to a Trupp Spring 1942.  
(artificial right leg)

PUSEACK, Hans, Korv Kptn, Leiter Nest NANTES and Hilfs Off III-F

Career: Kptn in merchant marine. Summer 1940 III-M OSLO.  
October 1940 transferred to Ast ANGERS and made Leiter  
Nest NANTES. Summer 1942 Leiter Nest ROUEN and III-F Hilfs  
Off. 1943 Leiter Nest MARSEILLE. Left Abw in July 1944  
because of illness.

REINECKE, Walter, Lt, Hilfs Off III-F

Career: Studien Rat. October 1940 transferred from Wkr  
Kdo VI MUENSTER to ANGERS for III-F training. Was found  
unsuitable and returned spring 1941.

ROESGEN, Hptm, Hilfs Off III-F (Evaluation)

Career: September 1941 transferred from Ast BERLIN to III-F  
ANGERS. Summer 1942 sent to Nest BREST. Later taken by  
Navy as III-M and sent to Corsica.

SCHRADEP, Maj, Ex O III-F ANGERS

b. MK's of III-F ANGERS

BERDUX, Z, Sdf, MK LE MANS and MK CHATEAUBRIAND

Career: End 1941 transferred from Feldkommandantur to Ast  
ANGERS. End 1942 sent to Alst PARIS from where he was de-  
tailed to LINOES. Left Abw 1943.

BUERVENICH @ GILLES, Sdf Uffz, MK NANTES and MK QUIMPER

Career: Employee of tourist agency in COLOGNE. 1939 Sdf  
III-F Ast WIESBADEN. October 1940 transferred to III-F  
Ast ANGERS for duty at MK's NANTES and QUIMPER.

CNYRIEM, Kurt @ FRANCOIS, Sdf Pionier, MK PARIS

Career: September 1939 called to I-L Ast SAARBRUECKEN.

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Middle 1941 transferred by administrative office PARIS to ANGERS, whence he was assigned MK PARIS. February-March 1944 MK MACON. April-May 1944 with Abw Trupp 352 as interpreter and V-Mannfuhrer. Transferred September 1944 to FAT 352 and December 1944 to FAK 307.

FUCHS, Viktor @ RENARD, Fw, MK ST MALO-DINARD and MK LA BAULE

Career: Innkeeper. 1940 transferred from Ast VIENNA to Ast ANGERS. March 1943 sent to Ast LYON as MK 2 LYON. August 1943 shot to death in his room in the Hotel Royal by a double agent.

HARTMANN, Uffz, Interpreter and office help

Career: Teacher. Beginning 1942 assigned to III-F ANGERS. September 1944 transferred to FAT 361 as V-Mannfuhrer.

HUMBER, O/Gefr, driver for subject and helper on the card index

Career: 1941 assigned to III-F ANGERS as driver. February 1943 taken by Maj SCHRADER.

KLOTH VON HEIDENFELD @ DE MONZIE, Fw, MK LE MANS

Career: Autumn 1942 transferred from Ast MUENSTER to III-F Ast ANGERS. During German withdrawal August 1944 became assistant to I-c AOK I. Assigned briefly to FAT 361 and then left for officer training.

KRAUSS, Sdf, MK BREST

Career: Spring 1941 sent from Ast VIENNA to ANGERS. Beginning 1942 sent to Ast ATHENS because it was found he spoke Greek.

MOTSCH, Alois, Fw, driver for subject

Career: September 1939 assigned to III-F Saar as driver. Had duty in ST WENDEL and MANNHEIM. September 1940 sent to III-F ANGERS and stayed with subject until the end. At KREUZNACH in FAK 313 was in charge of the mess.

RAUCH, Dr Siegfried @ RICHARD, O/Fachnr, MK 2 ANGERS and MK TOURS

Career: Lawyer and assessor. October 1940 transferred from Ast WIESBADEN to III-F ANGERS. April 1943 transferred to MK PERPIGNAN. August 1943 MK EVIAN. Lost contact with Abw Leit Trupp 351 during the withdrawal August 1944.

ROESICKE @ RAIMOND, Uffz, MK ST MALO-DINARD

Career: 1941 came to Ast ANGERS as an interpreter and taken by III-F. September 1944 assigned to FAT 361. Fell ill beginning 1945.

SCHIELE, Helmuth @ MEUNIER, Lt, MK 1 ANGERS

Career: Office employee with AO III West SAARBRUECKEN. Worked with III-F Ast WIESBADEN until September 1940 at which time he was sent to ANGERS. February 1943 III-F Ast LYON. February 1944 adjutant of Abw Leit Trupp 351.

SCHMITZ, Charles @ CHARLY, Uffz, MK LA BAULE interpreter

Career: 1940 taken over by III-F ANGERS from GFP in LA BAULE. February 1943 transferred to Ast LYON. February 1944 Abw Leit Trupp 351, and September 1944 FAK 313.

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SCHNEIDER, MK NANTES

Career: Customs official. Taken by III-F Ast ANGERS and sent to MK NANTES as customs official.

SCHROEDER, Fritz, & FREDERIC, Uffz, MK NANTES

Career: Spring 1941 sent from BREMEN to ANGERS. 1943 discharged because of illness.

SPECK, Dr Walter, & WALLIS, Lt, MK RENNES

Career: 1939-1940 V-Mann for III-F Saar. September 1940 sent to ANGERS. Served at MK RENNES until March 1943 when he went to MK CLEEMONT-FERRAND under Ast LYON. Then assigned in turn to Abw Leit Trupp 351 and FAX 313. Beginning 1945 was made deputy CO of FAT 361.

STAUFF, Fw, MK ST MALO-DINARD

Career: 1941 assigned to III-F ANGERS. Found unsuitable and given to GFP as interpreter.

WELLNER, Sold, driver for BUERVENICH

ZANDER & FISCH, Fw, MK 1 ANGERS

Career: Assistant to SCHIELE throughout.

BLAESCHE (female), clerk III-F ANGERS

Career: 1940 transferred from Ast DRESDEN to Abw II RENNES. Came to III ANGERS in 1941 and to III-F LYON in March 1943. Beginning 1944 taken by I LYON and in April 1944 transferred to Ast COPENHAGEN.

KREIS (female), clerk III-F

Career: 1941 transferred from Ast WIESBADEN to III-F Ast ANGERS.

LEONHARD (female), clerk III-F

Career: 1941 transferred from Alst PARIS to ANGERS. 1942 sent to I Alst PARIS.

POPP (female), registry III-F

Career: Beginning 1941 sent from Ast DRESDEN to ANGERS.

RIETH, Charlotte-Louise, secretary to subject

Career: Neo Pillon. Was with subject in 1938 at Ast SAARBRUECKEN. For a short time in 1942 was with Nest STRASBURG, then returned to subject in LYON in June 1943. Now living in SAARBRUECKEN and working for the President du Tribunal Intermediaire de la Sarre.

SCHNEIDER, Elfriede, clerk MK TOURS

Career: Beginning 1941 transferred from Ast DRESDEN to Ast ANGERS. First worked for Hptm KURTH, III-Kgf, then with III-F. Assigned to Dr RAUCH and went with him to MK's TOURS, PERPIGNAN, and EVIAN. Since August 1944 has been missing with Dr RAUCH.

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4. AGENTS

BEAUGE, French. @ GAULLE agent, run by SPECK.

BUX @ BUM, Austrian. Emigrated to France from VIENNA, where he owned a bar. Run by CNYRIEM to observe Austrians in PARIS. Dropped in 1942 because of undependability.

CENNO, German from WORMS. Served in the Foreign Legion. Worked for Obst/Lt FREUND in SAARBRUECKEN. Employed by DERNBACH in ANGERS until 1941 when he was dismissed for drunkenness and assigned to a unit composed of former legionnaires fighting with the Afrika Korps.

GAESSLER @ MARTIN, Alsatian. Run by DERNBACH in AMTSBRUDER case.

GANSTER @ ROBERT, German deserter. Run by SCHIELE in ANGERS.

GEFFROIE, French. Rented cars in ST NAZAIRE. Run by FUCHS at MK LA BAULE.

GUTEKUNST @ FRITZ, German. Run by DERNBACH in ANGERS, but soon discharged for stupidity and excessive sympathy with the Waffen SS.

HEYMANN @ HARRY, German. Run by DERNBACH

KOMLOSI, Hungarian. 1939-1940 worked for III-F Saar as a double agent against the French Intelligence in LILLE. After the collapse of France, it was found in French files that KOMLOSI had been working in their favor, however as many of his reports during the German advance had been important and correct he was not tried as a spy, but was discharged and sent to COLOGNE to work on the railroad.

LEMOINE @ IVAN, French. Run by SCHIELE in ANGERS.

LOUANS, French. Double agent run by DERNBACH in the Atlantik Chef case.

SALIS, von, @ FRITZCHEN, Swiss. Run by CNYRIEM.

STRAMP, Swiss. Had been in fruit importing with GUTEKUNST. In 1941 was sent by DERNBACH to MARSEILLE to start an importing company that would serve as cover for a III-F detachment. GUTEKUNST was to be the courier between ANGERS and MARSEILLE. However STRAMP used the money given him to start the company for his own purposes, and then it was discovered that he was working for the SD in Jewish affairs. He was dropped.

TREISS @ SAIDA, German. Was in the Foreign Legion. 1939-1940 worked for III-F Saar. Was sent on a mission into France by way of Switzerland, but was captured by the French and sent to Africa. He was released after the armistice and sent to work for MK's NANTES and LA BAULE. He drank too much and was sent to the ex-legionnaire unit of the Afrika Korps.

VICTOVIN @ VICTOR, German. Worked in a Rhenish brewery. Mother and siblings were French nationals. 1939-1940 worked as double agent against the French Intelligence for III-F Saar. Although French files revealed that he had not always told the truth to III-F Saar, DERNBACH continued to use him.

@ ALBERT, French. Run by RAUCH at MK TOURS.

@ BUBI, French. Double agent run by DERNBACH.

@ CHARLES, French. Run by SCHIELE.

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- @ FERNAND, French. Run by RAUCH.
- @ GEORGES, French. Commercial salesman in ANGERS. 1941-1942 black market operator. Run by RAUCH.
- @ HECTOR, French. Run by SPECK.
- @ JIMM, French. Salesman in NANTES. Indicted by French for some crime. Run by FUCHS.
- @ LANDSMANN, Belgian. Double agent run by DERNBACH.
- @ MARIUS, French. Employed by ANGERS civil authorities. Run by RAUCH.
- @ ROLAND, Alsatian. Run by SCHIELE. French soldier during the war. Recruited as an agent in 1940 by I ANGERS. Retained by subject's successor at ANGERS.

## 5. OPERATIONS

### a. Foreign Intelligence Services

#### (1) British

In the beginning the British Intelligence sent its agents into France either by land or water. The land route was from Gibraltar through Spain, across the frontier into the unoccupied zone, and then across the line of demarcation into the occupied zone. The water route was from the south coast of England to Brittany or Normandy. The first case of an agent arriving by parachute was not discovered until April or May 1941. The agents were all Frenchmen, members of the de GAULLE faction.

In 1940 and 1941 the chief area of operations was in Brittany, but after subject had uncovered and neutralized several nets of agents, PARIS was made the center of operations. This became manifest when it was discovered that the agents operating in Brittany were taking their orders, not from England, but from a higher agent in PARIS. Activities in the unoccupied zone were also directed from there. Because of this shift by the British Intelligence, the bulk of German counterintelligence activity against it moved from ANGERS to III-F 1st PARIS.

#### (2) French

After the Franco-German armistice, the Deuxieme Bureau was allowed to operate in the unoccupied zone, so long as Germany was not one of its targets. A German Sachbearbeiter was made supervisor of the Bureau to ensure that such did not happen. However, the Sachbearbeiter was usually incapable of maintaining a proper surveillance, and the Deuxieme Bureau had relations with the de GAULLE intelligence (supported by the British) and the GIRAUD intelligence (supported by the US). The centers of activity of the Deuxieme Bureau were LIMOGES, CHATEAUXROUX, CLERMONT-FERRAND, and VICKY.

February 1943, when DERNBACH ended his tenure as Leiter III-F 1st ANGERS, the Maquis and other resistance groups had not yet made their appearance. There were isolated cases of sabotage, such as cutting wires and damaging vehicles, but there was no indication that they were perpetrated by members of an organization. Apart from this, the only incidents of resistance that disturbed the period were a prison break at BREST, during which two guards were killed, and the assassination by Communists of Feld Kommandant Obst/Lt HOTZE of NANTES.

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**(3) Miscellaneous**

In Autumn 1941 an individual was apprehended crossing the line of demarcation near TOURS. He claimed to be a French Lt Col in the Reserve. He carried several sets of identity papers, all with different names but the same picture. Also he was possessed of about 40,000 French francs. He stated that he was a delegate of the VICHY government to the Polish Red Cross in France. He had to make a clandestine line crossing because of the excessive sum of money, which he was taking to his mistress in PARIS. III-F could find no evidence of espionage activity, and not being interested in prosecuting him for false papers and illegal entry, III-F secured the consent of Alst PARIS to turn him over to the VICHY government. Later the latter sent an apology to Alst PARIS.

Throughout subject's tour of duty, enemy airmen shot down over occupied territory were being escorted to the Spanish border for eventual repatriation through Gibraltar. V-Maenner were placed on southbound trains to catch the evaders and their escorts. Six or eight airmen were thus arrested, and in each case the escort was either Belgian or Dutch, therefore the arrestees were sent to Ast BRUSSELS or Ast HAGUE for action.

By February 1943, movements for Free Germany and Free Austria had not yet become manifest in France.

**b. Breton Autonomous Movement**

This movement was sponsored before and during the war by Abw II. III-F ANGERS contacted it for the purpose of recruiting agents. A man named MORELLE, living under German protection, was the representative dealt with. He agreed to establish an agent net and asked for a monthly salary of 100,000 francs. He also stated that he was the only member of the movement with whom III-F could negotiate. After some hesitation, his terms were accepted, but within a month the man was dismissed when it was discovered that he was not recruiting agents but using the money for his personal affairs. No further attempt was made to procure agents from the movement because it degenerated into a mass of small quarreling factions and exhibited extreme undependability. Also it was suspected that various members were working for enemy intelligence. Later the sponsorship of the movement was transferred from Abw II to Dr BEST of the SD.

**c. Captured Explosives Dumps**

In the first half of 1942 III-F captured three explosives dumps, outside of LE MANS, TOURS and RENNES. The LE MANS dump was discovered through the interrogation of an agent caught while committing railway sabotage. The TOURS dump was discovered by a V-man, and it had not as yet been used. Both of these dumps were supplied with explosives hidden by the French army upon demobilization.

The RENNES dump was established by de GAULLE agents from England. SPECK of MK RENNES had discovered a group of agents with two transmitters. He occupied the apartments in which they were found and waited for other members of the group. One night an individual entered, who claimed to be a Canadian officer. However, he turned out to be a Frenchman. He had a suitcase filled with money, false identity papers, a secret camera, secret ink, aerial photographs of ST MALO, BREST and other parts of the Breton coast, and a poison pill. A submarine had brought him from England and surfaced off ST BRIEUC, which he reached in a rubber boat. Through his interrogation the dump outside RENNES was discovered, and it was found to contain large quantities of explosives as well as the best and latest sabotage devices. As Alst PARIS was already working on other aspects of the case, the prisoner was sent there for

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further exploitation.

d. Captured Transmitters

Through V-Mann CENNO's observations of clandestine crossings of the line of demarcation, it was known that an espionage ring existed in SAUMUR. The radio detectors available to III-F at this time, May 1941, were not capable of specific localization. They merely registered W/T activity somewhere in SAUMUR. V-Maenner were directed to determine the exact location, which they discovered by noticing a house with an aerial set up in a peculiar manner. The operator was captured with the code, all technical details, and all the messages sent and received thus far. Interrogation revealed that he had been recruited in PARIS, and that his superiors there communicated with him by messenger. The W/T set was in communication with LONDON. He claimed ignorance of anything further, and his identity papers were authentic. Attempts to turn him were futile, although probably it made no difference because presumably he was blown by being captured in daylight. The operator was tried in PARIS and sentenced to death. It is not known if the sentence was carried out.

V-Mann FERNAND knew of the existence of a transmitter in LE MANS, but he was unable to locate it. A radio detector revealed the approximate location, after which FERNAND, with the help of another V-Mann, ALBERT, found the house. Four persons were arrested, and the operator was receiving a message from LONDON when the arrest took place. The transmitter was a small British set. Some messages and a code of Biblical quotations were found. The operator called himself DURAND and said he had been a W/T operator in the French army. He gave the name (probably false) of the man who had recruited him in PARIS. A messenger, unknown to DURAND, was the link with PARIS. DURAND's papers bore a stamp which was known to be used by the British, so it was assumed that he came from England. Further investigation and contradictions in the testimony led to the belief that the transmitter was fed by de GAULLE agents of the British Intelligence through the Deuxieme Bureau. DURAND refused to be turned and was sentenced to death. He told the executioner that his true name was BLOCH and that he was the son of a lawyer from LYON. This case took place in Autumn 1941.

In early Summer 1942, an operator was caught when he parachuted near LA FLECHE with his transmitter and code. It was impossible to discover the prisoner's accomplices in France or the times and call signals for transmission. It was surmised from the effects of the prisoner and the meager results of interrogation that another person had jumped with him.

In addition to these cases, transmitters were captured in ANGERS, VANNES, LAVAL, and TOURS, making a total of 16. The transmitters which did not communicate with LONDON were of little interest to III-F. It was noticed in 1942 that the majority of transmitters were being operated from the unoccupied zone.

e. Amtsbuder

In January 1941 an Alsatian named GAESSLER appeared at the Feld Kommandantur in NANTES asking for permits to reside and work. He aroused some suspicion and was turned over to III-F for investigation. A brief interrogation confirmed the suspicion that he was an enemy agent, and when he was accused of this, he admitted it and told the following story.

During the war he had been a W/T operator in the French Navy. After the French collapse he left BREST for England in a submarine with his CO and party. He was sent to a camp near LONDON for

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for French refugees. There trained W/T operators were asked to volunteer to return to France. A good number volunteered and were sent to another place near LONDON where they were trained in codes and the manipulation of small sets. During this training period they lived in a good hotel in LONDON and were allowed unlimited freedom of movement. Upon the completion of the course the volunteers were sent singly to receive orders for their missions from a French Capt PASSY. The latter told GAESSLER that he was to go to France by boat with a French officer, who there would give him information to be coded and transmitted to LONDON. He would receive sufficient funds and false papers under the name MARTIN. As a reward he would be made an officer. (GAESSLER declared that he had volunteered to return only in order to be able to reach his bride in SCHLETTSTADT, or at least communicate with her. Later III-F effected a visit to SCHLETTSTADT).

In mid-December 1940 GAESSLER was taken with the French officer to the beach near PLYMOUTH. GAESSLER did not know the true name of the officer, but his cover name was GIRARD. At the beach they boarded a fishing boat which came from an island called De Sein, which landed them near Pointe du Raz, the western extremity of Brittany. The pilot of the boat took them to an old fishing couple near the landing place with whom they stayed for several days. They then proceeded to NANTES via QUIMPER by bus and rail. They evaded the German customs inspectors for fear that the transmitter be discovered. In NANTES GIRARD secured a billet for GAESSLER and then left for PARIS, telling GAESSLER to open communication with LONDON and report their safe arrival.

When asked if he were willing to work for the Germans, GAESSLER replied affirmatively. A W/T playback was possible because GAESSLER knew the times and call signals, although only GIRARD had the emergency code. GAESSLER was told to perform all the tasks ordered by GIRARD and to send the message to LONDON announcing their arrival. Further he was to report regularly to BUERVENICH of MK NANTES. The identity of the other occupants of GAESSLER's apartment was noted.

About 20 January GAESSLER reported that GIRARD had returned from PARIS and was staying at the house of a civil servant in NANTES. GAESSLER had also had communication with LONDON and sent several messages. That night GIRARD and the people in GAESSLER's house were arrested and brought to a large house belonging to Nest NANTES for interrogation. During the arrest GIRARD attempted to escape and received a head wound. He could not be prevailed upon to give much information, but the other arrestees were relatively willing. GIRARD was revealed as a French submarine commander named Comte d'ORVE. Since GAESSLER's house was to be the rendezvous for additional agents coming from England, it was maintained for four or six weeks by III-F to catch them.

The transmitter was taken to ANGERS and installed in III-F rooms. Then a message was sent to LONDON announcing that the transmitter had been moved. This message was worded so as to appear that it had been written by GIRARD. A later message stated that GIRARD had gone on a trip.

A short time later LONDON signaled the name of an operator who was to arrive in February, and asked what color flag the fishing boat would carry. III-F ascertained that the flag had been changed on 1 February from white to yellow, and replied to LONDON accordingly. The German air force and navy were then asked by III-F to watch for the boat's return trip from England. On 17 February the fishing boat was picked up by a patrol ship and brought to BREST. Unfortunately the navy had locked up the crew and the W/T operator without a guard and the transmitter was found broken. They identified the operator by his flattened

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transmitting finger and addressed him by his name. The crew of the fishing boat revealed that they had made two trips before, one with GAESSLER and the other in October or November 1940. This meant that there was a W/T agent operating freely somewhere in Brittany.

Another W/T message from LONDON advised that the fishing boat was to pick up a Dutchman (name forgotten) at the house near Pointe du Raz where GAESSLER and d'ORVE had spent the first few days. That night the house was entered and the Dutchman, the fisherman, his wife, their son, and daughter-in-law were arrested. In the house were found British canned food, espionage material and two zinc containers for transmitters. One of them was GAESSLER's and the other belonged to the agent who had arrived before him. The captured material revealed that there was an alternate landing place at DOUARNENEZ, but this was not known to LONDON and therefore considered harmless. The Germans occupied the house, awaiting any further members of the ring.

At the next transmission period LONDON was informed that the boat bringing the W/T operator had not yet arrived and asked when it could be expected. The reply stated that the boat had left at the appointed time, but had been picked up by the German navy and was now in BREST. Obviously LONDON had received this information from the unapprehended operator who had arrived the previous Autumn.

III-F moved the transmitter again and advised LONDON that this had been done in order to avoid arrest and house search by the Germans. Messages were sent regularly to LONDON containing deception material supplied by III-D Alst PARIS with the approval of the General Staff.

At the end of March a message was sent to LONDON saying that GIRARD had discovered a net of German agents extending from PARIS to Normandy and Brittany. To give credibility to this story, III-F sent deceptive material pertaining to the area through which GIRARD would have traveled to discover such a net. The deception material used was exclusively military information. A few weeks later LONDON advised that in recognition of their excellent work d'ORVE was promoted to Korv Kptn and GAESSLER to Fw.

In the meantime, the Dutchman had given an account of himself. Through the arrangements of PASSY he had come to PARIS by way of Spain and the unoccupied zone in August 1940. His mission was preparatory for that of GIRARD, namely to ascertain conditions in France, particularly sources of money, and to determine who would be willing to work for the Allies. During his stay in PARIS he was given financial assistance by his brother, who had a business there, without the latter's suspecting the nature of his work. In January the Dutchman had met GIRARD in PARIS, according to a rendezvous made before the Dutchman had left England the previous summer. GIRARD had told him to go to the fishing couple and stay with them until called for by the boat. The Dutchman had been embarrassed frequently by lack of money. The only means of communication with LONDON was by letter through the unoccupied zone and Spain. A secret ink known as bird ink had been recommended for this. It is believed that the Dutchman did not write while he was in France.

Another message from LONDON stated that signals were no longer being received from a certain BARLIER. This was undoubtedly the first agent brought by the fishing boat. Presumably his transmitter had become defective. Soon after, BARLIER himself arrived at the British agent house in NANTES, where he was arrested immediately. He had little to tell that was not known already. He had landed the previous autumn near Pointe du Raz, having been brought by fishing boat from England. He had stayed with a

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fishing couple nearby, where he had removed his transmitter from its zinc container, leaving the latter with the fishing couple. He had then proceeded to NIORT and commenced transmission. By prearrangement he had met GIRARD in PARIS in January. In March the transmitter had become defective and he had decided to come to the address in NANTES which GIRARD had given him. He had hidden the transmitter and would not reveal its location. It was presumed to be in NIORT. He would say nothing about messages sent to and received from LONDON. On the whole, he would confess only those things which he saw were already known.

In June 1941 when Germany invaded Russia, GIRARD was ordered to return to LONDON. The instructions included a password and a rendezvous at CONCARNEAU, from where he would be taken to a boat. V-Mann RUDOLF was sent to CONCARNEAU, where he arrested the agent who was to meet GIRARD and found another transmitter. Apparently this operator had notified LONDON that a messenger had arrived from GIRARD, because GAESSLER was then asked by LONDON for elucidation of the matter. A tranquilizing reply was sent. LONDON then asked GIRARD for his exact time of departure as he was to be picked up by a submarine. GAESSLER answered that GIRARD was off on a trip for two or three weeks looking for more money sources and organizing a network in the unoccupied zone.

Three weeks later GAESSLER reported that GIRARD had not yet returned and that he, GAESSLER, was running out of funds. LONDON told him to await the return of GIRARD who had probably been delayed, and get money from him. A week later GAESSLER reported that he had no more money and was promised some immediately. Then from July to November he received money hidden in a book, which was addressed to MARTIN, c/o Postmaster ANGERS. Each payment was 10,000 francs. The transmission of the money indicated that there was another transmitter around, but it was assumed that it had no other connection with the GIRARD net. Nothing was ever ascertained about it, although later it was believed to belong to the Atlantik Chef net.

Another message from LONDON revealed the existence of a person named JEAN who was to go into the unoccupied zone. He was unknown to GAESSLER and never apprehended. Perhaps it was a feint on the part of the British. Since August there had been something not quite right about the communication with LONDON. An important agent had escaped from Alet PARIS who might have had some connection with the GIRARD group and revealed the playback to LONDON.

At the beginning of September GAESSLER was ordered to go to MARSEILLE where he would be contacted on the Cannebiere. He was told to cross the line of demarcation at a certain point near POITIERS, from which it was assumed that enemy intelligence was well organized in the unoccupied zone. However, III-F decided that the playback had been discovered and could be exploited no further. GAESSLER was told to notify LONDON that he was going to his brother in SCHLETTSTADT and gave an address in ANGERS where he would hide the transmitter. Actually he was retained for a while in ANGERS as a V-Mann. Then he was found to be undependable and sent to work in a hotel in VIENNA under the supervision of Ast VIENNA. Later he was reported to have joined the Waffen SS and fought on the Russian front.

f. LANDSMANN

In the Summer of 1941 a suspect named LANDSMANN was arrested at the line of demarcation near MONTBAZON, south of TOURS. His luggage contained a small British transmitter which was assumed by the border police to be a sabotage device. He was sent to ANGERS for interrogation.

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LANDSMANN was Flemish by birth and had been a W/T operator for the French merchant marine. After the armistice, his ship went to LONDON and LANDSMANN was sent to the French refugee camp near LONDON. There he was approached and volunteered to go to France as a W/T operator with a French officer. He was sent to another place for training (from the description apparently not the one to which GAESSLER was sent) and then was taken to PASSY to receive his assignment. He and the French officer, Maurice DUCLOS, were parachuted near PAU in the unoccupied zone. On landing DUCLOS fractured his leg and was arrested by the French gendarmerie. He was released shortly and went to live with a physician outside of PAU. He told LANDSMANN to go to his brother in the Place Vendome in PARIS to receive instructions.

LANDSMANN was turned by III-F and offered to discover and identify the whole net. Unfortunately a W/T playback was impossible because the transmitter had a defective tube and DUCLOS had the regular code, LANDSMANN having only the emergency code, the use of which was the signal to LONDON that the transmission was being controlled by the Germans. LANDSMANN was allowed to keep the money given him by the British in addition to receiving a monthly salary from III-F, with the promise of a bonus for success. To avoid suspicion he continued to get the food coupons supplied by the British. These were supplemented by coupons given him by III-F.

LANDSMANN was installed in PARIS with BUERVENICH of MK NANTES. He contacted DUCLOS' brother in his store in the Place Vendome, and told him, on instructions from III-F that he had been searched without result at the line of demarcation, and that he had entered the occupied zone because his papers were good there. Also he would recross the line only if it could be accomplished clandestinely.

DUCLOS' brother told LANDSMANN that he would procure a new tube for the transmitter from his branch store in MARSEILLE. It took a long time for the tube to arrive, which was favorable for III-F because during the interval LANDSMANN was able to meet a large number of the agents in the group, including one person who had some sort of connection involving armaments with the German administrative staff in PARIS. When this individual was arrested he was found to possess permits to enter factories producing secret items. LANDSMANN was given the job of finding three locations from which to transmit to LONDON. The intention was to move from one location to another after each transmission in order to minimize the chances of detection. LANDSMANN received regular installments of money and food coupons from DUCLOS' brother.

In September 1941 DUCLOS himself arrived in PARIS, bringing the tube with him. He lived with a friend who was his close collaborator as well as being employed in his brother's business. The first message was sent to LONDON by LANDSMANN, but it was given to him in the regular code, to which he did not have the key. In view of the impossibility of determining the contents of the W/T messages, III-F decided to close the case. A mass arrest was made, netting 45-50 persons. DUCLOS and his friend escaped into the unoccupied zone and were never encountered again.

On the day of the arrest LANDSMANN was allowed to flee so that he could discover other members of the ring. One of the agents not arrested immediately gave him the address of a photographer in SAUMUR. This man was arrested and it was discovered that he was the letter box for the transmitter which previously had been captured in SAUMUR. Both in SAUMUR and in PARIS valuable materials and large amounts of money were captured with the agents. An evaluation of the evidence received revealed that the DUCLOS net could be regarded as destroyed.

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LANDSMANN testified at the trial as a witness for the prosecution. Afterwards it was noted that the large amount of money he had received had rendered him unstable and unfit for III-F work. With his wife, whom he had married recently, he was returned to Belgium under the surveillance of Ast BRUSSELS.

g. Atlantik Chef

In September 1941 several V-Maenner of III-F ANGERS and its MK's became aware of an espionage ring in Brittany equipped with transmitters. The SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU were being bombed constantly and accurately in spite of fog, camouflage, and changing locations. At the end of the month V-Mann FRAUSS discovered a transmitter in BREST. During the capture the operator escaped, but his pass, transmitter, call signal and coded messages were obtained. As there was no key it was assumed that he did not decipher himself.

In October with the aid of V-Maenner and radio detectors, another transmitter was discovered in CARHAIX. This arrest was more successful than the one in BREST; it yielded the operator LOUANS, his wife, his brother-in-law, and the latter's wife. LOUANS received messages in clear from PARIS by a messenger who could not be identified. His call signals were the same as those of the BREST transmitter. It became clear that these two sets were part of a larger organization, whose disposition was not known to LOUANS. In transit from CARHAIX, LOUANS' sister-in-law suffered an injury which required hospital care. While in the ward she maintained contact with the organization. This was discovered by intercepted notes and the identification of her visitors as agents. However, no arrests were made because it was considered premature. III-F's strategy was to make no arrests until all members of the ring had been identified.

LOUANS was interrogated repeatedly. He declared that he had not come from England, but had been recruited in France. His identity card gave his occupation as radio specialist. Freedom was promised to himself and his wife if he would consent to work for the Germans and were successful in discovering the members of the organization in QUIMPER, which now was known to be the HQ in Brittany. Finally in January 1942 LOUANS consented to work for the Germans.

An escape from the ANGERS prison was staged, and LOUANS departed for QUIMPER, shadowed by V-Maenner ROLAND and FISCH. By 16 February LOUANS had uncovered the organization. During the night 18 persons were arrested, and the transmitter with all equipment and papers was seized. The V-Maenner also found the address of another transmitter in PARIS. This information was relayed immediately to Alst PARIS with a resulting capture. Alst PARIS had partially discovered the organization but had been unable to locate the transmitter, and was about to institute a W/T playback with a double agent in order to find it. From the messages taken in PARIS it was learned that among the people captured in QUIMPER was the "Atlantik Chef" of the British W/T net. It was also discovered that the British were extremely anxious to find out who had destroyed their other rings.

Further exploitation of the case was transferred to Alst PARIS. LOUANS continued to work for ANGERS for several months and was then discharged because of illness.

h. Dominic I and II

V-Mann ALBERT of MK TOURS was assigned to the penetration of the espionage organization of the Deuxieme Bureau. He and an assistant FERNAND were chosen because they were natives of LE MANS.

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where FROMENT, a known agent of the above organization, was then operating. ALBERT succeeded in contacting FROMENT and was recruited as an agent.

ALBERT's first mission for the Deuxieme Bureau was to report the composition of troop transports passing through LE MANS, their type, strength, armament and destination. Since the trains on which they moved were serviced by Frenchmen, this information was always available to anyone, so ALBERT was allowed to make full reports to FROMENT. Soon, however, a railway sabotage occurred and III-F arrested four agents of FROMENT. Interrogation only revealed that they were working for the latter; they did not know from whom he received his orders nor the identity of his other agents. During the arrest FROMENT disappeared, but was found again by ALBERT in NANTES.

FROMENT then appointed ALBERT courier between NANTES and LIMOGES. MK TOURS aided ALBERT's passages across the line of demarcation. He was required to collect information in Brittany relative to German Air Force installations, troop dispositions, naval craft in Breton ports, and any other information of a military nature that he might find. Deception material for his reports was supplied through Alst PARIS by OB West and Adm France. ALBERT gave his reports to a certain MARCEL, chef of the Deuxieme Bureau in LIMOGES. ALBERT discovered that many members of the local police force were agents of MARCEL. In November 1942, when the Germans took over unoccupied France, MARCEL and his agents departed for Africa. It was never possible to ascertain his true name.

It was further discovered by ALBERT that FROMENT had turned some of the V-Maenners of I-M BREST, among them Helene MURATORE, who had close contact with I-M NANTES, including access to secret files of agents' missions. Through her information, six agents of I-M BREST and NANTES had been arrested in the unoccupied zone. Once in LIMOGES at the Deuxieme Bureau ALBERT had been shown her picture and asked if he had ever seen her in NANTES, to which he replied negatively, and then was told that she was a Deuxieme Bureau agent and the mistress of a German Naval officer in charge of espionage.

The activities of the FROMENT ring were too harmful to the Germans to be allowed to continue, so III-F arrested all those known, about 15, half of whom were later released, the rest remaining in custody. This arrest prevented a W/T operation in NANTES planned by the Deuxieme Bureau LIMOGES, which could then have been exploited by III-F. ALBERT was arrested with the others to preserve his security with the Deuxieme Bureau, but was released after the trial, ostensibly for lack of incriminating evidence. MURATORE was also released in the hope that she would lead to the uncovering of more agents. III-F then sent ALBERT back to LIMOGES to tell the Deuxieme Bureau about the arrest in Brittany. He was now arrested by the Deuxieme Bureau, but released after he had convinced them that he was acting in good faith.

In LIMOGES ALBERT met a Russian called YGOR, a V-Mann of Maj ESCHIG, III-F Ast ST GERMAIN, and a double agent of the Deuxieme Bureau. Through him ALBERT discovered a ring in PARIS, which included YGOR's wife. Maj ESCHIG was also implicated because he was on intimate terms with YGOR's wife. Further penetration of the organization was deemed unnecessary and it was destroyed. Maj ESCHIG was relieved of his duties and sent to the Russian front. Among the documents captured with the PARIS net was a well-informed account of Ast ST GERMAIN and Alst PARIS. There were also plans for an extensive W/T and courier net in Alsace-Lorraine, which would have been controlled from LIMOGES.

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Before the Douxiomo Bureau LIMOGES could give ALBERT another mission, the Germans seized the unoccupied zone and its activities came to an end.

#### 1. CHARLES

CHARLES was a V-Mann of MK 1 ANGERS. Before the war he had been a medical student in his native Alsace. He got into political difficulties with the French government and was sent to a punitive unit in Africa. Later he managed to return to France and married a woman from ANGERS.

In the Summer of 1942 he was given the job of penetrating the de GAULLE intelligence in LONDON for the purpose of discovering the identity of its agents in France not yet neutralized by the Germans. He was to contact the French officer PASSY (who had controlled Amsbruder and LANDSMANN), telling him that he, CHARLES, had been sent by the unapprehended agents for instruction and support, and then he was to agree to return to France as a W/T agent with the request that he be parachuted between ANGERS and NANTES. If the plan succeeded he was to report to that effect through the BBC with a prearranged message. He was also to observe the result of German air raids and political and economic conditions in LONDON.

Dr SPECK of MK RENNES was in touch with de GAULLE sympathizers in Brittany. One of these was a druggist named BEAUGE from ST BRIEUC. At that time this man was planning to go to England with two other persons, but they were having difficulty procuring fuel. SPECK managed a meeting between BEAUGE and CHARLES, who posed as a member of the de GAULLE intelligence ring. CHARLES obtained fuel for the boat and they departed for England. In case of capture by the German navy, CHARLES was to have the officer in charge call III-F ANGERS immediately.

The trip was successful and BBC reported CHARLES' arrival. SPECK was also told of the arrival by BEAUGE's family. Nothing further was heard until the beginning of 1943, when an agent of REILE, III-F Alst PARIS, returned from England with the report that CHARLES had been discovered and made a full confession under interrogation. He was to be sentenced to death.

#### J. Wilhelm Tell

In Summer 1942 an individual @ BUBI was noticed in PARIS spending large amounts of money. Upon investigation it was learned that he was a watchmaker from MORTEMU near the Swiss border who made his fortune by smuggling watches from Switzerland into France. He had a French father and a Rhenish mother. It was also discovered that he worked for the Swiss Intelligence in return for being allowed to smuggle the watches. He reported on the German military situation in France. BUBI agreed to become a double agent if the Germans would not interfere with his smuggling.

His employer in the Swiss Intelligence was a Lt RICHARD stationed at LE LOCLE. The mission given him by III-F ANGERS was to find out for whom RICHARD worked and the identity of his other agents in France. BUBI discovered 12 agents in France, among them a certain OREL, who was a double agent, because he was also a V-Mann of III-F DIJON.

RICHARD then sent BUBI to determine the extent of German fortifications all along the west coast of France. To make his report BUBI was given deception material prepared by OB West and Adm PARIS. The location of this mission led III-F to the belief that British Intelligence was connected with the affair. BUBI was instructed to demand that RICHARD take him to his ultimate employer. The latter acceded

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and took him to a British Intelligence officer at the British consulate in BERN. The British officer gave him additional missions and told BUBI to report on them directly to him.

Toward the end of 1942, BUBI did not return from a trip to Switzerland. It was discovered that he had been turned in by OREL and sentenced to death. With BUBI blown, further exploitation of the Swiss net in France was impossible. The twelve people were arrested and tried in PARIS.

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Prisoner: DERNBACH, Friedrich

Obst/Lt in Abwehr

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**1. ORGANIZATION****a. Development**

Until the seizure of the unoccupied zone in November 1942, German counterintelligence activity there had been carried on by a III-F officer, Obst/Lt HEBLER, attached to the WAKO (Armistice Commission) at BOURGES. He was not responsible to A1st PARIS, but to the Abw detachment at WAKO HQ in WIESBADEN. When the full occupation took place, the former unoccupied zone was put under the jurisdiction of A1st PARIS, which immediately sent detachments to LYON, TOULOUSE, MARSEILLE, LIMOGES, NICE, and PAU. Then in February 1943 an Ast was established in LYON. In referring to this Ast the names LYON and Southern France were used interchangeably because its jurisdiction covered all of France south of the Loire. Thus DERNBACH, who was brought from ANGERS, was known either as Leiter III-F LYON or Leiter III-F Southern France. A small portion of southeastern France, east of the Rhone, was given to Italy for occupation. After the Italian armistice with the Allies, this area was added to Ast LYON.

**b. Subordinate Organizations**

Obst GARTHE, the Astleiter and formerly I-L PARIS, activated Nests in TOULOUSE and MARSEILLE and an Aust in LIMOGES. The III-F sections of these new stations were commanded respectively by Maj SCHNEEBACH, Obst/Lt BLEIBTRETU, and Maj SCHERZ. Personnel transferred from PARIS and ANGERS, together with the people who had been working with HEBLER, made possible the establishment of an extensive III-F network over southern France. MK's were set up under the Ast and Nests in the following places (Aust LIMOGES set up no MK's):

**Ast LYON**

LYON 1 under SCHIELE (from ANGERS)  
 LYON 2 under FUCHS (from ST MALO and LA BAULE)  
 LYON 3 under WILDE (from DIJON)  
 PARIS under CNYRIEN (from PARIS)  
 CLERMONT-FERRAND under SPECK (from RENNES)  
 PERPIGNAN under RAUCH (from TOURS)  
 ST ETIENNE under ECKERT (from ROUEN)  
 VALENCE under SEIBOLD (from PARIS)

**Nest TOULOUSE**

PAU under ZARNACK (from PARIS)

**Nest MARSEILLE**

NICE under PESCHKE (from NICE)  
 MONTPELLIER under GANSAUGE (from MARSEILLE)

After the capitulation of Italy, the following MK's were established in the acquired territory:

EVIAN under RAUCH (from PERPIGNAN)  
 ANNECY under KNEBEL (from BOURGES)  
 GRENOBLE under WILDE (from LYON 3)  
 CHAMBERY under STEINCKE (from Morocco)

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In addition new MK's were set up in the following places:

VILLEFRANCE under ECKERT (replaced in ST ETIENNE by RAUTENSTRAUCH)

PERIGUEUX under HERRMANN (from WIESBADEN)

All the III-F subdivisions were responsible to DERBACH (with the exception of SCHWEIBACH when he was dealing with the Spanish Maj CHAMORRO; in this affair SCHWEIBACH reported directly to REILE in PARIS). The MK's submitted weekly or biweekly reports except in instances when the MK Leiter made a personal trip to HQ.

c. Internal Set-up

III-F in LYON was composed of the following sections:

Administration: took care of personnel matters.

Registry: functioned as a message center.

Evaluation: wrote comprehensive reports on III-F activities in the territory under Ast control.

Card Index: contained names of all persons known to be or suspected of working with enemy intelligence.

File Examination: destroyed dead files and wrote reports on office routine.

Financial matters were handled by the Ast paymaster. Communication facilities were supplied by the Ast. III-F had organic transportation, and each MK had one car.

In administrative and disciplinary matters Ast LYON came under the Southern Military Region. Operationally it was responsible to Ast PARIS. Executive power was retained by the SD.

During the period that the Italians occupied part of France, they maintained two counterintelligence stations; one in NICE under Maj VALENTI and the other in GRENOBLE under Capt Dr BASSI. GARTHE and DERBACH were directed by Obst i G BENTIV GNI, Abt III BERLIN, to establish and maintain good relations with these Italian stations.

2. FUNCTIONS

The principal objectives of III-F Southern France were as follows:

- a. Discovery and identification of enemy intelligence.
- b. Penetration of enemy intelligence.
- c. Neutralization of enemy agents by removal or playback.
- d. Identification of enemy agents in bordering neutral territory.
- e. Discovery of resistance activities.
- f. Collaboration with Italian Intelligence (until August 1943).
- g. Collaboration with Spanish Intelligence.
- h. Special reports to military units.
- i. Observation of VICKY Government officials.
- j. Establishment of an R-Net (Rueckzugs Netz - or net of stay-behind agents).

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**3. PERSONNEL****a. Male**

DEINBACH, Friedrich, Obst/Lt. Leiter III-F LYON.

ARMELER, Rittm. Hilfs Off III-F LYON.

Career: Landrat. Autumn 1943 transferred from Ast WIESBADEN to LYON. Shortly after left Abw because of illness.

BIALKOWSKI, Hptm. Evaluation of resistance groups, III-F LYON.

Career: Autumn 1943 transferred from WIESBADEN to LYON. Two months later became Leiter of an Abw Trupp near ARRAS. And 1944 made Leiter F&T 352.

BLEIBTREU, Obst/Lt. Leiter Nest and III-F MARSEILLE.

Career: 1940 Hilfs Off I-L PARIS. 1941 transferred to III-F PARIS and sent on missions to Normandy. November 1942 sent to MARSEILLE under III-F MAKO BOURGES. February 1943 made Leiter Nest and III-F MARSEILLE. Left Abw in July or August 1943.

BOHNET, Hptm. III-F Hilfs Off Nest TOULOUSE.

Career: February transferred from Ast BORDEAUX to Nest TOULOUSE as III-C and III-F Hilfs Off. Spring 1944 sent to Ast LYON as III-C.

CNYRIE, Kurt & FRANCOIS, Sdf. III-F LYON.

Career: See Annex I.

CZERWIN, O/Gefr Graf. Evaluation section and interpreter.

Career: Official in Foreign Office. Autumn 1943 assigned to Ast LYON as interpreter. Put into evaluation section in which he remained after the conversion of III-F LYON into Abw Leit Trupp 531. Deserted with OHLER during the withdrawal.

ECKERT, & EVANS, O/Fw. MK's ST ETIENNE and VILLEFRANCHE.

Career: 1943 transferred from Nest ROUEN to Ast LYON. MK ST ETIENNE February 1943 to October 1943. MK VILLEFRANCHE October 1943 to August 1944. Then with Abw Leit Trupp 351 and F&T 313. December 1944 fell ill and was sent to a hospital in WIESBADEN.

FAHRENBACH, Maj. III-F Hilfs Off Nest MARSEILLE.

Career: Summer 1943 transferred from Alst PARIS to Ast LYON for duty at MARSEILLE. Upon the activation of Abw Leit Trupp 351 in February 1944 he was appointed deputy commander of Abw Trupp 359. Reported to have been killed during the withdrawal.

FUCHS, Hptm. Expert (Sachbearbeiter) of III-F LYON.

Career: Opera singer. November 1942 sent by Alst PARIS to LYON. Assigned to Ast LYON upon its activation in February 1943.

FUCHS, Viktor & RENARD, Fw. MK 2 LYON, until his assassination August 1943.

Career: See Annex I.

GANSBUE, Uffz. MK MONTPELLIER.

Career: February 1943 assigned to III-F Nest MARSEILLE, which sent him to MK MONTPELLIER to run agents. Upon the formation of Abw Leit Trupp 351 he was sent to MARSEILLE, which then became an MK under Abw Trupp 359. Missing since the withdrawal.

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GRIESSINGER, Hptm. III-F Sachbearbeiter Nest TOULOUSE.

Career: Attorney. III-F Stuttgart. Autumn 1943 sent to Ast LYON for duty at TOULOUSE. Stayed with this detachment, which became Abw Trupp 352 in February 1944 and FAT 357 in September 1944. In November 1944 he was appointed CO of the FAT.

GROSSMANN, Hptm. Administrative officer III-F Ast LYON.

Career: Travel agent in HEIDELBERG. August 1943 transferred from Nest STRASSBURG to Ast LYON. Not used in counterintelligence work. In February 1944 transferred to administrative section of III-H LYON.

GROSSKOPF, & BUBI, Uffz. Evaluation section LYON.

Career: February 1943 transferred from BOURGES to III-F Ast LYON. Worked in the evaluation section of the succeeding Abw Leit Trupp 351 and FAK 313.

HERPMANN, Hptm Dr. III-F Sachbearbeiter Aust LIMOGES.

Career: Deputy prosecuting attorney in SAARBRUECKEN. 1939 Hilfs Off I-L SAARBRUECKEN. 1940 with III-F WIESBADEN. February 1943 transferred to Ast LYON for duty at Aust LIMOGES. August 1943 established MK PERIGUEUX. Left the Abw in August 1944 to become prosecuting attorney in Upper Silesia.

KOEBLINGER, Lt. III-F Sachbearbeiter Nest MARSEILLE.

Career: 1942 with KO Spain. February transferred to Nest MARSEILLE. Summer 1943 exchanged with ECKERT from Nest ROUEN. Later belonged to an Abw Trupp.

KOCH, Maj. Deputy Leiter III-F LYON. Evaluation of resistance groups.

Career: Director of Kolonial Schule in WITZENHAUSEN. February 1943 transferred from III-F DIJON to Ast LYON. February went to Abw Leit Trupp 351, and was temporarily CO of its Trupp 357. September 1944 to November 1944 deputy CO of FAK 313. Then transferred to Dienststelle EHINGER of Amt VI (RSHA).

KOCH, Hptm. III-F Hilfs Off Ast LYON.

Career: Autumn 1943 transferred from Ast STETTIN to III-F LYON. Shortly found unsuitable and returned to STETTIN.

KNEBEL, & KREMER, Uffz. III-F LYON and MK ANNECY.

Career: 1942 transferred from Abw WAKO BOURGON to LYON as assistant to Capt FUCHS. Taken over by Ast LYON in February 1943. Sent to MK ANNECY in August 1943 after the Italian capitulation. Stayed on with FAK 313, FAT 361 and MK BITSCH until January 1945.

MEIER, O/Lt. Card index and files III-F LYON.

Career: Autumn 1943 transferred from Alst PARIS to Ast LYON. Later transferred to staff of Abw Kdo von FEL ANF. Has stiff leg.

NICHELMEIER, Sdf. MK NICE.

Career: 1943 transferred from Alst PARIS to Nest MARSEILLE for duty at NICE. Upon the formation of FAK 313 was sent to its MK Italy, working in MILAN and TURIN.

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MONZ, Christian, & CHRISTIAN, O/Fw Fahnj. Evaluation section of MK 2 LYON.

Career: 1943 transferred from the East to Ast LYON. First was chief of the evaluation section of MK 2 LYON, then transferred successively to III-F Ast LYON, Abw Leit Trupp 351 and FAK 313 in the same capacity.

MOTSCH, Alois, Fw. Driver for DERNBACH.

Career: See Annex I.

NIEM, Hptm Dr. Card index section of III-F LYON.

Career: Dentist. 1941-1942 Trupp Fuehrer of an Abw Trupp in the East under Maj von FREIDMANN. Beginning 1943 transferred to III-C LYON. Autumn 1943 assigned to III-F LYON. Beginning of 1944 sent to Aust LIMOGES, then to Abw Leit Trupp 351. After the withdrawal went to Ast WIESBADEN for a short time and then became a Trupp Fuehrer in FAK 314.

OEHLE, & FRANCIS, Uffz. Leiter MK 3 LYON.

Career: 1943 assistant Leiter III-F at Nest TOULOUS. End of 1943 transferred to LYON to become Leiter MK 3 LYON. During the withdrawal deserted with CZERNIN.

PESCHKE, Sdf. MK NICE.

Career: November 1942, transferred by Abt III-F BERLIN to NICE as III-F representative. After the constitution of Ast LYON, remained as Leiter MK NICE under Nest MARSEILLE. At the end of 1943 returned to BERLIN to work on Polish Intelligence. Beginning of 1944 was doing the same work for Alst PARIS.

PUSBACK, Hans, Korv Kpta. Leiter Nest MARSEILLE.

Career: See Annex I.

RAUCH, Siegfried, & RICHARD. O/Faehnr. MK's EVIAN and PERPIGNAN.

Career: See Annex I.

RAUTENSTRAUCH, & ROBIN, Fw Fahnj. MK ST ETIENNE.

Career: Summer 1943 assigned to III-F Ast LYON from a PW camp. August 1943 to August 1944 was MK ST ETIENNE. Withdrew with Abw Leit Trupp 351 and assigned to FAK 313 as V-Mann Fuehrer. January 1945 put in FAT 357 of FAK 313 in same capacity.

RECKEL, & REINERT, Hptm. MK PERPIGNAN

Career: Autumn 1943 transferred from Alst PARIS to III-F LYON for duty as MK PERPIGNAN. Temporarily with Abw Trupp 359 in July 1944. Withdrew with Abw Leit Trupp 351 and was wounded. Sent to hospital in KARLSRUHE.

RUDOLF, O/Gefr. V-Mann Fuehrer for Aust LIMOGES.

Career: 1943 assigned to LIMOGES. February 1944 taken over by Abw Leit Trupp 351. Then with FAK 313, and in December 1944 became Leiter MK DARM.

SCHMIDT, Helmut, & MEUNIER, Lt. MK 1 LYON.

Career: See Annex I.

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SCHERZ, Maj. Leiter and III-F Aust LIMOGES.

Career: III-F Hilfs Off Alst PARIS. February assigned to Aust LIMOGES under Ast Southern France. Remained Leiter when the Aust became part of Abw Leit Trupp 351. After the withdrawal went to Ast NIESBADEN, and shortly after set up FAT 349 in DARMSTADT which was then assigned to FAK 313. December 1944 transferred to 44th Fuehrer Reserve.

SCHMITZ, Charles, 1 CHARLY, Uffz. Interpreter III-F LYON.

Career: See Annex I.

SCHNEEBACH, Maj. Leiter and III-F Nest TOULOUSE.

Career: November 1942 assigned by Ast BORDAUX to TOULOUSE as III-F representative under WAKO BO RGES. February 1943 became Leiter and III-F of the newly constituted Nest. Beginning 1944 transferred to Ast AREAS. February 1945 transferred to Leit Stelle III Nest.

SEIBOLD, @ MICHEL, Fw Fahnj. MK VALENCE.

Career: Summer 1943 sent from Alst PARIS to III-F LYON, which made him MK VALENCE. Withdrew with Abw Leit Trupp 351 and was assigned to FAT 352 of FAK 313 as V-Mann Fuehrer. October 1944 hospitalized after a motor accident with Hptm von OSTWALDEN.

SPOCK, Walter, @ WALLIS, Lt Dr. MK CLEMONT-FERRAND.

Career: See Annex I.

STEINKE, Uffz. Interpreter for MK CHAMBERY.

Career: With Obst RUDOLF in Morocco under KO Spain. Summer 1943 transferred by Alst PARIS to III-F LYON and sent to MK CHAMBERY. March 1944 transferred to Abw Trupp 359 and MK DRAGUIGNAN. Missing since withdrawal.

VOHREXEL, civilian. III-F assistant at Nest MARSEILLE and MK NICE.

Career: 1943 assigned to BLEIBTREU in MARSEILLE and then to MK NICE. Later assigned to Abw Leit Trupp 351 and FAK 313.

WAPPENHANSCH, Hptm. Sachbearbeiter III-F TOULOUSE.

Career: Beginning 1943 assigned by Alst PARIS to Nest TOULOUSE. End 1943 transferred to MK MONTPELLIER under Nest MARSEILLE, and then member of Abw Trupp 359. Missing since withdrawal.

WEINER, Maj. Deputy Leiter III-F Ast LYON.

Career: Customs official. November 1943 transferred from Abt III-F (West) BERLIN to Ast LYON. Became deputy Leiter and worked on the evaluation of information concerning resistance groups. March 1944 transferred to Abw Trupp 359 as CO with HQ in AIX en Provence. During withdrawal captured near ROMAINS.

WILDS, @ BEINHARD, Fw Dr. MK GRENOBLE.

Career: Lawyer (Dr Jur). Formerly with GFP. 1941 sent to III-F Ast DIJON. November 1942 assigned to assist Hptm FUCHS in LYON. February 1943 became part of III-F Ast LYON. August 1943 assigned to MK GRENOBLE. During the withdrawal did not contact Abw Leit Trupp 351 and was captured. Suspected of desertion.

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ZANDER, @ FISCH, Fw d R. Assistant HK 1 LYON.

Career: See Annex I.

ZAPNACK, Uffz. MK PAU.

Career: February 1943 assigned by Alst PARIS to Nest TOULOUSE and sent to MK PAU as V-Mann Fuehrer. Then with Abw Trupp 352 and PAT 352 in same capacity.

b. Female

BLANSCHE. Clerk in evaluation section of III-F Ast LYON.

Career: See Annex I.

BRANDT, Liselotte. Clerk in administrative section III-F Ast LYON.

Career: Formerly with MO Spain. February 1943 assigned by Alst PARIS to Ast LYON, and continued with Abw Leit Trupp 351 and FAK 313.

FICK. Clerk in registry III-F Ast LYON.

Career: February assigned to Ast LYON. During withdrawal sent to Ast WIESBADEN.

HUSSER. Clerk for DERNBACH III-F Ast LYON.

Career: February 1943 transferred from I-L Alst PARIS to LYON. During withdrawal sent to Ast WIESBADEN. Later worked for Commandatura in MAGDEBURG.

JOERG. Clerk in evaluation section of III-F Ast LYON.

Career: February 1943 transferred from I-L Alst PARIS to LYON. Then with Abw Leit Trupp 351 and FAK 313.

KAISER. Chief of registry III-F Ast LYON.

Career: February 1943 transferred from Ast KASSEL via Alst PARIS to Ast LYON. February 1944 transferred to a FAK in Northern Italy.

RIETH, Charlotte-Luise. Secretary to DERNBACH.

Career: See Annex I.

SCHNEIDER, Elfriede. Secretary to RAUCH at MK EVIAN.

Career: See Annex I.

SCHNEIDER. Secretary to NIE in LYON and LIMOGES.

Career: February 1943 transferred by Alst PARIS to Ast LYON and put in III-C, where she became secretary to NIER. Went with him to III-F LYON, Aust LI OGES and Abw Leit Trupp 351. After the withdrawal was not employed by FAK 313.

4. AGENTS

@ ALFREDO, Italian. Run by HONE, MK 2 LYON. Watched Italians in LYON after the armistice, especially members of neofascist groups.

@ ANDRE, French. Run by CHYRIE of MK PARIS. Killed by the enemy.

BERGER & LOUIS, Hungarian Jew. Run by DEENBACH against the wishes of the SD.

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@ BORIS, French (Russian emigre). Run by CNYRIEM in PARIS. Observed Russian circles in PARIS.

@ CHARLES-LOUIS, French. Run by BAUTENSTRAUCH of MK ST ETIENNE.

von FALSFEIN @ FELDBERG, Swiss. Run by PESCHKE nad MICHELMAYER in NICE. Formerly had worked for Obst ROHLEDER of Abt III-F BERLIN. He was related to PESCHKE.

GANSTER @ ROBERT, German. Run by SCHIELE of MK 1 LYON. Expatriate in France since 1924. Did not go along with 351 during the withdrawal.

@ HECTOR, French. Run by SPECK of MK CLEF-MONT-FERRAND.

HEYMANN @ HARRY @ HERMANN, German Jew. Run by DERNBACH. He was used to establish contacts.

LUXAS @ IMAN, French. Run by FUCHS of MK 2 LYON whom he shot.

@ MAX, French. Run by ECKERT of MK VILLEFRANCHE.

@ PAULA, French. Run by MONZ of MK 2 LYON. She was a clerk with the PPF.

RONNSPERG, Austrian emigre. Run by DERNBACH. He had been active for Otto von HAPSBURG. Sought by SD. DERNBACH had him look for enemy intelligence connections with the French government and the Maquis.

von SALIS @ FRITZCHEN, Swiss. (female). Run by DERNBACH.

von SAURMA-JELTSCH @ MONOKEL, German. Run by DERNBACH in PARIS. Former German officer; dismissed because of Jewish wife. Rittm von PESCATORE of Abt III-F BERLIN asked DERNBACH to use him. Observed conduct of Germans in PARIS (nightclubs, theaters, etc.).

@ TANIA, French (Russian emigre). Run by CNYRIEM, MK PARIS. Wife of RUPIS.

**5. OPERATIONS****a. Collaboration with French, Spanish and Italian Intelligence**

Collaboration between III-F Southern France and what remained of the French intelligence was forbidden by BERLIN on the grounds that it would bring III-F into the political field and jeopardize the security of operations. Despite this, REILE in PARIS desired and recommended that DERNBACH deal with the PPF, DORIOT's party, but DERNBACH refused because the PPF was already working with the SD. A liaison was maintained with the PPF to observe its activities, however. There were three Frenchmen viewed with suspicion by III-F: MENESTREL and JEANTET of the VICHY government; and the Chef de Milice, TOULOUSE.

Collaboration with Spanish Intelligence was restricted to dealings between the III-F officer at Nest TOULOUSE (first SCHWERSACH then WEBER von OSTWALDEN) and Maj CHAMORRO. The latter had been sent by Spanish Intelligence to determine the activities of Spanish Republicans in Southern France. TOULOUSE reported directly to PARIS on the affair, so DERNBACH is unaware of the information gleaned.

Between February 1943, when Ast LYON was set up after the full occupation of France, and August 1943, when Italy surrendered to the Allies, the Italian Intelligence maintained Maj VALENTI at NICE and Capt BASSI at GRENOBLE. Relations with these two officers were friendly, although the Italians were reticent in the reports transmitted, whereas III-F relayed comprehensively all information pertaining to cases in the Italian zone. The two Italians would have no dealings with the SD. The cases usually were not worked properly by the Italians, they were allowed to lapse until they could be closed for lack of tactical or strategic value. DERNBACH believes that VALENTI and BASSI were following a policy

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of gentle sabotage in order to hasten the end of the war. After the Italian armistice, VALENTI went over to BADOGLIO, and BASSI rejoined his unit. An assistant of BASSI, the consular secretary in ANNECY, is reported to have seized all the Abw files available and taken them to Switzerland where he sold them to an enemy intelligence service.

**b. Belgian Transmitters**

In March-April 1943 three transmitters were discovered being operated by Belgian Intelligence, which had grown strong in Haute Savoie. It had been noticed that suspicious persons were moving in the vicinity of GRENOBLE and VOIRON. As this was Italian territory, BASSI was requested to grant permission to investigate. This he did. With the aid of radio detectors, a transmitter was located in VOIRON. A W/T operator and four others were arrested. Code, instructions and a British W/T set were captured. The operator was turned after the first interrogation and delivered to BASSI. By order of Gen AKE in ROME, the playback was conducted from TURIN. Later BASSI said that an additional one was being worked from SUSA. Information from the interrogation led to the discovery of three persons in LYON connected with the ring, and two transmitters in GRENOBLE. The French police permitted one of the operators to escape, and turned the other one over to BASSI. Further exploitation of the case was done through ROME and BRUSSELS.

**c. Legion GIRAUD**

In May 1943 an agent of MK 2 LYON, without revealing his identity, contacted a man called NEUMANN who had fled from Germany to escape prosecution for Communist activities. NEUMANN was a member of a subversive organization known as the Legion GIRAUD. It was headed by a French Lt Col who was never apprehended nor identified. The organization was dedicated to shooting leading French industrialists guilty of collaboration with the Germans and to the liquidation of high-ranking Germans in LYON. As the Legion had shot several of its members for having worked with the SD, it was deemed dangerous and implacable. Therefore immediate action was taken in order to prevent the planned assassinations.

When the Germans learned of a planned meeting with an Allied agent, they appeared and arrested NEUMANN. The Allied agent escaped during the arrest. Under interrogation NEUMANN stated that he was a native of HAMBURG and had been a leading Communist in Germany prior to 1933. He had left the country because he had committed "political and criminal acts", and was being sought by the Germans. He admitted that the Legion GIRAUD was going to carry out the above-mentioned terrorism. He identified about 20 members of the Legion, who were arrested and sent to Germany. The material found was incriminating, but indicated objectives limited to assassination, probably because the organization was in its infancy.

**d. von SALIS**

In Spring 1943 DERNBACH was introduced by CHYRIEM to a relative of his, von SALIS @ FRITZCHEN, daughter of a Swiss colonel. They were living in STRASBOURG with very little money, and the girl proclaimed herself ready to work for the Germans. She was given the mission of penetrating enemy intelligence (particularly British) in Switzerland and of receiving missions from them against Germany. She was also to observe the activity of a French Intelligence officer named GROUSSARD. She was given cover as representative of a fancy ware firm in FRANKFURT owned by MEIER (himself a W-Mann of I-M Ast WIESBADEN, Maj JERNEWEIN).

Several months later she returned with no results. Early in 1944 it was learned that she was in Bohemia, a trip that had been made without the knowledge of III-F LYON, and she was suspected of being an enemy agent. An interrogation was planned for the next meeting with her, but she was never seen again.

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**e. Italian Colonel**

In Summer 1943 III-F LYON received from BERLIN a copy of a report destined for the British, but captured by Spanish Intelligence. The report was on German troops and fortifications in Southern France, and revealed its source as an Italian colonel, CO of MONTEILMAR/Rhone. BERLIN ordered that the matter was to be handled in conjunction with Maj VALENTI of NICE and Lt Col DURAND, G-2 of the Italian Fourth Army, HQ MENTON. The latter had participated with the Germans in maneuvers at GIESSEN, but was not fond of them. DURAND took over the affair, and promised that the culprit would be dealt with according to regulations. III-F LYON heard that the agent was identified and transferred to Italy, but his name, unit, and all information relating to the trial and its findings were never divulged by the Italians.

**f. FUCHS**

Pw FUCHS @ RENARD was MK 2 LYON. In August 1943 he was shot to death in his room in the Hotel Royal. His typewriter, money, food coupons, and German and French identity papers were missing. The investigations of V-Maenner led to the discovery of the missing items in the house of a leading French Communist in LYON. Here several persons were arrested. Their interrogation revealed that the assassin was LUKAS G IMAN, a V-Mann of FUCHS, but never registered with III-F. LUKAS and his son belonged to the Maquis. Captured documents revealed that Fuchs himself had penetrated the Maquis, and discovered that they had plans of the house occupied by Leiter III-F for the purpose of dynamiting it. DEENBACH's name was not mentioned in the paper. According to an SD report, LUKAS was later killed during an SD operation in VERCORS.

As to FUCHS, it was presumed that the Maquis killed him as a double agent. Three days after his death, the BBC broadcast: "Le renard est mort".

**g. COTONI**

COTONI was a special commissioner of the French Surete in MARSEILLE and NICE. During the unoccupied period, German reports showed that COTONI was constantly active in the clandestine operations of the Deuxieme Bureau. When Southern France was occupied, COTONI went to Switzerland, where MK NICE repeatedly noticed his activities, but it proved impossible either to penetrate him or destroy his contacts with the Riviera. It could not be determined whether he was working for GIRAUD or de GAULLE.

After the Italian armistice in August 1943, COTONI was reported to be in Corsica. After that time nothing of importance was heard of him.

**h. RIQUET and DUNGLER**

In October 1943 V-Mann HECTOR, working for SPECK MK CLEMONT-FERRAND, reported that a friend of his from LYON had approached him to assist in building up an espionage ring. This man was known as RIQUET. SPECK told HECTOR to play along with RIQUET and to do nothing to arouse his suspicions. RIQUET informed HECTOR that other members of the organization were in LYON and VICHY, and that he was going to recruit more on the Riviera. In December RIQUET said that a visitor would come shortly to HECTOR with some items for safekeeping. Early in January 1944, a Frenchman appeared and gave HECTOR 21 quartz crystals and a radio code, which the latter was to keep until they were called for. The Frenchman said that he had just parachuted with a French captain (later identified as DUNGLER), who had injured himself on landing and was now proceeding slowly to LYON. The man announced that he had to go to VICHY for further instructions, and would then return to collect the code and quartzes. This he did.

III-F LYON had been informed of the affair and now directed that the code be copied in preparation for a penetration of the W/T net that would be set up. HECTOR had identified several members of the ring in

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CLERMONT-FERRAND and LYON, but none in VICHY or the South because RIQUET maintained contacts there personally. No arrests were made at this time. HECTOR was instructed by III-F to keep the confidence of RIQUET and to not appear overcurious as to the extent of the organization and the full scope of its activities. It was hoped that this information would come to HECTOR in bits and pieces over a period of time.

Also in January 1944 GARTHE, Leiter Ast LYON, informed III-F that Korv Kptn UNDERBERG & GIBHARDT, Leiter I LYON, and Rittm BUCHHOLZ, Leiter I NICE, had established connections with the GIRAUD Intelligence. BUCHHOLZ had been approached by Comte de FAUCOMBERGE, JEANTET of the VICHY government, and ESMIOL, who owned a bistro in NICE, with the information that they were in contact with US and British Intelligence in Africa. The latter desired it to be known that their governments were ready to talk to responsible German military authorities about a cessation of hostilities. It was stated expressly that the German Foreign Office and the SD must be excluded from the negotiations. BUCHHOLZ gathered that Gen WILSON and Mr MURPHY were the African sponsors. The GIRAUD delegation wanted to arrange through BUCHHOLZ the passage of Allied representatives to France and German officers to Africa in order to carry on conversations with higher authorities on both sides.

By the time III-F had been informed of the matter, ESMIOL had already installed a transmitter in BUCHHOLZ' villa and opened communication with Africa, and the basis for the peace talks had been determined as evacuation of France, including Alsace-Lorraine, and a return to the European status quo of August 1939. Also the affair had been reported to HANSEN and KEITEL, and the latter had directed that the situation be exploited.

III-F LYON expressed its displeasure at having been called in so late, especially as a transmitter was involved. It also drew attention to the oddness of the enemy contacting so low-ranking an officer as BUCHHOLZ on a matter of the highest policy. Upon the suggestion of III-F, a conference was held by HANSEN, DERNBACH, UNDERBERG and BUCHHOLZ, and the decision was reached to continue negotiations in order to determine the intentions of the enemy.

The following month, February, GARTHE informed DERNBACH that a GIRAUD representative had arrived in NICE, as well as a French Lt Col. III-F identified the latter as a member of the GIRAUD Intelligence who had evaded capture in GRENOBLE. The former was the French Capt DUNGLER who had parachuted four weeks earlier. Thus a connection was established between the W/T net of RIQUET and the armistice negotiations, now called the Nice peace feeler (Friedens Fuehler Nizza).

Later in February, KEITEL directed that the matter be turned over to the SD. However, Alst PARIS objected to this, and a compromise was reached whereby the responsibility was given to SD LYON and the execution to III-F LYON. Dr KNAAB, SD Leiter LYON, was briefed on the affair by DERNBACH, but the latter did not tell him of the RIQUET connection or of the GIRAUD Lt Col. He wanted to make a full penetration of the W/T net and was afraid that if the SD knew of it, they would arrest the operators prematurely. Another conference was convened on 20 February, composed of DERNBACH, UNDERBERG, BUCHHOLZ, KNAAB, FAUCOMBERGE, JEANTET, ESMIOL and DUNGLER. KNAAB posed as a German army officer from BERLIN. The Frenchmen explained that DUNGLER was the official spokesman of GIRAUD for the peace negotiations. He was an Alsatian industrialist and was to be made Governor of Alsace should the matter come to a successful conclusion.

In the meantime, DERNBACH had ordered MICHELMANIER, MK NICE, to shadow DUNGLER and ESMIOL. This led to the discovery that DUNGLER had changed his quarters twice, and that the house next to ESMIOL contained four British transmitters, which were left in place. The next day they had been removed. The SD was not informed of this investigation.

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The day after the conference, KNAAB announced that he had to arrest DUNGLER (presumably on orders from Dr KNOCKER, SD Leiter PARIS). DEENBACH could not prevent this, and DUNGLER was taken to PARIS and put in charge of Stubaf SCHMITT, and, according to KNAAB, a political penetration operation was started.

Further investigation, with the aid of ESMIOL's call signals and the reports of long range radio detectors, revealed that four messages had been sent to Africa without the knowledge of BUCHHOLZ. DEENBACH suspected that enemy intelligence was aware of his knowledge of the RIQUET net because the code copied by HECTOR was not found in any monitored messages. Therefore he arrested the people identified by HECTOR in CLERMONT-FERRAND and LYON and captured two or three transmitters. The 21 quartz crystals were not recovered. But it was established that DUNGLER had brought the transmitter in BUCHHOLZ' villa from LYON.

FAUCOMBERGE, ESMIOL, JEANTET and the GIRAUD Lt Col were not arrested. They were kept under surveillance in the hope that they would lead to further members of the organization, and especially to the four transmitters that had disappeared in NICE. However, nothing came to light by August 1944, and the withdrawal prevented any future clarification.

i. MICKLEY

In October 1943 a V-Mann reported to Alst PARIS that some enemy intelligence service was attempting to obtain the teletype code used by a Luftwaffe Signal unit stationed near LYON. The report was sent to III-F LYON for action. The unit was identified and its CO called in for consultation. It was decided to keep special watch over the code, subject all personnel to a daily personal inspection, and replace the monthly lecture on espionage with one on treason and its consequences.

At the beginning of December 1943, the Luftwaffe CO came to LYON bringing one of his W/T operators called MICKLEY. Under interrogation by III-F this man confessed that he was employed by some enemy organization to obtain secret material from the Luftwaffe, for which he was offered large sums of money. Two Russians employed by the unit were his accomplices. His records revealed that he had a previous conviction for which he had not been punished. III-F promised to waive the punishment if MICKLEY would help them to uncover the agency employing him. MICKLEY agreed to this.

Subsequent interrogations revealed that MICKLEY was not telling the truth, but he was allowed to believe that he was not viewed with suspicion. Surveillance of MICKLEY was maintained until he was observed to enter a bistro in LYON, where he received money and a camera. The next day he and the two Russians were arrested. The confession stated that they had all been recruited by Frenchmen and had agreed to photograph the code. MICKLEY had already received 15-20,000 francs. The names and residences of the Frenchmen were not known, so it was impossible to proceed further. The three prisoners were sent to PARIS for trial. III-F definitely considered the employing agency to be the US Intelligence.

j. Russian Transmitter

In Autumn 1943 a V-Mann of HK 1 LYON reported that he suspected the existence of a spy ring in RIVE DE GIER, small and equipped with a transmitter. With a radio detector, the house was discovered and the messages monitored. It was determined that the set was communicating neither with LONDON nor Africa, and from the call signals it was suspected that the transmitter was Russian.

During a subsequent transmission the house was entered and two women captured. Their identity could not be established, and the transmitter was found only after a long search. It was built into a large radio cabinet. The code and messages were discovered and confirmed the suspicion that the station belonged to Russian Intelligence. A standing

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order of Alst PARIS directed that all Russian agents be sent to PARIS immediately without preliminary interrogation. The order was observed and the women were sent off at once.

DERNBACH assumed that the transmitter was part of Rote Kapelle, classified Top Secret by the Germans. He knew that it was handled by a Sonder Kommando of the RSHA because of its political connotations. (In 1944 a Sachbearbeiter from this Kommando and Geifr. Dr LENZ from WNV Fu were in NICE working on some aspect of Rote Kapelle. They lived in the Villa Chanel.)

k. Croatian Mutiny

In Autumn 1943 a Croatian Waffen SS Legion was stationed in and around MILLAU (north of BEZIERS). This Legion as well as the police regiments stationed in the South of France received orders directly from HIMMLER through Pol Gen OBERG.

III-F TOULOUSE observed that there was discontent in the Legion and that several of its members had contacted the French Resistance. This report was sent to Alst PARIS. Soon a mutiny occurred in the Legion and the German SS officers were shot. Through the intercession of the Croatian chaplain and a doctor, the mutiny was prevented from spreading. 40-60 Croats deserted to the Resistance, taking with them many weapons and the Legion's treasury. III-F TOULOUSE discovered that the mutiny was connected with a movement known as Kwaternik. On the insistence of Alst LYON, the Legion was transferred to the East.

l. Blindenheim

In November 1943 it was observed that a great many persons were entering and leaving the Home for the Blind in LYON. As none of them could be identified, the time was deemed premature for a raid. Finally a courier with documents was seen to enter, and the place was raided by III-F. The director of the Home escaped, but five or six persons were arrested, and a large transmitter and espionage data were seized. Interrogations conducted by the SD revealed the names of a great many more, but they had all fled.

An evaluation of the captured material disclosed the fact that the Home was a central HQ for the de GAULLE Intelligence. It was the collecting point for reports and was in communication with a W/T HQ. In addition it was used by agents of the British and Polish Intelligence. After III-F had exploited the material in Southern France, it was sent to Alst PARIS, who used it to discover and destroy rings in other parts of France.

m. Swiss Consul

In Winter 1943, V-Maenner reported that MEYER, the Swiss Consul in LYON, was in contact with the Maquis, who were being supplied with weapons and sabotage material by the RAF. It was further observed that he was often seen driving at night in areas where containers were, or had been, dropped. The German military authorities were advised of the consul's conduct and warned to treat him with reserve. At the same time Alst PARIS was asked to effect his recall. This did not occur, either because the German Embassy in PARIS would not cooperate or because the Swiss Foreign Office refused to be intimidated. MEYER was kept under surveillance, but it was never discovered who were his contacts in the Maquis, nor how he learned of the time and place for the RAF deliveries.

n. Captured Transmitters

Before the occupation of Southern France, 75-80 enemy transmitters had been identified in the unoccupied zone, the majority of them being in LYON, with 40-45, MARSEILLE and TOULOUSE. During DERNBACH's tour of duty in Southern France, from February 1943 to August 1944, the gross number

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was reduced, because it was not so easy to establish them with the Germans occupying, and of these about 50 were either captured or rendered inoperative. In the latter part of this period it became more difficult to locate the transmitters, because the agents had become aware of the positions of the German radio detectors and kept away from them, and because armed men were put with the operators to offer resistance to the arresting agency in order to give the operator time to escape with the transmitter. Also the enemy began to use silent transmitters (Schweig Sender) and ultra short wave transmitters, which could not be monitored by the available radio detectors. It was known that these sets were being used to some extent, but only one was captured (on the coast of Normandy) and it was sent to Alst PARIS.

o. Polish Intelligence

In November 1943 III-F LYON received orders to penetrate the Polish Intelligence, which was strongly active in Southern France. All information discovered was to be transmitted immediately to PARIS and BERLIN. The executive power was given to Sonder Kommando Jersey of the RSHA. The radio detectors were to give priority to Polish W/T lines, especially line 6003. Sdf PESCHKE was ordered from NK NICS to BERLIN to work on the evaluation of Polish Intelligence.

A V-Mann of SCHIELE, NK 1 LYON, made contact with a Polish agent near GRENOBLE and gave him a Polish code which had been obtained by the Spanish Intelligence and sent to BERLIN. The V-Mann pretended that he had brought it from WARSAW via Spain. This code was then used by the Polish net in Southern France, thus permitting the Germans to decipher intercepted or captured messages. It was discovered that the Polish HQ in Southern France was somewhere between GRENOBLE and MARSEILLE, and the chief was probably an officer called ZICHON (formerly a manager of commercial expositions in DAFZIG and POSEN). Several key members of the Polish Red Cross were arrested when it was discovered that that organization was supplying Polish prisoners in France with the means of escape and assigning them intelligence missions.

In Spring 1944, III-F was instructed to arrest all Polish agents already identified. Of these there were a great number, including the operators of two W/T lines (neither was 6003). Among the arrestees were a PRVAUX and his wife. (He had been the French naval attache in BERLIN before the war.) Letters from RIBBENTROPP and CANARIS dated as late as 1942 were found in his possession. The prisoners, with all documents captured, were sent to PARIS, from where the case was continued.

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Prisoner: DEBNBACH, Friedrich

Obst/Lt in Abwehr

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**1. ORGANIZATION**

The reorganization of the Abw which began in February 1944 with the dismissal of CANARIS was felt immediately in France, although it was not completed in BERLIN until July. 1st PARIS and the subordinate Asts were converted into two Abw Kommandos with four to six Trupps and two Abw Leit Trupps with one or two Trupps. The senior Kommando was called Abw Kdo REILE, named after the CO, and carried on the functions of 1st PARIS, thus retaining command over all Abw activities in France. The command in BERLIN was transferred from Amt Abw to I-c Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab. Militarily Kdo REILE and its subject units were under I-c OB West. In practice the conversion created very little change because the personnel, locations and activities remained the same.

III-F Southern France became Abw Leit Trupp 351 with two subordinate Trupps, 352 and 359. 351 was made up of personnel from HQ III-F LYON and from III-F Aust LIMOGES. III-F Nest TOULOUSE became Abw Trupp 352, and III-F Nest MARSEILLE became Abw Trupp 359, moving its HQ to AIX en Provence. Abw Leit Trupp 351 retained all the MK's of III-F LYON and established two new ones, LIMOGES and PERIGUEUX. MK PAU of Nest TOULOUSE was given up. MK NICE of Nest MARSEILLE was put under 351. Trupp 359 also relinquished all its other previous MK's except MONTPELLIER, and established two new ones, MARSEILLE and DRAGUIGNAN. Among the personnel changes, SCHNEEBACH was sent from TOULOUSE to ARRAS, WEBER von OSTALDEN from PARIS to 352, ZARNACK from PAU to 352, OEHLE from TOULOUSE to 351, CNYRIEM from PARIS to 352, WERNER from LYON to 359 as CO, GANSAUGE to MK MARSEILLE, WAPPENHENSCH to MK MONTPELLIER, STEINKE to MK DRAGUIGNAN, and BURRIANN to MK PERIGUEUX.

**2. FUNCTIONS**

The functions of III-F Ast LYON were continued by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and its Trupps. Liaison was maintained with Maj SARACCO in TURIN, a member of the remnant of the Italian Intelligence which had not gone over to SADOGLIO. Abw Trupp 352 dealt with Maj CHAMORRO and reported directly to Kdo REILE. 351 was charged with the establishment of an R-Net, but this proved impossible because there was a deficiency of transmitters and agents. All agents now either wanted to go to Germany or remain in France and sever all connections with German Intelligence.

The executive power was still held by the SD, which resulted in the usual ill-feeling, especially as the Sd had greatly enlarged its forces in Southern France; they now had Dienst Stellen in LYON, VICHY, CLERMONT-FERRAND, ST ETIENNE, LIMOGES, PERPIGNAN, NICE, TOULOUSE, CARCASSONNE, MARSEILLE, MONTPELLIER, AVIGNON, TOULON and one at the Spanish frontier.

The Trupp were also charged with reporting anything of interest to the local military commanders.

**3. PERSONNEL****a. Mele**

DERNBACH, Friedrich, Obst/Lt. CO, Abw Leit Trupp 351.

BENDER, & ROEBI. MK PARIS.

Career: Was V-Mann of I-L PARIS. Summer 1943 assigned as assistant to CNYRIEM at Ast LYON's MK PARIS. February 1944 became Leiter MK PARIS when CNYRIEM went to Trupp 352. During withdrawal failed to contact Abw Leit Trupp 351 and joined Consul WÖRDLING in PARIS.

CNYRIEM, Kurt & FRANCOIS, Sdf. V-Mann Fuehrer for Trupp 352.

Career: See Annex I.

CZERWIK, O/Gefr Graf. Worked in evaluation section of Leit Trupp 351.

Career: See Annex II.

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DIETRICH, Uffz. Driver for Leit Trupp 352.

Career: Driver with Ast BORDEAUX and Nest TOULOUSE. End of 1943 transferred to III-F LYON and taken into 352 February 1944.

BOCKERT, & EVANS, O/Fw Fahnj. MK VILLEFRANCHE.

Career: See Annex II.

FAHRENHEIM, Maj. Deputy CO of Trupp 359.

Career: See Annex II.

GANSAUGE, Uffz. MK MARSEILLE.

Career: See Annex II.

GRIESINGER, Hptm. Deputy CO of Trupp 352.

Career: See Annex II.

GROSSKOPF, & EUBI, Uffz. Worked in evaluation section of Leit Trupp 351.

Career: See Annex II.

HERRMANN, Hptm Dr. MK PERIGUEUX.

Career: See Annex II.

IMIOLZIK. W/T operator in Trupp 352.

Career: February 1944 assigned to Trupp 352. September 1944 transferred to FAT 352 as W/T operator.

KNABE, Fw. Sgt/Maj of Trupp 352.

Career: Was with Nest TOULOUSE. February 1944 assigned to Trupp 352. September 1944 transferred to FAT 352 as Sgt/Maj.

KNEBEL, & KLEBER, Uffz. MK ANNECY.

Career: See Annex II.

KOCK, Maj. Deputy CO of Leit Trupp 351.

Career: See Annex II.

MEHL, O/Gefr. Driver and orderly for DERNBACH.

Career: February 1944 assigned to Leit Trupp 351. September 1944 transferred to FAK 313.

MICHELMEIER, Sdf. MK NICE.

Career: See Annex II.

MONZ, Christian, & CHRISTIAN, O/Fw Fahnj. MK LYON.

Career: See Annex II.

MOTSCH, Alois, Fw. Driver for DERNBACH.

Career: See Annex I.

NIEB, Hptm Dr. MK LIMOGES.

Career: See Annex II.

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OEHLER, @ FRANCIS, Uffz. MK 3 LYON.

Career: See Annex II.

RAUCH, Siegfried, @ RICHARD, O/Fuehrer. MK EVIAN.

Career: See Annex I.

RAUTENSTRAUCH, @ ROBIN, Fw Fahnj. MK ST ETIENNE.

Career: See Annex II.

RECKEL, @ REINERT, Hptm. MK PERPIGNAN.

Career: See Annex II.

RINKOWITZ, Uffz. Finance clerk for Leit Trupp 351.

Career: Worked for Ast LYON. February 1944 assigned to 351. September 1944 transferred to FAK 313, and February 1945 to FAT 349.

RUDOLF, O/Gefr. V-Mann Fuehrer for MK LIMOGES.

Career: See Annex II.

SACK, O/Gefr. W/T operator Leit Trupp 351.

Career: W/T operator for Ast LYON. February 1944 assigned to 351. September 1944 transferred to FAK 313.

SCHERZ, Maj. Leiter MK LI OGES.

Career: See Annex II.

SCHILLE, Helmut, Lt. MK 1 LYON.

Career: See Annex I.

SCHMITZ, Charles, @ CHARLY, Uffz. Interpreter for Leit Trupp 351.

Career: See Annex I.

SEIBOLD, @ MICHEL, Fw Fahnj. V-Mann Fuehrer for Trupp 352.

Career: See Annex II.

SEITZ, O/Gefr. Driver for Leit Trupp 351.

Career: Driver for Ast LYON. February 1944 assigned to 351. September 1944 transferred to FAK 313.

SPOCK, Walter, @ WILIS, Lt Dr. MK CLEMONT-FERRAND.

Career: See Annex I.

STEINKE, Uffz. MK DRAGUIGNAN.

Career: See Annex II.

VOHNICKEL, civilian. MK NICE.

Career: See Annex II.

WAPPENHENSCH, Hptm. MK MONTPELLIER.

Career: See Annex II.

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WEBER, Fw. Sgt/Maj of Leit Trupp 351.

Career: Worked for Abw WAKO BOURGES and Abt I Ast LYON.  
February 1944 assigned to Leit Trupp 351. September 1944  
transferred to FAK 313 as Sgt/Maj.

WEBER von OSTALDEN, Hptm. CO Trupp 352.

Career: February 1944 transferred from 1st PARIS to TOULOUSE  
as CO Trupp 352. September 1944 transferred to FAK 352 as CO.  
October 1944 injured in motor accident while en route from  
STRASBOURG to WEISSENBURG (with SEIBOLD). Upon recovery as-  
signed to FAK 314.

WENZEL, Uffz. Driver for Leit Trupp 351.

Career: Driver with Ast LYON. February 1944 assigned to 351.  
September 1944 transferred to FAK 313.

WERNER, Maj. CO Trupp 359.

Career: See Annex II.

WILDE, G. BERNHARD, Fw Dr. MK GRENOBLE.

Career: See Annex II.

WISZORECK, Hptm. Chief of card index section Leit Trupp 351.

Career: June 1944 transferred from Ast KOENIGSBERG by Kdo REILE  
to Leit Trupp 351. September 1944 returned to Ast KOENIGSBERG.

ZANDER, Fw d R. MK 1 LYON.

Career: See Annex I.

ZARNACK, Fw. V-Mann Fuehrer for Trupp 352.

Career: See Annex II.

ZELLER, Uffz. Motor NCO for Leit Trupp 351.

Career: Worked for Ast LYON. February 1944 assigned to 351.  
September 1944 transferred to FAK 313.

b. Female

BRANDT, Liselotte. Administrative clerk with Leit Trupp 351.

Career: See Annex II.

BREITHE. Clerk in evaluation section of Leit Trupp 351.

Career: 1943 assigned to Ast LYON as a stenographer-typist.  
February 1944 assigned to Leit Trupp 351. September 1944  
transferred to FAK 313. Beginning 1945 left because of illness.

PICK. Clerk in registry of Leit Trupp 351.

Career: See Annex II.

HUSSER. Clerk for DERNBACH

Career: See Annex II.

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JOERG. Clerk in evaluation section of Leit Trupp 351.

Career: See Annex II.

LOEFFKEN. In charge of registry Leit Trupp 351.

Career: February 1944 transferred from Aust LIMOGES to 351.  
During withdrawal sent to Aust NIESBADEN.

RIETH, Charlotte-Luise. Secretary to DERNBACH.

Career: See Annex I.

SCHNEIDER. Secretary to NIEM at MK LIMOGES.

Career: See Annex II.

SCHNEIDER, Elfriede. Secretary to RAUCH at MK EVIAN.

Career: See Annex I.

## 4. AGENTS

DESCAND, French. Run by SPECK, MK CLERMONT-FERRAND.

DE DENISE, French. Run by SCHIELE, MK 1 LYON.

LEGRAND, French. Run by SPECK, MK CLERMONT-FERRAND.

MADELEINE, French. Run by SCHIELE, MK 1 LYON.

MEYER, Swiss. Run by DERNBACH.

In addition to these, the agents recruited by III-F Ast LYON and its subordinate units continued to be used. (See Annex II).

## 5. OPERATIONS

### a. Captured Munitions Dumps in Southern France

Munitions dumps were discovered and captured through the investigations of V-Maenner, interrogation of enemy agents, and through fights with the Maquis. The number captured was very large, but it was believed that a great many more existed because many enemy flights were reported without discovering what they had dropped. On one night there were 37 flights over a given area. All of the dumps were new, supplied by enemy aircraft. This fact was established because the sites of the former French military dumps were known. In Spring 1944 60 containers were captured, which served to equip with weapons all the personnel of Leit Trupp 351, Trupps 352 and 359, and the WDV Fu detachment. At other times a sufficient number was captured to equip whole units, such as the Stamm Div of Gen/Maj von PENNING. The explosives were given to Abt II and the Engineers. The dumps were discovered in the vicinity of the following cities: LYON, TARARE, CLERMONT-FERRAND, TALLE, TOULOUSE, ARLES, GRENOBLE, ACON, NANTUA and ST ETIENNE.

### b. National Committee for Free Germany

In Southern France this organization was encountered on only two occasions. The first member found was a man named KUBALLA, a German deserter. He was captured with the Maquis during an operation near VALENCE. In his possession were considerable material about Free Germany and leaflets destined for distribution among the German troops. The leaflets came from Switzerland. KUBALLA was sent through PARIS to BERLIN for prosecution, and nothing further was heard of him.

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During Summer 1944, V-Mann HOUBLON met in LYON a certain KRAUSE and a person who liaped (referred to in the files as Humpelbein). Both spoke German and French. KRAUSE declared himself to be a German deserter and delegate of Gen SEYDLITZ. No attempt was discovered to propagandize German troops. The two men seemed to confine their activities to French workmen in German-operated factories and members of the Russian Hiwi (Volunteer) units. Possibly as a result of KRAUSE's activities, numbers of Armenians joined the Maquis and the Georgians became chronic malcontents. Several of the Hiwi units had to be dissolved. Shortly before the withdrawal, KRAUSE announced that he was going to STRASBOURG to organize Free German groups. It was decided to let him go, as he would lead to dissident Germans, which would be of more value than prosecuting him for his trifling activities in Southern France. A rendezvous was arranged in STRASBOURG with HOUBLON, but the latter could not keep it because he was occupied with the withdrawal.

c. Transmitter MARCEAU

In April 1944 a parachutist was captured on landing. Interrogation revealed that he was a French officer in the service of G-RAUD and called himself MARCEAU. He had with him a transmitter that he had developed in Africa. It was able to transmit and receive "blind" messages, impervious to all detective mechanisms. It was the best transmitter ever seen by German Intelligence. MARCEAU was sent to PARIS for technical interrogation.

d. Elektra

In April 1944 further exploitation of the material gathered in the Blindenheim case (see annex II) was possible. PARIS had been working on the data and discovered two or three transmitters in Southern France which were part of a network whose headquarters was somewhere in the PARIS area. Through the identified transmitters MK's VILLEFRANCHE, LYON 1 and LYON 3 penetrated the network and discovered eight or ten transmitters, in addition to a Schweige Netz (silent net), a network that had been fully established but was not to begin operations until after the invasion. The Germans gave the name Elektra to the PARIS HQ of the net. Elektra, with its subordinate stations, worked exclusively for LONDON. Later it was ascertained that the neutralization of the net cut enemy intelligence off from important W/T connections.

e. Chef de Milice TOULOUSE

Through a conversation which a V-Mann had with a Milice member early in 1944, it was learned that the Chef de Milice TOULOUSE was in W/T communication with England. PARIS was notified and asked to procure elucidation from Milice HQ PARIS. This was done and it appeared that DARNAND knew of the communication and had permitted it because England was equipping the TOULOUSE Milice with weapons, believing it to be a resistance group. PARIS was then requested to obtain the code and all messages, as well as to find out how the connection had been established. This proved to be impossible because of difficulties with Gen Pol OBERG, through whom all negotiations with the Milice were conducted.

In lieu of positive action, the Chef de Milice TOULOUSE was kept under observation. However, he was soon transferred to the Court Martial at VICHY, where he attracted attention by his severity. Later he led a Milice unit against the Maquis in Haute Savoie and was wounded. Upon his recovery, DARNAND, through his emissary DEGAND (also V-Mann of SPECK), inquired of DERNBACH if he had any objection to the man becoming Chef de Milice LYON. DERNBACH replied that his organization had no interest in political matters.

In this move of DARNAND, DERNBACH saw an attempt to involve Leit Trupp 351 politically and thus get it into difficulties with higher HQ, for it was forbidden to operate in the political field. Also DARNAND wanted to undermine the position of the Chef de Milice LYON, Comte de BERNONVILLE, whom he disliked because of his good relations with DERNBACH, as well as his advocacy of a military rather than a political campaign against the Maquis. The withdrawal prevented any further developments.

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**f. Swiss Courier**

In Spring 1944 MK CLEMMONT-FERRAND learned that the French Secret Police on orders of LAVAL had examined the pouches and luggage of the Swiss diplomatic courier going from VICHY to Switzerland, because it was suspected, and the examination confirmed, that information to the detriment of the French government was being sent to Switzerland by this means. The examination was made by DEGAND, who, although a V-Man of SPECK, MK CLEMMONT-FERRAND, treated SPECK with scant respect and confidence and gave him no details of the affair. DERNBACH suspects that DEGAND may even have arranged the matter himself in order to send intelligence to GROUSSARD, an enemy agent in Switzerland.

**g. MEYER**

In Spring 1944 ECKERT, MK VILLEFRANCE, sent to DERNBACH a Swiss national called MEYER, who declared himself willing to work for German intelligence in Switzerland. He was a business man who made frequent trips between France and Switzerland. DERNBACH gave him the following missions:

- (1) Clarification of the activities of GROUSSARD and his connections in France.
- (2) Information pertinent to British Intelligence in Switzerland.
- (3) Penetration of any enemy intelligence in Switzerland for the purpose of accepting missions against the Germans in France.

MEYER went to Switzerland charged with these missions, but he was never seen again, and nothing could be learned of him.

**h. Paulaner**

This operation was started in 1944, but the withdrawal prevented its being carried beyond the preparatory stages. SPECK, MK CLEMMONT-FERRAND, managed to have himself demobilized, with the aid of his V-Man FERNAND, a French Maj, as a member of the French army. Thus he received authentic French identity papers, giving Alsace as his native province. Then, with these papers and using the influence of DEGAND, he obtained the position of economic and propaganda assistant with the VICHY government.

In VICHY he met a French Baroness, pro de GAULLE, who had property in Switzerland. They planned to take a trip together through Spain and Portugal contacting local de GAULLE circles. She gave him an introduction to the Swiss envoy, von MONTEGNA, to whom SPECK represented himself as a deserter from VICHY. MONTEGNA gave him a recommendation to certain officials in Switzerland who were to take him to some enemy intelligence agency for employment.

At this point, it became necessary for the Germans to withdraw from Southern France, and the affair could not be continued.

**i. Captured British Report**

In July 1944 RECKEL, MK PERPIGNAN, received a captured report from the German Customs in PERPIGNAN. It had been taken from an agent, who had somehow escaped during the inspection. The report concerned a conversation between a British agent and a German general stationed on the Mediterranean coast. The general had made remarks derogatory to HITLER and the Nazi government, and depreciated the German troops and fortifications on the Southern French coast. Troop 359 discreetly identified the general and investigated his activities. It was established that the report was false, and that no such conversation had taken place. DERNBACH assumed that the report had been planted in order to sow dissension in German circles.

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j. BORGHINI from Monaco

From time to time reports were received that enemy intelligence was operating from Monaco, but it was difficult to investigate, because Monaco was an independent state and all executive action was in the hands of the local police. Finally at the end of July 1944, V-Mann PAOLO, working for MICHEL MEIER, NK NICE, identified State Councilor BORGHINI as an agent for enemy intelligence. PAOLO succeeded in getting BORGHINI to hire him as an agent with the mission of collecting information in MARSEILLE. A playback was rejected because any deception material given to BORGHINI by PAOLO could be checked by the former within 48 hours.

The German Consul General in MONTE CARLO was notified of the matter, and he arranged that the local police, accompanied by SD NICE, make a search of BORGHINI's office. A considerable number of documents were taken. These contained information relative to German equipment, strength, fortifications and movements along the Mediterranean coast. The documents were given to MICHEL MEIER for transmission to Leit Trupp 351, but before they could be forwarded the withdrawal was initiated. Presumably MICHEL MEIER destroyed them. They contained no clues as to which intelligence service employed BORGHINI.

k. Cid

In June 1944 V-Mann LEMOINE of NK 1 LYON discovered a courier belonging to a courier service operated by the Deuxieme Bureau. Through this courier three others were arrested in LYON, whose interrogation revealed that there were 12-15 lines in the service, of which four to six ran south. The lines were composed of segments, and the couriers knew only the men from whom they collected the messages and the one to whom they delivered them. Thus it was not possible to determine the origin and destination of the lines.

The messages captured with the couriers contained precise information on troop movements and the content of staff reports dealing with shortages of motor fuel, ammunition, etc. Some of the messages contained the names of enemy agents employed unwittingly by various German agencies, such as the SD, Abw units and military HQ's, and later contained warnings to those against whom the SD intended to take action. The messages were wrapped in rubberized paper, which could not be resealed without showing that it had been opened; but the Germans considered it more important to learn the contents of the messages than to prevent the enemy from knowing that the couriers had been discovered. Thus the three couriers arrested, after being persuaded to say nothing of their detention, were sent on their way.

At the same time a large scale penetration was organized. V-Leute MADELEINE and DENISE of NK 1 LYON were introduced clandestinely to the couriers and to some of the agents mentioned in the intercepted reports, and they arranged to be the letter box for all lines passing through LYON. From then until the withdrawal, 6-8 weeks later, MADELEINE and DENISE received a steady flow of messages. Shortly after the first interception, the enemy discarded the rubberized wrapping and sent the messages on microfilm, hidden somewhere on the person of the courier. These were taken by Leit Trupp 351, photographed and returned the next day.

It was learned from the messages that Col VERNEUIL & LAFONT was the director of the courier service. The information found in the messages was considerably exploited, both by the local agencies and by PARIS, which received daily copies of the photographed messages. FJG

The German plan was to allow the courier service to continue until such a time as it could no longer be exploited profitably, and then arrest all the personnel involved. The withdrawal prevented the fulfillment of this plan.

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**1. Action against the Maquis**

The Maquis in France did not assume noticeable proportions until the summer of 1943. Until November 1942, when the unoccupied zone ceased to exist, various groups of dissidents had been content to go into the unoccupied zone and live there without further agitation. But with the full occupation, accompanied by the complete demobilization of the French army and navy, the conscription of labor for Germany, and the persecution of Jews and Freemasons, the dissidents found their life difficult and harassed. Therefore they banded themselves together and were joined by some of the 85,000 foreigners living in Southern France (Spaniards, Poles and Czechs). By summer 1943 these persons had managed to organize into recognizable groups, although it was not until nearly another year had passed that they attained sufficient strength and efficiency to be regarded as a threat by the Germans. By that time, Spring-Summer 1944, there were four groups, designated as follows:

- (1) FFI. This was the largest and strongest of the resistance groups and dominated the Correze-Cantal and South Central regions.
- (2) FTP. This group was second in importance and was entrenched in the regions of Jura, Ain, Haute Savoie and Vercors.
- (3) Wild Maquis. This group was numerically small, and was rejected by the FFI. The FTP succeeded in a partial absorption of them.
- (4) Maquis Blancs. This group was found in Savoie. It was extremely exclusive, having nothing to do with the FFI or FTP. It was opposed not only to the Germans, the VICHY government and the Milice, but also to certain of the Allies. They would not allow the appropriation of food and materials from businessmen and farmers, as done by the other Maquis groups. DERNBACH believed that the Maquis Blancs were a GIRAUD movement backed by military and industrial interests.

Some Maquis detachments received training from Allied officers sent in by parachute, and they all received the bulk of their munitions from Allied planes. They maintained communication with England with small transmitters. The messages were monitored from PARIS, but the codes could not be broken.

There was a sharp controversy between the Abw and the SD as to how to deal with the Maquis. The former maintained that they should be regarded as a military organization and dealt with as such, whereas the latter held that they formed an ideological movement, politically unsound, which should be eradicated by purges. The SD point of view, supported by HIMMLER, was adopted as the official policy. However, after a large number of executions of civilians supplying the Maquis, with no indication of a decrease of resistance, the CG of Army Region South accepted the attitude of the Abw and resolved to send troops against the Maquis. DERNBACH estimated the Maquis strength in Southern France at 30,000. There was an increasing number of kidnappings of German customs personnel, Luftwaffe guards, and small German detachments.

In June 1944, the Volunteer Stamm Div under Gen/Maj von HENNING was ordered by Army Region South to march against the Maquis at NANTUA. Maj KOCH of Leit Trupp 351 and the personnel of MK VILLEFRANCHE were attached to the intelligence section. The operation was a success, resulting in a total liquidation of the Maquis group, as well as the liberation of 61 kidnapped Germans and the capture of large amounts of weapons, ammunition and explosives. However, by July another Maquis group had formed in the NANTUA region, although it was reported that it would withdraw to Switzerland in the event of another German military expedition.

During the withdrawal, there was considerable contact with the Maquis. WILDE of MK GRENOBLE and RAUCH and his secretary Elfriede SCHNEIDER of MK EVIAN were unable to join Leit Trupp 351 because of Maquis activity. A detachment sent by DERNBACH to capture a transmitter in BEAUJEU secured the transmitter, but was then captured by the Maquis.

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At ROMANS/Isore Trupp 359 was attacked by the Maquis and all members were captured except one driver who escaped to the north and reported the loss to Leit Stelle III West.

The final action against the Maquis conducted by Leit Trupp 351 was in the vicinity of BADONVILLE (east of NANCY), where 351 had a temporary HQ during the withdrawal. They were in the house of the Comte de WITRY, who had been arrested two weeks earlier by SD BACCARAT for having given assistance to the local Maquis. Luftwaffe Regt 91 arrived from the South and reported that they had just come through a three-day battle with the Maquis, and had some prisoners. Interrogation revealed that there was a force of 900 well-armed Maquis hiding in the forest outside BADONVILLE, and that they were led by British officers, the chief of whom was a Capt BARREMAN. Three of the prisoners were turned and led a German force to the Maquis HQ, where the Maquis suffered a defeat. Among the killed was BARREMAN. His personal effects were sent via Leit Stelle III West to the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab. The destruction of this group led to the discovery of two large munitions dumps, supplied with explosives, American machine pistols, rifles, and ammunition, as well as the many parachutes and containers which had brought them. A British transmitter with several codes was found and given to O/Lt BUCH of WNV Fu, whose unit happened to be close by. Later Leit Stelle III West received a report from WNV Fu that this material had provided valuable new W/T intelligence.

m. WILDE's Treason

As an aftermath to the withdrawal, DERNBACH received an interrogation report in November 1944 from Leit Stelle III West of an escaped German prisoner who had been in the same camp as WILDE. WILDE had telephoned to Leit Trupp 351 that he could not get through from GRENOBLE to join them. He was instructed to report to the I-c of the 159th Div, but this also proved impossible, and he was captured by the Maquis and put into a prison camp near GRENOBLE. There, the escaped prisoner reported, WILDE had not been well-received by the other prisoners. He had then proceeded to found a democratic party within the camp, which was producing propaganda for the National Committee for Free Germany.

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ANNEX IVFAK 313

Prisoner: DERNBACH, Friedrich

Obst/Lt in Abwehr

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**CONFIDENTIAL****1. ORGANIZATION**

In September 1944 Abw Leit Trupp 351 arrived at KLI: BACH (near WISSEMBOURG) accompanied only by Abw Trupp 352, Abw Trupp 359 having been captured by the Maquis during the withdrawal. Leit Stelle III West then effected a reorganization which resulted in the conversion of Abw Leit Trupp 351 into FAK 313 and the placement under its command of the following four FAT's:

**FAT 349.** This FAT was activated under the command of Maj SCHERZ with personnel who had no experience in counterintelligence work. SCHERZ left in October and was replaced by Lt HILLER, who received Lt MUGRAUER as assistant in January. The Fat maintained W/T communication with the FAK, but did not have sufficient W/T personnel to sustain it with the adjacent FAT's.

**FAT 352.** Abw Trupp 352 was converted directly into FAT 352, WEBER von OSTWALDEN remaining as CO until his motor accident in October, at which time Capt BIALKOWSKI assumed command. The FAT was divided into two sections, Staffel I and Staffel II. W/T communication was maintained only with the FAK.

**FAT 357.** This FAT was created out of Abw Trupp 357, which had been under the second Abw Kdo (CO Maj von FELDHAHN) in France. O/Lt NIEBUHR was retained in command, with HILLER as assistant until the latter was transferred to FAT 349. In December NIEBUHR went to Amt VI to become its liaison officer to Leit Stelle III West, and Capt GRIESINGER took over the FAT. He was given RAUTENSTRAUCH with four or five agents. The FAT was stationed in KAISERSLAUTERN.

**FAT 361.** This FAT was converted from Abw Trupp 361, also of Abw Kdo FELDHAHN. Its HQ was BERNKASTEL. Capt DREES was the CO and Capt SCHMIDT his deputy. In December 1944 DREES left and SCHMIDT became CO, receiving SPECK as his deputy, while Uffz's ROESIGKE, HART ANN and KNEBEL were assigned to run agents. The FAT was then attached to a division (90th or 92d) near TRIER for rations. Communication was maintained with the FAK by radio and courier.

In addition to the four FAT's, FAK 313 also operated three MK's at the following places:

**MK BITCHE.** This MK was operated during September and October 1944 by O/Fw ECKERT and Uffz KNEBEL. In October the MK had to be abandoned because of an Allied advance.

**MK DAHN.** Uffz BIERVENICH and O/Gefr RUDOLF started this MK in November 1944. It was a replacement for MK BITCHE.

**MK Italy.** The intelligence situation in Italy was not good from the German point of view. Maj SARACCO, the Italian Intelligence CO in TURIN refused to deal with the SD or the FAK under KESSELRING, but he had personal confidence in DERNBACH, whom he had known as Leiter III-F Southern France and CO Abw Leit Trupp 351. It was therefore decided by Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab to have DERNBACH establish an MK in Italy. The MK was commanded by MICHELMEIER and throughout maintained cordial and cooperative relations with SARACCO. It operated from both TURIN and MILAN. W/T communication with the FAK was through the WNW Fu, and VOHNKEL was the courier.

FAK 313 established its HQ in BAD KREUZNACH in the zone of Army Group G. It had a registry, evaluation section, school for agents, administrative section and W/T station. DERNBACH was CO and maintained supervision over the activities of the FAK and the subordinate FAT's and MK's. He also assigned the missions for agents. His deputy was Maj KOCH until November 1944, and then Capt WALTER, who was not fully trusted because he was a member of the SD. The deputy did not participate in the operation of the agents. This was done by the adjutant, Lt SCHIELE, who also arranged the courier service to the FAT's and MK's. NONZ and GROSSKOPF in the evaluation section were engaged in writing a history of

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counterintelligence activities in France. The registry kept one open diary and two secret ones. The W/T station, in addition to communication with the FAT's and MV's, maintained connection with agents committed and assisted the school in W/T training (See 2a, this annex).

In January 1945 I-c Army Group G advised DERNBACH that FAK 313 should be closer to the Army Group HQ (BAD DUECKHEIM and VACHENHEIM). DERNBACH therefore divided his unit into two groups, Staffel I and Staffel II. The former was placed at WEISWEIM AM BERG and acted as a forward echelon for dispatching agents. Staffel II retained the bulk of the FAK and was established in BAD DUECKHEIM.

Administratively FAK 313 was under Leit Stelle III West until December 1944, when I-c Army Group G assumed administrative jurisdiction. Operationally it was continuously under Leit Stelle III West, which was in turn responsible to Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab. The I-c was kept informed of all operations, and was allowed to assign missions to the FAK if they did not conflict with current activities.

The FAT's submitted reports of all activities to FAK 313, as well as supplying adjacent military HQ's with tactical information. The FAK made a composite report of the operations conducted by itself and the FAT's and MK's, which was sent to Leit Stelle III West. This HQ in turn compiled a report on the activities of all FAK's in the West, which was disseminated to Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab, Army Groups and Armies.

Executive power was lodged with the GFP units attached to the Army Groups and Armies. Interrogation of enemy agents was done by the FAK because the GFP had very little knowledge of the enemy intelligence services. As opposed to the arrangement in France, the SD was permitted no executive action in any sphere of FAK activity, although in February SS O/Gruf HAUSSER, CG Army Group G, brought around SS Stubaf MAY, an SD member, whom he wanted to install as I-c, which would have resulted in the subordination of FAK 313 to the SD. However, HAUSSER was relieved of his command the following month, and MAY was powerless with this support gone.

## 2. FUNCTIONS

The two principal objectives of FAK 313 were the neutralization of enemy intelligence within the German lines and the penetration of that intelligence behind the enemy lines. These were to be realized by fulfilling the following functions:

- a. Maintaining a school for agents with instruction in W/T apparatus and its operation, codes, secret ink, clandestine travel and resistance to interrogation.
- b. Dispatch of agents through the lines.
- c. Dispatch of agents by parachute.
- d. Surveillance of French organizations in Germany for the detection of agents.
- e. Surveillance of Russian military and labor units.
- f. Investigation of the National Committee for Free Germany.
- g. Placement of agents in industry.
- h. Establishment of R-Nets in territory surrendered to the enemy.
- i. Interrogation of enemy agents.
- j. Recruitment of agents.

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- k. Maintenance of W/T communication.
- l. Maintenance of liaison with adjacent I-c's and the GFP.
- m. Assignment and supervision of missions to FAT's and MK's.
- n. Observation and penetration of enemy intelligence in neutral countries.

The implementation of cert. in of these missions was delegated to the FAT's and MK's. FAT 349 dispatched line crossers. FAT 352's Staffel I was to establish an R-Net in the vicinity of HAGENAU, and Staffel II to observe DORIOT circles in NEUSTADT. FAT 357 participated with the GFP in raids in KAISERSLAUTERN and screened the arrestees. FAT 361 moved throughout the vicinity of TRIER in order to uncover enemy agents, and put agents through the lines in the area between Army Groups G and H. MK BITCHE was instructed to discover resistance elements in Lorraine, detect enemy agents, and determine transit points for line crossers. MK DARN was to run line crossers and investigate traitorous activities. The missions assigned to MK Italy included the identification of enemy intelligence working from Switzerland and Southern France, the dispatch of agents to Switzerland, France and Spain, investigation of the BADGLIO Intelligence, facilitation of the passage of agents to and from FAK 313, and the relay to the FAK of all information concerning Northern Italy.

### 3. PERSONNEL

#### FAK 313

##### a. Male

DERNBACH, Friedrich, Obst/Lt. Co until 11 Mar 45.

DISTRICH, Uffz. Driver.

Career: See Annex III.

GROSKOPF, © BUBI, Uffz. Evaluation section.

Career: See Annex II.

KOCH, Maj. Deputy CO (until November 1944).

Career: See Annex II.

KREMER, Fw. W/T operator for Staffel I.

Career: October 1944 assigned to FAK 313 from MNV Fu as expert on technical aspects of enemy intelligence.

MEHL, O/Gefr. Driver and orderly for DERNBACH.

Career: See Annex III.

MONZ, Christian, © CHRISTIAN, O/Fw Fahnj. Evaluation section.

Career: See Annex II.

MOTSCH, Alois, Fw. Driver and cook.

Career: See Annex I.

SACK, O/Gefr. W/T operator.

Career: See Annex III.

SCHIELE, Helmut, © MEUNIER, Lt. Adjutant and V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex I.

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SCHLEGEL, O/Gefr. Administrative section.

Career: October 1944 assigned to FAK as driver.

SCHMIDT, Uffz. Mess NCO.

Career: Formerly with Abt I Ast WIESBADEN. Transferred to FAK 313 Autumn 1944.

SCHMITZ, Charles, @ CHARLY, Uffz. Interpreter.

Career: See Annex I.

SEITZ, O/Gefr. Driver.

Career: See Annex III.

WALTER, Hptm. Deputy CO (from November 1944).

Career: Leiter of an SD detachment supervising aircraft construction in LEIPZIG. Leiter of an Abw Trupp in the East. November 1944 assigned to FAK 313.

WEBER, Fw. Sgt/Maj of FAK.

Career: See Annex III.

WENZEL, Uffz. Driver

Career: See Annex III.

ZANDER, @ FISCH, Fw d R. W/T agent instructor.

Career: See Annex I.

ZELLER, Uffz. Motor Maintenance NCO.

Career: See Annex III.

ZOLLFRANK, Uffz. Administrative section.

Career: Assigned to Fak September 1944. Hospitalized for stomach trouble in February 1945.

b. Female

BRANDT, Liselotte. Evaluation section.

Career: See Annex II.

BREITER, Stenographer-typist.

Career: See Annex III.

JOERG, Evaluation section.

Career: See Annex II.

KEMPER, Cashier in Sgt/Maj's office.

Career: 1943 worked in finance section of Ast LYON. February 1944 assigned to Abw Leit Trupp 351.

KROENER, In charge of registry.

Career: With Abw since 1934. 1943 transferred from Ast KASSEL to Ast LYON. February 1944 assigned to Abw Leit Trupp 351.

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RIETH, Charlotte-Luise. Secretary to DEFFBACH.

Career: See Annex I.

FAT 349

HILLER, Lt. FAT Leiter (from December 1944).

Career: 1943 with III-F 1st PARIS. February 1944 assigned to Abu Trump 357. September 1944 made deputy CO of FAT 357. December 1944 transferred to FAT 349.

MUGRAUER, Lt. Deputy CO.

Career: September 1944 assigned to FAK 313. February 1945 transferred to FAT 349.

RINKOWITZ, Uffz. Finance NCO.

Career: See Annex III.

SCHERZ, Maj. FAT Leiter (until December 1944).

Career: See Annex II.

STEIN, Uffz. W/T operator.

Career: Beginning 1945 assigned to FAK 313 and transferred to FAT.

FAT 352

BIALKOWSKI, Hptm. FAT Leiter (from October 1944)

Career: See Annex II.

CNYRISE, Kurt, & FRANCOIS, Sdf. Interpreter and V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex I.

IMJOLZICK, W/T operator.

Career: See Annex III.

KNABE, Fw. Sgt/Maj of the FAT.

Career: See Annex III.

SEIBOLD, & NICHEL, Fw Fahnj. V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex II.

SOPHA, Hptm. Deputy Leiter.

Career: End 1944 transferred by Leit Stelle III West from Customs Inspection to FAK 313 and FAT 352.

WEBER von OSTWALDEN, Hptm. FAT Leiter (until October 1944).

Career: See Annex III.

ZARMACK, Uffz. V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex II.

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FAT 357**CONFIDENTIAL**

BUBINGER, O/Lt. Deputy Leiter.

Career: Was I-c officer in the East. Autumn 1944 assigned to  
FAK 313 and transferred to FAT 357.

GRIESINGER, Hptm. FAT Leiter (from November 1944)

Career: See Annex II.

NIEBUHR, O/Lt. FAT Leiter (until November 1944)

Career: Teacher. At outbreak of war called to Abt III Ast  
WIESBADEN. April 1940 assigned to III-F Saar MANNHEIM. July  
1940 transferred to III-F Alst PARIS. 1941-1942 with Abw Trupp  
in Africa. February 1944 assigned to Abw Trupp 357 as Leiter,  
which position he continued to occupy after the conversion of  
the Trupp into FAT 357.

RAUTENSTRAUCH, &amp; ROBIN, Fw Fahnj. V-Mann Fuehrer (from January 1945).

Career: See Annex II.

FAT 361

DREES, Hptm. FAT Leiter (until December 1944)

Career: First with Ast DANZIG. Spring 1943 transferred to Ast  
ANGERS. February 1944 assigned as Leiter to Abw Trupp 361.  
September 1944 transferred with his Trupp as FAT 361 to FAK 313.  
December 1944 transferred to the East.

HARTMANN, Uffz. V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex I.

HOLL, Fw. Sgt/Maj of FAT.

Career: Beginning 1942 transferred from Ast ST GERMAIN to Ast  
ANGERS as driver. February 1944 assigned to Abw Trupp 361 as  
Sgt/Maj and remained as such with FAT 361.

KNEBEL, &amp; KLEBER, Uffz. V-Mann Fuehrer (from January 1945).

Career: See Annex II.

ROESICKE, &amp; RAYMOND, Uffz Fahnj. V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex I.

SCHMIDT, Hptm. FAT Leiter (from December 1944).

Career: 1943 assigned to Ast ANGERS. February 1944 transferred  
to Abw Trupp 361. September 1944 assigned to FAT 361.

SPECK, Walter, &amp; WALLIS, Lt Dr. Deputy Leiter and V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex I.

MX BITCHE

ECKERT, &amp; EVANS, O/Fw Fahnj. MX-Leiter and V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex II.

KNEBEL, &amp; KLEBER, Uffz. Assistant MX Leiter and V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex II.

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MK DARN

SUBERVENICH, & GILLES, Uffz Fehnj. MK Leiter and V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex I.

RUDOLF, O/Gefr. Assistant MK Leiter and V-Mann Fuehrer.

Career: See Annex II.

MK Italy

MICHELMEIER, Sdf. MK Leiter.

Career: See Annex II.

PREUSCH, O/Lt. Leiter of WW Fu detachment.

Career: Summer 1943 assigned to Radio Detector Company 616 in Southern France. Spring 1944 fell ill. Autumn 1944 recovered and assigned to Northern Italy to provide W/T communication between MK Italy and FAX 313.

VORHINKEL, civilian. Courier between MK Italy and FAX 313.

Career: See Annex II.

4. AGENTS

AGATHANON & AGA, Greek. Brought from France by Abw Trupp 357 and run by DERNBACH.

BACHELET & FLIC, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by DERNBACH.

BERNONVILLE, Comte de, & COMMANDANT & JACQUES, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by DERNBACH.

CHAPON & MARCEL, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by SCHIELE.

CHEVALIER & RICHARD, French. Brought from France by BERNONVILLE and run by DERNBACH.

DORIER brothers, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by DERNBACH.

HENRI, Belgian. Recruited in Germany by FAT 361 and run by either ROSSICKS or HARTMANN.

LEMOINE & IMAN, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by SCHIELE.

LOPEZ, Spanish. Sent to FAX 313 from Holland by FAX 306 and run by DERNBACH.

LOUIS, French. Brought from France by Abw Trupp 357 and run by DERNBACH.

MADE, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by DERNBACH.

MARCEL, French. Brought from by BERNONVILLE and run by DERNBACH.

MOGLIA & JACQUES, French (also Argentine national). Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by SCHIELE.

MORITZ, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by BACHELET.

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MUSLIER & RENATUS, Alsatian. Brought from France by Abw Trupp 361 and run by DERNBACH.

& NERI & MARCHESI, Italian. Recruited in Italy and run by MICHELMETZ.

NEY & WIELER, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by DERNBACH.

& PAOLO, Italian. Recruited in Italy and run by MICHELMETZ.

& PIERRE, French. Brought from France by BERNONVILLE and run by DERNBACH.

PRATTA, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by SCHIELE.

& ROGELIO, French. Brought from France by Abw Trupp 357 and run by DERNBACH.

SCHMITT & LOUIS, French or German. Recruited in Germany and run by HILLER.

SCHWEIZER-DIEBOLD & HOUBLON, Alsatian. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by DERNBACH.

SIMONE, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by RAUTENSTRAUCH.

& SUSANNE, French. Brought from France by Abw Trupp 357 and run by DERNBACH.

THOMAS, Dr. & MICHEL, French. Brought from France by BERNONVILLE and run by DERNBACH.

TREBOR & PENNORS, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by SCHIELE.

VIROL, French. Brought from France by Abw Leit Trupp 351 and run by SCHIELE and RAUTENSTRAUCH.

**5. OPERATIONS****a. BENDER**

BENDER & ROESI was the Leiter of the MK maintained in PARIS by Abw Leit Trupp 351. In July 1944 DERNBACH ordered him to close MK PARIS and report to LYON. At the request of REILE and FELDMANN, BENDER remained in PARIS to attempt to enlist the cooperation of the Swedish Consul General or his assistant, Consul NORDLING. In August BENDER reported that he was not successful in this mission, and was again recalled to LYON. But by this time it was no longer possible to get through because of the American salient south of PARIS.

Nothing further was heard of BENDER until NIEBUHR arrived at KLIMBACH with Abw Trupp 357. He reported that prior to his withdrawal from PARIS he had arrested a de GAULLE agent carrying reports of important German troop movements. NIEBUHR delivered the agent to the German commandant in PARIS. Shortly afterwards BENDER and NORDLING appeared before the commandant and interceded for the agent. The commandant gave the reports to NORDLING and released the agent. At the final evacuation of PARIS, BENDER did not leave with the Germans. NIEBUHR reported the affair to Leit Stelle III West, which ordered him to keep silent. In October DERNBACH was informed by Leit Stelle III West that BENDER and NORDLING had arrived in Switzerland in a Swedish diplomatic car. BENDER had been arrested by the Swiss but was released through NORDLING's intervention. DERNBACH was ordered to prepare evidence for a prosecution for treason. Efforts were to be made to effect BENDER'S extradition from Switzerland.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**CI-IIR/57**b. School for Agents**

A school for agents was maintained by Staffel II of FAK 313. Here the agents were given general training applicable to all types of undercover work. In addition each agent was given special information pertaining to his particular mission. The greatest amount of time was devoted to the operation of transmitters and the use of codes. Daily trial transmissions were conducted for the benefit of the W/T agents.

For clandestine writing the agents were given matches containing secret ink. In the event of capture the agents were told that they could either allow themselves to be turned (insincerely, of course) or commit suicide. This decision was made prior to leaving on the mission, and if the latter course were chosen, the agent was given a poison pill.

**c. RICHARD**

Early in September 1944 CHEVALIER & RICHARD was sent out with the following missions:

- (1) Determination of suitable landing sites for parachutists west and southwest of PARIS.
- (2) Recruitment of W/T operators to start work immediately with transmitter and code to be dropped by parachute.
- (3) Recruitment of line crossers.
- (4) Investigation of the White Maquis to ascertain their availability for work with German Intelligence.
- (5) Discovery of Allied strength, disposition and AA emplacements.

CHEVALIER was given French food stamps (obtained at BELFORT) and 15-20,000 francs. He had no false papers. As he refused to be parachuted, it was necessary to put him through the lines. A first attempt near LUXEVILLE was unsuccessful because of a current German retreat. A second attempt near ST DIE apparently succeeded because CHEVALIER did not return.

The line crossers recruited by CHEVALIER were to ask the German outposts for Obst/Lt DERNBACH of the Abw. This unusual method was adopted in view of the fluctuating line and the uncertainty as to the sector in which the agent would cross. DERNBACH's name was known to all FAK and FAT personnel.

CHEVALIER knew that BERNONVILLE was to be parachuted later. They arranged to contact each other through mutual friends in PARIS.

CHEVALIER was never seen again, and no line crosser recruited by him ever appeared.

**d. CO MANDANT**

The leadership of this mission was entrusted to the Comte de BERNONVILLE & CO MANDANT & JACQUES, the former Chef de Milice, LYON. Previously he had been a Maj in the Chasseurs Alpins Regt 102. After the armistice in 1940 he became a member of PETAIN's bodyguard, but resigned after a quarrel with ENETTEL, the Marshal's physician and secretary. He then joined the DARNAND Milice and took over the post at LYON, where he worked congenially with DERNBACH. He fell out with DARNAND over disagreement as to treatment of the Maquis and joined the German withdrawal, bringing several of his people with him.

Shortly after the departure of CHEVALIER, BERNONVILLE (accompanied by THOMAS & MICHEL, & PIERRE and & MARCEL) was dropped by parachute north of RAMBOUILLET, a region familiar to him. His objectives were as follows:

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- (1) Ascertainment of the political situation in France.
- (2) Investigation of the White Maguis.
- (3) Discovery of troop disposition, AA positions, and airports.
- (4) Recruitment of W/T operators.
- (5) Attempt to discover CZERNIN and OEHLE (who had deserted during the withdrawal) and determine their current activities.
- (6) Attempt to contact CHEVALIER.
- (7) Commencement of W/T communication with FAX 313 on 15 Oct 44.

Their equipment included French food coupons, about 50,000 francs, a small British W/T set with code, knives, spades and two or three British pistols. MARCEL and PIERRE were given German labor books for foreigners, with the cover story that they had escaped from Germany. BERNONVILLE intended to stay in a cloister in case of danger.

On the day appointed for the radio signal nothing was heard. Subsequently no information was received.

## e. RENATUS MUELLER

In September 1944 MUELLER RENATUS was sent to STRASBOURG and Upper Alsace to determine the attitude of the Alsatian population. He returned in several weeks with the information that the Resistance was circulating pamphlets among the Alsatian Volks Sturm instructing them to maintain strict discipline and obey their German officers until the approach of American troops. At that juncture they were to rebel and shoot every available German. The pamphlets were signed by a French officer. The Resistance HQ was in SCHIRMECK. MUELLER also discovered that there were enemy W/T agents around STRASBOURG.

In October he was sent out again with the cover of a black marketer. He was instructed to gather more information about the Resistance and offer his services as an agent. Nothing further was heard from him. DERACHACH deemed him a reliable agent, working more for conviction than for money.

## f. Attempted R-Net (Stay-Behind Net)

At the end of October 1944 Leit Stelle III West ordered FAX 313 to establish an R-Net throughout its territory in preparation for a possible enemy advance to the Rhine. The net was to be composed largely of W/T agents. The missions of the proposed net were as follows:

- (1) Collection of information about enemy troop movements.
- (2) Observation of enemy intelligence activities.
- (3) Penetration of enemy intelligence for the purpose of being hired as agents.
- (4) Establishment of contact points for German agents arriving at a later date.
- (5) Determination of points for line crossing.
- (6) Selection of sites for parachute landings.
- (7) Investigation of resistance movements.

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The FAK and the FAT's all made attempts to recruit agents for this net. In addition Leit Stelle III West sent a small number of Nachrichten Helferinnen (female signal assistants). However all endeavors to create the net were unavailing. This occurred for the following reasons:

- (1) The bulk of the population was being forcibly evacuated from the forward areas by the SS and the SD.
- (2) Of the few remaining, the eligible males were put into the Volks Sturm or the Werewolf, from which the local Nazi leaders refused to release anyone.
- (3) Lack of W/T apparatus.
- (4) The Helferinnen had not been informed of the mission before, and became afraid when they learned its nature.
- (5) The Helferinnen came from other sections of Germany and would have betrayed themselves by their accent.
- (6) Also they arrived in uniform and civilian clothes were almost impossible to obtain.
- (7) As a result of the evacuation they could not take the proposed cover jobs of domestic and secretarial help.
- (8) The establishment of the net required innumerable motor trips for which there was not sufficient gasoline.
- (9) A standing order forbade the use of military personnel as agents.
- (10) All foreign workers had been moved back at the beginning of the evacuation.

Thus FAK 313 had to report to Leit Stelle III West the impossibility of carrying out its order. As the above conditions prevailed continuously, no R-Net was ever established.

g. LEMOINE

The purpose of this mission was to penetrate Allied Intelligence in Switzerland to discover enemy W/T agents operating from Germany. SCHIELE sent V-Mann LEMOINE, instructing him not to accept employment from the Swiss Intelligence; if encountered, it was to be used only as a channel to Allied Intelligence.

LEMOINE was sent into Switzerland by the water route. The land route was considered unsuitable because the border was guarded by SS troops and SD members of the GFP, both accustomed to shoot first and question later. A legal entry could have been arranged, but that would have notified the Swiss authorities of the agent's good standing with the Germans. The water route was from KEHL up the Rhine to BASEL. It was used daily by hundreds of laborers who lived along the Rhine and commuted to work in Switzerland. The only paper required for entry was a German labor-book.

Two days after his departure from KEHL, LEMOINE returned without success. He had entered Switzerland without difficulty. He had gone to the Swiss police and inquired as to the location of the French Consulate. The information was readily supplied and LEMOINE had an interview. He told the French Consul that he had fled from his place of employment after an air raid, and, convinced that Germany had lost the war, he wanted to work for the Allies. The Consul told him to report for a physical examination the next day, and if found fit he would be sent to France. LEMOINE did not have the courage to go into France so returned to Germany instead of reporting for the examination.

He was not sent out again.

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h. Anne-Marie KOENIG**CONFIDENTIAL**

In October 1944 this Frenchwoman was picked up by a German outpost near HAGENAU and sent to FAK 313 for interrogation. She claimed to have been a nurse in ROUEN. Her fiancé was a French Lt who had been arrested by the FFI in PARIS for collaboration with the Germans and incarcerated in the prison of CPERCEE-MIDI. KOENIG had then decided to flee from ROUEN in order to escape arrest herself. She was making her way towards STRASBOURG, and had come part of the way in American vehicles. Near HAGENAU she ascertained from the local inhabitants the position of the German lines, to which she proceeded and was apprehended.

There was nothing in her papers to disprove this story, but it could not be established definitely that she was not an enemy agent. Therefore it was decided not to consider her for use as a German agent. At her request she was put to work in a German hospital, and at the suggestion of FAK 313 in one in Central Germany.

i. BUISSON

At the beginning of November a man called BUISSON surrendered himself to a German outpost on the Mosel, declaring himself to be an enemy agent sent from France. He was sent to FAK 313 for interrogation.

He claimed to be a French major, about 60 years of age. During the occupation he had collaborated with the Germans in the industrial sphere. After the liberation of PARIS, the FFI arrested him and gave him the choice of a court martial or going to Germany as an agent (he spoke German, several German dialects, English and Rumanian). He chose the latter and was told to discover German dispositions along the Mosel and the positions of AA guns. He was put across the river in a rubber boat which he had then set adrift because he did not intend to return.

During the interrogation BUISSON offered to work for the Germans. As his story could not be verified and his abilities were unknown, it was decided not to use him as a double agent, but to put him on trial working within the German lines. He worked for a while with FAK's 349 and 357 under observation of the other V-Maenner. He proved himself inept and was discharged by FAK 313 to the labor service which made him an industrial interpreter, presumably in the Opel Works.

j. Partisans near BITCHE

MORITZ and MARCEL, V-Maenner of MK BITCHE, discovered a group of partisans which was clandestinely bivouacked at the firing range of a military training village near BITCHE. The GFP was ordered to capture the group, but the operation was bungled and only two or three men were arrested. However, all weapons, ammunition and food supplies were seized. The majority of the group evaded and was not heard of again.

During the search for the partisans, MORITZ and MARCEL discovered an unrelated bit of information. A local woman had received a letter from her husband, who was a PW of the Russians. The letter had been mailed at DEUTELAN. Leit Stelle III West, when notified, replied that the Russians permitted correspondence to members of the Free Germany Committee.

k. Russian Agents of FAK 313

When Hptm WALTER was transferred to FAK 313 in November 1944, he mentioned the presence in a PW camp near FRANKFURT/Main of six Russians who had worked for his Abw Trupp on the eastern front. These men were then recruited by DEENBACH and disguised as Hiwi (Russian volunteers). They were instructed to uncover Communists agitating among German troops, to determine the loyalty of Hiwi units, and to observe Russian PW's and workers for seditious activities. The agents were promised a monetary bonus for each report. DEENBACH remembers two reports having been submitted and he considered the agents reliable.

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The first of these reports concerned a Russian girl employed at an inn in LUDWIGSHAFEN. She had been observed receiving documents from German employees of I G Farbe, LUDWIGSHAFEN. A search of her quarters was carried out and papers discovered there revealed the existence of a cell of the Free Germany Committee in I G Farben, LUDWIGSHAFEN. The persons implicated were turned over to the SD for prosecution.

The second report contained information given by a Russian PW from the camp at FREINSHEIM (near BAD DUECKHEIM). It stated that another prisoner named POLITRUK had escaped. He was now circulating among German workers and Russian PW's spreading propaganda for Free Germany. The matter was being investigated at the time of DERNDACH's departure.

1. EGLY

An enemy agent was captured while attempting to get through the lines. Under interrogation he stated that he was a Frenchman from Lorraine called EGLY. The mayor of his village, presumably directed by US Intelligence, had commissioned him to cross the lines and find the locations of German artillery. He said that he had always hated the Germans and had accepted the mission out of patriotism. He had neither received nor been promised money. He refused to give any information on American troops. EGLY was turned over to the GEP of the Army Group for prosecution.

m. Souvenir

TREBOR & PENNORS and NEY & MUELLER, who both came from LYON, were sent back to that city in the middle of November with the following missions:

- (1) Description of money and food stamps currently used in France.
- (2) Observation of political conditions in LYON.
- (3) Observation of enemy intelligence in LYON.
- (4) Observation of troop movements.
- (5) Discovery and investigation of CZERNIN, OEHLER and GANSTER (a V-Mann who had refused to join the withdrawal and remained in LYON).
- (6) Location of 'White Mequis in Haute Savoie.
- (7) Collection of information on French Intelligence activities.
- (8) Acquisition of a book on the SD written by the French.
- (9) Determination of parachute landing sites north of LYON.
- (10) Communication with dentist DALLIGAND, DERNDACH's contact in LYON.

The two agents were parachuted near LYON equipped with knives, a spade, pistols, a transmitter, secret ink matches, French food coupons, francs sufficient for three months, and a poison pill for TREBOR (at his request). They had two codes, the second to be used in the event of enemy control. In case of capture, they were to offer themselves as double agents. Transmissions should be done preferably at night.

Communication with FAK 313 was opened and was still going on at the time of DERNDACH's departure. The following messages were received:

- (1) Safe arrival.
- (2) Food stamps and identification papers in France unchanged except for the addition of a police control stamp.

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(3) Large troop movements, mainly tanks, going through LYON in the direction of BELFORT.

(4) Forced to move location. Further details about aforementioned troop movements unobtainable.

(5) 5,000-franc notes arouse suspicion.

(6) The French government had started to induct men and the agents were investigating methods of evading the draft.

(7) DALLIGAND was contacted and given DERNBACH's regards.

(8) The general opinion in LYON was that Germany had lost the war. Pro-German circles were diminishing.

(9) Request for more money.

TREBOR and NEY were notified that an acquaintance would come to them with money and further instructions. Although their reliability was not doubted, the agent (MOGLIA) sent with the money and instructions was told to check their fidelity.

n. AGAMEMNON

The plane that took TREBOR and NEY to LYON also took AGAMEMNON to MONTPELLIER. He was of Greek origin, but a Spanish and French national, having papers from both governments. Southern France was familiar to him as he had been active in smuggling across the Spanish frontier. He had a wife living in Spain, possibly in MADRID.

AGAMEMNON was given W/T and code training and then sent off equipped with a British transmitter, secret ink matches, sword, Colt pistol, French food stamps, French and Spanish money, \$100 US, and a poison pill. It was arranged that he would receive 25,000 pesetas additional from his wife through KO Spain. He was instructed to gather information about troop movements from MARSEILLE to the north, the operation of Allied Intelligence in Southern France, the political situation in that area, and the activities of the White Maquis. He was also charged with the establishment of three passages for agents with the aid of liquor smugglers between France and Spain, France and Switzerland, and France and Italy.

The last that was known of AGAMEMNON was his jump from the plane. He made this at 1000 feet and the parachute opened.

o. JACQUES

In January 1945 MOGLIA & JACQUES, a French national but Argentine by birth, was taken by SCHIELE to MUNICH for a flight to Italy. He was too old for a parachute mission and was considered too valuable for line crossing. Therefore it was decided to send him to France via Italy and Switzerland. In France he had good contacts with the French police and Resistance near NAURIAC. His missions were to:

(1) Contact the Argentine Embassy in BERN to arrange for passage to France.

(2) Establish a passage Italy-Switzerland-France under the cover of a smuggler band.

(3) Recruit reliable W/T operators in Haute Savoie.

(4) Procure French food coupons and identification papers.

(5) Observe conditions in LYON.

(6) Procure the French book on the SD.

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(7) Locate RAUCH and his secretary Elfriede SCHNEIDER of MK EVIAN who had been missing since the withdrawal.

(8) Recruit French agents and establish as large a net as possible.

(9) Select suitable parachute landing sites.

(10) Penetrate enemy intelligence and manage to have their agents either parachuted into Germany or sent to MK Italy.

(11) Become a double agent if uncovered.

MOGLIA arrived in Switzerland through a passage established by NERI (a V-Mann of MK Italy). He reported to the Argentine Embassy, but it wanted to send him back to Argentina so he severed relations. Then through the Swiss police he was introduced to the Swiss Intelligence and hired as an agent. He was shown pictures of various personnel of SD MILAN and told to go to Italy and identify the SD officers, agents and buildings used, in return for which he would be allowed to enter France.

MOGLIA returned to Italy and SCHIELE flew down to see him. He was given information about SD MILAN to take back to the Swiss Intelligence and assigned the following additional missions:

(1) To contact TREBOR and NEY (who had asked for money) and give them 100,000 francs.

(2) To observe their activities in order to ascertain their reliability.

(3) To locate all air ports in the vicinity of LYON.

(4) To establish a direct passage between France and Italy.

(5) To contact the dentist DALLIGAND in LYON.

Equipped with a secret ink pencil, \$100 US and sufficient French francs, MOGLIA again left for Switzerland. He was scheduled to return to Italy by 29 March and he met by DERNBACH.

p. NERI

@ NERI @ MARCHESI, a V-Mann of MICHELMEIER, MK Italy, was an Italian officer who had served with the French Foreign Legion and later worked for the Deuxieme Bureau in PARIS, presumably against Italy. He had a silver skull plate as the result of injuries from an air raid in 1940. He had settled in MILAN and married an Italian woman, although it was believed that he already had a wife somewhere in the Western Hemisphere. As he had good connections with the Swiss police and other Swiss authorities, MICHELMEIER had sent him to Switzerland to establish a passage (later used by MOGLIA).

MICHELMEIER dispatched NERI to Switzerland again to uncover Allied Intelligence, to offer his services to the Deuxieme Bureau (specifically to GROUSSARD) and to procure Haitian passports. This last mission was known as Sued See Perle (South Sea Pearl). NERI obtained an introduction to the Haitian representative in BERN through a friend of his in MILAN, the son of the former Haitian Minister to Italy.

When NERI returned from this trip he stated that the Haitian representative was quite willing to furnish the passports for a modest sum, but that they would not be valid without a US visa. Had the war been prolonged, efforts would have been made by the Germans to obtain this visa. NERI had nothing to report about Allied Intelligence or the Deuxieme Bureau, and was therefore suspected of being a double agent, especially in view of his dubious status at the beginning of the war. MICHELMEIER was instructed to watch him closely.

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q. PAOLO

Another V-Bann of MK Italy was G PAOLO, a native of Piedmont. He was charged with the establishment of two passages into France, one through the Maritime Alps and the other along the coast. In reconnoitering the former route he encountered members of the FFI. He managed to join the group and was given identification papers. It was planned to have the FFI conduct German agents unwittingly through the mountains from Italy to France, and possibly to supply the FFI with a transmitter which could communicate with MK Italy.

As for the coastal route, PAOLO discovered that the best guides were liquor smugglers, who were extremely active at the time because of the great demand for alcoholic beverages by American troops.

At a later date it was intended that PAOLO contact Maj VALENTI, whom he knew. VALENTI had been the Italian Intelligence officer at NICE and entered BADGLIO's service after the Italian surrender.

r. DORIER Brothers

The two DORIER brothers and their father had joined the German withdrawal. In 1944 one of them had lost an eye at the hands of the Maquis. In December the brothers were sent to WUERZBURG with the following missions:

- (1) To organize a net of agents among French groups in Southern Germany.
- (2) To watch for suspicious activities of French workers and PW's.
- (3) To observe DORIOT's party, Francists, etc, for possible connections with enemy intelligence.
- (4) To determine if any of these groups maintained a line of communication through Switzerland to France.

By March no information had been gleaned, but one of the brothers was en route to the FAK with a list of the agents recruited.

s. MACE

During the withdrawal MACE and his wife ODETTE were among those who joined BERNONVILLE and came to Germany. DERNBACH sent him to Southern Germany to assist the DORIER brothers in building up a net of agents and to collect information about the following:

- (1) The French Government at SIGMARINGEN.
- (2) DORIOT's party (the PFF).
- (3) DARNAND's Milice.
- (4) The Francists.
- (5) BESSON-RAPP.

MACE supplied the information as follows:

(1) The government in SIGMARINGEN maintained connections with France through MENETREL, PETAIN's physician and secretary. A member of the government was negotiating with a GIRAUD representative in Switzerland. (This piece of information was relayed to Leit Stelle III West).

(2) After the death of DORIOT, the PFF disintegrated rapidly, the bulk of it joining the SD and the Waffen SS.

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(3) DARNAND was concerned principally with satisfying his personal ambition. Throughout the Milice there were pronounced lethargy and lack of leadership.

(4) The Francists under BUCCARD formed a small group. They were all young and suspected of homosexuality.

(5) There was no cohesiveness between the various groups, each one willing to sacrifice the others to its own advantage.

(6) The DORIER brothers were seen twice and reported to be recruiting agents.

t. TONIN

In the middle of January TONIN reported to a German outpost near HAGENAU and was sent to FAK 313. He was a Sdf and had been a member of Abw Leit Trupp 354 at DIJON under Obst UHRINGER. During the withdrawal he had gone to STRASBOURG to look after an apartment he had there. (He had both German and Swiss citizenship.) He had intended to arrange a few things in STRASBOURG and then rejoin his unit, now FAK 314, at FREIBURG, but the Americans took the city too suddenly for him to get away. Three days after the US occupation he was arrested, which he believes resulted from a denunciation by his neighbors.

First he was interrogated by a US officer who spoke with a Swiss accent, and whose name may have been ALBRECHT. TONIN would say nothing and was turned over to another officer, a small man built like a boxer. According to TONIN, this interrogator tortured him and he confessed everything. His decision to talk was confirmed by having seen Krim Rat UHRINGER in the next room and assuming that the latter had already been broken. UHRINGER had been a police official in STRASBOURG hired by Hptm SCHNEIDER of SD PARIS, and TONIN had worked with him in PARIS. During the interrogation TONIN was shown a photograph album containing pictures of most of the officers at the Hotel Lutetia, HQ of Alst PARIS. DERNEBACH was not among them.

After the interrogation TONIN was given the choice of working for US Intelligence in PARIS or Germany, or a court martial. He elected the work in Germany in order to return to his unit. This choice was also made by four others who had been arrested at the same time, among them an SS O/Stuf working for SKORZENY. His mission had been to blow up a castle near PARIS. He likewise had allegedly confessed only under torture. TONIN was taken by a US scouting patrol to the vicinity of HAGENAU, where he reached a German outpost without encountering anyone. He had been assigned the following missions:

- (1) To return to FAK 314 and say that he had escaped from STRASBOURG.
- (2) To stay with the unit and collect information about the activities of all FAK's and FAT's.
- (3) To go to his brother in Switzerland in the event of an urgent and important message and give it to US Intelligence there. The latter would prevent his arrest by the Swiss police.
- (4) In the event of capture, to report to the nearest US Intelligence officer.

TONIN's story was sent to Leit Stelle III West and to FAK 314, and TONIN himself suggested that he be used for a playback through Switzerland. This project was rejected because of doubts as to TONIN's reliability. He was retained by FAK 313 without being arrested.

REILE of Leit Stelle III West then furnished the information that UHRINGER was a V-Mann of Hptm SCHNEIDER and had remained in France on a mission. He was expected to return shortly. Early in March UHRINGER returned and made incriminating statements about TONIN. Leit Stelle III West directed that TONIN be put before the court martial in KREUZNACH. UHRINGER himself was arrested, as well as the SS O/Stuf who had returned.

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DERNBACH believes that TONIN did not tell the whole truth. Probably he stayed in STRASBOURG in order to make his way back to PARIS at a later date to look after a business he had there, and to use his Swiss citizenship as a safeguard against arrest, although his alleged refusal to work for US Intelligence in PARIS contradicts this theory. TONIN's offer to go to Switzerland as a double agent was interpreted as a desire to escape to that country. In any case, DERNBACH feels that TONIN would have proved a traitorous double agent in the face of danger.

u. Escaped German PW

In the middle of February 1945 a line crosser was picked up by an outpost in the SAARBRUECKEN sector. I-c AOK sent him to FAK 313 for interrogation.

The prisoner claimed to be a German soldier and said that he had been captured during the withdrawal near CARCASSONNE. He was sent to a PW camp near BEZIERS where a Fw MUELLER made speeches advocating the National Committee for Free Germany. A part of the PW's were persuaded to join the Committee. One day a French officer proposed to the prisoner that he go to Germany as a French agent to collect information on the west bank of the Rhine. After some hesitation, the prisoner agreed because he wanted to get to his family in MUNICH. He was taken to the lines near METZ and told to observe what was traveling on the railroads KOELENZ-TRIER and MAINZ-KAISERSLAUTERN-SAARBRUECKEN. Within two to three weeks he was to return to METZ and give his information to a certain French officer.

The prisoner presented an identification tag of I G Farben, LUDWIGSHAFEN, but the tag was spurious because it bore no birth data. The missions which he had been assigned were more suitable for air reconnaissance because the information was obtainable from a plane and could be reported immediately, whereas a ground agent would consume so much time in traveling that the information would be useless when he returned to report it. He was delivered to the GFP in BAD DUERCKHEIM for positive identification. A report from MUNICH was awaited at the time of DERNBACH's departure from FAK 313.

DERNBACH assumed that the prisoner was an agent of the Deuxieme Bureau sent to Germany to work in I G Farben, LUDWIGSHAFEN, and actuate for the Free Germany Committee. This view was shared by Leit Stelle III West.

v. HOUBLON

SCHWEIZER-DIEBOLD & HOUBLON was one of the best agents DERNBACH had, and he demanded remuneration accordingly. He was an Alsatian and expected to receive German citizenship as an additional reward for his service with German Intelligence. He had a mistress called LAMURE, from DIJON, who accompanied him on all his missions. Both of them were known in Alsace so a mission in or through that area could not be considered. At the end of February they were escorted to MK Italy by VOHWINKEL to proceed from there to Southern France with the following missions:

- (1) To establish a W/T station in a secure location and open communication with FAK 313 via MK Italy.
- (2) To report all military movements out of MARSEILLE to the north.
- (3) To penetrate enemy intelligence in order to discover its channels of communication.
- (4) To ascertain whereabouts and activities of CZERNIN, OEHLER and WILDE (last reported doing propaganda for Free Germany in a PW camp).

By 11 Mar 45 (DERNBACH's departure) no report had been received from HOUBLON.

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W. FLIC

BACHELET & FLIC and his wife were taken to NK Italy on the same trip with HOUBLON and LAURE. FLIC had been sentenced by a French court martial for espionage in MARSEILLE and subsequently released by the Germans when they moved into the unoccupied zone. Therefore he was not to be given any mission which involved more than peripheral and temporary entrance into France. NK Italy charged him with the following:

- (1) Creation of a coastal passage from Italy to France.
- (2) Establishment of a water passage with smugglers' craft between Italy, France and Spain.
- (3) Recruitment and training of agents for NK Italy.

DERNBACH left before any report was received.

X. KORENZKI

In the beginning of March 1945 a Flieger Soldat named KORENZKI was arrested in KAISERSLAUTERN by the Feld Gend in a raid conducted during an air attack. He had insufficient identification papers, which he explained to the Feld Gend by stating that he had escaped from a PW camp in France. He was sent to FAK 313 for interrogation.

KORENZKI claimed that he had been captured in Southern France during the withdrawal. He was selected by a US Intelligence officer who took him to Chateau Colonges. Here he met several other Germans, and all of them were well treated. Late in February he was offered, and accepted, the job of agent in Germany to locate the HQ of Army Group G and collect information about the First Army, especially its field and AA artillery.

KORENZKI and a W/T operator, with whom he was not to work, were parachuted near STUTTGART. From there he went to FRANKFURT/Main by train. Here he was detained for an investigation, which he passed, but forgot his identification papers there. He then proceeded to MANNHEIM where he crossed the Rhine in spite of the numerous guards. Once across the Rhine he proceeded to collect the information desired by US Intelligence. (He gave the HQ of Army Group G as WACHENHEIM and BAD DUERKHEIM, although the sections in the latter town had moved to KREUZNACH). He claimed that during the air raid in KAISERSLAUTERN he had suddenly made up his mind to return to FRANKFURT and give himself up, but he was arrested by the Feld Gend before he could put this plan into effect.

KORENZKI was wearing an infantry uniform. He had no notes on the information he had collected. FAK 314 reported that there had been an enemy parachuting in the STUTTGART area. A request was sent to FRANKFURT to find the lost identification papers. It was obvious that KORENZKI was lying, and it was suspected that he was working with the W/T operator. Probably the latter could not transmit and KORENZKI wanted to cross the lines in order to inform US Intelligence of what had happened.

As KORENZKI had the qualifications for a good agent, it was contemplated turning him, in spite of the impossibility of determining which intelligence service he would serve more faithfully. At this juncture, DERNBACH left. Later he saw KORENZKI en route to STUTTGART and learned that Hptm WALTER had decided that turning KORENZKI was not worth the risk and had sent him off to be court martialed.

Y. SIMONE

SIMONE had been brought from ST ETIENNE by RAUTENSTRAUCH. As she was not considered suitable for line crossing she was put in I G Fernon, LUDWIGSHAFEN, to observe the French workers. But it was soon noticed that she did not take her work seriously and she was recalled to the FAK. Here she became pregnant and was delivered into police custody until the Labor Office found work for her.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**CI-IIR/57z. PRATTA

SCHIELE sent PRATTA to a factory in LEIPZIG as an interpreter to observe the foreign workers. This was accomplished with the aid of the local III Vi section. After a while PRATTA became dissatisfied with the work and was released at his request to work for the press department of the French Government in SIGMARINGEN.

ea. LOPEZ

This agent was a Spaniard, suspected of having fought for the Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War. He had been working for the naval GFF in Holland, and when FAK 306 took over that area it could not use him. LOPEZ then came to FAK 313 to be a line crosser. For this purpose he was sent to FAT 361, but his use was precluded by excessive drinking.

bb. REBOUL

REBOUL was the wife of Uffz KNEBEL. As she did not want to live with his family in the Ruhr because of air raids, she remained at the FAK, where she was employed as an interpreter with the Russian volunteers. In addition she received W/T and code training in order to go to WUERZBURG to establish permanent radio communication between the FAK and the DORIER brothers.

cc. ROGELIO

Under the PETAIN government ROGELIO had been the warden of LA SALLE prison in PARIS, and then had become an agent of Alst PARIS working for NIEBUER. He was a native Frenchman but his parents and wife lived in BARCELONA, where his father owned a paper factory and a printing press. As he had these Spanish connections, he was assigned to the FAK for long-range missions. In January 1945 it was planned to parachute him near BARCELONA with the following missions:

- (1) To contact his father in BARCELONA and have him print French identification papers and food stamps for the use of ROGELIO and future agents.
- (2) To proceed to CHALON sur Saone, in the vicinity of which he owned a small estate with a stone quarry, and select a parachute landing site and provide it with light signals.
- (3) To set up a transmitter in the stone quarry.
- (4) To continue on to PARIS and find his friend BARTOLOME, who was active with enemy intelligence. Through him ROGELIO was to penetrate the service and arrange to have agents parachuted near KREUZNACH, so that they could be caught by FAK 313 and played back.
- (5) To collect information concerning the Allied front from Switzerland to Luxemburg.
- (6) To discover Germans working for Allied intelligence.
- (7) To ascertain the political and economic conditions in France.

It was impossible to put this operation into effect because neither a plane nor sufficient gasoline were procurable. Later an attempt was made to get a plane to parachute him near CHALON, but this also proved impossible. It was then decided to start ROGELIO from Italy, but here again new difficulties had arisen. Since the beginning of February the VENICE-MILAN air route had been abandoned, and vehicles capable of making such a trip were becoming daily scarcer. It became necessary at times to make the journey by walking and hitchhiking. This ROGELIO could not do because he was not in good physical condition. Eventually DERNBACH decided to go to Italy himself. He planned a trip for 29 March, and was to take along ROGELIO and another agent, @ LOUIS.

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From Italy there were also difficulties. ROGELIO was not strong enough to use the land route into France, and there were no submarines to transport him by sea, so he was to go to BARCELONA by the water route that FLIC was supposed to have established. From Spain it was intended that he go to France and send a postcard to LOUIS, who would be in MONTPELLIER by that time, informing him of his arrival. This information LOUIS would relay to FAK Italy by radio. ROGELIO was to receive 250,000 pesetas and a three-piece W/T set to be operated from his stone quarry.

ad. LOUIS

@ LOUIS came from MONTPELLIER. He had been a good agent of I-L Alst PARIS, working for Sdf PRAGER. The latter had sent LOUIS as a W/T agent to the LORIENT sector in case of an invasion. When the withdrawal occurred, PRAGER had made no efforts to assure LOUIS' escape, so the latter had attached himself to Abw Trupp 357 and had come to Germany with it. DERNBACH kept him in spite of attempts by Leit Stelle I West to reclaim him, mainly because LOUIS did not want to return to PRAGER after the latter's abandonment of him.

At FAK 313 he was trained further in W/T operation, coding and decoding. He practiced daily with ROGELIO. It was intended to drop him either at MONTPELLIER or southeast of PARIS, where he had clandestine connections, and from there he would go to MONTPELLIER. However, as with ROGELIO, it was impossible to get a plane and it was decided to commit him from Italy. From there he would take the land route. His objectives were as follows:

- (1) To ascertain what had happened to AGABENON.
- (2) To discover Allied Intelligence stations along the Southern coast of France.
- (3) To discover Germans working for Allied Intelligence.
- (4) To report the safe arrival of ROGELIO from Spain.
- (5) To observe troop movements in MARSEILLE.
- (6) To locate the gasoline pipeline running from MARSEILLE to the North.
- (7) To establish contact with the White Maquis.
- (8) To recruit agents from smuggler bands and with their help create new land and sea passages between Italy and France.

LOUIS was to have gone to Italy with DERNBACH on 29 March, but the latter's arrest on 11 March interfered.

ee. SUSANNE

Formerly SUSANNE had owned a bistro in Normandy, possibly in CAEN. During the war she was recruited by Sdf BLEICHERT of Alst PARIS, and she was assigned to FAK 313 after the withdrawal. DERNBACH intended to send her into France from Italy in April to establish a W/T station near DIJON where she had friends. Later she was to be joined with ROGELIO, thus creating a check on both of them.

6. VISIT OF SS H/STUF SIMMER

In November 1944 SS H/Stuf SIMMER of Amt IV, accompanied by the Leiter of the Stapo station in BAD KREUZNACH, paid a visit to DERNBACH. He said that he had been sent by HIMMLER to find out what routes, if any, FAK 313 maintained into Switzerland. The RSHA had none at its disposal and the SD wanted to send some agents into Italy. Also SIMMER mentioned something about an SPD official who was either to be sent to Switzerland or to be

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contacted there. Further HILMER wanted to have all possible information on the National Committee for Free Germany because the RSHA files on the subject had been destroyed during an air raid. SIMMER stated that some time earlier an entire Stapo detachment had been killed while engaged in an operation against the Committee. It was imperative that the Western HQ be located.

DERNBACH told SIMMER that reports from LYON pointed to STRASBOURG as the center of the Committee's activities, and that the information had been given to FAK 314 for exploitation. There also was a report that the Committee maintained a radio station at EUGEN, but constant air raids had prevented investigation. SIMMER proposed that FAK 313 organize an operation to exterminate the Committee, but DERNBACH replied that such an objective was in the political field, and authorization would have to be obtained from Leit Stelle III West.

As to the Swiss routes, DERNBACH told SIMMER that they had been established for the exclusive use of agents collecting military intelligence, and permission for their use by SD agents would have to be secured from Leit Stelle III West. SIMMER replied that he would get the proper clearance from that HQ.

DERNBACH reported this visit to the Leit Stelle, which in turn made inquiries at Mil Amt, but no information was available, and FAK 313 heard nothing further from SIMMER. DERNBACH believes that the visit was part of an Amt IV stratagem to determine whether FA units were concerning themselves with political matters, as well as to check on the loyalty of the FA commanders. DERNBACH had been brought into the Abw by Gen OSTER who was involved in the 20 July plot, and presumably Amt IV wanted to neutralize the members of OSTER's circle. Of these GARTHE had been ill for a year, LOHRSCHWIDER was executed for dereliction of duty, and RUDOLF had been arrested, released, rearrested, and finally reported shot while fleeing to Switzerland. DERNBACH's turn came on 11 March when he was arrested for court martial.

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ANNEX V

ADDITIONAL GIS PERSONALITIES AND UNITS IN FRANCE\*

Prisoner: DERMBACH, Friedrich

Obst/Lt in Abwehr

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\*This annex answers (as far as possible) questions contained in briefs and not answered in other annexes of this report.

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**1. OFFICERS OF AST ANGERS (exclusive of III-F)**

ANSCHUTT, Maj. III-Leiter, September 1940-March 1942.

Career: September 1940 transferred from Ast MUELBURG or STUTTGART to ANGERS. March 1942 sent as III-Leiter to Ast ATHENS. Left Abw in 1943 to join a combat unit.

BARTH, Maj. III-C

Career: Before the war was with III-C Ast MUELBURG and came to Ast ANGERS upon its activation. 1941 left the Abw to become a welfare officer in MUELBURG.

BAURMEISTER, Eptm. Administrative officer.

Career: Came to ANGERS from Ast DANZIG. 1943 was still in ANGERS.

BONIN, Udo von, Eptm z S. Ast Leiter, July 1941-August 1942.

Career: July 1940-July 1941 I-M Leiter Alst PARIS. August 1942 transferred to OSLO as Ast Leiter.

BEACHT, Freg Kptn. Ast Leiter, August 1942-February 1944.

Career: Ast Leiter DANZIG until August 1942. February 1944 went to Hafen Kommando in WILHELM SHAVEN.

BEND, Obst/Lt. III-Wi.

Career: Before the war III-Wi in FRANKFURT/Main, then with Ast MUELBURG.

KIRCHNER, Maj. III-H.

Career: III-H assistant Leiter Ast KASSEL. 1943 transferred to Alst PARIS as III-H Leiter.

KURTH, Maj. III-Kgf.

Career: In September 1939 was called to Ast DRESDEN as III-Kgf Leiter. Was transferred to Ast ANGERS upon its activation. After the dissolution of PW camps in 1943 returned to Germany.

LIPS, Arthas, Obst/Lt. I Leiter.

Career: Before the war was a I Sachb. resiter with Ast COLOGNE. August 1940 transferred to ANGERS. June 1941 assigned to Nest BESANCON as Leiter.

MEISSNER, Hans, Freg Kptn. Ast Leiter, August 1940-July 1941.

Career: Before the war with Amt Abw in BERLIN, III-F West. February 1940 assigned to OSLO as XO Norway. Became Ast Leiter OSLO after the invasion in April 1940. August 1940 transferred to ANGERS. July 1941 became III-Leiter Alst PARIS. June 1942 until the end of the war XO Switzerland.

MUELLER-FRIEDING, Maj. III-H.

Career: Before the war probably with Ast MUELBURG as III-H. Beginning of 1941 became AO to an AOK near MUNICH. End of 1941 transferred to an army group as AO.

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PANSEN, Hptn. I technical assistant.

Career: Unknown.

PFEIFFER, Dr, Freg Kptn. I-M Leiter Nest BREST.

Career: Before the war I-M in WILHELMSHAVEN. August 1940 assigned to BREST under Ast ANGERS as Nest Leiter and I-M Leiter. June 1942 transferred to A1st PARIS as III Leiter. Middle of 1943 sent as I-M Sachbearbeiter to Amt Abw BERLIN. Later reported to have become KO Turkey.

RAUSCHER, rank unknown. With registry.

Career: Transferred from Ast VIENNA.

ROMEIKE, O/Lt. III-N.

Career: 1940 transferred from Ast KOENIGSBERG. Returned to KOENIGSBERG in 1942.

SCHAEFER, Kptn/Lt. Administrative officer.

Career: Transferred from I-M BORDEAUX. Left Abw in 1941.

SCHAF, Maj. III-L.

Career: Assigned to ANGERS in 1941 and maintained his office near the FENNES airport.

SCHUMACHER, Kptn/Lt. III-Rue (Ruestung - Armaments).

Career: At the beginning of the war was III-Rue in KIEL. 1940 transferred to ANGERS and sent as III-Rue to Nest NANTES. 1943 still in NANTES.

SOKOLOWSKI, Freg Kptn. Nest Leiter BREST.

Career: Before the war was with III-M WILHELMSHAVEN. June 1942 assigned to ANGERS and sent to BREST as Nest Leiter. Later transferred to DANZIG as Ast Leiter.

TRAEGER, Lt. I assistant.

Career: Unknown.

WEBER, Opst. I Leiter.

Career: Before the war was Nest Leiter KAISERSLAUTERN. August 1940 assigned to Ast ST GERMAIN as I Leiter. March 1942 transferred to ANGERS. March 1944 sent to Felde Gebiet I WIESBADEN.

WISSEL, O/Zahlmeister. Finance officer.

Career: Was finance officer for Ast WIESBADEN before the war. 1940 transferred to ANGERS, and still there in 1943.

WOLLERS, Hptn. Administrative officer.

Career: 1941 transferred from Amt Abw BERLIN. 1942 returned to BERLIN and left the Abw.

WUENSCH, Obst. III Leiter, March 1942-October 1942.

Career: August 1940 transferred from Ast NUREMBERG to Ast ST GERMAIN as III Leiter. March 1942 assigned to ANGERS. October 1942 became Ast Leiter SALZBURG.

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ZELTMANN, Maj. III-C.

Career: Reported to have left the army in 1943 to settle in the East.

2. MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES

GROENING, von, Rittm.

Career: 1941-1942 served in NANTES for II Alst PARIS (Obst/Lt von BRANDENSTEIN). Reported to have been transferred to Norway in 1943.

JUSTINGER, Maj.

Career: Was chief III-F evaluation officer for Alst PARIS. In 1944 visited LYON to investigate material relating to Elektra and RIQUET. After the withdrawal with the evaluation section of Leit Stelle III West.

KIESEWETTER, Hptm.

Career: Until end of 1944 with III-F Ast BRUSSELS. Then assigned to the FAK of von FEIDMANN and Obst/Lt GIESKE. February 1945 appointed liaison officer from Leit Stelle III West to Mil Amt.

PAULATS, O/Stuf.

Career: With the SD in PARIS. Probably worked on the procurement of foreign currency. BENDER had occasional talks with him on this subject.

MERK, O/Lt.

Career: Assistant to Obst EHINGER at III-F DIJON. Was especially concerned with resistance groups, and came into conflict with Ast LYON by working in the latter's area without permission. Attempts were made to have him transferred to III-F LYON, but the conversion into Abw Kommandos and Trupps occurred at the same time, and MERK was given the command of a Trupp under Leit Trupp 354. After the withdrawal he became a FAK Leiter under FAK 314.

MIMRA, Obst/Lt.

Career: Worked with Ast PRAGUE. Transferred to III-F West BERLIN, relieving Maj WERNER. At the beginning of 1944 transferred at his request to Alst PARIS where he worked in the evaluation section. He withdrew with the Leit Stelle to Germany and replaced EHINGER as Leiter FAK 314. This was the only III FAK containing I and II Trupps.

FELUG-HARTUNG.

BERNBACH knows of no such name in the Abw. An individual of this name was said to have been killed in a fracas in BERLIN.

FIEPER, Hptm.

Career: Worked with III-F Ast BRUSSELS under Maj MOERING. 1941-1942 eradicated the Rote Kavelle (W/T net of Russian Intelligence) in the Luftwaffe. This operation involved the arrest of about 200 Luftwaffe officers which resulted in their execution. Some arrests were made in the Air Ministry. Later the SD and WV Fu took over the affair and it was said that a playback known as Rote Drei was conducted by Krim Rat BAUER (or BRAUN) of the RSHA, assisted by Gefr Dr LUNZ from WV Fu. They were in NICE in 1944. After the withdrawal FIEPER presumably became a FAK Leiter under GIESKE.

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RADECKE, O/Lt.

Career: Was motor officer for Abt PARIS. Later he was put in Abt I to run V-Mann OTTO. This occurred under pressure from HIMMLER, which led to the belief that RADECKE was a member of the SD. OTTO had been imprisoned 1939-1940 in France or Belgium. He was released after the armistice and became a V-Mann of Obst RUDOLF, Abt Leiter PARIS. In the course of time III-F ANGERS noticed that doubtful elements were being introduced into the organization, and this information was relayed to PARIS. But investigation was prevented by the transfer of the case to RADECKE. He enlarged the organization considerably and left the Abw in 1943. Later it was reported that RADECKE had difficulties with the RSHA but the causes were not discovered.

RUSCHMEY.

Career: RUSCHMEY was a business man and V-Mann of Obst RUDOLF. He was presumed to work in Spain and Switzerland. DEINBACH saw him in AIX LES BAINS in 1944. RUSCHMEY was known by most Abt I officers. He came from the Rhineland, possibly COLOGNE.

SCHRADER, Hutm.

Career: By profession SCHRADER was a lawyer (from FRANKFURT/Main). From 1940 to Autumn 1942 he was I-c of Military Region B (HQ ANGERS). At the latter time he was assigned to Abw and put in III-F ANGERS. When DEINBACH went to LYON in February 1943, SCHRADER succeeded him as Leiter III-F ANGERS. After the reorganization of the Abw he was given the command of an Abw Trupp in RENNES. He withdrew to Germany and was temporarily with Leit Stelle III West and then transferred to the Fuehrer Reserve. At the end of 1944 he asked DEINBACH for employment in FAX 313 but was refused.

SCHRUEFER, FrI.

Career: She was the Sachbearbeiterin and secretary of Obst WEBER but was not with him. She worked at MK I PARIS of Abt ST GERMAIN, which was disguised as an office of the Heeres Waffen Amt. The MK was near the Arc de Triomphe.

### 3. MISCELLANEOUS UNITS

#### a. Ast ARRAS

Ast ARRAS was constituted at the end of 1942 directly under the jurisdiction of Amt Abw. It had an organic GFF detachment for executive action, and maintained its own court martial. Obst HEIDSCHUCK was brought from Italy to be the Leiter. Previously he had worked for Amt Abw on GFF matters and been the Leiter of Nests BIARRITZ and KENDAYE. After the use of V-weapons was begun, Ast ARRAS was placed partially under a special section of the OKW dealing with V-weapons. The Ast was required to maintain the security of launching sites and pertinent establishments.

During the withdrawal, HIMMLER ordered the SD to take command of the Ast. DEINBACH does not know what became of the Ast personnel. HEIDSCHUCK was neither with Leit Stelle III West nor with any western FA unit. SCHUEBACH had been sent from TOULOUSE to Ast ARRAS. He arrived at the time of the formation of the Abw Kommandos and Trupps and was put in command of a Trupp stationed near ARRAS, probably under von FELDMANN. Later he was assigned to Leit Stelle III West.

#### b. Ast BORDEAUX

A Nest was established at BORDEAUX in 1940 prior to the activation of Ast ANGERS. In 1941, with the advent of a Bezirks Chef, BORDEAUX became an

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Ast, but was made a Nest again in 1942 and placed under the jurisdiction of ANGERS. Obst/Lt LOHRSCHIEDER was Leiter and Obst/Lt FUCHSBAUER was I Leiter. The latter was later replaced by RUDOLF of Alst PARIS. BORDEAUX had four Nests: BIARFIZ, HENTAYE, POITIERS and LA ROCHELLE. The III-F section had little success.

c. Aust RENNES

Properly speaking RENNES was not an Aust. During 1940-1941 Alst PARIS maintained an Aust of Abt II which was administered by Ast ANGERS but remained operationally under PARIS. It was commanded by Hptm KOHLHASS assisted by Lt VOIGT. KOHLHASS left the Abw and in 1943 became I-c of Military Region South (HQ LYON). VOIGT remained in Abt II, and was reported to have joined Regt 800 (Brandenburg). DERNBACH met him in May 1945 in the PW camp BOEHLIGELHEIM.

After Alst PARIS had closed its Aust, Ast ANGERS set up a III-L office in RENNES.

d. SD LYON

In addition to the activities of the SD described in Annexes II and III, it was charged with quashing strikes among French workers, supervision of the Kripo, GFP and all French police organizations, and collaboration with DORICOT's PPF and DARNANDS's Milice. For assistance an Orpo Kdo under Pol Obst von SCHWEINICHEN was placed at the SD's disposal. The purpose of the collaboration was to gather political intelligence and control the political situation, and included the persecution of Jews and Freemasons, as well as individual extermination of members of the Resistance.

Stubaf Dr KNAAB was the Leiter, H/Stuf HOLLERT deputy Leiter, O/Stuf BARBI executive officer, and H/Stuf MORITZ gathered the information on undesirable minorities.

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CI FINAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 130

SOMMER, formerly with the SD in France and Italy, worked for the French Intelligence Service after the war and was sent to Spain, where he was engaged by the Spanish Intelligence Service. He has information of the new Spanish Intelligence and of attempts of former SIS personnel to evade repatriation from Spain by emigrating to Argentina.

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- II. Telephone Conversation Between CHURCHILL and REYNAUD
- III. The Establishment of Wireless Invasion-Nets in France
- IV. Penetration of The Spanish Intelligence Service
- V. Personalities

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CI-RIR/130

1. REFERENCES

USFET MIS Center CI-PIR/138, dtd 30 Sep 46

2. PERSONAL DATA

- a. SURNAME: SOMMER
- b. CHRISTIAN NAME: Hans
- c. ALIASES: SENNER, Herbert and STEPHAN, Hans
- d. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 26 Jun 14 in NORTORF (near KIEL)
- e. NATIONALITY CLAIMED: German
- f. OCCUPATION: Merchant
- g. RELIGION: Protestant
- h. DESCRIPTION:
  - (1) HEIGHT: 1.71 m
  - (2) WEIGHT: 140 lbs
  - (3) BUILD: medium
  - (4) FACE: oval
  - (5) HAIR: brown
  - (6) EYES: brown
  - (7) PHYSICAL PECULIARITIES or DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: None
- i. LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS: Calle Velasquez 134, MADRID
- j. LANGUAGES: German, French, Spanish, English, some Italian
- k. FATHER: Theodore SOMMER, KIEL
- l. MOTHER: Anna SOMMER nee ROESCHMAN (53), KIEL
- m. IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: None

3. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

- a. SOURCE OF PRISONER INCLUDING ARRESTING AGENCY: Direccion de Seguridad, MADRID
- b. ACCEPTED ON RECOMMENDATION OF REQUEST OF: G-2 (CIB) USFET
- c. DATE OF ARRIVAL: 22 Aug 46 from CIE 76, ASPERG
- d. RESUME OF ANY REPORTS AND/OR DOCUMENTS SENT IN WITH PRISONER: SOMMER's report on his intelligence activities, written at CIE 76.
- e. RESULTS OF NAME CHECK AGAINST PERSONALITY CARD INDEX: Pink Cards 648 and 47229
- f. BRIEFS UPON WHICH PRISONER WAS INTERROGATED: Briefs from the Office of Military Government for Germany, APO 742, Exploitation of German Archives Branch, dtd 31 Jul 46.

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- g. NAMES AND UNIT OF INTERROGATOR: Louis FISCHER, WD Civilian, 7707 MIS Center, APO 757.
- h. PRISONER'S ATTITUDE AND REACTIONS: Seemingly cooperative.
- i. EVALUATION OF PRISONER'S RELIABILITY: Not reliable. The information given by SOMMER appears to be genuine, but various considerations make its 100% accuracy doubtful.

4. REPORTa. Pre-GIS Career

26 Jun 14 Born in NORTORF, Germany, where he remained until May 1933. Finished high school at RENDSBURG in 1932.

1931 Joined the RJ.

May 1933 Worked for the Paul Kunat export firm in HAMBURG.

October 1934 Went to HOLTENAU, near KIEL, where he found work as a clerk in the Arbeitsdienst.

June 1935 Joined the NSDAP. Went back to NORTORF and stayed with his family, working in his father's bank.

October 1936 Joined the Wehrmacht and was sent to HALLÉ for an English language course lasting eight weeks. Spent a week in LONDON on furlough.

December 1936 Stationed at PASEWALK with the 2 Sig Bn (attached to the 2 Inf Div of STETTIN) as a radio operator.

October 1938 Discharged from the Wehrmacht as ROA (Reserve Officer Candidate). Went to live with his family, which had moved to KIEL. Unemployed until May 1939.

May 1939 Called into the 48 Sig Bn in BRESLAU as a sergeant. Fought in Poland.

b. GIS Career

April 1940 Through the efforts of Helmuth LOOHS, whom SOMMER had met in PASEWALK in 1936, he was requested by the SD after an exchange of letters between SOMMER and LOOHS, who worked in Amt III, BERLIN. SOMMER was discharged from the Wehrmacht and reported to SS-O/Stuf Heinrich BERNHARDT of Amt VI, where he was given three months of intelligence training.

July 1940 Sent to PARIS, where he was attached to the German Consulate as as Amt VI Deputy under the guise of an assistant to the Cultural Attache. He had four agents, who furnished him with information on political, Free Mason and ecclesiastical matters. Promoted to SS-U/Stuf and later to SS-O/Stuf.

October 1941 Jailed by the SS for having a French fiancée. Began sentence at FRESNES, later removed to BERLIN.

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April 1942 Released and re-employed by Amt VI. Sent to the German Consulate at MARSEILLE, where he had 20 agents who kept him informed on matters pertaining to Switzerland and Spain.

September 1944 Went to BERLIN because of the invasion of Southern France. Assigned to the German Consulate in SAN REMO, Italy, as an Amt VI Deputy in charge of 30 agents collecting information on Italian internal affairs.

April 1945 Went to NICE and contacted the French Deuxieme Bureau (French Intelligence Service) as to possible employment with them.

August 1945 Started to work for the Deuxieme Bureau and was sent to Spain. Arrested at the border and interned.

February 1946 Freed by friends and proceeded to MADRID to begin his intelligence work.

April 1946 Rearrested at the request of the US Embassy in MADRID and flown to Germany.

c. SOMMER's Connection with the Deuxieme Bureau

It was in October 1941 that SOMMER allegedly first became aware of the narrow-mindedness of the Nazi regime. He could not grasp why, for having a French fiancée, he was classified as unworthy to hold a responsible job and even jailed. This infringement on his personal liberty and freedom of movement made him realize that something was amiss with what he believed was a just war waged by Germany against the Allies. At the same time he recognized the insincere game Germany was playing with France. Having lived in France and knowing the mentality of the French, he suddenly lamented their short-sightedness in not perceiving how Germany was duping them. He felt obligated to his fiancée and to his conscience to make amends and decided to shed his affiliations with the GIS and the SS. SOMMER claims that he intended to join the Deuxieme Bureau immediately upon his discharge from prison in April 1942, but, aware of the omniscience of the GIS, he dared not attempt it. His first chance came in February 1945 while he was Amt VI Deputy in SAN REMO, Italy, when a French agent by the name of SOLETTI was arrested by the Germans on the Franco-Italian border. SOMMER succeeded in having SOLETTI released in his custody and dispatched him to NICE with a view to establishing relations for him (SOMMER) with the Deuxieme Bureau. Because of the intervening collapse of the Italian front, nothing further came of this connection.

SOMMER withdrew with the German troops from SAN REMO towards GENOA in April 1945, left the troops at SAVONA and reached NICE about May 45. His colleagues of Amt VI, SAN REMO, Werner NEISSER and Guy DELIOUX, went with him. Once in NICE, SOMMER contacted an old friend, Paul KOEHLER, living at PAGOMAS (nr CANNES) and learned from him that he (KOEHLER) was now a member of the Deuxieme Bureau and could bring SOMMER in if SOMMER so desired. SOMMER agreed, under the stipulation that French citizenship should later be provided for him. KOEHLER indicated that this would be an easy matter. NEISSER and DELIOUX also decided to join the Deuxieme Bureau.

The following day SOMMER met the Deuxieme Bureau Chief of NICE, who was known to everyone only as Le Capitaine. Nothing definite was decided at this meeting, however, as the Regional Chief at MARSEILLE, Commandant Georges HENRY, was expected momentarily in order to pass on all applicants. SOMMER was approved and was to go to Spain via TOULOUSE. NEISSER was to go to Italy via NICE and DELIOUX's territory was to be Switzerland, with headquarters in LYON.

When SOMMER arrived in TOULOUSE, he was put up at the Hotel Terminus, using the false French carte d'identite made out to Hans STEPHAN which had been given to him by the Deuxieme Bureau in NICE. According to plan, SOMMER reported to the Commissaire de la Securite Militaire where he was told to sit tight until the

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arrival of Monsieur LEON, the Deuxieme Bureau's Branch Chief at PERFIGNAN. When LEON arrived, accompanied by his deputy, Monsieur MICHEL, SOMMER was taken to CARBONNE, put in a hotel, and told to remain there for another four weeks to await further instructions. In case of emergency he was to call PERFIGNAN 7454 or get in touch with the Captain of the Gendarmerie, who would notify MICHEL.

Three weeks of idleness passed before SOMMER was ordered to proceed to CARCASSONNE about 1 Jul 45. He met LEON and MICHEL in a private house near the RR station. For his immediate task, he was instructed to go to Spain and there to contact old German Abwehr and SD agents. He was to tell them that he had escaped from SAN REMO and now wished to be of service to them, preferably in France, as the one place intimately known to him. LEON wanted the names and addresses of German and French agents who had formerly operated between MARSEILLE and BORDEAUX and were still not arrested by the French.

As LEON was fully convinced of the existence of the remnants of the GIS in Spain, employing French nationals, it was also to be SOMMER's task to uncover them and under some pretext bring them back to France.

The possibility of SOMMER's joining the Spanish Intelligence Service was also touched on by LEON. This plan was only to be used if all others failed. LEON told SOMMER not to worry too much about the Spanish Intelligence Service, which he termed fumbling and impotent. SOMMER received no schooling on the present Deuxieme Bureau and its methods, but was told to go ahead and operate on the basis of his many years' experience as an Abwehr Officer. It was understood that SOMMER was not to be a paid agent, but he did receive 20,000 pesetas from LEON as expense money. According to SOMMER, his motives for joining the Deuxieme Bureau were personal and not monetary.

LEON informed SOMMER that he could be reached through Paulina ALTUVEZ, 44 Calle Villadornat, BARCELONA. All the letters sent through this address were to bear the signature "Juan", but no replies would be sent to SOMMER. On 10 Aug 45 LEON drove SOMMER down to the border town of PUIGCERDA, at which point he was to enter Spain.

LEON, counting on the inefficiency of the Spanish Government, believed that SOMMER, as a former intelligence officer, would encounter no difficulty whatsoever in Spain and should therefore be able to report back to PERFIGNAN with the desired information within six weeks. LEON's miscalculation, however, resulted in the arrest and detention of SOMMER by the Spanish at Camp Miranda from August 1945 until February 1946. It was relatively easy for SOMMER to send letters to LEON through ALTUVEZ, because many people entered and left the camp without being searched.

When SOMMER was finally released from the camp, he went to MADRID to carry out the long-delayed mission for the Deuxieme Bureau.

#### d. The Alleged New Spanish Intelligence Service

SOMMER came to Spain under the false French carte d'identite of Hans STEPHAN. It was supposed to explain his success in reaching Spain after a flight from SAN REMO via France. When he was arrested at PUIGCERDA, SOMMER revealed his real identity, which LEON had told him to do. It was a necessary step, because SOMMER was known in Spain as a GIS agent and his future plans made it imperative for him to be recognized.

When SOMMER was released from Camp Miranda in February 1946, he went to MADRID. His attention was first called to the matter of a New Spanish Intelligence Service through a meeting with a former agent of the Central Abwehr Agency in France, Raymond HEVRARD, 2 ANDRE, 3 GALLARDO, now living in MADRID. HEVRARD had been sent to Italy by Mil Amt in March 1945, had been overtaken there by the defeat of Germany, had infiltrated into the Italian Partisans as a Spanish Loyalist, and had then escaped to Spain. He is married to a Spanish woman and took an active part in the Spanish Civil War on FRANCO's side. On his arrival in Spain in February 1946, HEVRARD ran across the Spaniard PENA, whom he had known in the Central Abwehr Agency in France.

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PENA told HEVRARD that his friend VICENTE was forming a new Spanish Intelligence Agency in agreement with FRANCO. VICENTE is a Falange leader and is in close contact with FRANCO in his capacity as head of the Falangist Servicio de Investigacione Informacion, an organization serving internal security. VICENTE proposed to FRANCO that an intelligence service on an entirely new basis be formed. He believed that the Servicio de Informacion Militar, an army information service, had proved a failure, that its officers were corrupt, and that it was regularly penetrated by enemy intelligence. He thought that after the downfall of the Axis Powers, Spain was fated to play a leading role in Europe and would therefore need an efficient intelligence service. His plan was approved and the necessary funds made available. The sum must have been considerable, since VICENTE paid HEVRARD, who had been hired as an agent, 8000 pesetas monthly plus expenses and the other agents were receiving 5000 pesetas, an unheard amount in previous Spanish intelligence circles.

As his first priority project, VICENTE applied himself to building up a net in France and North Africa, together with the establishment of contact with possible German and Italian resistance movements. Using the methods used by the Germans, he intended to integrate his people regularly into the Spanish Foreign Service, plant agents in Spanish embassies and consulates, and make use of the Falangists already in the service of the government. He envisioned the use of many former Axis agents of Spanish nationality and made some of his men take diplomatic courses and examinations for future assignments. Juan de ARENZANA, son of the Spanish Consul-General in MARSEILLE, remarked to SOMMER that these future intelligence agents, passing as diplomats in the eyes of the world, would destroy whatever reputation Spain might still have in other countries. VICENTE repeatedly high-pressed the Foreign Office to make the diplomatic examinations easy for his men.

SOMMER had only one interview with VICENTE, shortly before his second arrest in April 1946. He gave SOMMER the impression of being a man of exceptional energy and capability, and a convinced Falangist and idealist who was stubbornly set in his political outlook. VICENTE was unable to recognize the de Gaullist rightist tendency in present-day France, but insisted rather on helping and making use of the French collaborationists now living in exile in Spain. Some of these people were:

MOYNIER, Yves, & MAGICIER, Gilbert	- BARCELONA
FUTLAU, Adrien	- BARCELONA
TICHEYRE, Jose	- BARCELONA
FRECHOU, Paul	- MADRID
VOINEAU, Robert	- MADRID
GUICHARD, Guido	- MADRID
DORO, Michael, & LERA	- MADRID
ENAILLE, Andre	- MADRID
AUGUSTIN, (fnu)	- MADRID

SOMMER believes that AUGUSTIN succeeded in bringing two agents, QUEYRAT and AUBOND, into VICENTE's service.

For the building of the organization in France, HEVRARD was brought forward by PENA and received identity documents bearing the Spanish name of GALLARDO from VICENTE. HEVRARD is an agent of many years' experience, is very careful in his work, and recruits his agents from the fertile field of French emigres, which he knows very well. He has already installed wireless stations in SAN SEBASTIAN and BARCELONA and a net is soon to extend to France, covering TOULOUSE, MARSEILLE, BORDEAUX, LYON, PARIS, REIMS, and LILLE. As radio operators, HEVRARD intends to

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use old Abwehr agents, known to him through his past connections with that organization. Preparations were also being made for intelligence coverage of most of the other European and American countries.

While in BARCELONA, HEVRARD had already succeeded in establishing contact with a commissaire (name unknown) of the Securite Militaire who was to be transferred from MARSEILLE to PARIS. This commissaire offered to collaborate for money. VICENTE approved the spending of this money and when SOMMER was arrested, HEVRARD had just come from BARCELONA to close the deal. HEVRARD brought SOMMER together with VICENTE and an agreement was worked out whereby SOMMER should go to France. It was planned to have him go through Switzerland. SOMMER's idea was to set up radio stations with trained personnel and work together with the Deuxieme Bureau, thereby assuring the control of the whole net, while at the same time ostensibly collaborating with the Spanish. When the wireless net was in operation, SOMMER was to inform VICENTE on the following matters:

1. French troop concentrations on the French-Spanish border from BO D'AUXX to the Mediterranean.
2. The uncovering and removal of Spanish Loyalist groups now exiled in France.
3. Establishment of contact with French anti-Communist elements not satisfied with the present French regime.

Another plan of VICENTE's was to have a strong organization in North Africa fostering unrest among the Arabs against the French. He wanted quick results in order to justify his brain-child and its large expenditures to FRANCO.

SOMMER never had a chance to return to France and see LEON and MICHEL again. Before he was arrested and brought to Germany, he wrote them one letter through the Barcelona address advising them of his work. He also claims that no one in Spain knew of his connection with the Deuxieme Bureau and that he enjoyed the full confidence of VICENTE. Owing to the short time SOMMER was in Spain, he had no chance to learn the identity of VICENTE's other German collaborators. VICENTE was known to prepare a monthly progress report of his findings, which went to FRANCO as a secret report. Shortly before SOMMER's arrest, he had a glimpse of one of these reports.

e. The Departure of Former GIS Officers from Spain to Argentina

SOMMER was interrogated on the above subject, but in view of the fact that his stay and associations with various groups in Spain were limited to a few weeks, his information is sketchy.

SOMMER did not know about the departure of these former Abwehr Officers until he went to visit HORCHER in MADRID, during the latter part of 1945. HORCHER is a well-known restaurateur, part-owner of the famed Cabaret Maxime in PARIS. He was active in the Abwehr for many years and was later employed by Amt VI. In 1944 Amt VI planned to open a new restaurant in CANNES, along the same lines as Maxime's, managed by HORCHER, which was to have been used as an intelligence gathering agency. The Hotel Martinez was being considered for the purpose. While in Southern France SOMMER was introduced to HORCHER in MARSEILLE and was told to make the necessary arrangements. The Hotel Martinez was owned by an Italian of that name, who worked for the Italian Intelligence Service until 1943, when he switched over to the GIS. SOMMER last saw MARTINEZ in MILAN in the latter part of February 1945. He is believed to be in Switzerland at the present time. Nothing ever developed in connection with this proposed deal between HORCHER and MARTINEZ, so HORCHER went to MADRID and opened a restaurant there situated at 6 Calle Alfonso XII and it is now a rendezvous for Axis Intelligence personnel.

After SOMMER's release from Camp Miranda, he went to HORCHER, who informed him of his earnest intention to go to Argentina instead of returning to

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Germany. This was to be accomplished through a certain REUTER, an Argentine citizen who had been employed in PARIS during the war as an agent of Amt VI. This Argentinian was used by Amt VI to recruit likely contacts for the GIS among the Latin Americans living in France. SOMMER knows of two of these agents, MARTELL, the Argentine Consul in MARSEILLE, and a Cuban, Anibal de MESA, who were rounded up by REUTER.

According to SOMMER, REUTER was caught when the American troops marched into PARIS in 1944, but after some six weeks' internment he talked himself free on the basis of his Argentine citizenship. REUTER was in contact with HORCHER from December 1944 until February 1946, at the end of which month he succeeded in embarking for BUENOS AIRES. REUTER had some difficulty with navicerts, but in the end he managed to get away safely. HORCHER told SOMMER that he had asked REUTER to look around in BUENOS AIRES for a suitable building in which to install a restaurant.

When HORCHER informed SOMMER of his intention to go to Argentina, SOMMER sensed immediately that something important was going on. Since Gen KRAMER, H/Stuf FULMES, Obst/Lt FUCHS, O/Lt MOLL and quite a number of other officers in active service were hiding in Spain (SOMMER claims that he had a list with addresses of hidden officers which he destroyed when arrested by the Spanish police) and since SOMMER had found it impossible to contact them at that time, he got in touch with ESCAT, a Frenchman and former member of the Action Francaise and the editor of the magazine "Je Suis Partout" in PARIS. ESCAT is known as an active pro-German Frenchman and had the closest contact with the German General Staff and with the Foreign Office. He was arrested during the war (1939-1940) in PARIS and put in a concentration camp because of his pro-German feelings. After the armistice, ESCAT appeared in leading positions. In December 1944, ESCAT, together with his wife and two of his co-workers (names unknown to SOMMER), were sent to MADRID by plane with a special mission. There was a general rumor to the effect that ESCAT, by order of the German Foreign Office, was to sound out the Allies on the possibilities of a separate peace. Now, however, SOMMER is convinced that ESCAT's true mission was an entirely different one, possibly that of financing the Germans who were already in Spain and those who would have to hide there in the future. ESCAT had allegedly received large sums of money in BERLIN for just that purpose.

The course of action planned by SOMMER was to contact ESCAT in order to find out the names and the addresses of German officers and intelligence personnel and through them uncover the whereabouts of some French nationals working with the GIS.

SOMMER knew ESCAT from France and met him again in MADRID through his intimate friend, Robert VOINEAU, in whom ESCAT had absolute confidence, having known him for many years. Before the planned meeting with ESCAT, VOINEAU informed SOMMER that he had very good news from VICENTE. VICENTE had given VOINEAU the confidential information that now, after PERON's victory in Argentina, the plan concerning the departure of Germans for that country had taken a tangible form. The problem of securing false papers in order to deceive the Allies had already been solved. VOINEAU gave SOMMER estimates that between 150 and 200 Germans were to be shipped from CADIZ to Argentina, a few at a time. The first shipment would start in August or September 1946. SOMMER's presumptions on this were further confirmed by HORCHER.

At the meeting with ESCAT, which took place in a small restaurant in MADRID about 27 Mar 46, SOMMER proceeded carefully on the subject of Argentina. ESCAT told SOMMER that he had known PERON for many years and that they were close friends. ESCAT did not go any further into his friendship with PERON, but gave the impression that at one time or another he had been in Argentina and that the friendship had started there. SOMMER believes that ESCAT had been in communication with PERON through the Argentine Embassy in MADRID. During the meeting, ESCAT told SOMMER that he himself would undoubtedly leave for Argentina soon. SOMMER does not know whether or not he did actually go there. The conversation was interrupted at one point by a phone call for ESCAT. When he returned he said, "Still another one who cannot stay in hiding any longer. Everybody is asking when things will get going." This remark confirmed SOMMER's opinion that

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ESCAT might be leading the departure of Germans for Argentina. ESCAT is known to be an extremely careful and intelligent man. SOMMER did not feel at the time that he could safely probe too far into the subject of Argentina, inasmuch as this was his first meeting with ESCAT and it might have raised doubts and suspicions. After the conversation ESCAT questioned VOINEAU on SOMMER's reliability, which VOINEAU assured him to be 100%.

SOMMER had arranged another meeting with ESCAT for the coming week, but in the meantime he received a letter from an Abwehr agent, Hans MARTIN, @ Juan MARTIN. He was active in FIGULRAS as a German agent until March 1945, at which time he became the German Red Cross representative. At the end of 1945 he was warned by his Spanish friends to go into hiding, because the Allies wanted to extradite him. He hid in BARCELONA and presumably remained there, since SOMMER was asked to reply to his letter through Antonio RUIZ, Plaza Recomir 6, BARCELONA or through a certain KUHN, Letra B, Calle Volins Rey, BARCELONA.

In this letter, MARTIN informed SOMMER that friends had arrived at his hiding place and that they were all making preparation for a trip to their friend PERON, to start in two months. He also advised SOMMER to hide, as the pressure of the Allies was increasing every day. He therefore proposed that SOMMER join him in BARCELONA. A few days after this letter, SOMMER received another one from Jose TICHEYRE, a Frenchman who had been an Abwehr agent in PARIS and who was sent to Spain at the beginning of 1944. He worked in Spain together with Lopez MORENO, a member of the Spanish Intelligence Service and now of the Spanish General Staff. The last known address of TICHEYRE is 58 Ronda San Antonio, BARCELONA. In the letter TICHEYRE also mentioned his intention of going to Argentina.

At the second meeting with ESCAT about 10 Apr 46, there was talk about hiding the German officers, especially Gen KRAMER, who, betrayed by a German, had just managed to be brought from his hiding place in MADRID to the rural estate of a Spanish officer. It was mentioned that all those Germans who gave the American authorities information were known to these men in hiding and to the Spanish and were listed on a black list. It was further stated that proper measures had been taken and that the situation could be regarded as safe. The problem of Argentina was not touched upon that night, because the meeting took place in a much-frequented locale and had to be brief.

ESCAT's group, consisting of political fanatics joined together by a common bond of friendship extending over many years, is not an easy circle to penetrate. SOMMER feels himself fortunate to have been able, as a newcomer, to gain knowledge, little as it is, on the Argentine question.

This entire group is also closely tied up with the Spanish authorities, police and army. Any member of this group wanted by the Allies is being warned ahead of time by the Spanish police, giving him time to go into hiding. SOMMER is firmly convinced that in back of the whole Argentine scheme there is a well-considered plan to quietly create a central German intelligence agency with the assistance of the Argentine government. No other country is trusted as much by the Fascists as Argentina. These Fascist circles are of the opinion that the relations between the Allies will grow steadily worse and that another war is inevitable. They would take the greatest possible advantage of such a situation to realize their own hopes.

SOMMER could not attend the proposed third meeting with ESCAT, because he was arrested. In the prison of Carabanchel he met Stand Miquel ESQUERRA, Spanish citizen in the Waffen SS who had seen action with the Blue Division which fought on the Eastern Front. ESQUERRA also mentioned Argentina, having heard something on the subject through his wife when she had visited him.

#### f. French Collaborationists Now in Italy

During his work with the GIS in MARSEILLE and later in SAN REMO, SOMMER had many opportunities to observe the infiltration of former French collaborationists into Italy. This observation was augmented by information received by him from SS-Stubaf GOEL, Amt VI Chief in MILAN.

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In August 1944, during the German evacuation of France, many leading figures of the French collaborationist groups, together with a great number of other members, withdrew to Germany with the retreating German troops. An estimated 5,000 Milice (Militia) members, 6,000 PPF (Partie Populaire Francaise) members and several smaller groups boosted the aggregate figure to 15,000. These so-called French refugees constituted a much sought-after reservoir of potential material for the Abwehr and Amt VI.

DORJOT, Chief of the PPF, Joseph DAINAND of the Milice, Marcel BUCARD, leader of the Fascist "Francistes," and Marcel DEAT of the RNP (Rassemblement National Populaire) were approached by Abwehr officers, who had already made plans for the use of these Frenchmen. They were to return to their native land and engage in intelligence work for the Germans. The party chiefs agreed to the plan with the proviso that transportation was to be assured by the GIS and, once the agents were back in France, that they should be permitted to take up the reorganization of their respective parties. The plan was approved by SCHELLERBERG, Chief of Amt VI. SOMMER claims that the 15,000 Frenchmen in Germany did not comprise 10% of the Fascist-minded open collaborators still living in France. It would have been an easy matter to undertake reorganization with a receptive body of such magnitude, especially since countless other French people were not too enthusiastic over losing their homes and other possessions as their price of liberation. In Germany it was decided to send agents back to France via Italy, through INNSBRUCK, VIENNA and MILAN, instead of through Alsace-Lorraine, thereby reducing the chances of apprehension. The Amt VI offices in MILAN, TRIESTE and SAN REMO were instructed to look out for these agents and assist them in every way possible. SOMMER met some of them in September 1944 and April 1945.

The Milice, possessing the most capable men of all the collaborationist groups, had an agency in WILSBACH under the leadership of two former French officers, DEGENS and FILIOL, who selected prospective candidates and instructed them in future work. Both DEGENS and FILIOL had formerly acted as liaison officers with Amt VI. Another office of the Milice was established in MILAN under KNIPFING.

The PPF maintained an office and wireless school near CONSTANCO on Lake Constance in charge of BARTHOLEMY, who also had a small office in MILAN. Still another office was in SAN REMO, operated by the former PPF Chief Pierre FETTER. The office in SAN REMO was equipped with wireless devices.

At the end of the war in May 1945, BARTHOLEMY had about 40 or 50 finished agents in Italy who never had a chance to be set up in France. Among these agents were leaders of the PPF, many of them chagrined at being stranded in Italy. Some of them were equipped with radios and all of them had automatic weapons and large sums of money.

In addition to the aforementioned agents, more than 400 other members of the party were brought to Italy during January 1945. Practically all of the above-mentioned 15,000 Frenchmen in Germany were living on the German economy, already taxed to its capacity, so it was convenient and expedient to relieve the burden by dumping these people on their relatives in Italy, after establishing the fact that relatives in Italy did exist. They were not schooled in intelligence and were to play subordinate roles in France. It is SOMMER's opinion that because of their Fascist-minded political outlook, their knowledge of the Italian language, and connections gained through their relatives, the continued presence of these men in Italy constitutes a perpetual hazard to an orderly peace.

The same situation is true with the Milice. In February 1945, DARNAND and 800 of his followers arrived in MILAN with the idea of establishing an independent brown maquis group to fight alongside the Brigada Nera against the Italian Partisan groups. Later on, the same group was to fight the Allies in France, with special attention paid to sabotage and the disruption of oil lines between MARSEILLE and the front. That no more than 800 came to Italy out of the 5,000 who entered France was due to the fact that 3,000 of them joined the SS Infantry Division Charlemagne and another 1,000 were put in war plants.

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No more than approximately 15 agents succeeded in reaching France. They were transported under cover of darkness in small speedboats from SAN REMO to their destination, SAN RAPHAEL. According to SOMMER, the other agents are still in hiding in Italy. Because LEGANS, FILIOL and GOMBART, a good friend of DARNARD and a regional chief of the Milice, were former members of Eugene DELONCLE's Cagoulards (former pro-Fascist French party) and as such were in contact with the Italian Intelligence Service in 1936 and 1937, specifically with BARANCO and PETINATTI, SOMMER assumes that these contacts are now being renewed.

Marcel DEAT with his entire staff is supposed to be in Italy still.

Joseph GARETTE, leader of the Jeunesse Europeenne, a collaborationist youth movement, is known to be in Italy, as well as about 15 of his staff, all of whom were trained by two Amt VI agents (names unknown to SOMMER). GARETTE's main mission in France was to reorganize the youth group and fight the Allies in the area around the Pyrenees.

PALMIERI, a former agent of the PARIS Abwehr office, came to Italy about the first week in March 1945, accompanied by five men, including a certain COTY, a restaurateur in PARIS. This small group is of Corsican descent, speaks fluent Italian, and arrived in MILAN with false Swiss papers. Their last address was in MILAN.

SOMMER estimates the number of trained French agents now hiding in Italy to be about 100, with approximately another 1,400 active political collaborationists scattered throughout Northern Italy. Knowing the mentality of these people, SOMMER is convinced that their work did not end with the cessation of hostilities and that some clandestine activity must be going on.

##### 5. CONCLUSIONS

SOMMER came to this Center under the name Herbert SENNER and the interrogation proceeded according to the knowledge brief, with SOMMER seemingly co-operating 100%. It was not possible at this Center to check the veracity of his information. Even now, although in possession of the French data on SOMMER, which hardly differs at all from our version on the general intelligence aspect, although it shows discrepancies in SOMMER's real name, birthplace, and other pre-GIS data, it should be borne in mind that he still may be withholding information from us.

When confronted with the new evidence, SOMMER readily admitted that the name SENNER, as well as all the other details of his pre-GIS career, were given to him by Amt VI at the time he joined them. He was told to forget his real name completely and to be known only under the name SENNER.

When SOMMER joined the Deuxieme Bureau, he revealed his family name, but at CIE 76, allegedly because of harsh treatment, he decided to withhold the truth. At this Center, in spite of self-admitted satisfaction with the treatment, he still concealed the true facts. SOMMER claimed that he feared complications, solitary confinement, and a prolonged stay in this Center, if he revealed his real name.

SOMMER as a personality is not to be considered reliable, but his information as given in this report is seemingly genuine. He is shrewd, calculating and opportunistic. He is ready to work for his former enemies and at the same time professes to be a nationalist. At all times he is ready to hunt with the hounds and run with the hare.

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6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In compliance with the automatic arrest policy, SOMMER should be interned, unless recommendations are made by US Intelligence agencies to exploit his contacts.

LF/HC/rh

For the Commanding Officer:

*John Heinig*  
JOHN HEINIG  
Capt AUS  
Chief, CI Section

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**SECRET**CI-FIR/130  
10 Dec 46HEADQUARTERS  
7707 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER  
APO 757 US ARMYANNEX ITHE STORY OF STEVENS AND BEST

Prisoner: SS-O/Stuf SOMMER, Hans

SD man in France and Italy

SOMMER's version of this story probably does not differ greatly from the facts already known, but considering that Dr FISCHER himself related the entire story to SOMMER, it may perhaps add information, however small, to the history of this kidnapping.

When SOMMER came to PARIS in July 1940, one of the four agents under him in Amt VI was Dr FISCHER, a man about 50 years old, whose appointment to the Paris office of Amt VI was not so much a recognition of his talent; as a reward to FISCHER for his conscientiousness.

FISCHER was the editor of a Catholic paper in Germany until 1933 when, realizing the anti-Catholic tendencies of the NSDAP, he left Germany and settled in France. In the next few years his emigre life took him to many countries before he finally reached Holland in 1938. At this time homesickness overtook him and he decided to return to Germany. Not knowing what kind of reception he might encounter there after his voluntary exile of many years, FISCHER thought it necessary to do some service for his country, thereby assuring his re-entry into Germany.

He concocted a fantastic story about an underground movement in Germany and presented it to STEVENS and BEST, the leaders of the British Intelligence Service for Western Europe, in THE HAGUE, Holland. FISCHER proved to them that he was an anti-Nazi by having been away from Germany since 1933 and after gaining their confidence proceeded to draw a picture of a wide movement embracing people from all walks of life. STEVENS and BEST, sensing something big, apparently swallowed the story and gave operational directions to FISCHER, who simply wrote a letter to the ND office in BERLIN explaining the whole matter and asking their help in making the hoax look like the real thing. A certain CHRISTENSEN was sent to Holland by the ND with a list of alleged personalities engaged in the underground movement (most of them were fictitious, but some real names of higher Wehrmacht and Party people were included, in order not to arouse suspicion in STEVENS and BEST). FISCHER introduced CHRISTENSEN as one of the leaders of the movement and in the ensuing conversation it was decided to establish direct radio contact between BERLIN and THE HAGUE for quick communication. A radio station was put in operation by the ND and a disguised officer was sent to BERLIN in charge of the station. He was arrested and forced to transmit material handed to him by the GIS. In the meantime, German intelligence agents made frequent trips to Holland and consulted with STEVENS and BEST. The agents always presented themselves as Wehrmacht officers of the underground movement, while trying to obtain information from the British which they could use to their advantage. STEVENS and BEST still suspected nothing. The GIS played a cagey game and soon suggested that they might meet some high leaders of the movement at the border town of VENLO, because the continuous flow of people between Germany and Holland might become suspicious and could easily jeopardize the success of the movement. Unsuspecting, STEVENS and BEST traveled to VENLO, where in a designated house, they were arrested by German troops and taken to German.

The Netherlands General Staff knew about the contact STEVENS and BEST had with the bogus German underground movement and, while not opposing it, they viewed the negotiations with scepticism. When this meeting took place at VENLO, the Netherlands General Staff, suspected foul play, dispatched some troops to the border, but events moved too rapidly for them to go into action and prevent the arrest and removal of the two men.

SOMMER claims that STEVENS and BEST subsequently gave the GIS a thorough and precise picture of the entire British Intelligence set-up.

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10 Dec 46HEADQUARTERS  
7707 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER  
APO 757 US ARMYANNEX IITELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN CHURCHILL AND REYNAUD

Prisoner: SS-O/Stuf SOMMER, Hans

SD man in France and Italy

Late in 1939 O/Stuf LORENZ was sent to Italy by Amt VI with the task of reaching France as soon as possible. At that time the GIC possessed no intelligence data on France and was unable to provide LORENZ with even one agent's address. Handicapped by such odds, LORENZ succeeded in reaching PARIS with a false Swiss passport, but with bona fide visas obtained in Italy. One evening, strolling in the Bois de Boulogne, he engaged a young girl in conversation in the course of which she mentioned that she was a telephonist in REYNAUD's cabinet. In the ensuing conversation, much to LORENZ's surprise, she told him about a telephone conversation between CHURCHILL and REYNAUD which had taken place several days previously, in which CHURCHILL gave his consent to a plan to partition Germany. She allegedly overheard the entire conversation at the switchboard. LORENZ, with this good piece of chance information in his possession, returned to Germany, where the whole matter was widely propagandized. LORENZ received the Iron Cross for this piece of work.

SOMMER claims that Amt VI gained tremendous prestige with this one chance item alone, but in reality had very little intelligence success until the arrival of SCHELLENBERG, under whom Amt VI became a smooth running organization.

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CI-FIR/130  
10 Dec 46

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ANNEX III

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WIRELESS INVASION-NETS IN FRANCE

Prisoner: SS-O/Stuf SOMMER, Hans

SD man in France and Italy

At the beginning of January 1944, Amt VI ordered a wireless invasion-net to be established in France in order to be posted on the moves of the Allies. Commissioned for the jobs were Stubaf LANG, O/Stuf KOENIG and O/Stuf Werner NEISSER, all of Amt VI, BERLIN. SOMMER at MARSEILLE was ordered to give all the assistance he could in this undertaking. French collaborators with technical knowledge were recruited and given a course in wireless operations at Maison Laffitte, PARIS, but this school later moved to Holland. According to SOMMER, stations were actually installed in TOULON, MARSEILLE, MONTPELLIER, TOULOUSE, BORDEAUX and PARIS. Because of the relative danger these station-operators constantly faced, they were supplied with large sums of money and gold. There were some stations installed in other localities too, but SOMMER is unable to identify them, with the exception of two stations on the French-Spanish border, at SAN SEBASTIAN and FIGUERAS. After the occupation of France by the Allies, only the MONTPELLIER and PARIS stations still operated, as well as the two Spanish stations, which were maintained by former members of the Spanish Blue Division. One operator is named LARTIGUE, still lives in SAN SEBASTIAN and is known to have hidden his radio equipment.

This invasion-net was the greatest failure of the GIS, according to SOMMER. Its members were not carefully selected and, after being installed in a locality, many disappeared with the money. Some others just sat idly by and did no broadcasting, because it was too dangerous.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**CI-FIR/130  
10 Dec 46HEADQUARTERS  
7707 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER  
APO 757 US ARMYANNEX IVPENETRATION OF THE SPANISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Prisoner: SS-O/Stuf SOMMER, Hans

SD man in France and Italy

The following plan is SOMMER's idea. He thinks that the Spanish Intelligence Service can be penetrated by contacting VOINEAU and FRECHOU, Frenchmen whom SOMMER knew in SAN REMO.

After VE day VOINEAU and FRECHOU (See Annex V) escaped to Spain, because they feared punishment if they stayed in France. They would both like to make their homes in Argentina, and SOMMER thinks that if they were approached by the US with concrete assurances of their eventual departure to South America, they would reveal all they knew about the Spanish Intelligence Service. Both are trusted by VICENTE (Chief of the SIS) and are high enough in the organization to be able to give the most detailed information on the entire set-up.

SOMMER proposes to write a letter to FRECHOU telling him to have the utmost confidence in the bearer and in what he has to say. FRECHOU could be reached through an old friend of SOMMER's Juan de ARENZANA, Calle Veasquez 134, MADRID, or through Fermius ARNILLAGU, Paseo de la Florida 189 (or 198), MADRID. The latter is a business associate of FRECHOU's father.

Great caution must be exercised when trying to contact FRECHOU and VOINEAU, as VICENTE has an organization founded on people who are always spying on each other and who are well-enough schooled in intelligence work to be able to spot an enemy agent on sight.

An alternate plan which might produce better results is the following: In a letter\* to FRECHOU or VOINEAU, SOMMER would propose that they be sent to Italy by VICENTE in order to strengthen the connection between the Spanish Intelligence Service and the Fascists. A meeting could be arranged in MILAN with much less danger than in Spain, using the same method. With this plan, not only the Spanish Intelligence Service would be uncovered, but also a possible Fascist underground movement.

\* The letter would go either to SOMMER's fiancée or VOINEAU's wife, both of whom are in PARIS, and would then be delivered personally to the Spanish Consul-General, Juan de ARENZANA's father, in MARSEILLE, who in turn would take the letter to FRECHOU or VOINEAU.

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**CI-FIR/130  
10 Dec 46HEADQUARTERS  
7707 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER  
APO 757 US ARMYANNEX VPERSONALITIES

Prisoner: SS-O/Stuf SOMMER, Hans

SD man in France and Italy

1. Personalities Mentioned in the report

AUGUSTIN, (fnu) Milice member Abwehr agent Spanish Intelligence agent

Present Address: Unknown. Last seen in MADRID. Born: 1901 1.66m  
oval face prominent cheekbones dark brown hair blue eyesCareer: Went to Germany in August 1944. Flew to Spain in June 1945.  
Arrested and interned at Camp Miranda, Spain, until January 1946. Went  
to MADRID and joined the Spanish Intelligence Service.

AUMOND, (fnu) Milice member Spanish Intelligence agent

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1912 1.86m slender dark brown  
curly hair oval faceCareer: Tradesman. Worked on the Westwall. Enlisted in the French SS  
and fought on the Russian front as an U/Stuf. Captured by the British.  
Got to Spain and joined the Spanish Intelligence Service.Misc: Wife living in TOURS, France.

BARANCO, (fnu)

Present Address: Unknown. Last seen in MILAN. Born: 1901 1.82m  
oval face black hair dark complexionCareer: With the Italian Intelligence Service at NICE since 1933 with  
the Italian Consul-General. Liaison man between the Cagoulards and the  
Italian General Staff. In MILAN after June 1944.Misc: Married.

BARTHELEMY, (fnu) PPF member

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1894 oval face bluish eyes dark  
brown hairCareer: Had a leading position in the PPF. After DORIOT's death, it  
was rumored that he took over the PPF.

C LE CAPITAINE Chief of the Deuxieme Bureau in NICE

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1904 1.70m dark blond crewcut  
hair blue eyes slender prominent cheekbones

COTY, (fnu) Italian Intelligence agent Abwehr agent

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1891 1.76m oval face grayish hairCareer: Owns a restaurant in Rue Wagram, PARIS. Connections with the  
Paris underworld. Also a dope peddler.**SECRET**

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DEGANS, (fmu) Deuxieme Bureau agent

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1906 1.66m oval face black hair brown eyes squat figure

Career: Former member of the Action Francaise and later a prominent leader of the Cagoule in Southern France. Fought with the French Army in 1940. Milice member after 1941. Made the leader of General Intelligence.

Misc: Married. Very clever man.

DELIOUX, Guy Amt VI agent from 1940 to 1945

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1912 1.78m oval face curly blond hair blue eyes

Career: Former member of the Action Francaise and later of the Cagoule.

Misc: Wife lives in PARIS.

DODO, Micheel, @ LARA Amt VI agent from 1944 to 1945

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1914 1.74m oval pock-marked face brown eyes dark blond hair

Career: Fought with the French Army in North Africa. Volunteered for the anti-Bolshevist Legion in 1941. Promoted to Lt and became an agent of Amt VI in 1944. Sent to SAN REMO in February 1945 and went to France in a speedboat in April 1945. From France he flew to Spain, was imprisoned, was released, and joined the Spanish Intelligence Service.

Misc: Wife and child live in PARIS.

ESCAT, (fmu)

Present Address: Unknown. Probably MADRID. Born: 1891 1.74m stocky build curly gray hair neat dresser

Misc: Wife lives in MADRID.

ESQUERRA, Miguel Standf in the Spanish Waffen SS

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1908 1.84m oval face blond balding hair slender figure

Career: Took part in the defense of BERLIN and was given the will of Gen FAUPEL, the former German Military Attache in MADRID, who committed suicide. Is a fanatical follower of FRANCO.

Misc: Wife living in MADRID.

FILIOL, (fmu)

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1902 1.76m oval face medium build black hair

Career: Was one of the founders of the Cagoule. After the Cagoule was disbanded, he flew to Spain and offered his services to FRANCO. He volunteered for the Deuxieme Bureau in 1939 and worked in Spain until 1940 for that organization. He was arrested by the Spanish in 1940 and was released through German intervention and returned to PARIS. Joined the MSR (Mouvement Sociale Revolutionnaire). Arrested by LAVAL in 1943, but was released by DARNAND and began to work for the Milice. He is a confirmed Fascist.

Misc: Wife living in PARIS. **SECRET**

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FRECHOU, Paul Deuxieme Bureau agent

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1918 1.74m oval face black hair beard

Career: Member of the Cagoule. Fought in the war until the middle of 1940 and then became a Deuxieme Bureau Officer in NICE. After the closing of the Deuxieme Bureau, he worked in the Milice Intelligence. Went to Germany and then to Italy and was arrested by Amt VI, but escaped to Spain through France in April 1945. Now working for the Spanish Intelligence Service.

Misc: Wife living in TULLE, France.

GARETTE, Joseph Amt VI agent

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1914 1.82m oval face black hair brown eyes

Career: Member of the Action Francaise and later a Cagoulard. As an agent for Amt VI he searched for talent suitable for Amt VI work. In August 1944 he went to Germany with some of the followers of the Jeunesse Europeenne where some of them were trained for intelligence work and then sent to Spain.

Misc: Wife and one child living in NIMES, France.

GOMBERT, (fnu)

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1898 1.74m oval face grayish hair

Career: Old member of the Action Francaise. Volunteered for the French Army in 1939 and became a captain. Became a Regional Chief in the Milice in 1941.

Misc: Excessive drinker.

GUICHARD, Guido PPF member Amt VI agent Spanish Intelligence agent

Present Address: MADRID. Born: 1914 oval face very wavy black hair

Career: Became a member of the PPF in 1941. Was arrested on the charge of helping to assassinate DORMOY, the former Socialist Minister of the Interior. Set free in 1942 for lack of evidence. Worked for Amt VI in Franco and later in Spain. Dropped for being inefficient and joined the Spanish Intelligence Service.

Misc: Wife living with him in MADRID.

HENRY, George Commandant

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1.78m oval reddish face dark blond hair

HEVRARD, Andre, @ GALLARDO Abwehr agent Spanish Intelligence agent

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1913 oval face long nose dark blond hair

Career: Fought with FRANCO in the Spanish Civil War. Went to Obst/Lt RUDOLPH in PARIS in 1940 and was trained in wireless operation. After working four years in France, he withdrew to Germany with the Abwehr and was sent to Italy in March 1945. He infiltrated into the Italian Maquis and was sent back to France as a red Spaniard and finally went to Spain, where he joined the Spanish Intelligence Service.

Misc: Wife and one child living in SANTANDER, Spain.

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HORCHER, (fnu)

Present Address: MADRID. Born: 1893 1.74m oval face balding blond hairMisc: Wife and two children living with him in MADRID.

KNIPPING, (fnu) Regional Chief of the Milice

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1896 1.75m angular face prominent cheekbones balding blond hair blue eyesCareer: Career-officer in the French Air Force. After the Armistice he became a close friend of DARNAND. Became Regional Chief of the Milice in MARSEILLE and later deputy to DARNAND in PARIS.Misc: Wife living in PARIS.

KOEHLER, Paul Amt VI agent Deuxieme Bureau agent

Present Address: PAGOMAS, Spain. Born: 1907 1.76m blond hair blue eyesCareer: Lived in PARIS after 1924 and worked for the Pernod Co. Joined Amt VI in 1939 and was dismissed in 1942 for drinking. Joined the Abwehr and was sent to NICE in 1944. Joined the Deuxieme Bureau at the start of 1945.Misc: Lives with a woman named Gil BAUGNIAS in PAGOMAS.

LEON, (fnu) Deuxieme Bureau Chief of PERPIGNAN.

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1.78m grayish close-cropped hair lantern-jawed brown eyes military bearing

MARTIN, Hans, @ Juan

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1904 1.78m balding dark blond hair robust appearanceMisc: Excessive drinker. Wife living in FIGUERAS.

MARTINEZ, (fnu)

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1886 oval pale face balding black hair stuttersMisc: Married.

MATHEI, (fnu) Former Consul-General of Argentina in MARSEILLE

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1891 1.78m grayish hair stout full faceCareer: Studied in Germany and Italy. In LONDON with Argentine Diplomatic Corps; sent his information to the GIS and IIS without compensation, purely from sympathy with Fascism. Was known to be in contact with REUTER. Transferred from MARSEILLE, allegedly at the request of the US Consul-General there, to VALENCIA, Spain, as Consul.

MESA, Hannibal de GIS Agent in Spain Cuban

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1886 1.68m oval face gray hairCareer: Feared internment because of Cuba's entry into the War and offered his services through REUTER to Amt VI of the RSHA; sent to Spain where he proved a failure.

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MICHEL, (fnu) Deputy Chief of Deuxieme Bureau in PERPIGNAN

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1910 1.70m oval face black hair wears hornrimmed glasses

MOYNIER, Anne GIS Agent in Spain

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1906 1.76m oval face brown hair blue eyes wears very elegant dresses

Career: Wife of Yves MOYNIER, whom she met in PPF circles. In 1940 accused of taking part in assassination of DORMOY, sentenced to two years in jail. After her release became an Amt VI agent. At present she works for VICENTE in BARCELONA, supplying him with information on the French colony there, under cover as an entertainer at a Cafe.

MOYNIER, Yves, & MAGICIER, Gilbert GIS Agent in Spain

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1913 1.80m Slavic type face reddish blond hair

Career: Former member of Action Francaise and Cagoule; arrested when latter was disbanded and obtained amnesty by joining French Army in 1939. Joined PPF and became agent for Amt VI in 1942. Sent to Switzerland to establish contact with de GAULLE's Intelligence office in GENEVA, but failed in this mission. Fled to BRUSSELS with his wife in 1944. In July 1945 they went to Spain. Interned at Camp Miranda and after release went to BARCELONA in January 1946.

NEISSER, Werner Deuxieme Bureau Agent Austrian

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1913 1.80m oval face blue eyes reddish blond hair

Career: Ski teacher in France. Became agent for Amt VI in 1939. In October 44 placed in Sabotage group and sent to SAN REMO to facilitate its entry into France. Later entered Deuxieme Bureau.

Misc: Has a wife in MILAN.

QUEYRAT, (fnu)

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1901 1.70m oval face grayish hair

Career: Leading member of PPF in North Africa. Came to France in 1942 as member of the Party's Directorium. Joined French SS in 1944 and later captured by the British. Escaped to Spain with AUMOND and interned at Camp Miranda; freed through intervention of VICENTE.

Misc: May be sent back to North Africa by VICENTE as an expert on Arabic matters.

PALMIERI, (fnu) Dancer Corsican

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1910 1.68m oval face blue eyes dark brown hair

Career: Lived in PARIS where he was well known in gangster circles and arrested several times. Became Abwehr agent in 1941 and recruited numerous characters of the underworld for the organization.

Misc: A shrewd and dangerous man, last known to live in MILAN with his friends and mistress.

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PENA, (fnu) Agent of the Spanish Intelligence Service

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1906 1.68m oval face curly dark blond hair

Career: Old follower of FRANCO's Falangist Party. Until 1944 with Spanish Embassy in PARIS, he worked at the same time for the Abwehr. Went to Germany in 1944 and escaped to Spain at the end of the War. Since he was well acquainted with French affairs and had good contacts with former collaborationists, VICENTE employed him to recruit French agents among the refugees streaming into Spain at SAN SEBASTIAN. He has great influence and access to substantial funds in Spain.

Misc: Speaks French with a strong Spanish accent.

PETIER, Pierre

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1906 1.68m oval face curly dark blond hair

Misc: Speaks fluent Italian. Has a wife in NICE.

PETINATTI, (fnu) Agent for the Italian Consulate-General in MARSEILLE

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1902 1.75m oval face black hair

Career: Returned to Italy late in 1943 and allegedly maintained contact with the Spanish IS.

Misc: Married.

PUTEAU, Adrien Agent for Spanish IS

Present Address: Unknown. 1.80m long face prominent nose dark brown hair

Career: Former member of the PPF. From 1942 until August 1944 Abwehr agent in MARSEILLE. Then went to Spain and was interned at Camp Miranda. Released in January 1945, he first worked for Lopez MORENO in BARCELONA and was then engaged by VICENTE.

Misc: Speaks French with a typical Mediterranean accent.

REUTER, (fnu) Parisian banker and GIS Agent

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1891 1.68m black hair

TENAILLE, Andre Agent for Spanish IS

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1908 1.80m long face grayish hair

Career: A former Cagoulard and good friend of DELONCLE with whom he was arrested in 1938. Released in 1939, he volunteered for the French Army. After the armistice he became a leading member of the newly formed MSR (Mouvement Sociale Revolutionnaire). Received an assignment in DIJON by the Abwehr and was trained as wireless operator. Built a radio station in the Ardennes in August 1944. Escaped to Spain after the war, and after a brief stay at Camp Miranda, he found employment with VICENTE.

Misc: Has a wife in PARIS.

VICENTE, (fnu) Head of Spanish IS

Present Address: Unknown. 1.82m oval face black hair slender

Career: Violent Falangist. Founder of FRANCO's new IS and leader of the Servicio de Informacion e Investigacion.

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VOINEAU, Robert Journalist and Agent of Spanish IS

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1911 1.80m oval face black hair

Career: Fought with the French Army as a Lt in 1939-1940. In 1943, he received an important post from DARNAND in the Ministry of the Interior. In 1944, escaped to Germany and later was in Spain, employed by VICENTE.

Misc: Clever man and confirmed Anti-Communist. Comes from a military family, his father still being a Colonel in the French Army.

2. List of Personalities not mentioned in Interrogation Report

BAGRATION-MOUKHRANI Sr, Prince (fnu) Georgian

Present Address: Unknown. Last seen in CANNES. Born: 1881 1.78m oval face grayish hair

Career: Considered spiritual leader of Georgians among emigre circles in France.

Misc: Married and has two children.

BAGRATION-MOUKHRANI Jr, Prince (fnu) Georgian

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1902 1.84m oval face black hair

Career: Married into Italian royal family and supplied GIS with information through PETROW. Went to BERLIN frequently to discuss his family's re-instatement in Georgia after the German occupation of the Caucasus.

BAGRATION-MOUKHRANI, Princess (fnu) Georgian

Present Address: Unknown. Last seen in MADRID in April 1945. Born: 1901 1.72m oval face black hair

Career: Sent to Spain by PETROW in 1943.

Misc: Married to an Englishman.

BASTIANI, (fnu) RSHA Agent in MARSEILLES French

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1881 1.76m oval face bald

Career: Colonel in the French Army and Commandant of MAINZ after World War I. Being retired he joined Amt VI for purely financial reasons. On friendly terms with PETAIN and visited VICHY frequently.

Misc: Married. Probably still lives in NICE with his wife.

BONNARDEL, (fnu) RSHA Agent in MARSEILLES French

Present Address: Unknown. Born: 1912 1.82m oval face blond hair

Career: Employed with US Consulate in MARSEILLE until 1942. Then, after German occupation of MARSEILLE, he offered his services to Amt VI from fear of reprisals for his former affiliations and also for financial reasons. He was sent to Switzerland to penetrate the US Diplomatic Corps, but failed. After April 1944 he suffered from tuberculosis and was too sick to be employed.

Misc: A bachelor, he lived in MARSEILLE with his mother.

BRANDES, Otto Intelligence Officer in German Embassy in BRUSSELS

Misc: Directed activities of Belgian Amt VI agents. After German occupation of France, he headed purchasing office of the Wehrmacht in PARIS, called Einkaufs Organisation Otto. This office also served as an intelligence gathering agency.

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CHANEL, Mme (fnu) Owner of the great perfumery in PARIS

Misc: Made frequent trips to Spain in 1943 and 1944, allegedly in the service of the GIS. German Border police were instructed to assist her in every way and even delivered money to her in MADRID.

CHAPAZ, (fnu) Bicycle merchant in GENEVA Swiss

Misc: In 1942, leader of illegal Communist Party in Switzerland and also worked for RIS. Tried to obtain information on workings of US and British Intelligence Service in France for the Russians.

DELFAN, (fnt), @ BAUER RSHA Agent Belgian

Present Address: Unknown. Last seen in Carrabanchel prison in MADRID in April 1945. 1.72m oval face brown eyes black hair

Career: Worked for Amt VI from 1937 under direction of German Military Attache in BRUSSELS, after he had been refused a commission in the Belgian Army. Became most important GIS Agent in Belgium and said to have played an important part in surrender of Fort Eben Emael. Arrested by Belgian authorities in May 1940, but released after armistice and went to BORDEAUX. Then went to PARIS to work for the purchasing office of the Wehrmacht (see BRANDES) and maintained the largest German Intelligence network in France. Having received schooling in wireless operations in Germany, he went to HENDAYE (on the Franco-Spanish border) to handle radio communications, and later to SAN SEBASTIAN. In July 1944, after the merging of the Abwehr with RSHA, he was denounced to the Spanish police as the result of intrigue, and arrested. DELFAN's extradition was demanded by Belgium, Holland, France, England and the US. To forestall this extradition, DELFAN proposed to Martinez CAMPOS of the Spanish General Staff that he be allowed to set up his remaining wireless net in France for the Spanish General Staff. Before VE day, the Spanish General Staff gave DELFAN a list of names, complete with addresses and photographs, of leading Spanish opponents of the Franco regime and requested him to liquidate them. DELFAN believes that the Spanish Government will never let him be extradited, for fear that this information might become known to the Allies.

DJASEWILLI, (fnu)

Career: Sent to Turkey in charge of eight agents. Assassinated in MARSEILLE with wife in September 1944.

GIRAUD, Jacques Amt VI agent Member of the Action Francaise

Present Address: Presumably MARSEILLE. Born: 1908 1.62m oval face blond hair

Career: GIRAUD became a partner in his father's real estate business. He was involved in a law suit when he had a love affair with another man's wife. GIRAUD was sent to Amt VI by Charles GAUDIOT, head of MSR (Mouvement Sociale Revolutionnaire) in unoccupied France. He told Amt VI that he was working for the British Intelligence Service, but would play a double agent and work for Amt VI if they would squash the indictment against him. He produced some questions, allegedly from the British Intelligence Service, dealing mostly with troop movements they wanted to know about. GIRAUD was engaged by Amt VI at MARSEILLE in 1942 and told to continue his associations with the British and feed them false information prepared by Amt VI. He never disclosed his contacts with the British, but did mention a French middle-man. He was very friendly with the Turkish press attache in VICHY and obtained valuable information on the Turkish stand in the war. GIRAUD stayed with Amt VI until June 1944 when he joined the French Army as an officer.

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KELLER, Pater Dr Peter Benedictine monk Amt VI agent

Present Address: Unknown. Perhaps in the Montserrat Monastery near BARCELONA. Born: 1906 1.66m oval face curly blond hair wears glasses

Career: KELLER is a member of the Benedictine order and was abbot of its only monastery in Germany. He worked for the Abwehr in STUTTGART as far back as 1936, mostly on Near East and Italian questions. He was transferred to Amt VI in July 1940 and was sent to PARIS. His intelligence duties were the penetration of high ecclesiastical circles in France and the gaining of any intelligence material available in his talks with the clergy. He was also to maintain liaison with the Benedictine monastery in MONTSERRAT near BARCELONA, as Sir Samuel HOARE, the former British ambassador to Spain, often went there to visit his close friend, the abbot of the monastery. KELLER also made frequent trips to ROME in order to obtain information on the missions and talks of the Special American Ambassador Myron C. TAYLOR with the Vatican. Prof STOLZ of the Vatican was one of the sources. KELLER was quite friendly with the confessor (nu) of PETAIN and LAVAL who very indiscreetly conveyed some of the confessions to KELLER. KELLER influenced Cardinal BAUDRILART, head of the Institut Catholique in PARIS, to such an extent that he became a rabid Germanophile and the protector of the Anti-Bolshevist League. The same influence was exerted on Cardinal SUHARD.

Misc: Speaks fluent German, Italian, French, Arabic and Hebrew. Has a mistress, but is often seen in the cheapest brothels.

KUTSCHMAN, Walter SS H/Stuf Border Police Commissioner of HENDAYE

Career: He and Mme CHANEL of the famous perfumery made frequent trips to Spain in 1943 and 1944, allegedly in the interests of the FIS. On one occasion, KUTSCHMAN was told to deliver a large sum of money to Mme CHANEL in MADRID. In August 1944, he was ordered to the Russian front, but fled to Spain, where he had formerly fought with FRUNCO in the Civil War. He was arrested and is believed to be in Camp Miranda in Spain.

LAFOND, (fnu) Press Attache at the Vichy French Embassy in MADRID  
Amt VI agent

Career: In September 1944 LAVAL entrusted LAFOND with the organization of a relief agency in Spain for the French collaborators who had to flee there. He was given five or six million pesetas, part of which he gave to the collaborators and part of which he kept. He is believed to be in Spain still, hiding in a little fishing village.

MARTIN, Ludwig Amt VI agent

Present Address: May be in BARCELONA. Born: 1908 1.82m oval freckled face curly blond hair blue eyes

Career: Was a member of the Intercommerciale, a large trucking agency in France which was liquidated in May 1943. Joined Amt VI as an unpaid agent and was sent to BARCELONA to observe the politics and tendencies of the South American diplomats. He was dropped by the G1S when the repercussions of the Intercommerciale became too great and was ordered to go to Germany, but disobeyed and stayed in BARCELONA.

Misc: Married to Baroness KORFI, a white Russian. Has Panamanian citizenship

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PETROW, (fnu) Abwehr agent

Present Address: Believed to be in Switzerland. Born: 1891 1.66m  
oval face ruddy complexion blond balding hair

Career: PETROW was first employed by the Japanese Intelligence Service after the collapse of the Czar in Russia. Even before 1933 he worked for the Abwehr in Germany and in 1939 for Amt VI. His main job was to penetrate White Russian circles and select capable and willing ones to work as agents.

Misc: Has a mistress.

REICHL, Dr (fnu) Austrian journalist Amt VI agent

Present Address: Unknown. Perhaps in France or Austria. Born: 1896  
1.70m oval face prominent nose yellowish complexion gray hair

Career: After Germany's occupation of Austria, REICHL became affiliated with Amt VI and was sent to PARIS in 1940. He was to renew his contacts with French Free Masons and through them establish contact with the British Free Masons, who were then to be exploited for GIS. He was unsuccessful in this task, but did manage to pick up some intelligence information on the Vichy regime.

Misc: Prominent Free Mason in Austria before it was occupied.

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