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Country Profile

Guyana

June 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS

COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the subject country • Chronology • Area Brief • Summary Map

THE SOCIETY Social structure • Population • Labor • Health • Living conditions • Social problems • Religion • Education • Public information • Artistic expression

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolution of the State • Governmental strength and stability • Structure and function • Political dynamics • National policies • Threats to stability • The police • Intelligence and security • Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabilities

THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy • Its structure—agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction • Domestic trade • Economic policy and development • International economic relations

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems • Strategic mobility • Railroads • Highways • Inland waterways • Ports • Merchant marine • Civil air • Airfields • The telecom system

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate • Military geographic regions • Strategic areas • Approaches: land, sea, air

ARMED FORCES The defense establishment • Joint activities • Ground forces • Naval force, air force

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Cooperative Republic or Two Racial Camps 1

- More People, More Problems
- Different Worlds of Black and Brown
- The Politics of Race
- Turning Left and Slowing Down

Chronology 11


Area Brief 14

Summary Map follows 14

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Sugarcane, rice, and bauxite form the resource base from which Guyana derives its livelihood.

Cooperative Republic or Two Racial Camps (c)

A sense of new direction and a striving for genuine nationhood are symbolized by the selection of the name "The Cooperative Republic of Guyana" for the country long known as British Guiana. "Guiana" and its capital, Georgetown, evoke memories for veterans of World War II of a steamy tropical airport hacked out of the South American bush—a ferrying point on the long hop to Africa and Europe.

Although located on the northeastern coast of South America, Guyana is culturally part of the Caribbean. The English-speaking Guyanese are isolated from most of their Latin American neighbors by language and historical tradition as well as by uninhabited savannas and tropical rain forest. The airfield, now an international jet port, is still the main entry point for visitors; the relatively shallow coastal waters limit ship traffic to ore carriers and small freighters, and there are almost no roads that link Guyanese towns with other urban centers in South America.

Some change has come to Guyana since the days of those memories. The road from the airport north to Georgetown has been improved; only the presence of bullock carts and heavy traffic slow a fast auto trip in to the capital. To the south, a high-speed superhighway cuts through the thinly populated rain forest to the bauxite mine at Linden. The British colonial administration has departed, and the independence that followed has provided hopes but no cures for the persistent problems facing the new state.

Physical isolation has not deterred Guyanese participation in world affairs. Current leadership, influenced by several decades of experimentation with Socialist and Marxist philosophies, has increasingly sought to reduce Guyana's dependence on the United Kingdom and the United States—and more recently to broaden relationships with both major centers of the Communist world—the Soviet Union and China—and with its Latin American sub-center, Cuba. Guyana has assumed a major leadership role in

the movement for Caribbean unity, which is replete with anti-U.S. and black nationalist overtones. Guyana also has attempted to make common cause and identify with the Afro-Arab bloc in the nonaligned world. Success and prestige in these efforts were enhanced by the choice of Georgetown as the site for the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers Conference in August 1972.

The excitement generated by Guyana's initiatives in the international field only temporarily obscured the need to deal with domestic discontent and to cope with the country's most intractable problem: the inability of the government to develop its resource base rapidly enough to keep pace with the needs of its growing population. The government successfully suppressed a domestic revolt in the interior in 1969, aborting what was widely perceived as an opportunity for Venezuela to advance its claim to a large parcel of Guyanese territory. In order to meet the economic needs of the population, the government has embarked upon a radical socialization program to make Guyana a truly "cooperative republic."

The goals of the new economic policy are to be achieved through nationalization or majority control of foreign-owned enterprises involved in the exploitation of natural resources, the adoption of the cooperative as the preferred form of domestic economic organization, the expansion of agricultural exports, and the development of new industries with the aid of both domestic and foreign capital. Plans also call for a drastic reduction of imports through mobilization of all available manufacturing capabilities and through self-help projects, and the intensification of efforts to develop the economic potential of the interior of the country. The achievement of these ambitious goals is threatened, however, by deeprooted racial hostility and political infighting between the two dominant groups in the population: the Guyanese of African extraction and those referred

to as East Indians, the descendants of indentured sugarcane field workers from India. Race serves as a convenient symbol for the wide cultural cleavage that impedes the national integration of East Indians and Africans, but the root of their differences is extreme competitiveness in the economic sphere. In general, East Indians visualize Africans as lazy, dishonest, im-

provident, profligate, and physically aggressive. The African Guyanese, on the other hand, see themselves as the natural successors to British dominance and view the East Indians as clannish, prudish, tightfisted, acquisitive and—not least of all—prone to capitalize on light skin pigmentation to facilitate economic mobility.

More People, More Problems



The struggle for economic and political dominance between the African Guyanese and the East Indians has been heightened by the high rate of population increase and the persistent unemployment problem. The rapid conquest of Guyana's tropical diseases since the turn of the century, particularly the eradication of malaria from low-lying rice and canefields during the 1930's and 1940's, was characterized by a dramatic rise in the average annual rate of population growth. The rate increased from 0.5% during the 1921-31 period to 2.9% during 1946-60, and then dipped slightly to 2.5% during 1961-70. Nonetheless, the current age structure remains highly conducive to rapid population growth and, concomitantly, to the addition of progressively larger annual increments to the labor force. A much higher rate of natural growth among East Indians than among African Guyanese has resulted in a progressive rise in the East Indian proportion of the total population. By January 1969 they had achieved an absolute majority of 51% compared with an approximate 43% for the combined African and mulatto communities. Africans fear that the ever-widening East Indian lead in population size will result in the loss of their political dominance and, in turn, lead to the weakening of their position in the job market. With 20% of the labor force unemployed and sizable numbers underemployed, the job market is highly competitive.

Although development programs have benefited from generous inputs of foreign aid, the economy has displayed only modest growth rates. During the period

from 1967 to 1971, the economy grew at an estimated annual average of 4½% in real terms, or nearly twice the rate recorded in the previous decade when production suffered as a result of periodic civil disturbances and strikes. Despite this increase, per capita gross domestic product amounts to only US\$385. The economy does not support an affluent class or yield high profits to foreign investors. Given the modest labor-absorption capacity of Guyana's major growth sectors, coupled with the expected high rate of labor force growth, there is little ground for optimism that unemployment can be quickly and substantially reduced.

In developing their natural resources, the Guyanese turned first to wresting from the sea and numerous river estuaries the fertile, low-lying silt and clay coastlands which represent their most productive agricultural land. The soils in the interior, associated with the tropical rain forests, savannas and forested uplands, tend to be low in natural fertility and have limited potential for agriculture without heavy capital investments. The application of water-control techniques by the early Dutch settlers, perfected in reclaim-

ing their own homeland from the North Sea, and the use of the mass labor of imported African slaves laid the basis for forging a society which to the present day has been concentrated on a narrow strip of empoldered coastland comprising only about 1% of the country's 83,000 square miles of terrain. Here an annual regime of two wet and dry seasons promoted the cultivation of two harvests of sugarcane and rice. These traditional export crops constitute the mainstay of the economy, supporting about half the population and accounting for 70% of the agricultural output and 39% of export earnings. The country is not self-sufficient in food crop production and obtains about one-fifth of its food requirements abroad.

Guyana's mineral deposits constitute its second important natural resource. Bauxite extraction and processing account for over 50% of export earnings but employ a very small proportion of the labor force. Manufacturing—mostly processing of sugar, rice, and other agricultural products—has grown steadily with the help of government financial incentives, but its contribution to the country's total product and employment remains small.

Different Worlds of Black and Brown

From the beginning the European settlers perceived that plantation agriculture on polders was dependent upon a large and coordinated labor force and, therefore, was vulnerable to any marked changes in control and availability of labor. The large-scale abandonment of the plantations by Africans after their emancipation in 1838 forced the European managers to seek a new source of cheap labor. Their decision set in motion an influx of indentured laborers—chiefly from Uttar Pradesh and Bengal in northern India—which during the next three-quarters of a century accounted for a quarter of a million immigrants and established the basis of a second mass culture in Guyana parallel to that of the Africans. Small numbers of two other groups—Portuguese and Chinese—were also imported as indentured workers. The Portuguese,

largely from Madeira, soon acquired sizable economic influence through the expansion of small retail establishments into large merchant and financial undertakings. With their Latin and Catholic orientation, however, they generally tended to be regarded as part of the mulatto society by the politically dominant Protestant English establishment. The Chinese retained a certain residue of their original culture, a sense of group identity, and a tendency to marry among themselves, but in the main their life patterns have conformed to British social norms and values. The Amerindians, the only indigenous inhabitants of Guyana, account for about 5% of the population and are dispersed on reservations in the interior of the country.

During the first decade after emancipation, African freedmen pooled their resources to acquire lands abandoned by the former slave-owning plantocracy and converted the former plantation settlements into communal villages. The independent peasantry movement of the former slaves rapidly declined, however, lacking strong communal ties and without access to credit. Some took up subsistence agriculture, some worked as wage laborers in the sugar industry or took jobs inland as woodcutters, balata (gum) tree bleeders or, after 1914, as bauxite miners, but the majority sought a livelihood in the cities. Here they soon established themselves as the numerically predominant ethnic group, exploited available educational and other social service resources, and strongly entrenched themselves in skilled labor occupations, the civil service, and small shopkeeping. The Africans were cut off from their own cultural heritage for nearly two centuries, and adaptations of the European religious, kinship, and associational institutions constituted the basic framework of their social structure.

In contrast to the Africans, indentured East Indians tended to preserve elements of their heritage and cohesiveness. East Indians completing indentureship were encouraged by the colonial government to forego their entitlement to free passage home in return for a plot of land. Assiduous exploitation of these lands and, after the introduction of rice cultivation in the 1890's, the intensive application of their native rice-growing skills enabled the East Indians to accumulate modest amounts of capital, to buy up much of the residual land of the Africans, to gain control of most of the country's rural commerce, and to establish businesses in the cities. The East Indians, without abandoning their value system, gradually relaxed their self-imposed isolation from the rest of Guyanese society and began to exploit non-Hindu educational facilities. Because politics, government, and entrepreneurial fields had been monopolized by other races, the East Indians used their newly acquired educational qualifications to gain entry into occupations such as law, medicine, and commerce. They also began to make significant inroads into the civil service and other white-collar occupations. Thus they entered the post-World War II era conscious of becoming a majority race, occupying an economic power position superior to that of the Africans, and disposed to be even more culturally disapproving of the Africans than the latter were of them.

Most aspects of Guyanese life reflect the evolution of two parallel sets of social and economic institutions. The tenacity with which the East Indian has clung to traditional concepts of extended kinship as the basis for social organization has served to retard the development of associational institutions based on

other interests. The only organizations generally found in the average East Indian village or plantation community that are not based on blood relationship are religious groups and land acquisition societies. In contrast in the African village, there is likely to be found a wide range of voluntary groups patterned after European counterparts, including educational associations, thrift and credit societies, fraternal bodies, welfare organizations, religious groups, and burial societies. The extensive associational activities in African villages also reflect the wide variety of social relationships common to the city, where large numbers of Africans have spent a good part of their lives in urban occupations before returning to the village upon retirement or in search of a haven when unemployed. These differences in the associational activities of the two races have been reflected in the tendency of East Indian national organization to be more dependent on personalist leadership than that of the African.

The influence of religion on political alignments in Guyana remains strong, but as the impact of secular issues upon the formation of attitudes and values among the Guyanese has expanded, some potential for cultural integration—or at least social mobility—has emerged, particularly in the East Indian community. In recent years the increase in the numbers of the young East Indians receiving a modern education has undoubtedly resulted in some changes in their attitudes and in a willingness to make choices independently of their parents. Christianity has attracted a thin trickle of crossovers from Hinduism, although motivation can be attributed as much to requirements of social mobility as to religious conviction and is limited largely to urban residents.

The tenets of Hinduism are particularly strong in the East Indian community, which is approximately 70% Hindu and 18% Muslim. Hinduism represents a belief system that is woven into almost every aspect of the Hindu East Indians' economic and social life and is often viewed by him as identical with his nationality. Hindu-Islamic differences in Guyana have been muted, however, by time and distance, and disagreements based on religion lack the intensity of those in India from whence the immigrants came. Nevertheless, some Hindu traditionalists consider Muslims "low caste" and would prefer association with Christian Africans and whites.

Religion does not impact upon the behavior and attitudes of the African with the same force that it does upon the East Indian. The total obliteration of their ancestral culture and religious beliefs by generations of slavery resulted in the acceptance of Christianity by the African Guyanese. Because of the persistent tendency of most Hindus in Guyana to identify

Africans as of "low caste" status, the only East Indian religious organization which has attracted any Africans at all is the reformist sect known as *Arya Sama* (Aryan League), which rejects concepts of caste. A much more important trend is the increasing tendency of Africans—although by no means statistically large as yet—to equate Islam with the religion of their pre-enslavement African heritage. This phenomenon is part and parcel of the cultural revolution proposed by black Guyanese, including "black power" extremists, who wish to eliminate all cultural values except those identified with black Africa.

Among Africans the influences of black nationalism are apparent in the widespread interest in folk music and other aspects of indigenous African cultures. Having become dissatisfied with the European cultural identity adopted after emancipation, African intellectuals perceive the ultimate problem of integration to be not simply one of establishing a unitary national consciousness, a self-supporting independent economy, and stable constitutional government but also of fashioning a cultural identity, or national ego,

with clear lines of succession to an authentic historical past. Integrating the "late comers," i.e. the East Indians, causes problems to those who want to relate Guyanese personality to Africa and worldwide black consciousness. Some responsible Guyanese intellectuals, however, find in the concept of a united brotherhood of Asians and Africans the source of a national identity that will submerge this issue of racial plurality and delineate a common Guyanese identity.

The Guyanese in fact have done little to develop a national tradition of indigenous artistic or intellectual expression of their attitudes, values, or lifestyles. Most of the better known productions of Guyanese professional artists and writers reflect European models. Some members of the small group of literati of the post-World War II generation have attempted to introduce distinctively national forms into their creations, but most have devoted their energies to the development of national pride in the basic forms of folk expression attributable to the various ethnic groups.

The Politics of Race

The competition between the African Guyanese and the East Indians has been embittered by the racially derogatory slogans advanced by the ambitious, charismatic leaders of the two groups—Cheddi Jagan for the East Indians and Forbes Burnham for the Africans. In the power struggle, the electorate has been aligned into two racially organized political parties, which have frequently arrayed their constituents in violent confrontation in lieu of rational compromise as a means of settling disputes. Despite a long-standing respect for parliamentary institutions, the refusal of each of the two major political groups to work with a government controlled by the other has prevented the development of a constructive opposition. Both Jagan and Burnham had sought to transcend race as a basis for organizing their political constituencies. Their

eventual resort to racially oriented tactics was due mainly to lack of commonly shared social institutions within which differences could be mediated.

The Political Affairs Committee, founded by Jagan and his wife towards the end of World War II to promote national independence based on politico-cultural integration, was designed to attract the support of both principal racial groups, particularly intellectuals of various persuasions. The accession of Burnham to this movement and the founding in 1950 of Guyana's first mass participatory party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), reflected a solid consensus in favor of an independent multiracial polity dedicated to the achievement of rapid economic development through socialist techniques. The party's constitution contained an expression of interest in an eventual

ederation with other countries of the British Caribbean. The latter was a concession to Burnham which Jagan made with great reluctance because of the likely preponderance of Africans in any such union. A leadership showdown then culminated in Burnham's formal withdrawal from the PPP in 1955, and his establishment first of a rump party and later of the People's National Congress (PNC), consisting chiefly of the PPP's African constituency based on the urban working class.

Virulent symptoms of racial politics appeared almost as soon as the breach between Jagan and Burnham became certain. The high percentage of Africans ousted from the PPP in the purge which followed Burnham's defection were interpreted by Jagan's three most powerful African allies—Sidney King, Martin Carter, and Roy Westermaas—as racially rather than politically motivated. As a result they too quit the party, leaving it stripped of its main pillars of African support and all but completing the process of transforming the nationalist movement into racial politics.

The emergence of two racially polarized parties, each with a countrywide organizational structure, served to escalate local-level racialism into a national-level phenomenon. Given the basic feeling now shared by each race—that the victory of the opponent would be tantamount to the loss of traditional prerogatives, property rights, and even freedom itself—political confrontation erupted into violent conflict. Jagan's party had won the national elections of 1957 and 1961 with the support of the original PPP apparatus and the additional advantage of a larger voter base. In organizing for the 1961 elections, the PPP promoted racial politics in a systematic way, popularizing throughout the East Indian community the slogan "*apanjaht*" or "vote your own kind." The slogan does not primarily invoke common biological origin or similar physical characteristics as the basis of cohesion but rather is an appeal to stand together in order to preserve a deeply held cultural identity based on shared habits, religion, relationships, and values. With government patronage at Jagan's disposal as the head of the party in power, *apanjaht* politics brought East Indians a promise of economic power which they had never before had reason to hope for and, at the same time, provided them with an important symbol of Indian cohesion.

Burnham, too, resorted to all out racial politics in order to assure himself of the total African vote and of a parliamentary representation of a sufficient size to constitute an effective opposition. PNC organizational activity focused the African population's attention on East Indian encroachment upon traditionally African

villages, the heavy investment of government funds for expansion of ricegrowing at the expense of industrial enterprises, and the drive by the Jagan regime to Indianize the civil service and the teaching profession.

Violent incidents with heavy racial overtones were widespread prior to the elections of 1961 but fell short of escalation to a major race riot. In 1962, however, a week-long riot left Georgetown's business district in shambles and many East Indian shops gutted. Renewed rioting in 1964 culminated in the dismissal of the Jagan government and the assumption of power by the colonial governor.


Not all Guyanese were attracted to the increasingly polarized positions of the two main parties. A third party, the United Front (UF), was founded in 1960 by a group of Portuguese businessmen and old-line labor leaders under the chairmanship of a prominent brewer, Peter D'Aguiar. The new party drew its constituents from elements of the Portuguese and Amerindian minorities and from a large bloc of urban middle-class East Indians. Its political position was basically conservative. A coalition comprised of PNC and UF candidates emerged victorious in the elections of December 1964 and took over the government under Burnham's leadership.

Other splinter groups expressing dissenting opinions have been formed. As early as 1965 Jagan's primacy in the PPP was openly challenged by several leaders who had been among his strongest supporters. Brindley Benn, an African who had headed the powerful Ministry of Natural Resources under Jagan, in January 1969 founded a militant Maoist organization known as the Working Peoples Vanguard Party (WPVP). The WPVP, together with another militant Maoist clique (founded in 1970-71), the Movement Against Oppression (MAO), advocates abandonment of participation in the parliamentary system in favor of strategy for radical revolution.

An appeal for a moderate course has been made by Moses Bhagwan, formerly head of the Progressive Youth Organization, the PPP's youth movement. He quit the party in 1965 and emerged in 1972 calling for a dialogue between the new sets of leaders on both sides as the only way to overcome the present alienation of the East Indian population from the mainstream of national life. Another moderating viewpoint is expressed by the Guyana Anti-Discrimination Movement (GADM), comprising elements of the East Indian professional class. They condemn the PPP's orthodox Marxist line and advocate *rapprochement* with the United States as a means of defeating the PNC. In addition, East Indian businessmen still affiliated with the PPP have shown an interest in a more pragmatic accommodation with the PNC.



Black Guyanese heeded the appeal to sweep out the Jagan Government and elected Prime Minister Burnham's People's National Congress party.



Fellow East Indians of Cheddi Jagan, socialist leader and Guyana's first prime minister, form the base of his People's Progressive Party.

Burnham has tried to pry Muslims from the Hindu-dominated East Indian political community, using as a lever the religious and cultural differences between the two groups. While some Muslim leaders have been attracted to the Burnham camp, large-scale defection has been forestalled by the instinctive recognition of rural Hindus and Muslims of the importance of maintaining a united front to safeguard their cultural and economic interests against inroads by the politically dominant Africans.

A small but growing black power movement in Guyana is a threat of significant proportions. The African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA) was founded in 1964 by Sidney King, primarily to emphasize the African heritage of black Guyanese. Subsequently, King took the name Eusi Kwayana and has tried to reorient the organization toward an aggressive racist position with the avowed goal of destroying white influence in the country. Burnham, in an attempt to exploit the political advantage of the black nationalist movement, provided him a prestigious place in the party and government. Kwayana's constant criticism of the administration and open espousal of racist policies, however, finally provoked Burnham in 1971 to strip him of his posts and to employ subtle, but powerful, tactics to try to undermine the influence of ASCRIA. The movement's continued popularity with younger Africans could motivate them to withhold their votes from the PNC in the next national elections, which must be held before March 1974.

The trade unions in Guyana have been one of the few forces to manifest any significant inclination to go beyond purely racial considerations in forging their objectives. In general, the movement has tried to chart

an independent course rather than embrace a particular political party or power center—a course calculated to preserve its maneuvering room and to maximize the electoral potential for which parties and their leaders can compete.

Trade unions, like all other institutions in Guyana, have been shaped by the social and economic cleavage between East Indian and African. Unions representing rural and agricultural workers are composed almost exclusively of East Indians, and unions representing workers in urban and industrial areas are mainly African in membership. This alignment provides a ready resource for aspiring political leaders to try to tap in an effort to generate mass support. Indeed, the unions have emerged as the key building blocks on which every contemporary Guyanese politician would build his power strategy.

Sugar workers, Guyana's most numerous labor group, are largely rural and East Indian. Their role in the production of Guyana's most profitable agricultural commodity places them in a position where they could undermine the power base of the most influential economic interests in the country. Sugar workers make up the core membership of the Manpower Citizens' Association (MPCA) founded in 1937. A rival union, the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union (GAWU), was organized by Jagan when he failed to capture control of the MPCA. But the GAWU, despite intensive efforts and probably the support of a majority of the workers in the sugar industry, has not been able to win the legal endorsement necessary to replace the MPCA as their bargaining agent. Numerically, the sugar workers comprise about one-third of the total union membership in Guyana of approximately 70,000 persons. They wield a

dominating influence in the overall trade union movement and are a powerful voice in the country's major labor organization, the Guyana Trades Union Council (GTUC).

Virtually all other unions have predominantly African memberships. The larger and more important are: the Guyana Labor Union, founded in 1922 under the leadership of H.N. Critchlow, an African waterfront worker revered as the father of Guyanese unionism; the Guyana Mine Workers Union; the Transport Workers' Union; the Post Office Workers' Union; the Guyana Teachers' Association; the Guyana Civil Service Association; the Printers' Industrial Union, and the Postmasters' Union.

The independent tendency of the labor movement was demonstrated in 1972 when the GTUC rejected the Burnham-supported candidate as the choice for its president, thus reminding the head of the government of the existence of a "third force" to be reckoned with in his bid for reelection. Labor's threat was tempered,

however, by its continued hostility to Jagan and by the MPCA's dependence upon continued government denial of recognition to Jagan's GAWU, which could in all probability win a majority of votes of workers in the sugarcane industry if a test of strength were allowed.

The interests of the working class have been viewed sympathetically by all administrations since the end of World War II. Current labor legislation represents a comprehensive collection of guaranteed safeguards and worker benefits. Government policies to assist labor include support of the principle of closed or union shops and compulsory union dues. The National Insurance and Social Security Scheme, legislated in 1969, provides a wide range of worker benefits, including medical insurance and a pension program. The government exercises no control over organized labor beyond the minimal degree of supervision prescribed by the Trades Union Ordinance of 1921.

Turning Left and Slowing Down

The Burnham administration came to power in 1964 with the positive support of the British Government and the sympathy of the United States. With generous financial aid from the United States and other donors, Burnham improved the country's economic performance and established a development program designed to expand the economic base and to distribute its product more evenly throughout the population. To disarm the suspicion with which his administration was regarded by East Indians, and to break the PPP's monopoly on their political allegiance, he brought a few of their leaders into the upper layers of government. He also eased somewhat the obstacles historically blocking their entry into the bureaucracy, educational system, and police, and allocated a major portion of public expenditure to the agricultural sector of the economy, especially to rice cultivation.

In 1970 Burnham publicly admitted that the

technically favorable economic growth achieved after Jagan's ouster was occurring in a milieu of poverty, backwardness, high unemployment, and primitive social services. Thus, he found it expedient to adopt most of the domestic and foreign policies of his more radical opponent. He intensified the socialist character of the economy, issued frequent denunciations of Western economic penetration, and adopted progressively closer ties with Communist and non-aligned countries.

The most far-reaching of these leftist measures was the outright nationalization in July 1971 of the Demerara Bauxite Co. (DEMBA), a subsidiary of a Canadian company, and Guyana's largest economic enterprise, which in recent years has accounted for approximately 15% of the country's gross domestic product. However, the decline in government revenues of about 7% between 1970 and 1971, due to reduced

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tax receipts after the nationalization of DEMBA, must have served as a warning signal to the government. The downturn doubtless counseled a cautious approach in negotiating ownership adjustments with Guyana's only other bauxite producer, the U.S.-owned Reynolds Guyana Mines.

Apart from the bauxite industry, the extent of government ownership of enterprises—as distinct from the formation of cooperatives—has remained very modest, limited mainly to a few rice mills, about half of the country's electric power generating capacity, its telecommunication facilities, and the domestic scheduled airlines. The number of nonagricultural cooperatives has greatly increased since 1970, particularly in such service fields as credit, banking, and marketing, and in small industry. Many of these undertakings have failed due to lack of capital or management skills. A number of privately controlled services, especially banking and credit, have been "miniaturized" in order to make way for cooperative enterprises in those fields.

The early gains made by Burnham in winning the confidence of some middle-class East Indians have apparently been eroded by the confiscatory effects of his cooperativization and national self-reliance programs. The unethical election procedures he has resorted to in order to offset the numerical advantage of the East Indian population, the authoritarian methods he has employed to implement his economic programs, and the black nationalist tenor of many of his political tactics have since 1970 exacerbated East Indian animosities against the Africans generally and provoked the antagonisms of middle-class elements irrespective of race.

There is little evidence that most Guyanese, whether in the African or East Indian sector, perceive significant tangible benefits from Burnham's economic policies. Some new jobs have been generated in the bureaucracy and public works sectors; overall, however, the high level of unemployment has not been appreciably lowered. The private-property oriented rice peasantry manifests considerable passive resistance to the agricultural cooperativization drive. The drive has been confronted with a hostility to communal concepts generated in the family- and kinship-oriented East Indian rural society, as well as with their deeply ingrained suspicion of any programs sponsored by an African-controlled government. These attitudes were reinforced by the employment of African Guyanese agents to weigh, purchase, and store the rice crop. They were further aggravated by dissatisfaction with the methods used by village councils, dominated by African Guyanese officials of Burnham's PNC, in distributing water control services, and by what the East

Indians perceive as a general proliferation of PNC members among government functionaries, including police and defense force personnel. As a result, very few of the rice farms have been transformed into cooperative enterprises.

Restrictive import policies and the preference shown to state-controlled enterprises have resulted in a sharp drop in local and, especially, foreign sources of private capital investment, the shutdown of numerous private trading enterprises, and a sharp increase in emigration visas, the greatest proportion from Portuguese and Chinese businessmen. The plans for settlement of the interior, directed largely for political reasons and aimed mainly at urban Africans and even at blacks from other Caribbean countries, have met with little success. Moreover, Burnham's sharp turn to the left has generated some uneasiness on the part of the United States and other Western benefactors. It could make them more inclined than in the past to permit political considerations to temper economic criteria in the evaluation of assistance requests.

Burnham claims to recognize the difficulty of reorienting the economic values of a people accustomed, as he has said, to a system of "rugged and cynical individualism." Nonetheless, he pledged in 1972 that most light industry and service enterprises would be cooperativized during the next 10 to 15 years, and that profits would be allocated for the good of the nation. Plans under consideration retain incentives for continued participation by private interests and for continued financial inputs by U.S. and other foreign-aid benefactors. Most importantly, they specify as their primary goal the development of an economy with labor-intensive programs designed to deal with the seemingly unsolvable unemployment problem.

The new economic framework could prove to be essentially sound in the long run, but results to date are mixed. The country still is heavily dependent upon relatively few exports—chiefly bauxite, sugar, and rice, all of which are partly subject to world market fluctuations. In addition, the high rate of population increase deepens the urgency of raising the presently marginal level of social services, housing, and health facilities. Above all, despite some hopeful signs, the outlook is uncertain for the kind of increased cooperation between the two major racial groups that clearly holds the key to stability and any significant progress for Guyana.

All this gives rise to speculation about the country's future—whether Guyana is destined to be divided into two racial camps, or will be able to develop into the cooperative republic it has declared as its goal. The

marked increase during 1971 and 1972 in societal unrest and political discord, together with the sometimes authoritarian tone of government reactions to them has apparently contributed to doubts even within Burnham's PNC itself that the government can win an easy victory in the forthcoming elections. Misgivings about his policies may check the incipient tendencies of important, if still small, segments of society to moderate their race-oriented social and political commitments in favor of pragmatic cross-racial cooperation. If these tendencies have indeed been slowed,

Burnham's instinct for self (and PNC) preservation, probably will induce him to employ even more blatant electoral rigging than he did to win the 1968 elections. Both East Indians and Africans are so sensitive about this issue that a repetition of such tactics would not only diminish Burnham's prestige but widen the circle of those who feel that he, and Jagan as well, should give way to a second generation of leaders. The real problem is that there appears to be no alternative candidate to assume the leadership mantle in either the East Indian or the African community.

tax receipts after the nationalization of DEMBA, must have served as a warning signal to the government. The downturn doubtless counseled a cautious approach in negotiating ownership adjustments with Guyana's only other bauxite producer, the U.S.-owned Reynolds Guyana Mines.

Apart from the bauxite industry, the extent of government ownership of enterprises—as distinct from the formation of cooperatives—has remained very modest, limited mainly to a few rice mills, about half of the country's electric power generating capacity, its telecommunication facilities, and the domestic scheduled airlines. The number of nonagricultural cooperatives has greatly increased since 1970, particularly in such service fields as credit, banking, and marketing, and in small industry. Many of these undertakings have failed due to lack of capital or management skills. A number of privately controlled services, especially banking and credit, have been "miniaturized" in order to make way for cooperative enterprises in those fields.

The early gains made by Burnham in winning the confidence of some middle-class East Indians have apparently been eroded by the confiscatory effects of his cooperativization and national self-reliance programs. The unethical election procedures he has resorted to in order to offset the numerical advantage of the East Indian population, the authoritarian methods he has employed to implement his economic programs, and the black nationalist tenor of many of his political tactics have since 1970 exacerbated East Indian animosities against the Africans generally and provoked the antagonisms of middle-class elements irrespective of race.

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Chronology (u/ou)

1498

Columbus sails along coast of present-day Guyana during last of his three voyages.

1616

Dutch expedition establishes settlement on island in Essequibo River.

1621

Colony placed under direction of the Dutch West Indian Company.

1814

Three Dutch settlements of Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice are ceded to the United Kingdom following Congress of Vienna.

1831

The three settlements unite to become the colony of British Guiana with administration centered in Georgetown.

1838

Emancipation of slaves sets off large-scale immigration of indentured East Indians.

1928

Full crown colony government is introduced, and women acquire the vote.

1950

January

Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham organize the People's Progressive Party (PPP).

1953

April

PPP wins overwhelming majority in general elections.

1955

February

Burnham breaks with Jagan and forms the PPP(B).

1957

August

PPP(J), Jagan's faction of the party, wins general election.

October

Burnham drops pretense of PPP affiliation and forms the People's National Congress (PNC).

1961

August

PPP wins general elections; Jagan becomes Premier.

1962

February

A general strike degenerates into bloody racial rioting as the opposition tries to bring down the Jagan government.

1963

April-July

General strike accompanied by violence paralyzes economy; state of emergency is declared; Cuba aids Jagan financially to prevent his fall from power.

1964

May

Increasing bloodshed and racial violence cause U.K. Governor to assume emergency powers.

December

PPP gains slim plurality in elections, but Burnham takes over as Premier by forming a coalition with the smaller United Force party and gaining a parliamentary majority.

1966

February

Venezuelan claim to territory west of Essequibo River is submitted to a commission established to reach a settlement within 4 years.

May

British Guiana becomes independent state of Guyana with Burnham as Prime Minister.

New constitution establishes an appointed judiciary and an elected unicameral legislature.

September

Guyana becomes a member of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

1968

December

Prime Minister Burnham's PNC gains parliamentary majority in general election.

1969

January

Small-scale insurrection, encouraged by Venezuela, breaks out in southwestern area and is suppressed by the Guyana Defense Force.

March

Defense force becomes exclusively Guyanese when Col. Pope, British adviser, departs on 27 March.

April-June

Venezuela renews and intensifies campaign to regain the Essequibo, raising Guyanese fears that Venezuela eventually intends to use force to recover the disputed area.

July

Cheddi Jagan publicly enrolls the PPP in the World Communist Movement at the Moscow Conference of Worldwide Communist Parties.

August

Guyana Defense Force drives small contingent of Surinamese police from disputed border area.

1970

January

Border tensions rise as both Venezuela and Guyana concentrate troops on the border.

February

Guyana becomes a republic but remains within the Commonwealth (first Caribbean member of the Commonwealth to do so); officially known as the Cooperative Republic of Guyana.

1971

January

Government alarms business community by imposing unexpectedly sharp tax increases and foreign exchange restrictions. Outflow of funds of some foreign firms also are restricted.

April

Prime Minister announces new economic program with a strong nationalistic and socialistic bent.

May

Government moves to extend its control over existing foreign investments. Demands at least 51% equity participation in future concessions that exploit the nation's natural resources.

June

Venezuela and Guyana sign the "Port-of-Spain Protocol" for a 12-year moratorium on the dispute.

Surinam and Guyana agree to shelve their longstanding border dispute and promote better relations. Guyana retains "administrative control" of the disputed region.

July

PNC sweeps local elections, captures 80 of the 97 council seats contested. Opposition boycotts elections and charges fraud.

Government establishes the External Trade Bureau (ETB), to serve as the sole importer of goods from Communist countries, later expanded to handle all imports and exports.

Government nationalizes the Demerara Bauxite Co. (DEMBA), a subsidiary of a Canadian firm, after nearly 8 months of bitter negotiations; company renamed the Guyana Bauxite Company (GUYBAU).

November

People's Republic of China and Guyana sign trade agreement.

December

Soviet Union and Guyana establish "non-resident" diplomatic relations.

1972

January

Economic difficulties, attributable in part to world oversupply of bauxite and alumina, intensified by recent "Guyanization" measures by the government.

"Permanent observer" status extended to Guyana by the Permanent Council of the OAS.

March

Peking establishes seven-man trade mission in Guyana and extends \$26 million interest-free credit for industrial projects.

April

Burnham pushes for increased government controls over the economy and reiterates intention to strengthen the cooperative movement.

June

People's Republic of China and Guyana establish resident diplomatic relations.

Government-owned alumina plant temporarily closes because of the depressed international market for aluminum.

CONFIDENTIAL

Area Brief

LAND: (U/OU)

Size: 83,000 sq. mi.

Use: 1% cropland, 11% grassland, 66% forested, 22% built-up area, inland water, wasteland, and other

Land boundaries: 1,600 mi.

WATER: (U/OU)

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 3 n. mi.

Coastline: 285 mi.

PEOPLE: (U/OU)

Population: 763,000, average annual growth rate 2.7%

Ethnic divisions: 51% East Indians, 31% African, 12% African mixed, 4% Amerindian, 2% white and Chinese

Religion: 57% Christian, 33% Hindu, 9% Muslim, 1% other

Language: English

Literacy: 86%

Labor force: 175,000; about 25% agriculture, 14% manufacturing, 16% services, 11% commerce, 3% mining and quarrying, 10% other; 21% unemployed; shortage of technical and managerial personnel

Organized labor: 25% of labor force

GOVERNMENT: (U/OU)

Legal name: Cooperative Republic of Guyana

Type: Republic within Commonwealth

Capital: Georgetown

Political subdivisions: 9 administrative districts

Legal system: Based on English common law with certain admixtures of Roman-Dutch law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Branches: Council of Ministers presided over by Prime Minister; 53-member unicameral legislative National Assembly (elected); Supreme Court

Government leader: Prime Minister L.F.S. Burnham

Suffrage: Universal over age 21

Elections: Last held in December 1968; next elections before 1974

Political parties and leaders: People's Progressive Party (PPP), Cheddi Jagan; People's National Congress (PNC), L.F.S. Burnham; United Force (UF), Feilden Singh

Voting strength (1968 election): 36.5% PPP, 55.8% PNC, 7.4% UF, 0.3% other

Communists: Total unknown; PPP officially a member of World Communist Movement; Moscow oriented; top echelons of PPP and PYO (Progressive Youth Organization and militant wing of the PPP) include many Communists, but rank and file is non-Communist

Other political or pressure groups: Guyana All-Indian League, African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA), Progressive Youth Organization (PPP affiliate), Young Socialist Movement (PNC affiliate), Guyana United Youth Society (UF affiliate), Afro-Asian-American Association (AAAA), Committee for National Reconstruction, Guyana National Party (GNP)

Member of: CARIFTA, FAO, GATT, IBRD, ICAO, IFC, ILO, IMF, ITU, OAS (observer), Seabeds Committee (observer), U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO

ECONOMY: (U/OU)

GDP: US\$282.3 million, 1971 (G\$556.6 million), US\$385 per capita; real growth rate 1971 (est.) 4%

Agriculture: Main crops—sugarcane, rice, other food crops; food shortages—wheat, processed foodstuffs, dairy products

Major industries: Bauxite mining, alumina production, sugar and rice milling

Electric power: 112,000 kw. capacity (1971); 330 million kw.-hr. produced (1971)

Exports: US\$137 million (f.o.b., 1971); bauxite, sugar, alumina, rice, shrimp, rum

Imports: US\$131 million (c.i.f., 1971); manufactures, machinery, food, petroleum

Major trade partners: U.K., U.S., Canada, Commonwealth Caribbean countries

Aid: Economic—from U.S. (FY65-72), US\$55 million loans, US\$19 million grants; from international organizations (FY46-71), US\$26.8 million

Monetary conversion rate: 2 Guyana dollars = US\$1

Fiscal year: Calendar year

COMMUNICATIONS: (U/OU)

Railroads: 103 mi., all single track; 85 mi. 3'0" gage, 18 mi. 3'6" gage

Highways: 1,450 mi.; 290 mi. paved, 620 mi. otherwise improved, 540 mi. unimproved

Inland waterways: 3,700 miles

Ports: 1 major, 3 minor

Merchant marine: 1 ship exceeds 1,000 g.r.t., a 2,950-g.r.t. or 3,149-d.w.t. bulk carrier

Civil air: 6 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 102 total; 89 usable, 4 have permanent-surface runways, 12 have runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 2 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: Well-developed telecom system; multi-station radio-relay network; over 16,000 telephones; tropospheric scatter link to Trinidad; 257,000 radio receivers, 2 AM and 1 FM stations

DEFENSE FORCES: (C)

Military manpower: Males 15-49, 178,000; 122,000 (approximately 60%) are fit for military service; approximately 9,000 annually reach age 18, which is the conscription age in many countries (Guyana has no conscription)

Personnel: Over 4,000, including police

Major ground units: 2 infantry battalions

Ships: 7 patrol craft

Aircraft: 3 small utility aircraft

Supply: Almost entirely dependent on the United Kingdom for materiel, some U.S. equipment

Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1971, \$2.6 million; 2.7% of central government budget




Places and features referred to in this General Survey (u/ou)

	COORDINATES		COORDINATES
	° 'N. ° 'W.		° 'N. ° 'W.
Ankoko Island (island).....	6 43 61 08	Port-of-Span, Trinidad.....	10 39 61 31
Annai.....	3 57 59 06	Potaro River (stream).....	5 22 58 52
Barima River (stream).....	8 35 60 25	Rockstone.....	5 59 58 32
Bartica.....	6 24 58 37	Rose Hall.....	6 16 57 23
Berbice River (stream).....	6 17 57 32	Rosignol.....	6 16 57 32
Best.....	6 50 58 11	Rupununi District adm. district.....	3 00 59 00
Canje River (stream).....	6 16 57 32	Rupununi River (stream).....	4 03 58 31
Charity.....	7 24 58 36	Skeldon.....	5 52 57 08
Coeroeni Rivier, Surinam (stream).....	3 23 57 36	Spendaam (plantation).....	6 19 58 06
Corriverton.....	5 52 57 10	Springlands.....	5 54 57 09
Courantyne River (stream).....	4 45 57 50	Takama.....	5 34 57 55
Cuyuni River (stream).....	6 23 58 41	Tamatumari.....	5 20 59 00
Demerara River (stream).....	6 48 58 10	Turkeyen (plantation).....	6 19 58 07
Essequibo River (stream).....	6 59 58 23	Vreed en Hoop.....	6 48 58 11
Everton.....	6 12 57 31	Waini River (stream).....	8 23 59 48
Georgetown.....	6 48 58 10	Wismar section of Linden.....	6 00 58 18
Hyde Park.....	6 30 58 16		
Ireg River (stream).....	3 33 59 51		
Issano.....	5 50 59 26		
Ituni.....	5 30 58 14		
Kaituma River (stream).....	8 11 59 40		
Kanuku Mountains (mountains).....	3 12 59 30		
Kutari River (stream).....	2 22 56 52		
Kwakwani.....	5 17 58 03		
Lethem.....	3 23 59 48		
Linden.....	6 00 58 18		
Mackenzie (section of Linden).....	6 00 58 17		
Mahaica.....	6 41 57 55		
Mahdia.....	5 13 59 09		
Matthews Ridge.....	7 30 60 10		
Mora Passage (tidal creek).....	8 20 59 45		
Mount Roraima (mountain).....	5 12 60 44		
New Amsterdam.....	6 15 57 31		
New River (stream).....	3 23 57 36		
Pakaraima Mountains (mountains).....	4 05 61 30		
Parika.....	6 52 58 25		
Pomeroon River (stream).....	7 37 58 44		
Port Kaituma.....	7 44 59 53		
		Selected airfields	
		Aishalton.....	2 29 59 19
		Annai.....	3 57 59 06
		Apoteri.....	4 02 58 36
		Barimita.....	7 25 60 30
		Bartica.....	6 22 58 39
		Good Hope.....	3 52 59 35
		Imbaimadai.....	3 43 60 17
		Kamarang.....	5 52 60 37
		Karanambo.....	3 16 59 21
		Karasubai.....	4 00 59 31
		Kato.....	4 39 59 50
		Lethem.....	3 22 59 47
		Lumid Pau.....	2 24 59 26
		MacKenzie.....	5 58 58 16
		Monkey Mountain.....	4 26 59 38
		Ogle.....	6 18 58 06
		Orinduik.....	4 43 60 00
		Timehri International.....	6 30 58 15
		Wiehabai.....	2 53 59 30






3



Vegetation

- Dense tropical forest
- Seasonally flooded tropical forest with scattered marsh and swamps
- Grassland or savanna
- Cultivated land




Ethnic Groups




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
Economic Activity

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------|
| INDUSTRY | MINING |
| Meat packing | Al Bauxite |
| Sugar milling | Au Gold |
| Food processing | Diamonds |
| Sawmill; wood products | FISHING |
| Machine and metalworking | Fishing area |
| Bauxite processing | AGRICULTURE |
| Shipyards | Sugar |
| Lumbering | Rice |
| | Coconuts |
| | Cattle |



Vegetation

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- Seasonally flooded tropical forest with scattered marsh and swamp
- Grassland or savanna
- Cultivated land




Population

Persons per square mile
0 1 100 500


Persons per square kilometer
0 0.4 39 193

Data based on 1960 census



Ethnic Groups





Guyana

- International boundary
- - - - - International boundary in dispute
- Administrative district boundary
- ⊙ National capital
- ⊙ Mabaruma Administrative district capital
- Railroad
- Surfaced road
- Unsurfaced road or track
- ✈ Airfield
- ⋆ Major port

Populated places
 Georgetown: 170,000
 ○ 10,000 to 35,000
 ● Under 5,000

Spot elevations in feet

Scale 1:2,500,000

0 20 40 60 80
 Statute Miles

0 20 40 60 80
 Kilometers



Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative

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
Central Intelligence Agency For Official Use Only

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
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- Cultivated land




Ethnic Groups


- East Indian majority*
- Negro and mixed Negro majority*
- Amerindian majority*
- East Indian majority** with Negro and mixed Negro minority
- Amerindian majority with East Indian minority
- Probable Negro and mixed Negro majority



* Presumably unpopulated; environment inhospitable and/or data lacking
 *Majority more than 50%; no other group more than 25%
 **Majority more than 50%; minority 25% to 45%




- | INDUSTRY | | MINING | |
|----------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| | Meat packing | | Bauxite |
| | Sugar milling | | Gold |
| | Food processing | | Diamonds |
| | Sawmill; wood products | | |
| | Machine and metalworking | | |
| | Bauxite processing | | |
| | Shipyard | | |
| | Lumbering | | |
| | | FISHING | |
| | | | Fishing area |
| | | AGRICULTURE | |
| | | | Sugar |
| | | | Rice |
| | | | Coconuts |
| | | | Cattle |




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
Population

- Persons per square mile
 0 1 100 500
- Persons per square kilometer
 0 0.4 39 153
- Data based on 1960 census



Ethnic Groups

- East Indian majority*
 - Negro and mixed Negro majority*
 - Amerindian majority*
 - East Indian majority** with Negro and mixed Negro minority
 - Amerindian majority with East Indian minority
 - Presumably Negro and mixed Negro majority
- Presumably unpopulated; environment inhospitable and/or data lacking



*Majority more than 50%; no other group more than 25%
 **Majority more than 50%; minor groups to 45%