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Chapter Five

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Long Experience in the Anti-Soviet Game (U)

Even before the end of World War II, Allied intelligence grew intrigued by the work that the Germans had done to rally much of Europe to the Nazi cause. As the Allied armies fought across Italy and France in 1944, growing numbers of Wehrmacht prisoners who fell into British and American hands were not Germans, but Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Russians, Balts, Cossacks, Ukrainians, and dozens of other nationalities and ethnic groups that took up arms for the Third Reich. While many of these combatants proved to be less than enthusiastic soldiers, the Nazis nonetheless raised substantial manpower from Europe's non-Aryan populations. (U)

Within weeks after the collapse of German resistance, Allied intelligence pondered the advantages and disadvantages of using for its own purposes the numerous émigré groups that sought shelter in the West. As the US Army took up occupation duties in Austria and Germany, it encountered members of these groups who claimed to be not only anti-Nazi, but also anticommunist. Sorting out the various factions, their leaders, philosophical goals, motivations, and backgrounds took up an increasing amount of time and effort on the part of American intelligence as tensions mounted between the East and the West.¹ (S)

¹As an example, X-2 in Munich came into contact with Lithuanians in the summer of 1945, but was told to leave those groups alone for SI's exploitation. See Boleslav A. Holtsman's reporting

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Mission RUPPERT (S)

Even before the war ended, the Americans made efforts to learn more about the supposed anti-Nazi groups in Nazi Germany. On 3 November 1944, Youri Vinogradov, a 21-year old White Russian born in Germany and educated in France, crossed over German lines. Recruited by SI's Labor Division in Paris for Mission RUPPERT, Vinogradov had spent the latter part of the war in Berlin working at the Swiss Legation until his arrest and brief confinement in a concentration camp. Following his release, Vinogradov found a new job in the German capital, but finally decided to make his way to Allied lines in the fall of 1944 with plans to join the French army.² (S)

After making his way across the lines, he was picked up by the French and brought to Paris for interrogation by OSS. Vinogradov quickly proved to be a valuable source of information on life in Germany. He also furnished details that led to the arrest of a Gestapo agent in Paris and explained how French collaborationists operated in Germany. His new SI case officer, Lt. Albert E. Jolis, proposed that Vinogradov be returned through German lines to resume his life in Berlin. Jolis wanted Vinogradov to

on the Lithuanian activities in Bavaria in SCI, Twelfth Army Group to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "The Underground 'Government of Lithuania,'" 17 June 1945, (S), and SCI Twelfth Army Group to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "Union of the Combatants for the Freedom of Lithuania," 19 June 1945, both in DO Records, [redacted], Box 515, Folder 2, CIA ARC. See also Headquarters, Third Army Intelligence Center, Research Section, to G-2, Intelligence Center, "The Government of Lithuania (Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation)," 3 June 1945, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 515, Folder 2, CIA ARC. (S)

²The basis of this account regarding Vinogradov's work with OSS is found in 1st Lt. Albert E. Jolis to Col. David K. Bruce, "Mission RUPPERT," 14 October 1944, [no classification listed], in Michael Kedia, [redacted], DO Records. Mission RUPPERT is also recounted in Joseph E. Persico, *Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II* (New York: Viking Press, 1979). (S)

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penetrate the SD through an acquaintance, who he claimed worked for the Nazi security service. This man, a Georgian, "served the Nazis out of his opposition to the Stalin regime. His position," Vinogradov told Jolis, "is now extremely delicate. He dreads the arrival of the Russian armies and will undoubtedly grab at any opportunity of being able to show that he helped the Allies." Jolis hoped Vinogradov would obtain an organizational layout of the SD and learn its plans for resistance after Germany's defeat. In addition, Vinogradov would also seek out targets to be attacked by Allied aircraft and keep his finger on the pulse of life in Berlin. He would have no radio to communicate with SI, but he would let OSS know that he had arrived safely by placing advertisements in two Berlin newspapers as well as sending a postcard to an address in Switzerland.³ (S)

German troops quickly seized Vinogradov and passed the White Russian, who claimed to be dissatisfied with life in Paris because of the growing strength of the Communist party in France, to SD *Amt VI*'s office in Strassburg. Vinogradov claimed that he was an agent for an SD collaborator named Michael Kedia, president of the Georgian National Committee in Berlin and a critical link between the Nazis and various Caucasian and Turkestan nationalist groups. Vinogradov was directed to report to a *Standartenfuhrer* Bickler in Baden Baden, where he underwent an interrogation for three days. He was then allowed to proceed to Berlin to visit his sick mother. He arrived on 7 November, changing trains 14 times en route due to the Allied bombings. On arriving in the city, he contacted Kedia.⁴ (S)

The next day, the Gestapo arrested Vinogradov after learning that he had returned from Paris. Taken to a local office, Vinogradov met *Sturmbannfuhrer* Erich Georg-Karl

³1st Lt. Albert E. Jolis to Col. David K. Bruce, "Mission RUPPERT," 14 October 1944, [no classification listed], in Michael Kedia, ☐ DO Records. (S)

⁴"Personal Report of Agent RUPPERT," c. April 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia, ☐ DO Records. (S)

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Albin Hengelhaupt, the *Amt VI* referent on Russian émigré matters.⁵ Once again his luck held. Hengelhaupt, who worked closely with Kedia, trusted Vinogradov and accepted him as an *Amt VI* agent. Vinogradov was allowed to remain in Berlin, where he fought various character denunciations while collecting information on the SD. As the Soviets approached in April 1945, he managed to escape to the West with a group of fellow Georgians, and he fell into American hands near Eisenach. He was transferred to Paris for further debriefings.⁶ (S)

The RUPPERT Mission was one of only three OSS operations in Germany in December 1944. While OSS did not have regular contact with Vinogradov during his five months in Berlin, he provided extensive information from the capital. Most importantly, Vinogradov opened the eyes of OSS to the existence of an entire underground network of Eastern Europeans who supported the Nazi cause. Upon his return to Paris, he told OSS that he had been in regular contact with Prof. Gerhard von Mende of the *Ostministerium* and a special assistant to Alfred Rosenberg, and with Michael Kedia.⁷ Vinogradov also told the Americans that Kedia and his followers had

⁵For further details on Hengelhaupt, see Hecksher to FBM, "SS Stubaf. Dr. Erich Hengelhaupt," 29 May 1947, MGH-003-529, XARZ-28061, (S), enclosing Hecksher to FBM, "SS Stubaf. Dr. Erich Georg-Karl Albin Hengelhaupt," 26 April 1947, MGH-003-426, (S), with a copy of Maj. J. Walmsley, 7 Review and Interrogation Staff, 7 Civilian Internment Camp, British Army of the Rhine, "Report on the Interrogation of Dr. Erich Georg-Karl Albin Hengelhaupt," 7 March 1947, [no classification listed], in WASH-REG-OP-1, DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 27, CIA ARC. (S)

⁶"Personal Report of Agent RUPPERT," c. April 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

⁷Alfred Rosenberg was a leading figure in the development of Nazi anti-Semitism in the years before the war. Born in Estonia, Rosenberg lived in Russia during the revolution and fled to Germany where he became an avid supporter of Hitler. In 1941, Hitler appointed Rosenberg as the Reich Minister of Eastern Occupied Territories. While he did not decry the Nazi genocide, Rosenberg worked to get the Russian minorities to cooperate against the Soviets. The Allies tried Rosenberg for his role during the Third Reich and sentenced him to death at Nuremberg in 1946. (U)

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escaped from Berlin to Switzerland where they wanted to meet with an American representative. Kedia, according to Vinogradov, hoped to contact the International Red Cross to assure the safety of the Georgians in Germany so as to prevent their repatriation to the Soviet Union. He also sought Allied protection of some 100 officials, both German and non-German, who were "most active in anti-Russian activities." Most interestingly, he wanted to meet with OSS to discuss the "'mutual' problem of penetrating Georgia and Russia." Kedia, Vinogradov felt, was hoping to meet with the Americans on behalf of other unnamed individuals in the German SD, SS, and Wehrmacht.⁸ (S)

Jolis quietly coordinated with the OSS station in Bern to establish contact with Kedia's group "to determine what intelligence potential they represented."⁹ At this point, OSS had only a limited knowledge of Kedia's background as the leader of the Georgian movement in Germany.¹⁰ Jolis suggested a plan of action:

To talk with Kedia and find out what information he can give us immediately on the SD and the post-hostilities clandestine movement.

Inform him of the treatment accorded to Russians captured by the American forces (both Wehrmacht and civilian personnel) who either do not wish to return to Russia or do not acknowledge Soviet citizenship.

Ascertain who are the 100 persons whom he wishes to protect and obtain a list of their names, pseudonyms, jobs, physical descriptions, if possible.

⁸Thomas S. Wilson, OSS/Labor Division to Cdr. Thomas G. Cassady and Maj. Robert B. Dodderidge, "Preliminary Report on Mission RUPPERT (Youri)," 16 April 1945, (S); "Mission RUPPERT," 19 April 1945, [no classification listed]; and "Mission RUPPERT: Summary of Mission and Results Obtained as of this Date," 31 May 1945, [no classification listed], all in Kedia, ☐ ☐ , DO Records. (S)

⁹"Mission RUPPERT: Summary of Mission and Results Obtained as of this Date," 31 May 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia, ☐ ☐ , DO Records. (S)

¹⁰For a summary of what OSS knew about Kedia by the spring of 1945, see the entries on OSS Form 1652a in Kedia ☐ ☐ , DO Records. (S)

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Give him passwords whereby the above persons can contact OSS Field Detachments.

Indicate to him that such persons will be treated as P/Ws (and will not be turned over to the Russians) but that any other concessions will depend entirely upon their value to us after suitable opportunities for interrogation and screening.¹¹ (S)

In late April, Jolis and Vinogradov slipped into Switzerland to meet with Kedia and his motley group in Geneva. What Jolis found there did not please him. "He was not," the SI Labor Division officer wrote a month later about Kedia, "a suitable person to be used for current intelligence objectives. His fanatical anti-communism, which amounted to a strong desire to see an early war between Russia and the US as a means of realizing the independence of the Caucasus, and the fact that basically he is a political activist and revolutionary, rendered it essential for security reasons that no commitments be made to him, and that contact be held to a minimum." Jolis still expressed the hope that Kedia could be the source of leads on Nazi planning for postwar resistance.¹² (S)

But the Allies Must Know Stalin (U)

With the end of the war, OSS began to learn more about Kedia and his shadowy movement. On 11 May 1945, for example, a few days after the German surrender, Eduard Waetjen, a German lawyer and *Abwehr* officer who had defected to the Allies in 1944, told Allen Dulles in Switzerland what he knew about Kedia and the Georgians. Kedia, born in 1902 in what had been the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, was a

¹¹"Mission RUPPERT," 19 April 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia, ☐ ☐ DO Records. (S)

¹²"Mission RUPPERT: Summary of Mission and Results Obtained as of this Date," 31 May 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia, ☐ ☐ , DO Records. (S)

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German national of Armenian heritage. He fled Georgia after the Russian Civil War and settled in Paris, where he allied himself with the exile government of Georgia. In 1940, he became the president of the Caucasian National Committee, a loose alliance of Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Caucasians, formed by the Germans to support the Nazi cause. During the war, the Committee recruited troops to serve with the Germans and agents to penetrate Soviet-held territory. The Committee acted as the government-in-waiting for the time when their nations were free of the Bolsheviks, but the Nazi regime was ambivalent in its support of the various nationalities.¹³ (S)

Waetjen expressed his opinion that Kedia was "a person of great decency, strong character, sharp intelligence and trustworthiness. Knowing him," the German agent told Dulles, "we should give his friends the benefit of the doubt." Kedia and his comrades were not traitors, but sought to free their homelands from the yoke of communism. Waetjen urged the Americans to aid Kedia and other Georgians now in Allied prisoner-of-war camps. By all means, they should not be turned over to the Russians, Waetjen reported to Dulles.¹⁴ (S)

Kedia stated his own case in an "aide memoire" that he prepared for Jolis on 28 April 1945. He justified his Committee's struggle against the Soviets and expressed his vision of the future, now that Germany lay vanquished:

The principal question which dominates the international situation today is the determination of Stalin to emerge as sole beneficiary from this war which has been fought with so much sacrifice by the Allies . . .

His aims are no longer the defeat of Nazi Germany, a fact which is already practically accomplished, but the expulsion of the Anglo-Saxons in Europe, Asia,

¹³ Waetjen to Dulles, "Michael Kedia and His Friends of the Caucasian National Committee," 11 May 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia, , DO Records. (S)

¹⁴ Ibid. (S)

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and wherever else he can. In addition to his legendary cunning and his iron will, he possesses throughout Europe and Asia armies of discontented people and fifth columns. The ranks of these fifth columns are being swelled in proportion with Stalin's advance through Europe under the halo of a Liberator

In face of this grave danger which threatens them, the world democracies must face Stalin without a day's delay with an active and tenacious policy. If the democracies wish to avoid committing suicide they must prepare a cordon and organize the people on this side of the barricade before the explosion of inevitable armed conflict

With regard to the people of Eastern Europe including non-Russians in the USSR who number 90 millions, the Baltic states, White Ruthenia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Volgar-Tatar, and the Taxus people of the Crimea for whom I and my friends were the spokesmen in Berlin; their organization and direction will be simple. These people all want to separate from Russia and establish the independence of their countries This great mass of men consisting of several hundreds of thousands cannot of course be organized on a policy based on a concept of the 'sub-human' out of the east, but with a democratic policy of Liberty and the self-determination of peoples.

The first thing to be done in this direction is to prevent at once all the Caucasians and other non-Russian people who have fallen into the hands of the Western Allies as prisoners, refugees or deported workers from being returned to the Russians

I hope that our apprehensions and fears for the policies and person of Stalin will be received by you with more understanding than they were by the Nazi government of the Herrnvolk who thought they understood everything better than us poor 'sub-humans' from the East.¹⁵ (S)

OSS did not follow up on Kedia beyond interrogating a few of his followers, who had now scattered into refugee camps throughout Europe. In one case, OSS found a Kedia collaborator, took him to X-2's interrogation center in Paris, and then turned him

¹⁵"Translation of Aide Memoire Prepared by Kedia," 28 April 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia, [] , DO Records. (S)

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over to the French. Kedia and a number of the other émigré leaders remained in Switzerland where they quickly attracted the attention of the local authorities. (S)

In January 1946, an officer from X-2 met with the Georgian to discuss his collaboration with the Germans and his activities in Switzerland since the previous May. Kedia, "appeared ready to answer all questions," even claiming that he had helped to protect Georgian Jews while trying to save those Georgians who had become Nazi prisoners of war. He was still anxious to work with the Americans, but grew concerned that he would not be able to do so if the Swiss placed him in an internment camp. He urged his American contact to talk with the Swiss to prevent his detention. Paul Blum, X-2's chief in Switzerland, however, was not convinced that Kedia was all that he seemed. Based on leads from several informants, Blum observed that Kedia could be a possible Soviet spy. "In view of this confused story, our incomplete information on Kedia and his Georgians and their many contacts, DB-1 [Blum] is leery of the whole situation," X-2 reported to Washington. "For, if Kedia, who appears to be a professional White Russian, is actually in contact with the JE-Land [Soviet] service and is offering his network in a penetration attempt, any action on our part would involve a triple agent operation."¹⁶ (S)

As 1946 progressed, Headquarters in Washington grew interested in the role of the Georgian émigrés in the Third Reich. In March, SSU sent out a lengthy study, "Georgia and the Georgians," that had been prepared to provide field stations with some

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background material. X-2 in Washington also summarized its information on Kedia contained in the larger study. SSU had ascertained that Kedia's contact with the Germans had started in September 1940 when he began to work for the *Abwehr*. He specialized in the recruitment for the *Abwehr* of Georgian emigres in France. Later during the war, Kedia recruited a legion of Georgians to serve in the German army. SSU believed that Kedia had also been the head of the section of the *Sicherheitsdienst* involved in German sabotage and other subversive actions in the East (the so-called ZEPPELIN operations). Kedia was implicated in several pro-Nazi organizations, including the Georgian National Committee under the *Ostministerium*. From a variety of reports, SSU headquarters determined that Kedia was an "opportunist," willing to take advantage of the situation for his own gain.¹⁷ (S)

Perhaps for this reason, American intelligence kept Kedia at a distance for the next couple of years until he simply disappeared. While the Agency collected an extensive amount of material on him, his activities, and collaborators, Americans remained skeptical of the man and his motives.¹⁸ Richard Helms, Foreign Branch M's

¹⁶DB-5 [identity unknown] to SAINT, Washington, "Michael Kedia, Georgian Nationalist," 30 January 1946, BX-625, XARZ-26814, (S), in Kedia, ☐ DO Records. (S)

¹⁷SAINT to SAINT, Bern, "Georgians in General - Kedia et al," 13 March 1946, XARZ-28659, (S), in Kedia, ☐ DO Records. A copy of the study, "Georgia and the Georgians," is also located in Kedia, ☐ DO Records. (S)

¹⁸Kedia's file after 1947 contains reporting from numerous sources, including American, German, Swiss, and Ukrainian, about Kedia and his activities. Much of it deals with suspicions that Kedia was a Soviet agent and that his wife in Paris was the mistress of a high-ranking Soviet official. The files show that, while the CIA was interested in Kedia as an intelligence personality, the Agency did not recruit him as an agent or employ him for other purposes. The Georgians, however, were among the groups that the Office of Policy Coordination later tried to

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chief, summed up the feelings in Washington in a note to [redacted] [redacted] now the chief of station in [redacted] [redacted] in late December 1946:

Our present stand on the handling of Kedia and the Georgian group is, very simply, that every effort should be made to obtain as much additional information as possible on Kedia and his Georgian associates and that, for the time being, no action whatever be taken on the utilization of Kedia and his associates for operational purposes It is worth stressing that whether or not these lads are ever employed in any fashion for the procurement of intelligence, detailed coverage of their present and future activities represents a positive political intelligence target of interest in Washington not only to State but also to the Army and the Navy.

We agree most heartily with your reservations on keeping a potential Kedia operation completely away from Germany and from the White Russians; although in general terms and looking ahead for a few years, we can reasonably estimate that whatever anti-Soviet minority groups maintain their organization for the next year or two will inevitably coalesce into a more and more closely knit 'bloc' and consequently make it extremely difficult to conduct any type of collaboration with one group unbeknownst to the others.¹⁹ (S)

Incredible Complex of Groups (U)

Helms's statement to [redacted] [redacted] foresaw the growing American interest and eventual utilization of the Ukrainian emigre movement in Germany. The young Central Intelligence Agency established its closest bonds with the Ukrainians. These ties

rally as an anticommunist front group. Entries in Kedia's file, however, end in 1953. Interestingly, Kedia's 201 file is among the first personality files organized by the new CIA in 1948. (S)

¹⁹Helms to [redacted] [redacted] "Kedia and the Georgians," 16 December 1946, X-9010, XARZ-28658, (S), in Kedia, [redacted] [redacted], DO Records. A copy of this same document is found in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 6, Folder 126, CIA ARC. (S)

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lasted long after the Agency realized that the Ukrainian exiles could not penetrate the Iron Curtain to contact the small underground anti-Soviet movement there. (S)

By April 1946, the Strategic Services Unit had established contact with the Ukrainian resistance movement in Western Europe.²⁰ Hesitant at first, SSU's contact marked the start of one of the CIA's oldest covert action projects.²¹ It also marked the beginning of a controversial relationship between the Agency and a large Eastern European population in which many had supported Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. While sharing a hatred for Russian imperialism and Soviet Communism, many Ukrainians also despised Poles and Jews. The war that passed over Ukraine became deeply entangled in ancient hatreds; the Agency's Cold War support to the Ukrainian émigré struggle also became entwined with these age-old conflicts. (C)

Throughout 1946, American intelligence grew interested in anti-Soviet resistance movements in the Soviet-occupied areas of Eastern Europe.²² Through a sensitive source

²⁰Portions of this chapter appear in condensed form in Kevin C. Ruffner, "Cold War Allies: The Origins of CIA's Relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists," in [redacted]

[redacted], *Central Intelligence: Fifty Years of the CIA* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), pp. 19-43. (S)

²¹A description of the first contact between American intelligence and the Ukrainian nationalists is found in [Zsolt Aradi] to Chief of Mission, "Belladonna Project," 24 June 1946, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 168, Folder 5, CIA ARC. For a request to vet various Ukrainian clerics as SI agents, see Cable, Vienna to SSU, War Department, 13 June 1946, Vienna 131, IN 38136, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 3, Folder 25, CIA ARC. A week earlier, SI/Austria designated the American-Ukrainian contact as Project Belladonna. Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., to Chief, SI, SSU/Germany, "Project Belladonna," 7 June 1946, (S), in DO Records, [redacted]

[redacted] Box 168, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)

²²SSU disseminated what it knew about the Ukrainians, their various factions, and the extent of collaboration with the Germans in SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, "Ukrainian Nationalist Movements," 24 June 1946, LWX-485, in WASH-INT-REG-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Box 284, [no folder listed], NARA. SSU's London station response to this report is found in SAINT, London to SAINT, AMZON, "Ukrainian Nationalist Movements," 16 July 1946, XX-12288, in WASH-REG-INT-169, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 109, Box 91, Folder 133, NARA. (U)

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in Switzerland, OSS had first learned in the summer of 1945 that Ukrainian partisan groups, active in fighting the Germans, were now engaged against the Soviets.²³ X-2's Boleslav A. Holtsman in Munich became the primary American contact with the Ukrainian leaders in the American zone in Germany.²⁴ By September 1946, Holtsman had obtained reports from Ukrainians dealing with the organization of Soviet intelligence in Western Europe.²⁵ American intelligence also learned through other sources about the partisan struggle in the Ukraine.²⁶ (S)

SSU in Washington initially told its subordinates in Germany that "these White Russians and Ukrainians have but one aim and that is to create dissension between us and the Russians since they must be intelligent enough to know that their specific aim, i.e., the independence of the Ukrain[e] or of White Russia, is practically impossible of fulfillment."²⁷ Headquarters also told its German mission that "we believe here that generally it is not a good idea to have our officers make **direct** contacts with these

²³523 [Henry Hyde] and 789 [Unidentified] to Lester C. Houck, Chairman, Reporting Board, "Attached Intelligence Reports," 15 August 1945, (S), in DO Records, Job 91-01046R, Box 2, Folder 37, CIA ARC. (S)

²⁴Holtsman made preliminary contact with the Ukrainians through his Russian sources in July 1946 and reported what he had learned in "Ukrainian Groups Now in Germany (General Info)," 17 August 1946, LWX-965, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Box 285, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)

²⁵SAINT to SAINT, Bern, "Ukrainian Nationalist Movement," 27 September 1946, X-8363, (S), in DO Records, 3, Box 1, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)

²⁶Open press reporting on resistance to the Soviets was fairly common in the years after the war. As an example, see a September 1946 report in a Warsaw newspaper translated in FR/Berlin, "Poland/UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Party), Directed against Polish and Russian Regimes," 18 December 1946, Peter Report A-1163, (S), in WASH-REG-INT-131, DO Records, 3, Box 258, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

²⁷SAINT to SAINT, AMZON, untitled memorandum, 12 August 1946, X-8014, (S), in DO Records, 3, Box 1, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)

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dissident groups before we have had an opportunity to find out much more than we know now about their individual background, reliability, and motivation.”²⁸ (S)

American reservations, however, centered on the practicality and reliability of the Ukrainians—not on their wartime affiliations. X-2’s vetting personnel in Germany expressed doubts about the reliability of Russians and other Eastern European nationalities. “The White Russians . . . possess long experience in the anti-Soviet game. In this respect the GIS [German Intelligence Service] background of many of them becomes an asset, however distasteful.” These same groups posed immense problems for American intelligence because of “the sometimes almost incredible complex of groups and ramifications of groups with which they are involved.” According to a memorandum to Washington in the summer of 1946, “the groups are the objects of vigorous Soviet penetration attempts. Their relationships to other groups, their composition, even their philosophy, shift.” US intelligence officials were reluctant to use these sources because “their ramifications stretch across borders, defying all attempts at definition.”²⁹ Zsolt Aradi, a Hungarian consultant in Munich with SSU, wrote a detailed account of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, its tumultuous history, leaders, émigré groups, and religious background. The study also listed Nazi organizations that administered occupation policies in the Ukraine during World War II and discussed native collaborators.³⁰ (S)

²⁸SAINT to SAINT, AMZON, “Ukrainian Nationalist Movement,” 19 September 1946, X-8276, (S), in DO Records, [] Box 1, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)

²⁹SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, “White Russians—Vetting Policy,” 31 August 1946, LWX-1058, (S), in DO Records, [] Box 1, Folder 11, CIA ARC. (S)

³⁰Strategic Services Unit, “Ukrainian Nationalist Organizations,” Intelligence Brief No. 13, 15 October 1946, in Zsolt Aradi, “Ukrainian Nationalist Movement: An Interim Study,” October 1946, (S), in History Staff Records, HS/CSG-2482, [] Box 5, CIA ARC. (S)

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Citing Aradi's study, SSU's Director, Col. William Quinn, recommended that American intelligence concentrate on gathering information about Ukrainian groups before "major steps are taken to exploit them for intelligence purposes." He believed that US officials could obtain much of the information from open sources, but warned that "unwillingness of a source to provide the information required must be interpreted as evidence of bad faith and *ipso facto* [original emphasis] good ground for treating such sources with the utmost caution."³¹ Quinn summarized current activities among the scattered Ukrainian groups and their impact on American intelligence:

The elements of the Ukrainian Nationalist movement . . . are presently engaged in acquiring allies in their struggle against the USSR or, at least, in gaining sufficient moral and physical support to maintain their existence in exile. Their leaders, therefore, create the impression that their cause is just, that their past record is a clean one, that there exists a strong resistance movement in the Soviet Ukraine, that they have excellent intelligence services leading directly into the USSR, and that they are backed by an efficient organization.³² (S)

³¹Ibid. As an example of what American intelligence gathered on the Ukrainians in the fall of 1946, see AB-51 [Hecksher] to [redacted] [redacted] "Miscellaneous Ukrainian Personalities," 4 November 1946, MGH-002-1104a, LTS-827, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 48, Folder 42, CIA ARC. In this document, the Counter Intelligence Branch at USFET's G-2 interviewed Roman Stepanovich Smal-Stotsky, an Ukrainian professor and the "minister of propaganda" in the UNR, the *Ukrainski Narodna Republica*, an organization that claimed to be the Ukrainian government-in-exile in Germany, who had applied to teach in the United States. CIG later published a fuller report of the interview with Prof. Smal-Stotsky in late 1946, but Headquarters did not disseminate the information to its consumers. See External Survey Detachment, Intelligence Report, "Ukrainian Organizations [and Personalities], 14 December 1946, MGH-409, (S), in WASH-REG-INT-131, DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 271, [no folder listed], DO Records. Smal-Stotsky recounted at great length the work that his friend, Gen. Paul Shandruk, did during the war as the commander of Ukrainian troops in the German service and his postwar activities in Munich. In early November 1946, CIG reported that the Army's G-2 had also interviewed Shandruk, who reportedly offered to set up an intelligence network in the Ukraine for the Americans at a monthly cost of \$2,000. See AB-51 [Hecksher] to [redacted] [redacted] "General Szandruk, Head of the UPA (Ukrainian Partisan Army)," 4 November 1946, MGH-002-1104c, LTS-826, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 48, Folder 42, CIA ARC. (S)

³²Ibid. (S)

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The SSU director then admitted "actually, these are almost all open questions for each of the major groups concerned. The Ukrainian Nationalist leaders are among the most highly opportunistic groups in Europe," Quinn reported. "They are adroit political intriguers and past masters in the art of propaganda. The attempts of the old OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] leadership, for example, now representing UHVR-UPA [Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council-Ukrainian Insurgent Army], to give the movement a 'democratic' aspect and to represent it as the **only** [original emphasis] effective Ukrainian group have been especially conspicuous in recent weeks--the first statement is false, and the second is yet to be proved."³³ (S)

Stefan Bandera and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (U)

Col. Quinn had good reason to question the motives of the Ukrainian nationalists. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, formed in Prague in the late 1920s to fight for Ukrainian independence, split at the outbreak of the Second World War. The bulk of the Organization followed Stefan Bandera while a smaller segment remained with Andrey Melnik. Both factions had participated in terrorist activities against Polish officials before the war. To complicate matters further, Ukrainian nationalists allied themselves with Nazi "liberators" during of Operation Barbarossa in 1941.³⁴ (U)

³³Ibid. (S)

³⁴Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis is discussed in Boshyk, ed., *Ukraine during World War II*, pp. 61-88. The historical backdrop to Ukrainian political activism is found in John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2d ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). See also Jeffrey Burds, *The Early Cold War in the Soviet West Ukraine 1944-1948*, The Carl Becker Papers, no. 1505 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2001); Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929* (New

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While Ukrainian enthusiasm dimmed after the Nazis failed to support Ukrainian statehood, thousands of Ukrainians fought with Germans until the end of the war. At the same time, the OUN's leaders also stated that they had been held in German concentration camps during the war. These claims made it difficult then, and now, to determine the full extent of Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis. (U)

Stefan Bandera, one of the leading Ukrainian nationalists, earned a fierce reputation for conducting a "reign of terror" against the Poles, according to an OSS report issued in September 1945. "The mere mention of the name 'Bandera' invariably brings curses and imprecations among Polish refugees, OSS officers discovered." OSS summarized its information on this notorious Ukrainian nationalist:

Bandera is a young and violent student who some five years ago began opposing the elderly Melnik as leader of the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists]. In 1941 he went to Lemberg [Lvov] and proclaimed himself head of a Ukrainian state, supposedly with the approval of the German General Staff. This caused the Germans great embarrassment, and he was instructed to desist from further political activities unless given official approval. However, he and his followers began a campaign of terrorization, directed mainly against the followers of Melnik, which resulted in his [Bandera's] arrest and

York: Columbia University Press, 1980); and Maria Savchyn Pyskir, *Thousands of Roads: A Memoir of a Young Woman's Life in the Ukrainian Underground during and after World War I*, Trans. by Ania Savage (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2001). Timothy Snyder's article, "'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and For All: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947,'" in *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Spring 1999), pp. 86-120, provides a description of Ukrainian-Polish relations before, during, and after the war. Other sources of information include John-Paul Himka, "Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during the Second World War," in Jonathan Frankel, ed. *The Fate of the European Jews, 1939-1945 Continuity or Contingency?* (The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Studies in Contemporary Jewry Annual XIII) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). See also Sol Littman, "The Ukrainian Halychyna Division: A Case Study of Historical Revisionism," in Saul S. Friedman, ed., *Holocaust Literature: A Handbook of Critical, Historical, and Literary Writings* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), pp. 279-300. (U)

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confinement at Klein-Sachsenhausen. Melnik was also arrested. Both were later released, however, when the Wehrmacht and Ostministerium attempted to build up a strong Ukraine. Bandera can be regarded as both anti-Soviet and anti-German. He appears to be continuing his campaign of violence since the German withdrawal from the Ukraine.³⁵ (S)

As the Third Reich collapsed, many Eastern and Southern European Nazi collaborators fell into Western Allied hands as prisoners of war or displaced persons. The presence of a large body of anticommunists in Germany and Austria, with intimate knowledge of Soviet activities, proved too enticing for American intelligence to ignore. (S)

SSU's Hungarian Connection (U)

Bill Holtsman in Munich became involved with the Ukrainians through Zsolt Aradi.³⁶ The author of the October 1946 interim study, Aradi exploited ties to Ukrainian church officials at the Vatican in order to meet with emigre leaders in Germany and to gain positive intelligence on the Soviets. SSU moved Aradi from Italy to Austria in late 1945, where he continued to work as a "consultant." Aradi maintained close ties to his Vatican sources and, according to Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., SSU's chief of mission in Austria, "it is believed that KILKENNY [Aradi] was one of the first to suggest to OSS the use of

³⁵OSS Intelligence Report, A-61154-a, "Activities of Bandera," 21 September 1945, (S), in Stefan Bandera, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

³⁶Zsolt Aradi was born in Zombor, Hungary, in 1908 of Jewish background although his father's family converted to Catholicism. He moved to Rome at the beginning of the war and worked as press attaché at the Hungarian Legation at the Vatican until the Allies liberated the city in 1944. Married to a German woman and a father of three children, SI recruited Aradi in June 1944. He worked with OSS and its successors in Italy, Austria, and Germany until he moved to the United States in early 1948. During the period that Aradi worked in Munich, he was known initially as KILKENNY and, after September 1947, as CARRYALL. For further information, see Zsolt Aradi, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

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priests and Vatican contacts for obtaining intelligence in Central Europe." In the spring of 1946, Aradi became acquainted with several Ukrainian religious leaders in Rome.

Through the Hungarian, Ulmer reported "it has been possible to establish contact with representatives of the so-called Ukrainian government, an anti-Soviet political group."³⁷

(S)

Ulmer made the following comments about the Ukrainian nationalists based on reports provided by Aradi:

This group appears to be well organized both within the Ukraine and among Ukrainian DPs in southern Germany and Austria. It controls a strong resistance movement which appears to be giving considerable trouble to the Red Army. Two vice-presidents of the government (both of them closely connected with the Catholic Church) have been contacted in southern Germany with the view to exploiting the intelligence possibilities such a movement can furnish to SSU If all goes well, within a reasonable period of time there should be established a good line of communications to the resistance within Russia and the results of this chain will be available to both the Austrian and German Missions.³⁸ (S)

Both Ulmer and Gordon M. Stewart, chief of SI in Germany and later mission chief, expressed satisfaction with Aradi's efforts.³⁹ Ulmer claimed "it should not be

³⁷Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., to [Unstated], "Vatican Contacts," 4 June 1946, (S), in Aradi, ☐ ☐ DO Records. For further details on Aradi's Vatican sources, see Lt. Benjamin H. Cushing to Harry Rositzke, "Contacts in and through the Vatican," 17 February 1947, FSRO-1379, (S) enclosing Zsolt Aradi, "Contacts in and through the Vatican," 5 February 1947, (S), in DO Records, ☐ ☐ Box 513, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

³⁸Ibid; and Aradi to Ulmer, 19 June 1946 (S), in Aradi, ☐ ☐ DO Records. (S)

³⁹Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., born in 1916, received his degree in English from Princeton University in 1939. He joined the US Navy in 1941 and served with OSS throughout the war, including a lengthy period as operations officer of its German-Austrian Section and head of SI in Austria immediately after the war. He became chief of mission in Austria in November 1945 ☐

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forgotten that much of the success for past operations is due to KILKENNY himself. He is ideally suited by years of experience in Church matters, by temperament, and as a result of intimate contact with important people within the Church to carry out these valuable and highly delicate operations."⁴⁰ Stewart asked Ulmer to tell Aradi, "I am glad that your relations in Munich are satisfactory and hope that your work in that area will soon bear fruit." Commenting on Aradi's initial approach to Ukrainian nationalists in Bavaria, Stewart wrote, "it is my understanding that Washington is quite interested in the type of contacts you are making."⁴¹ (S)

After dealing with several Ukrainian religious figures in both Italy and Germany, Aradi met with the leaders of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR or *Ukrainska holovna vyzvolna rada*) in Germany.⁴² He initially worked with Father Ivan Hrinioch and Yury Lopatinsky, two members of the Council.⁴³ Hrinioch, a Greek

⁴⁰Ulmer, "Vatican Contacts," 4 June 1946, (S), in Aradi, [] O Records. (S)

⁴¹Stewart to Ulmer, 19 July 1946, (S). See also Aradi to Ulmer, "Belladonna Progress," 1 August 1946, (S), both in Aradi, [] , DO Records. (S)

⁴² []

Clandestine Service Historical Series []

[] . For unclassified reading of Ukrainian history, politics, and personalities, see Volodymyr Kubijovyc, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 5 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1984-1993). (S)




⁴³Aradi, "Operation Belladonna," 27 December 1946, MGH-391, (S), in DO Records, []


[] Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC (hereafter cited as "Operation Belladonna," 27 December 1946). According to this memo, Aradi first met a Father Diaczisyn in Rome through Father Ivo Zeiger, special adviser to the chief of the Vatican mission to the US Army in Germany. Diaczisyn introduced Aradi to Bishop Ivan Buczko, an active Ukrainian nationalist, and an adviser to the Pope on Ukrainian affairs. Buczko put Aradi in contact with UHVR's vice president in Germany, Vasily Mudry, who then passed the agent on to Hrinioch and Lopatinsky in the American zone. For further discussion of Aradi's initial contact with Ukrainian clergy, see External Survey Detachment, Intelligence Report, "UHVR and UPA," 26 October 1946, FSRO-677, (S), in Bandera, [] DO Records. See also the results of an interview that Aradi had with Mudry in External Survey Detachment, Intelligence Report, "[Current] Ukrainian Affairs in Germany," 24 December 1946, MGH-410, (S), in WASH-REG-INT-131, DO Records, [] [] Box 271, [no folder listed], DO Records. (S)

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Catholic priest and longtime Ukrainian nationalist, served as the UHVR's second vice president while Lopatinsky acted as liaison between UHVR and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, UPA (or *Ukrainska povstanska armia*), fighting the Soviets in Ukraine.⁴⁴ (S)

Aradi dubbed the Munich group Referat-33 (or R-33). It also included Mykola Lebed, who still lived in Rome (he later moved to Germany with American assistance in 1947).⁴⁵ Lebed served as the foreign minister of *Zakordonne Predstavnytstvo UHVR* or Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. A key figure in the Ukrainian liberation movement, Lebed was also one of the most controversial. Convicted for involvement in the 1934 assassination of the Polish minister of interior, his death sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. A founder of the *Organizacya*

⁴⁴Hriniach (his name is spelled numerous ways) was the most important Ukrainian contact with the Americans during this time period. Born in 1907, Hriniach grew up in western Ukraine where he was ordained in the Church and became an active Ukrainian nationalist. While one American case officer noted "subject was in contact with the GIS [German Intelligence Service] during the early stages of the German campaign in Galicia," American intelligence officers found Hriniach to be "very well informed and highly intelligent" as well as "incorruptibly honest." Hriniach, in fact, served as the chaplain of the infamous Ukrainian Nachtigall Legion of Ukrainian Nationalists, which collaborated with the Nazis during the invasion and played a major role in the 1941 proclamation of Ukrainian statehood. Hriniach had the operational cryptonym of CAPARISON in this early period and continued to provide information to US intelligence through the 1970s. Hriniach served after the war in his clerical role and by 1982 he had been elevated to the rank of Patriarchal Archimandrite. See External Survey Detachment, Intelligence Report, "UHVR and UPA," 26 October 1946, FSRO-677, (S), in Bandera,   DO Records. See also Acting Chief, Munich Operations Base, Memorandum to Chief, FBM, "Personal Record of CAPARISON," 6 May 1949, MGM-A-1148, (S), in Ivan Hriniach, 

 DO Records. In addition, see Ivan Hrynokh entry, Kubijovyc, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. Lopatinsky was born in 1906 and served as an officer in the Polish Army. He also joined the Nachtigall Legion and immigrated to the United States in 1953. He died in New York in 1982. Yurii Lopatynsky entry, Kubijovyc, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. (S)

⁴⁵"Operation Belladonna," 27 December 1946, p. 6. Referat-33 (R-33) included the following members: Hriniach, Lebed, Lopatinsky as chiefs; Myron Matvieyko (chief of the OUN's security branch); and Yaroslav Stetsko (head of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations). (S)

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Ukrainskych Nationaltiv or the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Lebed fervently desired the independence of his homeland.⁴⁶ (S)

Aradi reported to the Americans about the members of R-33. He observed that Hrinioch, Lebed, and Lopatinsky were "determined and able men, but with the psychology of the hunted. They are ready to sacrifice their lives or to commit suicide at any time to further their cause or to prevent security violations, and they are equally ready to kill if they must." The Hungarian added, "it is always necessary to remember that they have an almost religious worship of their nation and distrust anything foreign: first and foremost, Polish; then Russian; then German." Aradi believed that if the Ukrainians were "properly treated they can be useful at any time and for any purpose."⁴⁷ (S)

By October 1946, Aradi reported that both Hrinioch in Munich and Lebed in Rome offered to provide the Americans with intelligence on Soviet activities and agents in exchange for US assistance to the Ukrainian struggle.⁴⁸ Drawing upon his contact with numerous Ukrainian groups, Aradi commented later in December that "after a thorough study of the Ukrainian problem and a comparison of information from several sources in Germany, Austria, and Rome, source believes that UHVR, UPA, and OUN-Bandera are the only large and efficient organizations among Ukrainians." Based on information provided by leaders of the UHVR, Aradi believed that this group had "the support of the younger generation and of Ukrainians at home." Aradi also noted "some other groups are envious of the UHVR complex because the organization is independent

⁴⁶Lebed was born in 1909 and organized the youth wing of the OUN in the early 1930s. For more information on Lebed, see Mykola Lebed, [] DO Records, and Mykola Lebed entry, Kubijovyc, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. Lebed's activities and immigration to the United States are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. (S)

⁴⁷"Operation Belladonna," 27 December 1946, p. 17. (S)

⁴⁸ESD Intelligence Report, "UHVR and UPA," 26 October 1946, FSRO-677, (S), in Bandera, [] DO Records. (S)

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and forceful and has always refused to collaborate with Germans, Poles or Russians."⁴⁹

(S)

First Projects (U)

In mid-1946, Aradi in Austria and Holtsman in Munich launched two separate projects involving Ukrainians in Germany. The first project, BELLADONNA, drew upon Aradi's contact with Hrinoich to dispatch Ukrainians from Germany into the western Soviet Union in order to collect information on the Soviet military.

BELLADONNA had a positive intelligence function while LYNX, launched by Holtsman in July 1946 as a supplementary project of BELLADONNA, focused on the identification of Soviet agents in western Germany. Security Control in Munich (formerly X-2) replaced LYNX with a new project, TRIDENT, in early 1947 to better manage Ukrainian affairs and overall security.⁵⁰ A third project, known as UKELE, drew upon the services of a double agent known as SLAVKO.⁵¹ (S)

⁴⁹"Operation Belladonna," 27 December 1946, pp. 16-17. This report also enumerates the Ukrainian proposals for cooperation. A supplement to this report is found in Aradi, "Belladonna Operations - 2," 27 December 1946, MGH-430, FSRO-985, (S), in DO Records, [] Box 510, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. Aradi wrote both reports, but according to Stewart, "they are the work of Zsolt Aradi and Mary Hutchison. If you find them obscure, don't hesitate to fire questions at us. Mary did wonders in converting Zsolt's quaint English into 'Reports Style' but the material has, after all, come a long way around (Ukrainian to Hungarian or German to English) and some concepts may be a little blurred." Mary Hutchison, the wife of Capt. Gregory L. Hutchison, the adjutant of the War Department Detachment in Germany, worked with X-2 in Heidelberg. Stewart to Helms, "Belladonna Operation," 2 January 1946 [1947], FSRO-1111, (S), in DO Records, [] , Box 511, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

⁵⁰For details on these early SC Munich operations, see "CE Operational Progress Report No. 5," 17 February 1947, (S), in DO Records, [] Box 513, [no folder listed], CIA ARC; "Operation Trident: Progress Report 1," 21 January 1947, MGH-642, HSC/OPS/9, (S); "Developments in the TRIDENT Project," 21 February 1947, MGH-900, HSC/OPS/026, (S); and SC Munich, "Operation TRIDENT," 15 June 1947, (S), all in DO Records, [] , Box 4, Folder 20, CIA ARC (hereafter cited as "Trident Project."). See also SC, AMZON to FBM,

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[] used Myron Matvieyko, chief of OUN's security branch known as *Sluzba Bezpeka*, as their primary contacts in Munich for the three projects. Matvieyko, who had served as an agent for the German *Abwehr* during the war, exchanged information gained by OUN's "bunkers" in Germany with American intelligence "in return for protection in the American Zone and some minor operational supplies."⁵² He, however, proved to be increasingly unreliable, and the CIA eventually dropped Matvieyko in 1950 for "ineptitude." The following year, Matvieyko defected to the Soviets after his return to the Ukraine on a secret British mission. He later denounced the entire Ukrainian emigre leadership as Nazi collaborators and tools of the "capitalist intelligence services."⁵³ Matvieyko's defection seemed at the time to confirm some American and Ukrainian suspicions that he had been a Soviet double agent throughout the period of his work in Germany with US intelligence. (S)

Low Scale and Ideologically Biased (U)

"Progress of Munich Operations," 15 May 1947, HSC/OPS/53, FSRO-1796, (S), in DO Records, [] [] Box 516, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)

⁵¹SC, AMZON to Chief, FBM, "Organization of Project UKELELE," 28 March 1947, HSC/OPS/35, FSRO-1547, (S), in DO Records, [] [] Box 514, Folder 4, CIA ARC. See also [] [] "SLAVKO, Resident MGB Agent in Munich," 17 February 1947, MGH-826, MSC/RIR/429, (S), and [] [] "SLAVKO and the MGB," 28 March 1947, MGH-1100, MSC-445, (S), both in WASH-REG-INT-131, DO Records, [] [] Box 272, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

⁵²Quotation cited in SC Munich, "CAPANEUS," 15 June 1947, (S), in "Trident Project." (S)

⁵³English translation of Radio Kiev broadcast, "Broadcast for Ukrainians in the Emigration," 24 November 1960, in Myron Matvieyko, [] [] DO Records. For further information on Matvieyko's defection, see Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks: The Memories of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), pp. 257-259. (S)

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Matvievko's illegal activities (including murder and counterfeiting) strained American willingness to work with the Ukrainians in Germany.⁵⁴ As early as the fall of 1946, the Office of Special Operations expressed its dissatisfaction with the OUN when it commented that Aradi's reports were slanted in favor of Hrinoich and Lebed, downplaying the role of other Ukrainian nationalists.⁵⁵ Headquarters told Security Control in Heidelberg that "the securing of information on activities of the various Ukrainian groups in the American Zone is a straight CIC job and we should get no more involved in it than we unfortunately already are."⁵⁶ (S)

By the spring of 1947, Headquarters personnel noted that "intelligence derived from such Ukrainian groups is [not] worth the time and effort which would necessarily have to be expended on such a project. Experience has shown that information derived from such organizations has been both low-grade and ideologically biased."⁵⁷ In another dispatch, Headquarters commented that "it has been impossible so far to elicit from our SB [Ukrainian] contacts the names of any of their subsources—this in spite of repeated attempts to get such data from them. Time and again mention has been made by our Ukrainian sources of the existence of "bunkers," supposedly small intelligence cells, in the American Zone of Germany as well as Czechoslovakia." The report went on to say, "it is fully appreciated that it is often extremely difficult to check on the veracity of such

⁵⁴"Liquidation of Lt. Andrei Pechara," 3 June 1947, MGH-1399, (S), in "Trident Project." A description of other murders committed by Matvievko and the SB/OUN is found in [redacted]

[redacted]. For description of Matvievko's counterfeiting activities, see numerous reports in his 201 file. (S)

⁵⁵SAINT to SAINT, AMZON, "Ukrainian Nationalist Movement," 24 October 1946, X-8565, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted] Box 6, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

⁵⁶SC, FBM to SC, AMZON, "Ukrainians in Germany," 23 January 1947, X-9223, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 5, Folder 168, CIA ARC. (S)

⁵⁷"CE Operational Progress Report No. 5," 17 February 1947, FSRO-1306, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 513, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

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reports; on the other hand unless attempts are made to verify the existence of such groups, we will never be able to evaluate the quality of the intelligence reporting of the Ukrainians." OSO added that "it is seriously recommended that this contact be severed completely, although graciously."⁵⁸ (S)

Holtzman, in fact, dropped arrangements with the LYNX group in late 1946 and focused on more limited contacts under Operation TRIDENT. In doing so, SC Munich severed relations with Hrinioch (who had been Aradi's source) although it still maintained contact with Matvieyko. In the meantime, the OUN's ongoing internal dissension further tested American patience with the Ukrainians. The explosion came after a stormy meeting in Germany in August 1948 when the leaders of the ZPUHVR in Germany (principally Lebed and Hrinioch) broke with Bandera's OUN. The increasingly totalitarian attitude taken by Bandera and his resentment toward the Americans constituted the main reasons behind this break.⁵⁹ (S)

Hiding Bandera (U)

Despite the general instability of the Ukrainian emigre leaders and the dissolution of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, American intelligence continued to protect the Ukrainians in exchange for information. In 1947, [] brought Aradi's contact, Michael Korzan, from Austria to Munich to provide better insight into the activities of the

⁵⁸"Munich Detachment," 6 May 1947, (S) in "Trident Project." (S)

⁵⁹The background of this conference and the dissension between the OUN and ZPUHVR and other Ukrainian groups is discussed in Chief of Station, Karlsruhe (signed by James Critchfield and [] to Chief, FBM, "Project ICON: Postwar Ukrainian Exile Organizations in Western Europe," 20 October 1948, MGM-A-793, (S), in DO Records, [], Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. This report is hereafter cited as Project ICON/Ukraine Report. (S)

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OUN.⁶⁰ Several months earlier, the German Mission had sheltered Stefan Bandera from extradition to the Soviet Union. Since the end of the war, the USSR had demanded that the United States return all Soviet citizens suspected of war crimes and Nazi collaboration from the American zones in Austria and Germany.⁶¹ The Ukrainians

⁶⁰SC, AMZON to FBM for SC Washington, "CAPELIN-New Agent of SC Munich," 3 June 1947, HSC/OPS/60, (S), in "Trident Project." SC Munich reported that "CAPELIN [Michael Korzan] was moved by us on 17 May 1947 from his former residence in Taxenbach, Austria (E96), and is now living at Gausstrasse 3, Munich. We are supplying him with a residence permit for Munich and the necessary food and identification cards." Korzan "is expected to give us better coverage than has been possible through CAPANEUS [Matvieyko] and CANAAN [Kamian Korduba] who have refused agent status, preferring instead to 'cooperate' with the Americans. Consistent with this attitude, the two have been withholding information from us when they judged it unfavorable to the Ukrainian cause." Korzan, a former member of OUN's SB in the Ukraine, came to Germany from Austria to take charge of Matvieyko's SB counterintelligence section. Korzan had already assisted American intelligence by identifying SLAVKO, the double agent in Project UKELELE; something that Matvieyko had refused to do. Information on Korzan was first reported in Aradi to [redacted] "Belladonna Agent," 14 December 1946, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 168, Folder 5, CIA ARC. For an example of an OUN/SB semi-monthly report compiled from sources throughout Europe, see SAINT to SAINT, Bern. "DB-7/1 and Mme. Rudnika," 19 November 1946, X-8804, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 6, Folder 125, CIA ARC. (S)

⁶¹It was common practice for the Soviet Military Administration to communicate to the American military governor lists of names and organizations that it sought. In June 1946, Marshal Sokolovsky wrote Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, commander of US Forces in the European Theater, to protest the presence of numerous Ukrainian groups "functioning in the American Zone of Occupation and engaged in open anti-Soviet propaganda and in spreading rumors aimed at undermining the friendly relations existing between our two countries." McNarney wrote back in October stating that he had instituted tighter controls on newspapers published in the American zone by displaced persons, but adding that the "evidence of the organizations furnished by you cannot be substantiated by our investigations in all cases." McNarney added that "it now appears that some national committees, by working under UNRRA, believed that they had received some moral approval by the United States occupational authorities. However, this is not the case." McNarney remained "greatly concerned in fair treatment in this Zone to protect the interests of our esteemed allies. Measures are continually in effect for that purpose." See Marshal Sokolovsky to Gen. McNarney, 5 June 1946, R-496-A, and McNarney to Sokolovsky, 12 October 1946, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, The Records of the Executive Office, The Chief of Staff, Records Maintained for Military Governor Lucius D. Clay 1945-49, Box 19, [no folder listed], NARA. As another example of a similar Soviet request in 1949 and the American reply, see US Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, *Germany: 1947-1949 The Story in Documents* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 124-127. (U)

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presented an unusual situation, as did other Eastern Europeans, such as the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians. Many Ukrainians claimed to be Polish citizens, thus exempt from repatriation to the USSR (Poland controlled tracts of Ukraine). Likewise, the United States did not recognize the Soviet occupation of the Baltic nations in 1940, and these refugees refused to be classified as Soviet citizens or to be returned to their homelands as long as they remained under Soviet domination. (S)

A Soviet request for the repatriation of the Ukrainians came at the same time as Zsolt Aradi and Boleslav A. Holtsman were making their first contacts with the OUN and ZPUHVR. American authorities faced a predicament as to how to respond. On 15 October 1946, Colonel-General P.A. Kurochkin, the deputy commander of the Soviet Military Administration, wrote his counterpart, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, to request the arrest of Stefan Bandera as a war criminal. "For these crimes committed against the Russian people," the Soviet officer wrote, "he should be arrested and tried by a Military Tribunal, but this can only be done with your assistance because of the fact that he is now hiding in the American Zone of Occupation" Three days later, Gen. Clay responded that the Soviet request had been forwarded to Gen. McNarney, the commander of American forces in Germany, for further investigation.⁶² (U)

A few days later, Henry D. Hecksher, Security Control chief in Heidelberg, advised Holtsman in Munich that he "should take special pains at steering a judicious middle course." Hecksher wanted Holtsman to "place yourself squarely on record with Bandera as greatly concerned as regards Bandera's security but equally unable to materially contribute to its preservation, because you had not been taken into the



⁶²Kurochkin to Clay, 15 October 1946, R-934-A, and Clay to Kurochkin, 18 October 1946, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, The Records of the Executive Office, The Chief of Staff, Records Maintained for Military Governor Lucius D. Clay 1945-49, Box 19, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)

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complete confidence of the UHVR.”⁶³ By doing this, Hecksher hinted that Holtsman could blame Ukrainian reticence in the event of Bandera’s arrest. “Tipping off Bandera, if this should be decided upon, would have to be done with utmost discretion obviating the remotest possibility that his escape is traced back to a US agency.” Holtsman was told to use cutouts to advise the Ukrainians “taking into account, of course, that should any intimation of our connivance in Bandera’s escape reach the ears of the UHVR, we could expect with certainty that the Soviets would learn about it sooner or later.”⁶⁴ (S)

Clay soon replied to the deputy Soviet military governor, informing him that the US Army was doing what it could to locate Bandera. “US police agencies which were already alerted were directed to intensify the search for Stefan Bandera. He has not yet been apprehended and our initial efforts to date have proven fruitless.” Clay assured his counterpart that, if located, Bandera would be turned over to the Russians via “the regular channels established by international agreement for the handling of war criminals.”⁶⁵ (U)

Hecksher explained to Washington that “G-2 USFET is definitely loath to comply with the Soviet request to find Bandera and to repatriate him as a ‘war criminal.’” Bandera’s arrest would hurt American intelligence efforts to learn more about the Ukrainian resistance movement. “We are,” Hecksher wrote, “definitely interested in cautiously cultivating our contacts with the UHVR if not along lines of active cooperation, then with at least the objective to keep ourselves informed of what its plans

⁶³AB-51 [Hecksher] to AB-43 [Holtsman], “Stefan Bandera,” 28 October 1946, FSRO-656, (S) in Bandera,   DO Records. (S)

⁶⁴Ibid. (S)

⁶⁵Clay to Kurochkin, 31 October 1946, and Huebner to Clay, 28 October 1946, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, The Records of the Executive Office, The Chief of Staff, Records Maintained for Military Governor Lucius D. Clay 1945-49, Box 19, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)

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are and to what extent it has succeeded in building up and servicing cells in the Ukraine.”⁶⁶ Zsolt Aradi speculated that:

There can be little doubt as to what would happen in case the American authorities should deliver Bandera to the Soviet. It would imply to the Ukrainians that we as an organization are unable to protect them, i.e., we have no authority. In such a case, there is not any reason or sense for them to cooperate with us.

One of the reasons why full cooperation between the UHVR and our organization has not developed yet is the suspicion of these leaders that we will ultimately ‘betray’ them.

From the very beginning they complained that Americans have no real interest in them and that Communist-penetrated USA officers will trade them to Russia. This belief was shared by both the Bandera people and the conservative Ukrainians.

My personal feeling and conviction is that in case of Bandera’s arrest, it would immediately put an end to operations Bella Donna and Lynx. (S)

Aradi concluded that “if it should be decided not to use these people and their organization for intelligence purposes, it would be better to arrest not only Bandera, but all the leaders whose names and whereabouts are known to us.”⁶⁷ (S)

In the meantime, OSO officials at the German Mission headquarters in Heidelberg remained concerned about how to handle this crisis. Gordon M. Stewart, Intelligence Branch chief, told Richard Helms in early 1947 that he and his colleagues “wanted, on the one hand, to have the American authorities appear energetic in satisfying the demands of the Russians and, on the other, to have [Operation] BELLADONNA take on adequate

⁶⁶SC AMZON to SC Washington, “Search for Bandera, Leader of the OUN,” 20 November 1946, FSRO-766, (S), and Attachment 1 (KILKENNY) in Bandera, ☐ , DO Records. (S)

⁶⁷Ibid. (S)

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cover." In doing so, the Central Intelligence Group urged Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burrell, USFET G-2, to delay his investigation until after 15 January 1947.⁶⁸ (S)

The additional time permitted Aradi "to inform his people that they must be under cover by 15 January, because the United States Government is going to accede to a legitimate request of the Russians that war criminals and conspirators be rounded up and delivered to them, even if they are not former Soviet citizens." Stewart added, "by taking cover we mean breaking off all contact with the overt political groups in the Ukrainian colony, changing names and cover documents and actually hiding until the political flap is over."⁶⁹ According to Stewart's communiqué to Helms in early 1947, "the result was less dramatic than we expected." The Soviets did not push further for Bandera's arrest and, Stewart wrote, "the Belladonnians fell into line very nicely."⁷⁰ (S)

Despite their role in sheltering Bandera, OSO officials in Washington's Foreign Branch M and Special Projects Division still took a dim view of Munich's work with the Ukrainians. This movement, Washington commented, "is, as the field agrees, **primarily** [original emphasis] a terrorist organization." Headquarters felt that intelligence produced by both LYNX and BELLADONNA had been minimal. In a fitting—and prophetic—statement, Washington told its field officers that:

⁶⁸ Stewart to Helms, "Belladonna Operation," 2 January 1946 [47], FSRO-1111, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 511, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

⁶⁹ Stewart to Lewis and Aradi, "Operation Belladonna," 10 December 1946, FSRO-1111, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 511, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

⁷⁰ Stewart to Helms, "Belladonna Operation, 2 January 1946 [47], (S). CIC dubbed its role in hiding Bandera from the Soviets as Operation ANYFACE, named after a Dick Tracy character. No indication exists in the surviving records that CIG actually met with Bandera to warn him of the search. As an indication of how difficult it was to track Bandera down, American intelligence in Rome reported that the Ukrainian leader had escaped from the Ukraine and now lived in Czechoslovakia. The CIA reported this in October 1947 based on information provided by a Ukrainian named Federonczuk to the Counter Intelligence Corps. See [redacted] to Washington, "Liberty International," 10 October 1947, PIRA-1580, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 296, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

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The case of Bandera's extradition and our part in it brings to the fore the whole Ukrainian problem. If the *sine qua non* of Ukrainian cooperation is political, then we should cease all **direct contact** [original emphasis] immediately. We are not in a position to give it, and if we attempt to create the impression that we can, we can expect only bad results, for it will become obvious sooner or later that the protection we offer is extremely fragile as factors beyond our control are brought into play. If we accept the premise that political support is out, we must also face the fact that in the long run operations using the Ukrainians as an organized group will probably turn out to be worthless—simply because without political support the Ukrainian nationalist groups will be decimated by Soviet pressure and demoralization. It is therefore difficult to see the Bandera problem as really significant. The effects of Bandera's arrest will only be to precipitate an inevitable development.⁷¹ (S)

The day after Harry Rositzke, the acting chief of Special Projects Division—Soviet (SPD-S), wrote this memo, he criticized OSO for failing to develop Soviet strategic “Lambda targets.”⁷² Rositzke, who later headed CIA's efforts to penetrate the Soviet Union, protested to Col. Donald H. Galloway, the Assistant Director for Special Operations, that OSO was overinvolved in tactical operations in Europe. He expressed concern about OSO's “hasty exploitation of sources of opportunity, especially anti-Soviet émigrés from the USSR and satellite countries, to the exclusion of actual penetration operations.” Rositzke wanted to centralize American intelligence efforts against the Soviets and to reduce “OSO exploitation of such organized anti-Soviet groups as the

⁷¹SC, FBM to SC, AMZON, “Munich Contacts,” 9 January 1947, X-9126, (S), enclosing SPD-S, “AB-51 and Kilkenny's Views on the Effects of Bandera's Extradition,” 7 January 1947, in DO Records, [] Box 6, Folder 126, CIA ARC. A copy of this same document is found in DO Records, [] Box 5, Folder 168, DO Records. (S)

⁷²The term LAMBDA was used to designate “critically important reports” dealing with the Soviet Union. (S)

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Ukrainians, Georgians, and Balts for penetrating the USSR [which] involves dangerous security and political hazards.”⁷³ (S)

As a part of a major reorganization of operations in Germany and the formation of the Munich Operations Base in mid-1947, Holtsman was told to reduce his work with the various émigré groups, especially the Ukrainians, and to concentrate on other targets. This led him to drop many of his Ukrainian contacts, with CIC, in turn, picking up both Ivan Hrynioch and Mykola Lebed as sources.⁷⁴ (S)

CIG officials in Washington advocated a gradual reduction in the American involvement with the Ukrainians during 1947 because of the inherent weaknesses of the OUN and the UHVR as well as the belief that these organizations were penetrated by Soviet intelligence. The fact that many of the Ukrainian leaders and organizations had worked with the Nazis was not regarded as a decisive factor. American interest in the Ukrainians lay dormant until the pressure of Cold War rivalry prompted another review. (C)

⁷³Rositzke to Col. Galloway, “Recommended Policy for Lambda Strategic Operations Program,” 8 January 1947, (S), in DO Records, [] [], Box 4, Folder 14, CIA ARC. (S)

⁷⁴Region IV, 970th CIC Detachment, Lt. Col. Ellington D. Golden to Commanding Officer, 970th CIC Detachment, “Hrynioch, Ivan,” 18 November 1947, (C), enclosing Special Agent Camille S. Hajdu, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, “Hrynioch, Ivan,” 17 November 1947, (C), in Ivan Hrynioch, Dossier XE-20-19-66, Investigative Records Repository, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland (hereafter cited by dossier number, IRR, INSCOM). (C)