In the Shadow of the Cold War (U)

The Nazi war criminal investigations labored under the shadow of the Cold War. When the Office of Special Investigations reached an agreement with Soviet authorities in 1980 to interview witnesses and collect evidence behind the Iron Curtain, doubts arose concerning the motives behind Soviet cooperation. ¹ Many ethnic groups, especially those from the Baltic States and other Eastern European countries, blasted OSI as a tool for Soviet KGB disinformation activities to discredit anticommunists living in the United States by affixing the “fascist” label on groups that resisted Moscow’s oppressive rule. They directed vehement protests against Allan A. Ryan, Jr., OSI’s director, for his work in fostering cooperation with the Soviet regime and his description of the Ukrainian role during World War II in his 1984 book, Quiet Neighbors.² (U)

During the 1970s and the 1980s, the Central Intelligence Agency grew increasingly aware of the importance that Soviet intelligence placed on “active measures.” The KGB, in fact, had a branch in the First Chief Directorate dedicated to

¹For a discussion of OSI’s agreement with the Soviets, see Ryan, Quiet Neighbors, pp. 65-93. (U)
²Examples of emigre writings against OSI are seen in National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups, Inc., Victory Without Fear: A Response to OSI’s “Nazi Hunting” Experiment (Irvington, N.J.: n.p., 1985), and various articles in Boshyk, ed., Ukraine during World War II. (U)
employing front groups, media manipulation, disinformation, forgeries, and agents of influence to promote Soviet foreign policy goals. The Soviets also sought to discredit the American government in the eyes of world opinion and to undercut international support of the United States. As a result, the Nazi war criminal investigations became drawn into the larger arena of US-USSR competition.3 (U)

Konstantin Hanff (U)

Even before the establishment of the Office of Special Investigations in 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency questioned the relationship between the Nazi war criminal investigations and the disinformation activities of the Warsaw Pact intelligence services. One case, that of Konstantin Hanff (also known as Konstanty Zygfryd Hanff), threatened to embroil the United States and Poland in a diplomatic squabble. Hanff, of mixed Polish-German background, was born in the Polish village of Czestochowa in 1926 and immigrated to the United States in 1969. According to later statements to the FBI, Hanff lived in Poland until the outbreak of the war, when he moved to Lithuania. He then worked in Warsaw and Berlin and served in the German Army on the Eastern Front.

3The CIA exposed the KGB’s efforts in Congressional hearings while the State Department also publicized examples of deliberate disinformation attempts. See US Congress, House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *Soviet Active Measures*. 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 13-14 July 1982, and various special reports, foreign affairs notes, and bulletins issued by the Department of State. For a discussion of Soviet targeting against emigre groups, see Herbert Romerstein and Stanislav Levchenko, *The KGB Against the “Main Enemy:” How the Soviet Intelligence Service*
Hanff deserted in 1944 but was arrested and sentenced to two years imprisonment. The Germans soon placed Hanff in a special rehabilitation unit and returned him to frontline duty. In the spring of 1945, he fell into Soviet hands and, thereafter, he assisted the Russians in spreading anti-German propaganda. The NKVD later apprehended Hanff for anticommunist sentiments and held him until his return to Poland in early 1948.

Following his release, Hanff worked throughout Eastern Europe in numerous private and governmental bodies, primarily in the import-export business. In mid-1969, at the age of 43, Hanff, his wife, and one son obtained immigrant visas and moved to the United States, where they took up residence in New York City.4

A Threat to US-Polish Relations (U)

While holding an assortment of jobs, Hanff, a translator, had other goals in mind. In September 1975, he published his first issue of Wolna Polska, or “Free Poland,” the voice of an anticommunist group, “Combat Organization Free Poland.”5 In this paper, Hanff listed the names of alleged Polish, Czech, and Soviet intelligence officers stationed in the United States under diplomatic cover. In addition, Hanff tried to influence various

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4Hanff’s brief autobiographical statement is found in various excerpts of FBI reports in OGC Records, i, Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. Hanff’s CIA personality file is quite extensive. For further details, see Konstanty Zygfryd Hanff, C, DO Records. (S)

Operates Against the United States (Lexington: DC Heath and Company, 1989), pp. 308-318. (U)
Warsaw Pact officials to defect. These activities incensed the Polish Government to the point that the Foreign Minister complained to the American ambassador in March 1976. The State Department noted that “the message was clear to the Ambassador that retaliation of some kind is possible unless Poles are convinced soon that Department takes their concern seriously and that everything possible will be done to meet their demands.” By June of that year, the Hanff affair threatened to upset the American secretary of state’s visit to Poland. (S)

The Poles had, in fact, already checked Hanff’s financial support among the Polish emigre communities in both New York and Chicago. At the same time, the first indications of Polish disinformation efforts appeared in the United States. In early April 1976, the Zionist Organization of America received an anonymous letter that claimed that Hanff had served as a Nazi informer in 1941 and, later, had participated in war crimes in eastern Poland. While Hanff denied these allegations to the FBI, he did not curtail his anticommmunist activities. On the contrary, he continued his work and even registered as an American agent of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London in the summer of 1976. This act once again led the Polish Government to protest Hanff’s presence in the United States and increased Polish suspicions that Hanff worked for American intelligence.6 (S)

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5For a chronology of the Hanff case, see Office of Technical Service to OGC, “Technical Assistance for US Attorney’s Office, New York,” 7 April 1978, QDL 51-78, (S), in OGC Records, Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. (S)

6William H. Webster, the FBI director, asked the Director of Central Intelligence in early 1979 if “Hanff was ever employed or had his activities directed by the Central Intelligence Agency.” The Agency replied that “an intensive search of the files and indices . . . reveals no evidence of any contact or association between Subject and this Agency.” See Webster to DCI, “Unknown
Hanff’s publications and his own suspected forgeries raised concern within the State Department, the FBI, and the CIA. The Poles took Hanff’s threats seriously and began to retaliate in kind by spreading doctored copies of a “Free Poland Special Report Nr 3,” which published a “black list of dangerous CIA and FBI agents.” Consequently, in the spring of 1977, the State Department asked the Justice Department to examine Hanff’s wartime activities and ascertain the validity of war crimes allegations. The US District Attorney’s Office in New York had already located several witnesses in Israel who claimed that Hanff had helped select Jews for extermination camps. The FBI also had an informant who said that he had seen a photograph of Hanff in an SS uniform. (S)

CIA’s Technical Assistance (U)

In early 1978, the chief of CIA’s Questioned Documents Laboratory in the Office of Technical Service, became involved in the Hanff case after he received a call from the US District Attorney’s Office in New York. In a meeting with

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Subjects; Mailing of Forged Letters on Polish Consul General Stationery in New York City; Protection of Foreign Officials-Harassment-Subversives,” 1 February 1979, in DO Records, Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. The Agency’s reply is found in DDO to Director, FBI, “Unknown Subjects; Mailing of Forged Letters on Polish Consul General Stationery in New York City; Protection of Foreign Officials-Harassment-Subversives,” [undated], (S), in OGC Records, Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. (S)

7 Born in 1928, had served with the Counter Intelligence Corps in Austria in the early 1950s. He later worked with as a document technologist when he transferred to the CIA. He received his Ph.D. and retired from the Agency in 1982.
Harry Batchelder, Jr., the assistant US attorney, reviewed the 1976 letter to the Zionist Organization of America and its three photocopies of German wartime documents, which had implicated Hanff. Batchelder wanted to determine if the documents were accurate or if they were Soviet/Polish forgeries implicating Hanff with war crimes. After receiving permission from the Office of General Counsel, agreed to undertake a technical examination pending further approval for any expert testimony in court. (S)

After performing his examination of the three photocopied documents, concluded in April 1978 that Hanff was a victim of a disinformation effort on the part of the Polish intelligence service. He recommended that CIA have no further involvement with this case “unless there could be a definite showing that Hanff was the proper subject of Agency interest.” assessment, confirmed by the Office of General Counsel later that spring, reinforced the Agency’s belief that Hanff “seems to be a political entrepreneur involved in imaginative intelligence intrigues.”

Despite technical advice about the German documents, the US District Attorney’s Office and later the Office of Special Investigations insisted on pursuing the Hanff case, especially after he petitioned for naturalization. In the spring of 1978, the Justice Department asked the CIA to interview.

also Interview with by 16 July 2001, transcript and tape in Oral History project, CIA History Staff. (S)

8David S. Brandwein, Director, OTS to OGC, “Assistance to US Attorney, New York, by 11 April 1978, OGC 78-2349, (S), in OGC Records, Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. (S)
C., lived in New York and had worked with Hanff to publish the names of Polish
intelligence officers. C. of OGC and C. of the DO interviewed
C. in mid-April 1978 in order to determine the extent of his involvement with
Hanff. C. acknowledged that he had assisted Hanff, whom he described as a
“survival artist,” and that he had seen wartime photographs of Hanff in a German
uniform. C. agreed that the timing of the allegations about Hanff’s wartime
service “could not be dismissed as accidental.” Based on this interview, C. and
C. felt that C. should speak directly with the US attorney’s office in New
York.10 (S)

The New York district attorney’s office determined in mid-1979 that it lacked
sufficient evidence to proceed in prosecuting Hanff.11 In August 1980, C.
in OGC provided OSI and the US Attorney’s office of the Southern District of New York
with a list of third-agency material in CIA’s files pertaining to Hanff.12 Later in 1981,

9Philip Wilens, Chief, Government Regulations and Labor Section, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice to C., OGC, “Konstanty Hanff,” 14 April 1978, OGC 78-2417, (C), in OGC Records, C., Box 1, Folder 17, CIA ARC. (C)
10 C., Memorandum for the Record, “Denaturalization Proceedings against Konstanty
Hanff,” 9 May 1978, OGC 78-3017, (C); see also C., Memorandum for the Record,
“Denaturalization Proceedings against Constanty Hanff,” 18 April 1978, OGC 78-2470, (S), both
in OGC Records, C., Box 1, Folder 17, CIA ARC. (S)
11 C., Memorandum for the Record, “Konstantin Hanff and Tscherim Soobzokov,” 3 July
1979, OGC 79-06165, (S), and C. OGC to C., “Konstantin Hanff and
Tscherim Soobzokov,” 3 August 1979, OGC 79-07123, (C), both in OGC Records, C.,
Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. (S)
12 C. to Ryan and Thomas Belote, Assistant US Attorney, Southern District of New York,
the CIA met with Hanff as a possible source of current information on Polish political developments. Interestingly, a defector told the CIA in 1990 that Hanff was the target of a disinformation campaign by the Polish Ministry of Interior. Aleksandr Makowski, a press counselor and the Ministry of Interior resident, was credited as planning the attacks against Hanff. Makowski served in New York at the United Nations from 1976 to 1981, during the height of the Hanff investigations. This case highlights the complicated dimensions of the Nazi war criminal investigations and the difficulties that Federal investigators and agencies faced in bringing war criminals and collaborators to justice. (S)

**Defectors as Experts on Disinformation (U)**

Concerns about Soviet disinformation activities and the reliability of witnesses and evidence from the USSR increased as the Office of Special Investigations expanded its caseload. The CIA’s sources of information about life behind the Iron Curtain became increasingly important in cases dealing with former residents of Eastern Europe. Both Justice Department prosecutors and defense attorneys wanted to question defectors

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13DCD to Director, “Operational Lead (Poland),” 6 April 1981, 39600, IN 6181194, (S), in Hanff, DO Records. (S)

from various Warsaw Pact regimes who possessed insights about Soviet operations against various emigre groups in America. (U)

Konstantin Hanff, is the first known defector to participate in the Nazi war criminal investigations in the United States. Several years later, Imants Lesinskis, a Latvian-born defector from the KGB, submitted depositions in the cases of Vilis Hazners, Karl Linnas, and Liudas Kajyrs. Lesinskis bolstered defense attempts to allege that the Soviets wanted to smear anticommunist groups as pro-Nazi organizations. The Central Intelligence Agency, (U)

coordinated interviews with Lesinskis. (U)

As early as the fall of 1978, Ivars Berzins, a lawyer active in the Latvian-American community, learned about Lesinskis and sought his testimony in the case of Vilis Hazners. The Immigration and Naturalization Service had filed charges in 1977 against Hazners for his service in a Latvian police unit. Lesinskis claimed personal knowledge of the KGB’s efforts to frame Hazners. To accommodate Berzins’s request, Martin Mendelsohn of the Special Litigation Unit and (U) of the Office of

15 Various memoranda concerning (U) Lesinskis are found in OGC Records, (U) Box 1, Folder 18, CIA ARC. (S)
General Counsel arranged for both the defense and prosecution to interview the KGB defector.  

Three years later, Berzins again wanted to interview Lesinskis about his knowledge of Soviet disinformation campaigns directed against immigrants in the United States in the case of Karl Linnas. The Justice Department had accused Linnas, an Estonian, of running a concentration camp and murdering inmates. The court supported Berzins's new request, and in the Office of General Counsel arranged with CIA's Domestic Collection Division for a meeting at the Federal courthouse in St. Louis in early June 1981. Berzins had Lesinskis provide a sworn deposition in which he outlined his work with the KGB in discrediting Latvian emigre organizations.

David E. Springer, attorney for Liudas Kairys, filed a subpoena for all documents pertaining to his client, including evidence of Soviet disinformation activities and the

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16 According to the signed memorandum of agreement, the three attorneys “agree that Mr. Leshinskiy’s [sic] appearance in open court, or exposure to the public or the public media, would be unnecessary and possibly hazardous.” Berzins, Mendelsohn, “Memorandum of Agreement,” 18 October 1978, in OGC Records, Box 1, Folder 18, CIA ARC.

17 Memorandum for the File, “OSI/DOJ Request for Briefing re: Imants Leshinskis,” 30 March 1981, OGC 81-05153, OGC Records, Box 1, Folder 18, CIA ARC.

18 US v. Karl Linnas, “Deposition of Imants Lesinskis,” 3 June 1981, OGC Records, Box 1, Folder 18, CIA ARC. See also, Chief, IMS/FPLG, Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting in St. Louis, Missouri to Interview and Depose Defector Imants Lesinskis,” 8 June 1981, in DO Records, Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. Prior to the deposition, CIA and OSI debriefed Lesinskis in St. Louis in April 1981. See Chief, IMS/FPLG, “Meeting with Imants Lesinskis,” 24 April 1981, in DO Records, Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC.
alteration of fingerprint files. Springer’s request led eventually to a deposition of Imants Lesinskis in April 1982 to discuss his role with the Latvian Society for Cultural Relations of Foreign Countries. Lesinskis highlighted for Springer the KGB’s efforts to discredit Latvians who opposed the Soviet regime. Although Kairys was actually Lithuanian, Lesinskis offered his opinion that Soviet deception methods were similar throughout the Baltic States. The Soviets, he claimed, wanted to undermine support for the various nationalist movements by tainting all anticommunists as fascist supporters or war criminals. “I would not attribute any validity at all to any Soviet documents or Soviet witness testimony,” Lesinskis declared. Lesinskis’s depositions did have some influence on the outcome of the Hazners case, which the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed for lack of evidence in 1981. In the case of Linnas, the court revoked his citizenship and ordered his deportation in 1984. Allan A. Ryan, Jr., the director of OSI, fiercely denied that American judicial proceedings were corrupted in any manner by the use of Soviet evidence or witnesses. “The Soviets have never attempted to tell OSI who to investigate. They do not send us unsolicited information; they respond to our inquiries,” Ryan asserted in his 1984 book.

19 US v. Liudas Kairys, “Deposition Subpoena to Testify or Produce Documents or Things,” Civil Action File No. 80 C 4302, 6 May 1981, OGC 81-03777, in OGC Records, Box 1, Folder 7, CIA ARC. (U)

20 US v. Liudas Kairys, “Deposition of Imants Lesinskis,” 9 April 1982, in OGC Records, Box 1, Folder 7, CIA ARC. (U)
Valerian Trifa (U)

The depositions of Imants Lesinskis were conducted in relative isolation without public intrusion. Both the Central Intelligence Agency and Lesinskis himself desired this in order to protect his safety. In the case of Orthodox Archbishop Valerian Trifa, who had been a leader in the Romanian Iron Guard during the war, the presence of a Romanian defector became a major issue between the Archbishop’s defense attorney and the Federal government. John J. Sibisan, Trifa’s lawyer, raised the matter with President Ronald Reagan in the fall of 1982, protesting that Ion Pacepa, a former general and deputy head of the Romanian intelligence service, had admitted to Sibisan that Pacepa’s information had been withheld by OSI in a “smear campaign against the religious leader of 100,000 Orthodox people of Romanian descent in this country.”

Sibisan’s letter naturally unleashed a flurry of activity in the White House, the Office of Special Investigations, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency and OSI, in fact, had interviewed two Romanian defectors, Ion Pacepa and Nicholae Horodinca, about their knowledge of alleged efforts by the Romanian Government to

21Sibisan to President Reagan, “Archbishop Valerian D. Trifa,” 14 October 1982, 107625, in OGC Records, ☐ ☐ ☐, bos 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. Pacepa, a lieutenant general and head of Romania’s Department of Foreign Information (DIE), later wrote a book, Red Horizons, in 1987. For further information about Pacepa’s postdefection activities, see Alison Mutler, “Romanian Court Acquits Former Spy Chief; Ruling Viewed as Attempt to Impress NATO,” Washington Times, 8 June 1999, op.A15. (U)
falsify evidence concerning Trifa. Because the US Government had not yet publicly acknowledged that it had given sanctuary to the Romanians, the CIA preferred to integrate OSI’s questions during the Agency’s routine debriefings of both men. As a result, OSI did not initially conduct a personal interview, although of OGC offered this alternative if the debriefings provided any particular details. As a result of the Agency’s interrogations, reported that both men considered Trifa to be a war criminal, but that they also believed that the Romanian regime had taken steps to fabricate evidence to be used against him in American courts. told OSI that both men were willing to speak with the Justice Department and to examine documents in an attempt to identify the doctored evidence. OSI’s interest in the Romanian defector diminished following Trifa’s “voluntary” surrender of his citizenship and his subsequent appeal. This move delayed the case for nearly two years. (U)

In preparing a response to Sibisan’s charges, OSI’s Richard Sullivan consulted with of the Agency’s Office of General Counsel, , in turn, received guidance from the Directorate of Operations, which had debriefed Pacepa two years earlier using information. D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant US Attorney

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22 The following documents contain material pertinent to the debriefings: , Memorandum for the Record, “Request to Interview Romanian Defectors by Office of Special Investigations, DOJ,” 16 June 1980, OGC 80-05083, (S); Charles B. Renfrew, Deputy Attorney General to Frank Carlucci, DDCI, 2 July 1980, OGC 80-06031, (S); to Ryan, 15 July 1980; to Ryan, 24 July 1980, OGC 80-06378, (S); and Ryan to 1 August 1980, (S), all documents in OGC Records, , Box 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. (S)

23 to “Defector Interviews in US v. Trifa,” [undated], in OGC Records, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. (U)
General in charge of the Criminal Division, told Trifa's attorney in December 1982 that "your statement that Department of Justice attorneys withheld information favorable to Archbishop Trifa is flatly untrue." Jensen then informed Sibisan of the circumstances surrounding the interviews. "When Department of Justice attorneys became aware in 1980 that a Romanian defector purported to have information on an alleged campaign to discredit Trifa through false evidence, steps were immediately taken to ascertain the truth of the matter. These steps," Jensen said, "revealed that the defector had no reliable information concerning Archbishop Trifa or any alleged attempts by any person or government to use falsified evidence against him."  

OSI’s Range of Interests in the CIA (U)

As OSI’s caseload expanded in the early 1980s, the Department of Justice and various defense attorneys expressed interest in interviewing current and former Agency employees, who either possessed special knowledge about postwar Europe or about specific individuals. As seen in the Bolschwing and Soobzokov investigations, CIA case officers could answer key questions and resolve missing gaps in the records. Unfortunately, Bolschwing's primary case officer had died before the investigation.

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24 a to c, “Nazi War Criminal Investigations—Valerian Trifa,” 3 September 1980, OGC 80-07551, in OGC Records, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. (U)

25 A draft copy of this letter, Jensen to Sibisan, [undated], appears in OGC Records, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. For the circumstances surrounding CIA’s approval in the
commenced, while Soobzokov’s CIA contact failed to provide insights into the origins of the State Department documents in the Agency’s files. In other cases, such as the Hanff investigation, a current employee, assisted Federal authorities with his expert knowledge of Soviet disinformation practices. (S)

While the CIA preferred to remain in the background of the Nazi war criminal investigations, there were moments when Agency officials stepped into the limelight. In February 1979, the CIA transferred to the National Archives a series of aerial photographs taken of the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau by Allied reconnaissance aircraft in 1944 and 1945. At a press conference, two analysts from CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center described what they had learned from the photographs, which had been stored in a Federal archival facility since the end of World War II. Viewed in the light of hindsight, the photographs revealed activities on the ground at Auschwitz-Birkenau, including concentration camp inmates standing in line for the gas chambers.  

Dino A. Brugioni and Robert G. Poirier prepared a study, “The Holocaust Revisited,” which President Jimmy Carter presented to Elie Wiesel, a

wording, see Memorandum for the Record, “Nazi War Criminal Prosecutions—Valerian Trifa,” 17 December 1982, OGC 82-11182, in the same job as above. (U)

prominent survivor of the Nazi death camps. CIA’s Brugioni hailed wartime overhead imagery as “an untapped source of history.”

The Office of Special Investigations occasionally interviewed CIA officials as a part of a formal investigation. Allan A. Ryan, while leading the Klaus Barbie investigation in 1983, requested traces on several retired Agency employees in order to arrange for interviews. As a part of the initial stage of the Trifa investigation, which broadened into the Bolschwing case, the Special Litigation Unit contacted the CIA in the summer of 1978 for information pertaining to Col. Boris T. Pash. INS investigators suspected that Colonel Pash had “a strong influence” on Trifa’s entry into the United States and his rapid rise within the ecclesiastical ranks of the Romanian Orthodox Church.

Pash, whose father served as the Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church in America during the 1940s, joined the Office of Policy Coordination as a military detailee

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27The article, “The Holocaust Revisited: A Retrospective Analysis of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Complex,” by Dino A. Brugioni and Robert G. Poirier appeared in Studies in Intelligence, 22 (Winter 1978), pp. 11-29. OSI continued to express interest in CIA’s capability to interpret aerial photographs. In 1981, Neal Sher, OSI’s acting director, asked that Poirier analyze a massacre site in the Soviet Union and provide some technical assistance in the prosecution’s case against Albert Deutscher. The Department of Justice also considered having Poirier testify in the trial of Hans Lipschis in 1982 concerning his concentration camp guard duties. See Neal M. Sher, OSI, to Stanley Sporkin, OGC, 23 June 1981, OGC 81-05356, and Sher, OSI, to Sporkin, OGC, 22 December 1981, OGC 81-10990, both in OGC Records, Box 2, Folder 31, CIA ARC. See also various memoranda concerning Lipschis case in OGC Records, Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (S)

28Ryan to OGC, 6 May 1983, OGC 83-03816, (S), in DO Records, Box 12, Folder 128, CIA ARC. CIA name traces to OSI’s requests are also included in this folder. (S)
in 1949. He served with OPC in the Far East, Washington, and in Austria until his return to the Army in 1952. Pash had a long record in intelligence activities, having commanded the Alsos Mission at the end of the war. As the Third Reich crumbled, Pash’s Alsos task force located German scientists with knowledge about atomic research in order to keep them from passing the information to the Soviets. Pash continued his intelligence activities after leaving OPC and had a wide range of contacts. The Agency, however, could not determine whether Colonel Pash—whose name had been publicized in the course of the Church Committee hearings in 1975—had any official or unofficial relationship with Trifa.  

The Office of Special Investigations grew interested in the Agency for other reasons. The fact that CIA had a number of employees who had initially served in the Army Counter Intelligence Corps in postwar Europe proved a valuable resource. In addition, many of the Agency’s early employees had immigrated to the United States from Eastern and Southern Europe and possessed native fluency and familiarity with the countries behind the Iron Curtain. OSI focused most of its investigations on this region of the world because it had been the scene of many of the worst Nazi atrocities. Indeed,

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30 [Office of Legislative Counsel to Name Trace and Records Search—Colonel Boris T. Pash,” 12 September 1978, OLC 78-4034/1, (C), in OGC Records, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. For further information of his wartime activities, see Boris T. Pash, The Alsos Mission (New York: Award House, 1969). (C)
the United States had accepted hundreds of thousands of Europeans as displaced persons in late 1940s and the 1950s, including untold numbers of former Nazi collaborators. (U)

OSI Looks at 

The Special Litigation Unit first expressed interest in a retired CIA counterintelligence officer, when he testified on behalf of Vilis Hazners, the Latvian resident alien in New York accused of membership in a collaborationist Schutzmannschaft during the war. Later served as a witness at the denaturalization hearings for Karl Linnas and Karlis Detlavs. In all cases, spoke on Soviet disinformation practices. His testimony to and affiliation with the CIA concerned SLU and OSI, because left the impression that he enjoyed official sanction. This led the Department of Justice to make inquiries about service in the Agency. (U)

Born arrived in New York Once in America, he changed his name and worked until joining the Army in 1943. Served in the CIC in Europe, where he located Nazi scientists for Operation PAPERCLIP. Following his discharge from military service, remained as a civilian instructor at the Army’s counterintelligence school at Fort

31 "In the Matter of Vilas A. Hazners before Hon. Anthony M. DeGaeto, Immigration Judge," 1 May 1978," in DO Records, Box 8, Folder 159, CIA ARC. (U)
Holabird in Baltimore, Maryland. In January 1949 he accepted a position with the CIA in Germany recruited in early 1951 to serve as an Intelligence Officer in the Foreign Division S, Baltic Section.  

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32 For further details on Cl

33 Mr. Vedeler to Mr. Joyce, “Activities of Cl, an Employee of CIA,” 23 August 1951, (S), in DO Records, Box 13, Folder 128, CIA ARC. This document, and Joyce’s memorandum to Wisner below, were located in State Department records. See Classification Review Division to Classification Review Division, “Review at State of Material Possibly Containing Information on Klaus Barbie,” (C), in the same job as above. (S)

34 Joyce to Wisner, 29 August 1951, in DO Records, Box 13, Folder 128, CIA ARC. (U)
Joined the Agency's Counterintelligence Staff, where he handled defector cases and became CIA's expert on Nazi records.\(^3^5\) Biggest success came after the Israelis arrested Adolf Eichmann in 1960, when he uncovered the fact that Otto von Bolschwing, one of the Agency's top agents in Austria after the war, had actually worked with Eichmann in the 1930s. His review of captured German records revealed the extent of Bolschwing's duplicity; \(\) duly reported this information to his superiors in CIA. (S)

Retired from CIA in 1976, two years before he came to the attention of the Special Litigation Unit. As a result of his testimony, Martin Mendelsohn, SLU's chief, requested that the CIA provide him with an unclassified summary of Agency service to assist in "evaluating his veracity and competence as an opposition defense witness in Government hearings."\(^3^6\) In May 1980, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., OSI's

\(^{3^5}\) Between 1956 and 1960, \(\) directed the review of some 1,500,000 pages of captured German documents under the Agency auspices. \(\) and his team checked the German records for counterintelligence leads which, in some cases, were incorporated into CIA's own records. Some of the German material, \(\), \(\) notes, and \(\) progress reports are found in DO Records, \(\) , Box 1, and \(\) Boxes 1-9, CIA ARC. (S)

\(^{3^6}\) To Director of Personnel et al, "Justice Department Request for Data on " 5 February 1979, OGC 79-01171, in DO Records, \(\) , Box 8, Folder 159, CIA ARC. Mendelsohn believed that \(\) may have sponsored Hazners's immigration to the United States, although \(\) denied in court that he knew of the Latvian. See \(\) , Memorandum for the Record,
director, sought further details about C’s role in raising money for Latvian exile groups. Drawing its conclusions from State Department correspondence, OSI believed that C may have recruited war criminals while working for the Army and, later, for the Displaced Persons Commission.37 (S)

OSI’s interest in C increased after he testified about the Latvian Waffen SS at the deportation hearings of Karlis Detlavs, a Latvian accused of belonging to the Auxiliary Security Police.38 Ryan believed that C had committed perjury, and he pressed the Army for information about his CIC employment. This request came back to the CIA, prompting concerns about OSI’s procedures. “We find it less than courteous and of considerable concern,” wrote C of the DO, “that the DOJ is requesting information on a former CIA employee without any notification to the Agency.”39 (U)

The Agency arranged to have C meet with OSI investigators to discuss “several items of interest” in the fall of 1980.40 Nearly two years later, C again

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37 Ryan to C, OGC, 6 May 1980, OGC 80-03905, (S), in OGC Records, C, Box 1, Folder 15, CIA ARC. (S)
38 Sheridan Lyons, “Ex-CIA Man Blames Soviets for Detlavs Charge,” Baltimore Sun, 9 February 1979, p. C1-5. (U)
39 C to C, “Department of the Army Request for Coordination of CIA Records Requested by the Department of Justice, Office of Special Investigation,” 12 May 1980, in DO Records, C, Box 8, Folder 159, CIA ARC. (U)
40 OSI, in fact, did meet with C in October 1980, with CIA officials also in attendance, to discuss his work in compiling captured German war records and ferreting out Otto von Bolschwing’s connection to Eichmann. See C, Memorandum for the Record, “Nazi
came up in conversation between CIA and OSI. The Department of Justice now had specific, if obtuse, questions about past, including his religious affiliation, language proficiency, the circumstances surrounding his mother’s death, and his postretirement work with the Agency. The Office of General Counsel answered all of these questions in the summer of 1982; after that point, OSI’s interest in dwindled. He died nine years later. (U)

CIA’s Crucial Role in the Investigations (U)

proved to be the exception to the rule. The Office of Special Investigations never investigated any other member of the Central Intelligence Agency for illegal action or conduct. In fact, OSI even hired, a retired CIA officer and native of Latvia, in 1981 for his knowledge of the Baltic region and languages. During the course of the Barbie investigation, Ryan interviewed several retired Agency officers for their activities with CIC in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Department of Justice, however, has never pressed charges against any CIA employee, current or retired, for actions taken on behalf of any Nazi war criminal or collaborator. (U)

OSI drew on CIA’s wealth of talent and resources. By the early 1980s, the Office of Special Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency operated a fairly

War Criminals,” 16 October 1980, in DO Records, Box 1, Folder 4, CIA ARC. (U)

mother, for example, died in 1941 of “Communist atrocities.” (U)
smooth system of conducting name traces, which, for the most part, avoided controversy or public inquiry. While there were occasional delays due to communication problems between the two organizations, as well as other demands imposed upon CIA’s records managers, it became apparent that the Agency played a key role in the Nazi war criminal investigations.43 This relationship, due in large part to Allan Ryan’s almost daily contact with CIA’s Office of General Counsel, soon faced a severe test. John Loftus, an attorney on Ryan’s staff, pursued his own conspiracy theories, which tested the CIA’s patience. His subsequent claims on a national television program and the publication of his book brought renewed Congressional interest into the Agency’s past. From 1981 to 1987, the Nazi war criminal investigations occupied a significant part of the Central Intelligence Agency’s resources in a series of well-publicized cases. *The Belarus Secret* marked a new chapter in the Nazi war criminal investigations. (U)

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42It also appears that a member of the Special Litigation Unit cooperated with CIA in providing information about Soviet officials. See various memoranda in DO Records, ▼ ▼ Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. (S)

43The Department of Justice complained about CIA’s lengthy responses to its name trace requests in early 1982. See D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to Sporkin, OGC, 4 March 1982, OGC 82-02269; see also Sporkin to Jensen, 15 March 1982; ▼ ▼ to Jensen, 14 May 1982, OGC 82-04740; Jensen to Sporkin, 29 June 1982, OGC 82-06286; and Sporkin to Jensen, 9 July 1982, all in OGC Records, ▼ ▼ Box 1, Folder 3, and Box 2, Folder 31, CIA ARC. (U)