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Poland

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed in January 1973.

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Poland

CONTENTS

This chapter supersedes the sociological coverage in the General Survey dated September 1970.

FIGURES

The Society

A. Introduction (U/OU)

Scarred by repeated foreign incursions from both east and west, Polish society has depended on a strong fusion of nationalism with Roman Catholic culture for the survival of its national consciousness and traditional social values. Despite domination since 1947 by a Soviet-imposed Communist regime, the Poles have retained their Western social, cultural, and political roots. Although these traditional values survive, the institutional fabric of Polish society has been largely reshaped by wartime social upheavals and by rapid postwar industrialization and urbanization.

The transformation of Poland's prewar, largely rural society—dominated by relatively small social elites—into an increasingly urban, mass society was facilitated by the unprecedented political, economic, and ethnic changes brought about directly by World War II. The wartime extermination of the sizable Jewish minority by the Nazi occupiers, the postwar expulsion of Germans from the so-called Regained Territories (former German lands in the west and north), and exchanges with the U.S.S.R. of nationality groups as a consequence of boundary shifts, produced an ethnically and religiously homogeneous population about 98% Polish and 95% Roman Catholic.

Following the war, the surviving remnants of the traditionally influential landed gentry were impoverished through land reform and removed from social leadership. The prewar middle class was also soon deprived of its economic strength through nationalization of industry, commerce, and most services, and its class consciousness and influence on society was destroyed by discriminatory Communist social policies. A massive postwar rise of a largely ex-peasant working class unfamiliar with the demands of urban society but ideologically courted by the Communist regime has contributed to social tensions.

Because of postwar circumstances and subsequent totalitarian controls, the Polish regime has been successful in structurally transforming Polish society; it has not been successful, however, in imbuing it with its own values and making it effectively serve Communist political, economic, and social goals. Strong attachment to individualism, resistance to imposed authority, deeply felt nationalism, and adherence to religious faith continue to be the main determinants of the national character.

The political upheaval of 1956 marked a revolt against a Stalinist past and wrested from Poland's leaders a repudiation of terror and coercion as instruments of rule. But the initial liberalism and promise of a better life attributed to the Gomulka regime, which then came to power, were largely the illusions of an exuberant populace; the regime itself made few commitments. Indeed, its backsliding from initial reforms and the gradual atrophy of its leadership at all levels of the bureaucracy during the late 1960's intensified the strains between the rulers and the ruled. These strains, fueled by major economic blunders and sparked by ill-timed price rises, finally exploded in December 1970. The ensuing rapid political change represented the first instance of the proletariat overthrowing a Communist regime whose theory had failed in practice. More importantly, it ushered in a change not only of leadership but also of generations.

The current regime of Edward Gierek is not based on concession and weakness; in fact, its stress on social progress and material abundance is matched by its insistence on hard work and social responsibility. But, for the first time in Poland's history under Communist rule, the rulers have promised to consult their subjects and, more importantly, are pledged to the proposition that material and social development is the determinant of the validity of the guiding political and social theory.

Gierek's rule by no means spells the beginning of a free society. As a tough but thoroughly pragmatic administrator, Gierek knows that the dominant position of the Soviet Union makes the basic elements

of the Communist system and its ideological imperatives virtually inviolable. At the same time he seems committed to removing those features of the past that for so long contributed to national weakness: the gulf between the people and the Communist rulers, lagging economic development, the willingness of the government to risk social friction to further its political and economic goals, and official unresponsiveness to popular aspirations. If he succeeds even partially, then the demonstrated capability of the people to unite in the pursuit of popular and attainable goals could substantially ease his task of improving material conditions and of giving Polish society a more dynamic image on the world stage. For most Poles it is difficult to shed the skepticism that has so often proved to be well-founded. Nevertheless, most of them appear to believe that their rulers now share to a greater degree than before the popular hope that improved living standards, reduced East-West tensions, and a deemphasis of doctrinal considerations will enable Poland to assume a more prominent role in European society.

B. Structure and characteristics of the society

Poland's geographical location—astride the flat plains of the north-central European corridor—has been the principal factor governing its almost uninterrupted struggle for national identity and territorial integrity in the face of real or threatened domination by neighboring powers. This overriding element of national history, in turn, has been the main determinant of the ethnic, linguistic, religious, and social characteristics of the people. (U/OU)

A strong attachment to the land, so often thwarted by claimed as well as actual domination by foreign powers, has engendered a finely honed nationalism and a highly developed sense of the need to protect basic national interests. Active patriotism, born of the willingness to struggle against overwhelming authority, was thus historically raised to the level of the chief national virtue and became the most important force for social cohesion among the Polish people of all classes. (U/OU)

The same historical conditioning which made for national cohesion in the face of a foreign enemy, however, held the seeds of internal discord, class divisions, and lack of clear national purpose when projected solely into a domestic context. Long periods of partition and domination by as many as three different foreign powers—Orthodox Russia, Catholic Austria, and Protestant Prussia—all with widely differing philosophies of rule and social order—generated among the Polish people inherently different views concerning the correct targets and methods of the struggle for the preservation of national identity. The long absence of indigenous domestic authority and the moral righteousness of resistance to foreign viceroys strengthened the native individuality of the people, but at the same time weakened their social cohesion and their ability to subordinate individual and group interests to social and political discipline. (U/OU)

Despite the force of events which have engulfed Poland in this century, the social character of the Polish people has not been appreciably affected. The interwar interlude of weak civilian and military rule was followed first by the brutal rule of Nazi Germany and then by indirect domination by Soviet communism. Both forms of domination, although widely different in character, were initially fiercely resisted, and subsequently were punctuated by outbursts of popular resistance to Nazi brutality and Communist misrule—the Warsaw uprising in 1944, the quasi-revolt of 1956, and the workers' riots of December 1970 resulting in the first instance in history of the overthrow of a Communist regime by the working class. Despite the strong efforts of the post-1970 Gierek regime to tackle some of the root causes of the national malaise and to instill in the people both discipline and a new sense of viable national purpose, many ingrained elements of the national character continue to pose a danger to the stability and unity of the society. (C)

1. Physical characteristics and language (U/OU)

Ethnically, the Poles are a highly complex people, being an amalgam of the Nordic, Neo-Danubian, East Baltic, Alpine, and Dinaric physical types of the Caucasian race. Among the Poles there is no distinct national physical type, and most Poles could be taken for natives of almost any country in central Europe. Wartime dislocations and postwar shifts in population have contributed to further ethnic homogeneity. Based upon a sampling of military recruits in the mid-1960's, Poles have a mean stature of about 5 feet 6 inches, the average for Europeans, a mean weight of about 140 lbs., and a moderately heavy build. Except in the south, the skin is almost uniformly light, the hair colors are commonly medium to dark brown and dark ash-blond, and the eyes are predominantly light-mixed, frequently with shades of grey. The dominant Nordic and Neo-Danubian elements account for the blond pigmentation in most of the population. The

several more distinctive ethnic types are shown in Figure 1.

Polish, the official language, serves as the mother tongue of about 99% of the country's inhabitants, ranking seventh among European languages in number of native speakers. Outside of Poland, it is used to some extent by several million Polish emigrants scattered throughout the world, representing one of their main ties with the motherland. In modern times the Polish language has achieved importance as an instrument of both literary and scholarly expression.

Along with Czech, Slovak, and Lusatian (Wendish), Polish belongs to the Western division of the Slavic (Slavonic) language group, which is in turn a member of the Eastern division of the Indo-European family. Despite the considerable uniformity in vocabulary and grammatical pattern that characterizes the Slavic tongues, Polish is not readily comprehensible to other Slavic speakers. Its distinctive features include fixed accent on the penultimate syllable, frequent occurrence of palatal and sibilant sounds, and preservation of archaic Slavic nasal vowels. In common with other Slavic tongues whose speakers chose the Roman Catholic rather than the Eastern Orthodox form of Christianity, Polish in its written form uses the Latin alphabet.

Regional dialects and subdialects, although numerous, cause few practical difficulties in intercommunication. The flat character of the country has been instrumental in checking the emergence of strong dialectal differences, while local language peculiarities have practically disappeared since World War I through such leveling influences as public education, mass media, urbanization, and internal migration. Authorities do not always agree on the classification of Polish dialects and subdialects, but all recognize three major groupings: 1) Great Polish (*Wielkopolski*), with Poznan[1] as the center; 2) Little Polish (*Malopolski*), with Krakow as the center; and 3) Mazovian (*Mazowiecki*), with Warsaw as the center. A transitional central area among these three groups is located north, west, and south of Lodz.

The most distinctive dialect is Kashubian, considered by some scholars to be a subdialect of Pomeranian and by others to be a separate West Slavic language; it is spoken by a relatively small group (estimated between 100,000 and 250,000) inhabiting an area along the Baltic Coast west of the Vistula. In Silesia the older generation of indigenous people speak a highly Germanized form of Polish.

[1]For diacritics on place names see the list of names at the end of the chapter.



FIGURE 1. Polish ethnic types (U/OU)

In modern times literary Polish has been the standard speech of the educated upper classes in all Polish cities. Members of the urban lower classes, mainly of recent peasant origin, retain many of the characteristics of their regional dialects. Among the distinctive features of educated speech is the use of the third person singular, as in Italian and Spanish, in the polite form of address (i.e., for "you"); *pan* (sir) is used to a man and *pani* (madame) to a w[illegible].

Before World War II, [illegible], Yiddish, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, and German were the principal non-Polish languages. They were spoken by nearly all of the minorities, who made up about one-third of the total prewar population. Wartime decimation of the Jewish minority, postwar population and territorial shifts, and Communist policies of assimilation have reduced the use of non-Polish minority languages to negligible proportions. Their use among the remaining minority groups totaling about 1.5% of the population is increasingly confined to the elderly, while the younger members of minorities are either bilingual or entirely Polish-speaking.

German probably remains the principal Western language spoken by the older as well as some members of the younger generation, although its use is resented and shunned by older nonprofessionals. The second language of most Communist party leaders, both old and young, probably is Russian, although some among them shared in the general tendency of professional people and intellectuals educated in the interwar period to look to French as a vehicle for social, cultural, and political intercourse with other European peoples. Communist party leader Edward Gierek, for example, reportedly speaks only poor Russian but is fluent in French, having spent much of World War II within the Communist resistance movements in France and Belgium.

In the postwar period, knowledge of Russian has increased through compulsory teaching in the schools. Since 1956, however, English has become the most popular and widely studied Western language among the younger generation, followed closely by French and German. Three-fourths of all Polish students of foreign languages other than Russian studied English in 1970. The result of this trend has become evident in the lower and middle levels of the party and government bureaucracy, where increasing numbers of the younger professionals possess a knowledge of English, German, or French. In line with the Gierek regime's avowed desire to increase Poland's political and economic role in Europe, it is likely further to give practical encouragement to the study and knowledge of Western languages—especially English and French—by those engaged in diplomatic and commercial relations.

2. Minorities (C)

Although insignificant numerically, the postwar ethnic minorities have retained their own special characteristics and have frequently had a social and political impact far beyond their numbers. The tiny Jewish minority has played a significant role in the shaping of Communist rule in Poland. The German group is at the center of the repatriation issue which played an important part in the conclusion of the Polish-West German treaty of December 1970. Some of the minority groups are known to be antagonistic toward the Polish state, but because of their numerical weakness and their lack of cohesiveness and leadership none of them are regarded as a threat to national security. For the same reason, they have not become a serious problem in Poland's relations with its neighbors, although the concentration of certain minorities along border areas has sometimes prompted rumors of border adjustments.

The events of World War II and of the early postwar years helped to create the most ethnically homogeneous citizenry in the history of the Polish nation. The proportion of minority groups has continued to decline, constituting only 1.5% of the total population in 1969. Nonetheless, lingering animosities, including anti-Semitism, remain. Much of this animosity has historical roots, since Polish national consciousness has to a large extent been molded by resistance to foreign incursions on Polish culture and to the irredentist claims of Poland's neighbors. The generally unviable borders of the Polish state during the interwar period did little to reduce this feeling of national insecurity, particularly since they encompassed a significant and often restive non-Polish population. The census of 1931 showed that ethnic minorities accounted for 31.1% of the total population, the largest being the Ukrainians and Ruthenians (13.9%), the Jews (8.6%), the White Russians (3.1%), and the Germans (2.3%).

Wartime losses, postwar territorial shifts, and population transfers might have been expected to eliminate ethnic frictions. Nevertheless, much of the former bitterness among ethnic groups was actually compounded in the immediate postwar period. Traditional Polish-Ukrainian enmity boiled over in the late 1940's, stimulated by the existence of Ukrainian partisan groups in southeast Poland agitating for a free Ukraine. This resulted in the forced transfer of over 100,000 Ukrainians to northwest

Poland, where faltering steps to relieve their cultural suppression came only after 1956.

Anti-German feelings were so much a part of Polish nationalism after the war that until the late 1950's harsh restrictions were levied on those Germans who remained within the newly drawn Polish boundaries. Even token emigration of individual Germans was not permitted although mass expulsion was an official policy. After 1956 a relatively lenient policy permitted Germans who had previously declared Polish nationality to profess their Germanism and allowed emigration for the purpose of "reuniting families." Thereafter, applications for emigration were dealt with on an individual basis, with wide variation in the ease with which such applications were granted. Denial was most frequently experienced by those possessing skills needed by the Polish economy. This factor has greatly complicated the repatriation of ethnic Germans and has become something of a hindrance to the "normalization" of bilateral relations with West Germany.

Poland's policies toward its Jewish minority, the subject of periodic international concern, is rooted in the country's political and social history. The drastic reduction of the Jewish population from about 3 million in the immediate prewar years to about 25,000 in the mid-1960's was due to the wartime extermination policies of Nazi Germany and to extensive emigration in the postwar period. The postwar exodus of Jews was to a large extent attributable to the persistence of anti-Semitism, despite grudging Polish respect for Jewish heroism in the famous Warsaw ghetto uprising of 1943 and the stirring of the national conscience over the question of possible Polish guilt in failing to help most Jews escape from wartime destruction.

In prewar Poland, Jews were typically small merchants or industrial workers who spoke Yiddish as a native tongue and lived in a state of isolation in the cities and towns. About 10% deviated from this pattern, becoming members of the intelligentsia. They contributed greatly to Polish culture but were strongly resented not only by the landed gentry but also by the growing numbers of Polish intellectuals with whom they competed in the professions. Because of the wartime destruction of the Jews, anti-Semitism might have disappeared in the postwar period had not a disproportionately large number of the surviving Jews become Communists and had not many of them acquired responsible positions in those agencies of state authority associated in the public mind with Communist oppression, especially during the Stalinist era of the early 1950's. Moreover, most of the Jewish Communists had spent the war years in the Soviet Union and were thus regarded as foreign "viceroys" not only by the non-Communist population but also by the large nationalistic element within the Communist Party. Anti-Semitism thus became a major issue in the party's factional strife after the assumption of power in October 1956 by the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had spent the war years as leader of the Communist underground in Poland. The political impact of anti-Semitism was further complicated by the fact that many formerly Stalinist Jews rallied to the support of Gomulka in 1956, thus becoming identified with his rule, and by the fact that this rule soon forsook those liberal and national policies which characterized the immediate post-1956 period.

Popular attitudes as well as factional rivalries brought about frequent, though limited, purges of Jews from various party and government positions during the years of Gomulka's rule, but it was not until the political crisis of 1968 that anti-Semitism became a major political tool openly used by Gomulka's opponents within the party. Spurred by the generally pro-Israeli attitudes of some leading Polish Jews during the Middle East conflict of June 1967 in contravention of Soviet and official Polish pro-Arab policies, the party's nationalistic wing combined lingering popular anti-Semitism with anti-intellectualism to form an essentially populist challenge to Gomulka's rule. Gomulka's survival of this challenge was due not only to his political skill and Soviet backing, especially after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, but also to concessions which resulted in wholesale purges of the Jewish element in the party and government apparatus and in cultural and economic life. These purges were accompanied by a policy of actively encouraging the emigration of those Jews "whose primary loyalty was not to Poland."

Because of the formerly disproportionate importance of the Jewish element in Poland's political and cultural life, the impact of the 1968 events was significant. More than one-half of the estimated 25,000 Jews in Poland before 1967 are believed to have left the country since then, reducing the Jewish minority to a core of some 8,000 to 10,000 mostly elderly persons who do not intend to emigrate. To many Poles, the purges and emigration of Jews have had the desirable effect of transferring some power and influence from an old and frequently discredited group to a generally capable younger generation, even before the demise of the compromised Gomulka regime. For the same reason, the leadership of Edward Gierek must have been privately relieved that the issue

of Jewish influence in Poland's political life was not one of the many problems which it faced upon assuming power.

Because many of Poland's Jews were leaders in the professions and in cultural and academic life, their departure has had a negative impact on society, at least in the short run. This was illustrated by the emigration to the West of leading members of the world-famous Warsaw Jewish Theater, including its internationally known doyenne, Ida Kaminska, and such personalities as film-makers Jerzy Toeplitz and Alexander Ford, as well as by the less visible impact of personnel losses in Poland's scientific research and in general management.

Poland's constitution of 1952 grants ethnic minorities the right to preserve and develop their own culture. This right, generally ignored during the Stalinist era, has been publicized and to a limited degree honored since 1956, although its implementation has been confined to those segments of the existing minorities devoid of political importance. In general, however, minority members have some opportunity to receive school instruction and to read periodicals and books in their mother tongues. Serving as the main vehicles for cultural development—and enabling regime supervision—are the sociocultural associations for each of the significant minority groups except the Gypsies. Formed mostly in 1956 and 1957, these associations maintain for the minorities various regional recreational-cultural centers, libraries, and amateur theater groups. They also assist in the education of children in the schools for minorities, now slowly decreasing in number, within the regular Polish school system. In 1968, a total of 3,132 students (mostly in elementary school) attended these schools, which either provided all instruction in the mother tongue or used Polish as the language of instruction while giving lessons in the minority language. The latter type appears to be gradually replacing the former.

3. Social characteristics (C)

Polish national identity coalesced in the 10th century as a result of growing external threats. Since then, the search for national security and the proper means to achieve it has been the chief factor in shaping the Polish people's view of themselves and others, as well as in shaping individual, group, class, and inter-state relationships.

In A.D. 966 the Polish tribes of the Vistula and Oder river basins between the Carpathian Mountains and the Baltic were united into one state by Mieszko, the first historic ruler of the native Piast dynasty (966-1370). In the same year, Mieszko was baptized and brought the Roman Catholic faith to Poland, which at the time was the most powerful state among the Slavs. The fate of the church in Poland and that of the nation have since been inextricably intertwined, a relationship which has molded the cultural awareness and social orientation of the Polish people. Thus, the year 1966 marked the millennium of both the state as an entity and the dominant Roman Catholic Church.

Both of Mieszko's achievements were urgently needed, since the Polish tribes were being threatened by the developing power of neighboring tribal unions and feudal states. On the West, the Poles were faced by the Germans, whose king had been Holy Roman Emperor since 962. At the same time, Poland's eastern neighbors had been united by the Norman Rus in the Kievan state, which accepted the Christian faith from Byzantium and soon began to invade the Polish border areas. Lying between these two rising powers, the Poles opted for cooperation with the Latin West, but with independence from Germany and under the protection of the papacy. Subsequent centuries of struggle against incursions from both the east and the west—religious conflict with the latter sharpened with the rise of Protestant Prussia—resulted in periods of national crisis and honed the national consciousness and pride of the Polish people. Inherent Slavic individualism, the divisive tendencies of the nobility, and differences over whether the east or west posed the main danger, however, often eroded the strong nationalism conditioned by the Roman Catholic faith and contributed to the successive foreign partitions of Poland, culminating in the disappearance of the Polish state in 1795.

The new Polish state which reappeared in 1918 benefited as well as suffered from most of these same factors. Expansive nationalism, barred from outlets to the west, led to a successful military campaign in the early 1920's against a Russia weakened by internal upheaval. As one result, Poland's eastern frontiers in the interwar period encompassed sizable new minorities. The existence of these minorities and the struggle by different social groups for political dominance led to marked social stratification, even though the dislocations of the initial post-World War I period had increased social mobility in some cases. Differences in levels of wealth, class, and cultural attainment were emphasized by the broad urban-rural division of society. Such social conflict as existed was primarily among the many nationality groups and within the ranks of the increasingly numerous and underemployed intelligentsia. Although the domi-

nance of the Roman Catholic Church assured general religious concord, resentment against the large Jewish component of the lower middle class had economic and religious overtones. The dominant tradition of learning was German- and French-oriented, and in general cultural relations with the West were avidly cultivated. All except the peasant class were literate, and urban cultural awareness was high.

The landowning gentry, who for centuries set the tone of political and social life, had been undergoing a rapid decline since the beginning of the 20th century and had dropped to a mere one-third of 1% of the population, but they still retained a sizable measure of political and social influence. The peasants, numerically the largest group in the population and economically the most important, had little social and cultural influence. Their sense of inferiority and passive acceptance of a subordinate social role changed only slowly. The peasant movement, however, did become an important political force during the interwar period. The great majority of peasants, nevertheless, lived a primitive life of poverty and continued to use medieval agricultural techniques.

The small middle class, which had been hampered in its development by the succession of partitions and foreign occupations of the country and by internal dissension and lack of economic opportunity, did not assert itself as a strong social force. It did, however, provide the ultimate base for the ruling military clique in the immediate prewar years. Though socially the most cohesive group in the population, the industrial working class was also limited by its relatively small size and by the regional character of heavy industry. Although no single social class dominated Poland during the interwar period, a loose social coalition of the clergy, the professional people, the bureaucracy, and the military officers corps exerted an authoritarian influence on social and political life.

The broad social revolution following World War II was accelerated but not initiated by the Communist regime. The factors which caused many of the postwar social changes had already begun to appear during World War II and affected the property-owning class most drastically. Many members of this group fled abroad; others were placed in Nazi concentration camps or deported to the U.S.S.R., never to return. Those who remained in Poland were deprived of influence in public life by police measures as well as by a basic reorientation of industry and trade. Economic changes that started with the expropriations and physical destruction during the war years were subsequently completed through nationalization, land reform, and reconstruction under state control.

The middle class fared better. Although materially impoverished, the wartime destruction of its Jewish element left it more socially cohesive, and it adapted itself more easily to postwar conditions. During the initial postwar era of economic stabilization, the middle class actually increased in size and strengthened its economic basis. The subsequent elimination of nearly all private enterprise during the Stalinist period, however, reduced the major part of this class, composed mainly of small businessmen and other self-employed persons, to the status of wage earners. Since 1956 the regime's varying degrees of encouragement for the expansion of private handicrafts and services has again spurred the growth of a small middle class. This official encouragement has been particularly marked under the Gierek regime, and could result in a faster growth of the urban middle class. With the passage of time the character of this class is changing, however, as newly integrated elements from the lower levels of the inflated bureaucracy as well as the peasantry are absorbed into it. The material well-being and the social prestige of the middle class is generally only slightly above that of the lower classes. There are highly visible, and frequently officially criticized, exceptions to this rule, however. In many urban centers, particularly in Warsaw, there has developed a distinct sub-class of highly successful individual entrepreneurs who, by providing needed services, garden produce, and specialty products, have often amassed personal fortunes. Because their services are undeniably needed, the government tolerates the existence of this small "neo-capitalist" sub-group.

The peasants enjoyed a relatively privileged position during and shortly after World War II. With foodstuffs at a premium, they were regarded as benefactors by all Polish society, and they gained significantly in self-respect and influence as a class. Between 1949 and 1956, however, the social and political pressures of collectivization, heavy taxes, and other discriminatory policies undermined the newly won social and economic position of the peasants. Subsequently, as a result of the Gomulka regime's more flexible agricultural policies, the peasantry as a class again prospered relative to many categories of industrial workers. Although the social position of the peasantry remains well below its immediate postwar level, the tenacious traditionalism of this class has played a central role in the regime's continued toleration of an essentially private agricultural system. Even during the peak of the collectivization drive, in the early 1950's, over 75% of Poland's farmland remained in private hands, and in 1970 the figure stood at 83.9%. The bulk of the remainder (14.8%)

was composed of state farms, generally in the former German territories, and only 1.3% constituted agricultural collectives. The Gierek regime, committed to improving consumer welfare in which food supply plays the key role, has courted the peasantry in many ways—guaranteeing continued private ownership of land, abolishing compulsory deliveries and, especially important to the highly religious peasantry, moving toward normalization with the Roman Catholic Church. If the peasantry responds by overcoming its past unwillingness to use modern agricultural methods and thereby improves production, it could earn the gratitude of other segments of society and thus somewhat improve its social standing. Working against this, however, are such trends as a continued flight from the countryside by rural youth, thus leaving the farms in the hands of the old and conservative generation.

The industrial proletariat was especially hard hit during World War II. Trade unions and other workers' organizations and their leadership were decimated, and, along with other strata of the urban population, the working class underwent a general pauperization. In the postwar period, however, the relative status of the skilled worker has been enhanced as a result of the movement of unskilled peasants into the lowest levels of urban society through the shift from agricultural to industrial employment. Also, the increasingly sophisticated requirements of a developing industrial economy have resulted in some upward social mobility for the technically skilled members of the industrial working class. During the stifling, later years of the Gomulka era, however, the industrial workers as a whole became increasingly aware of being only theoretically the backbone and the most favored component of Communist society, while in practice their material well-being was eroded by the regime's inept economic policies and their social standing was far below that of a domineering, inflated, and isolated state bureaucracy. This in turn fueled the workers' dissatisfaction which, sparked by the regime's folly of raising food prices and reinstituting harsher work rules just before Christmas 1970, resulted in the riots that swept the Baltic coast and toppled the Gomulka regime.

Gomulka's successor as party leader, Edward Gierek, is by age (60 in January 1973), social class (a former Silesian miner), and inclination (a pragmatist), more in touch with the working class than any of his Communist predecessors. Moreover, it is this class that brought him to power, a debt which in the public eye will have to be repaid. What effect this situation will have on the social status, as distinct from political and economic influence, of the average Polish worker is not yet clear. In addition to his other attributes, Gierek is a prime example of a new generation of administrators and efficient technocrats, less concerned with ideology than with performance. Discipline and hard work by the workers is the other side of the coin of Gierek's concessions to the working class which, still largely composed of former peasants, faces a difficult task in upgrading its social acceptability.

The Gomulka regime, like its predecessors, strove to build a Polish society based on three main classes: workers, peasants, and the "working intelligentsia." It expected that of these the last, which initially was not numerous, would evolve rapidly from the worker and peasant classes and provide a reliable Marxist leadership for the society as a whole. All measures of postwar social development show, however, that although these expectations were fulfilled in their sociological sense, the resulting class of young, educated workers and "intelligentsia"—even more than society as a whole—disregarded the underlying ideological premise. The outlook of the young intellectual class was no closer to the spirit desired by the regime than was that of their older colleagues; in fact, they actively sought alternatives to what they considered anachronistic Marxist concepts, favoring a blend of socialism and individual incentive characteristic of some advanced Western technological societies. The success of the Gomulka government in creating this class, while at the same time failing to imbue it with uncritical acceptance of Communist policies set by a ruling clique, was the main cause of the regime's downfall.

That the dangerous sociopolitical situation which developed during the 1960's did not reach a climax before December 1970 is in part a measure of the persistent class divisions. The political crisis that shook but did not topple the Gomulka regime in 1968 was sparked by the elite intellectual class, whose traditional role as steward of the national culture was illustrated by a writers' revolt in the spring of that year against censorship and arbitrary restrictions. Their cause soon spread to the student milieu, leading to demonstrations initially against academic grievances but soon widening into the political arena. None of the issues, however, were of the economic "bread-and-butter" kind that might have engaged the workers or the peasantry, a fact skillfully exploited by the Gomulka regime to pit the workers against the students and intellectuals.

When in December 1970 the workers on the Baltic coast, many if not most of them belonging to the younger generation, took to the streets in protest

against the regime's tangible economic blunders, they were not joined by either the students or the intellectuals in any significant numbers. This feature of the revolt, however, was a disguised blessing since the regime was prevented from once again exploiting class differences for its own ends, and was left for all to see as pitted solely against the class upon whose mandate Communist rule theoretically depended. This situation, untenable either in real or ideological terms, caused the internally chaotic, weakened, and isolated Gomulka regime—devoid of Soviet support—to fall of its own weight.

The attributes of the Gomulka regime in its later years also bore witness to a long-developing social split—basically generational—within the Communist hierarchy. The fluid upper class which had emerged under postwar Communist rule consisted of the high party and government leaders themselves, heads of mass organizations, managers of state enterprises, and others who owed their social ascendancy to the Communist regime. The existence of this class, however, had little impact on the traditional standing of other social classes. Its control over national life and material well-being was resented, and it generally carried no real prestige within the society. Moreover, the rising age structure of this class, internecine warfare within it, and its demonstrable policy failures opened its ranks to increasing inroads by the younger generation of tough but less ideologically hidebound managers and technocrats.

The rise of this managerial and technocratic component of the ruling elite—younger, more forward-looking, and in touch with social, political, and economic reality is symbolized by the Gierek regime. Cutting across class lines to include members of the middle echelon of the economic bureaucracy and other young professionals, this group had given evidence even before 1970 of developing into a new class in its own right, one based on administrative and technical competence rather than on political considerations. The Gierek regime's public commitment to precisely these attributes in all aspects of national life promises not only to foster the growth but also the self-identity of this incipient social class.

Because this growing class has tended to give priority to national self-interest and public welfare in general, to the detriment of both Communist ideology and institutional forms, it has earned the respect and increasing allegiance of other classes. This is particularly true of the educated youth of all class origins, a fact heavily counted on by the government in its efforts to engage the support of the new generation. This youth already forms the main component of the new technocratic class, having been absorbed into it at its lower levels. With the passage of time, this class, in close alliance with the skilled workers, will probably become the dominant class of Polish society.

4. National attitudes (C)

Polish national attitudes, both individual and collective have been formed through centuries of struggle for national survival and are characterized by strong nationalism, tenacity of purpose, and adherence to those social and cultural traditions which have been instrumental in preserving the national identity. Together with the Roman Catholic Church, which has played a central role in shaping and maintaining national consciousness, these factors have consistently militated against the achievement of Communist objectives in Poland. As a people, the Poles value originality in the individual but tend to be conservative when acting collectively. This contradiction, together with a chronic feeling of national insecurity, has long thwarted effective political rule. If the Poles were described in the interwar period as a people "charmingly impossible to govern," then even more so in the postwar period they must rank among the world's most unnatural Communists.

These prevailing attitudes parallel the basic postwar conflict between the traditional value system of European humanism that emphasizes individual worth and the atheistic and collectivist orientation of Marxism. The confrontation in Poland between these two value systems has also been characterized by interplay and cooperation. In each system, apart from the highly antagonistic ideological mainstream, there is an articulate minority current which allows some convergence with the other despite irreconcilable differences. In the traditional system, for example, "open Catholicism" advocates cooperation with the regime on practical matters and seeks adjustment to social change, in contrast to the dogmatic, formalistic Polish Catholicism entrenched in the countryside and at the top of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Within the Communist system, various "revisionist" currents have long been concerned with creating a "socialist humanism" suffused with nonideological, technological efficiency which would focus on the problems and needs of the individual. Although untainted by revisionism in ideological terms, the new Polish regime of Edward Gierek typifies one such current.

Probably the most fundamental task of the new leadership is to reassert the moral authority of the rulers vis-a-vis the ruled, and to bridge the gulf long separating the two with a new sense of participation

and mutual trust. Despite Gierek's evident good will and the willingness of the people to give his regime in its early years the benefit of the doubt, the task is formidable. The population is only slowly emerging from the great social changes attendant upon rapid industrialization and urbanization. Against this backdrop, the postwar struggle for moral authority has produced general disorientation and a tendency to indict the system of Communist rule as a whole. The psychological state of uncertainty and confusion over permissible and impermissible behavior has created widespread moral disintegration.

Under such conditions, the chief cohesive force in society has been Polish nationalism, combined with a desire to rejoin a European family of nations devoid of East-West ideological antagonisms. The impetus toward nationalism is being cautiously exploited by the Gierek regime with the awareness that these efforts must remain ideologically acceptable and within the limits of the Polish-Soviet relationship. The national desire for becoming once again a part of the European family of nations similarly has been useful to the government in obtaining wide popular support for various proposals designed to spur European detente.

Throughout the postwar period, even more so than in past historical eras, most Poles of all ages were chiefly concerned with national survival and the integrity of Poland's postwar frontiers. For this reason, they welcomed the conclusion of the 1970 Polish-West German treaty giving finality—in Polish eyes—to the country's western border. To most Poles, this step marked the essential precondition for their own security as well as for general progress toward European detente. Though increasingly looking to their own future in an all-European context, the people realize there is no present realistic alternative to continued alignment with the Soviet Union. While most of them continue fundamentally to oppose the Communist regime, they are inclined to support those domestic and foreign policies and initiatives of the Gierek regime that are demonstrably in the national self-interest. Moreover, the country's new leadership, aware of this potential for support, has sought to harness it. Although the Gierek regime is as intent as its predecessor to prevent adverse popular attitudes from crystalizing into political opposition, it has opened the way—within the present institutional forms—for greater popular participation in the decisionmaking process, and has increased the flow of information between the people and those who lead them.

Historically rooted anti-German and anti-Russian sentiments continue to exist among all strata of the population, the former reinforced by the experiences of World War II and the latter by its identification with an alien Communist social order imposed from the East. Although the postwar generation now assuming positions of leadership has been instrumental in the gradual political reconciliation with West Germany and the German nation as a whole, most older adults still feel that the enormity of the wartime Nazi crimes in Poland will prevent social reconcilation between the two nations for at least another generation. In this regard, most Poles, including ranking party members, make little distinction between West and East Germany. Anti-Russian sentiments, mainly conditioned by a history of Russian and Soviet domination and brutality, also contain significant elements of cultural, political, and social disdain and an almost automatic rejection of virtually all material achievements and ideas of Russian origin. Almost equally well-rooted in national history and consciousness, however, is a persistence of good will for the United States, whose constitutional ideas and material well-being have traditionally inspired admiration. Moreover, heavy Polish emigration to the United States, especially at the beginning of this century, has engendered both real or claimed family ties with the United States on the part of most Poles. Despite varying degrees of Communist-imposed isolation, these feelings among the Polish population appear to be unshaken, and have counterbalanced the regime's partial success, especially among the youth, in exploiting U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict.

Despite the longstanding conflict with their German neighbors, the Polish people are traditionally Western-oriented and pride themselves on being the often unappreciated bulwark of Western European culture against encroachment by Eastern despotism. Poland won a reputation as the guardian of Christianity by stopping the westward advance of the Tatars in the 13th century and was responsible, through King Jan Sobieski, for the defeat of the Turks at Vienna in 1683, both events being popular examples of national heroism and of Poland's contribution to Western civilization. The symbols, heroes, and events which evoke national pride are for the most part connected with periods of struggle for the independence of Poland as well as of other nations. Poland's contribution to the American Revolution in the persons of Tadeusz Kosciuszko (1746-1817) and Count Kazimierz Pulaski (1748-79) illustrated the historical motto of Poland's expatriate military leaders: "For our freedom and yours." The heroic figure of the Polish knight, as depicted by 19th century Polish painter



FIGURE 2. The Polish Knight, by Aleksander Orlowski, 19th century painter (U/OU)

Aleksander Orlowski, symbolizes this aspect of the national spirit (Figure 2). The decision by party leader Gierek soon after coming to power to reconstruct the Royal Castle in Warsaw (Figure 3), a move that had been avoided by all postwar Communist governments in Poland, shows the willingness of the new regime to appeal to popular pride in the national heritage. As a seat of royal power, the castle dated to the late 16th century, when King Zygmunt III moved the court to Warsaw.

The sufferings and losses of World War II have remained fresh in the national memory, not only because of persistent verbal propaganda disseminated by the regime but also through the many national monuments dedicated to both native and foreign victims of Nazi policies who died on Polish soil (Figure 4). The most infamous of the many Nazi concentration and extermination camps, Auschwitz (Oswiecim), has been maintained in its stark condition as a mute monument to an era. Since the war, a reconstructed Warsaw has become the embodiment of Polish pride in national tradition and heritage and the Polish will to survive. The Warsaw Nike, a monument unveiled in 1964 (Figure 5), symbolizes the heroism of the city.

In an effort to counteract foreign pressures during the interwar period, the Poles usually sought support from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact, the French and British declarations of war against Germany in response to its invasion of Poland in September 1939, and the subsequent occupation of the eastern part of the country by the U.S.S.R. further strengthened the average Pole's predisposition toward the Western powers. Although the Communist regime places the origins of postwar Poland's military forces in the Polish contingents which fought alongside the Soviet army in World War II, it has given increasing recognition to the average Pole's stress on the contribution of Poles to the military effort of the Western allies. (For example, more than 10% of the German aircraft destroyed during the Battle of Britain were shot down by Polish

FIGURE 3. The Royal Castle in Warsaw prior to 1939. The structure was badly damaged during the initial Nazi bombardment of Warsaw in September 1939, and was razed by the Nazis after the Warsaw uprising of 1944. (U/OU)

airmen, and Polish contingents played a central role in the crucial battles of Tobruk in North Africa, and of Monte Cassino in Italy.) This willingness to be fair and objective with regard to the total wartime Polish struggle is particularly true of the Gierek regime, which has gradually given recognition to the wartime non-Communist underground by far more numerous and effective than its Communist counterpart. Moreover, Poland was the only country in Eastern Europe where the advent of postwar Communist rule was significantly resisted by force of arms.

Most Poles take pride in this military resistance, but the uneven struggle against Germany's "blitzkrieg" in 1939, the crushing of the Warsaw uprising in 1944, the ill-fated postwar armed struggle against communism, the failure of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the Soviet willingness to use overwhelming force to maintain hegemony in Eastern Europe illustrated by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, have all had a cumulative impact on the national attitude toward armed conflict. Nevertheless, strong nationalism and patriotism remain powerful factors, especially when the nation is faced with a clear external threat. Although Polish youth remains largely apathetic to domestic politics and is unwilling to risk life or make other sacrifices for the sake of ideology, their willingness to come to the defense of human life, family, and the "Fatherland" is undoubted. Given

FIGURE 4. Monument to Nazi war victims of Majdanek, site of Nazi concentration extermination camp near Lublin (U/OU)

FIGURE 5. The Warsaw Nike (U/OU)

these factors the reliability of the enlisted ranks of the armed forces must be considered as largely dependent on the issues and circumstances of any future conflict, the nationality of opposing forces, and the magnitude of a direct threat to Polish territory. There were, for example, significant morale problems among Polish military units which took part in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, during the 1970 worker's uprisings along the Baltic coast, Polish regular army units (as distinct from the police and militarized internal security units) reportedly were neither ordered to, nor would have, fired on the workers. Indeed, the behavior of the military establishment of all ranks in 1970 appears to have mitigated the general postwar low esteem in which the military is held by the people, and opened the way toward somewhat greater military influence in national affairs.

Despite the success of the workers in 1970 in essentially overthrowing one Communist regime and seating another, most other elements of society are aware that the development resulted from the action of but one class and with the aid of fortuitous circumstances. While the people are newly aware that popular opinion can effect change in the system—indeed, this principle has been embraced by the Gierek regime—the 1970 events have not substantially increased the militancy of the society as a whole.

The Polish outlook in the early 1970's is, therefore, hopeful but tempered by a down-to-earth realism which has been as prevalent in the nation's history as the more publicized bouts of romantic idealism. This is most acutely reflected in the attitudes of the youth. In terms of specific beliefs, educated Polish youth tend to favor the Western European type of social democracy as a political and social order, nonsectarianism in religion, and experimental freedom in art. They tend toward individual rather than collective responsibility in social relations, and toward supranationalism based on a combination of Polish nationalism and allegiance to Europe as an entity.

Although the Gierek regime may be no more successful than its predecessor in meeting the aspirations of the youth, it has acted on its commitment to bridge the generation gap by increasing the influence of ambitious and qualified members of the younger generation in policymaking and generally giving the youth a greater stake in the system. In doing so, it also hopes to eliminate the youth's remaining potential for revolutionary in contrast to evolutionary change. If the government succeeds in providing a tangible increase in living standards and maintains its rapport with the workers, the working class is unlikely to jeopardize its gains by new militancy. Moreover, the powerful Roman Catholic Church in Poland ceased in the late 1960's to fan the spirit of militant opposition to the regime. In 1968, for example, the church did not take a strong stand against the official anti-Semitic campaign, nor against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1970 it did not inject itself in any significant measure into the confrontation between the workers and the regime. With church-state relations progressing toward a probable formal accommodation since the advent of the Gierek regime, the church in Poland appears no longer to be a force inducing anti-Communist militancy among the people.

C. Population (C)

1. General trends

The characteristics of Poland's postwar population and its vital trends have been largely the result of wartime population and territorial losses and shifts, heavy postwar urbanization, and, since 1955, a steadily declining birth rate, at least initially encouraged by the government's policy of family

planning. These general trends are illustrated by the selected demographic indicators shown in Figure 6.

The impact of World War II on the Polish population was of exceptional magnitude, the total population decreasing by some 22% during the 1938-50 period. War-related deaths accounted for an estimated 12% of the prewar population of nearly 32 million. This figure may be compared with the 16% loss rate experienced by the U.S.S.R. and the 6% loss rate for Germany, the other countries which suffered most heavily.

Voluntary and forced postwar population shifts further reduced the population density. The Potsdam Conference of 1945, which placed some 40,000 square miles of former German territories under Polish administration and formalized Soviet annexation of some 70,000 square miles of former Polish lands in the east, also sanctioned the transfer to occupied Germany of the German minority from within the redrawn Polish boundaries. The arrival of the Soviet army in Poland in 1944, however, had already caused the flight of millions of Germans from areas east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. This movement continued until February 1946 when organized transfers began. The German population of the territories gained by Poland dropped from an estimated 11.9 million at the end of 1944 to 5.6 million in the summer of 1945, a net loss of over 6 million persons. Large numbers of these persons died in the last stages of the war, but probably more than 5 million had fled by the time Polish authorities assumed control in July 1945. An additional 500,000 had moved out before official transfers began. During the period of these transfers, from February 1946 to the end of 1949, an additional 2.3 million Germans left the territory of present-day Poland.

In contrast to these losses of population, agreements made in 1944 and 1945 between the Polish and Soviet governments resulted in an exchange of large numbers of persons which on balance added to Poland's population. Ethnic Poles and Jews in the U.S.S.R. who had been Polish citizens in September 1939 could opt for Polish citizenship and be transferred to Poland, while ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, White Russians, and Lithuanians living within the new Polish boundaries could opt for Soviet citizenship and be transferred to the U.S.S.R. Some 518,000 of the latter group chose to be repatriated to the Soviet Union, and 1,950,000 Poles returned to Poland by the end of 1947. The number of returnees to Poland included about 170,000 Jews, most of whom subsequently emigrated to Israel. In addition, some 1.5 million persons were repatriated to Poland from other European countries,



* *Census years; other data are based on official Polish demographic estimates. (Census of 1946 was of a "summary" nature and is not considered definitive.)*

FIGURE 6. Selected population indicators, 1938 and 1945–70 (U/OU)

mostly ethnic Poles from Germany where they had performed forced labor during the war. These small additions to Poland's population were far outweighed by the cumulative losses, and despite the postwar net loss of about 20% of the country's territory compared with the prewar period, it was only in 1967 that Poland's population reached the approximate total of persons residing in the same area in 1939.

Present trends indicate that despite the initial postwar population boom, Poland's population will not reach the prewar total before 1975. The relatively rapid decline in the initial postwar growth rate was further confirmed by the results of the official census of 8 December 1970, which showed that since the first postwar "count" in 1946, the country's population had increased by 8,659,000 persons. Most of this growth (4,768,000 or 19.1%), however, occurred during the 1950-60 decade, with only a 2,813,000 or 9.4% increase during the decade that followed.

2. Density and distribution

In January 1973 the population of the country was estimated at 33,146,000, and its territory comprised about 120,600 square miles—approximately the size of New Mexico with a population somewhat larger than that of California and Texas combined. Excluding the U.S.S.R., Poland ranks sixth among European countries in population (after West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Spain), as well as in area (after France, Spain, Sweden, Finland, and Norway). It is second only to the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe.

Poland's overall population density, about 275 inhabitants per square mile at the beginning of 1973, is near the European average; nevertheless, it is considerably lower than such densely populated regions of Western Europe as the Lowlands, and much higher than the Scandinavian average. In Eastern Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R., Poland's population density is exceeded by that of East Germany (406), Czechoslovakia (294), and Hungary (287). Poland's relative standing in this respect compared to selected countries in 1970 is shown in Figure 7.

Heavy postwar internal migration has been the result of the government's vigorous policy of resettling the former German territories, generally with repatriates from the Soviet Union, and by a simultaneous policy of urbanization, which caused a general movement of population from the countryside into existing urban centers or newly created cities. According to official Polish data, the former German territories in the west (excluding former East Prussia) had a prewar population of about 7.2 million Germans



FIGURE 7. Population and population density, Poland and selected countries, 1970 (U/OU)

and 1.5 million Poles. According to the official claims, nearly 9 million Poles resided in these areas by 1970 including about 5 million persons who were born there. The population density of these territories in 1970, therefore, somewhat exceeded immediate prewar years. The sensitivity of the Polish Government throughout the postwar period to charges of underutilization of the former German lands indicates that the policy of encouraging population growth in these areas will continue.

Although the population density in rural areas exceeds the European average by about one-third, the static nature of the rural population compared with the consistently rising urban increments is widening the gap between urban and rural density patterns. The general population density patterns follow the pattern of urbanization and industrialization and reflect the lingering effects of postwar population shifts from former German territories in the north and west. A belt of low population density thus stretches across the entire northern third of the country, generally comprising less productive agricultural land (Figure 8). The province of Koszalin, for example, has a population density as low as that of Turkey. By contrast, concentrations of population are highest



FIGURE 8. Population density (U/OU)

along the southern border, an area which contains the industrial complex of the Upper Silesian coalfields and the country's most productive agricultural land, where population density exceeds that of the Netherlands, Europe's most densely populated country. Population density and urban and rural distribution by province is shown in Figure 9.

Both the Polish Government and the people have taken pride in the relatively rapid urbanization which has taken place since World War II. Compared to the slow increase in the proportion of the urban population between 1900 (19.6%) and 1946 (31.8%, adjusted to the country's prewar boundaries), postwar growth has been nearly double that rate; on 14 December 1966 it was officially announced that as of that date the urban population had reached exactly 50% of the population total. By December 1970 this figure had reached 52.2% of the total population. Although internal migration from rural to urban areas has decreased in terms of absolute numbers since 1962, the net urban increase continued to rise rapidly through 1970. Shifts in rural and urban population since 1952, shown in Figure 10, continue to reflect this strong trend toward urbanization. Notably, the increase in the total population between the 1960 and the 1970 censuses, or about 2.8 million persons, is almost exactly equal to the net urban increase over the same period.

Despite these achievements in urbanization, Poland in 1970 still ranked behind such Eastern European countries as East Germany (73.8%), Czechoslovakia (62.4%), and Bulgaria (53.0%), and the U.S.S.R. (56.3%). Moreover, Polish criteria for urban as against rural areas are imprecise or do not correspond to Western standards. In 1970, official data indicated 889 localities considered as urban areas. Of these 834 were classified as cities and towns, but 359 were under 5,000 in population and only 24 exceeded 100,000 in population. These 24 major urban centers accounted for 22.6% of the total population, and 43.2% of the total urban population.

FIGURE 9. Urban and rural population and density by administrative area, 8 December 1970* (U/OU)

	AREA	POPULATION	URBAN	RURAL	DENSITY	INDEX OF GROWTH
	Square miles	*Thousands*	*Percent*		*Per square mile*	*1960 = 100*
Provinces (Wojewodztwo):**						
Bialystok	8,916	1,173	*37.1*	*62.9*	131.6	107.6
Bydgoszcz	8,028	1,912	*50.6*	*49.4*	238.2	111.9
Gdansk	4,246	1,465	*69.5*	*30.5*	345.0	119.8
Katowice	3,667	3,691	*76.7*	*23.3*	1,006.5	112.7
Kielce	7,527	1,889	*32.5*	*67.5*	251.0	104.0
Koszalin	6,948	793	*49.5*	*50.5*	114.1	115.3
Krakow	5,905	2,181	*30.3*	*69.7*	369.3	109.6
Lodz	6,600	1,670	*35.7*	*64.3*	253.0	104.7
Lublin	9,572	1,922	*30.8*	*69.2*	200.8	106.7
Olsztyn	8,106	978	*41.0*	*59.0*	120.7	111.0
Opole	3,667	1,057	*42.6*	*57.4*	288.2	113.8
Poznan	10,306	2,190	*39.6*	*60.4*	212.5	109.9
Rzeszow	7,218	1,757	*27.5*	*72.5*	243.4	110.8
Szczecin	4,902	897	*66.6*	*33.4*	183.0	118.3
Warszawa	11,348	2,514	*35.5*	*64.5*	221.5	108.8
Wroclaw	7,256	1,973	*55.6*	*44.4*	271.9	109.3
Zielona Gora	5,597	882	*54.2*	*45.8*	157.6	112.8
Cities with provincial status:***						
Warsaw	173	1,308	*100.0*	...	7,560.7	114.8
Krakow	88	583	*100.0*	...	6,625.0	121.2
Lodz	81	762	*100.0*	...	9,407.4	107.2
Poznan	85	469	*100.0*	...	5,517.6	114.9
Wroclaw	85	523	*100.0*	...	6,152.9	121.2
Total or average	120,300	32,589	*52.2*	*47.8*	270.9	109.4

... Not pertinent.
*Date of 1970 census.
**Provinces bear the name of their respective capital cities.
***Data for cities with separate provincial status is not included in data for provinces bearing the same name.

FIGURE 10. Internal migration (U/OU)
(Thousands)

YEAR	TOTAL	PERSONS LEAVING*		PERSONS ARRIVING*		NET URBAN INCREASE
		City	Country-side	City	Country-side	
1952	1,386.2	620.6	765.6	753.6	632.6	133.0
1954	1,458.7	684.1	774.6	786.1	672.6	102.0
1956	1,444.2	648.1	796.1	694.0	750.2	45.9
1958	1,323.4	513.2	810.2	622.2	701.2	109.0
1960	1,256.2	517.6	738.6	592.4	663.8	74.8
1962	1,034.1	403.8	630.3	499.1	535.0	95.3
1964	932.9	348.2	584.7	462.6	470.3	114.4
1966	840.3	298.5	541.8	419.9	420.4	121.4
1968	861.5	302.9	558.6	437.2	424.3	134.3
1969	898.5	310.6	587.9	455.8	442.7	145.2
1970	881.9	307.9	574.0	469.4	412.5	161.5

*Includes movement between cities and within the countryside.

3. Immigration, emigration, and minorities

Available data on immigration and emigration of individual persons indicate a rapid rise in both categories in the immediate years after 1956, reflecting the simultaneous easing of Polish policy on exit visas and encouragement of repatriation from the West. Immigration to Poland rose from 8,500 in 1955 to a high of 95,300 in 1957, but had fallen to negligible proportions, some 800 persons, by 1970. Emigration, which increased from 2,300 in 1955 to a peak of 148,500 in 1957, fell to 10,300 in 1970. Official figures for this period, however, do not include almost 250,000 persons repatriated from the U.S.S.R. between 1957 and 1959 on the basis of the 1956 Polish-Soviet repatriation agreement. The Gomulka regime had pressed the Soviet Union for a new repatriation agreement, mindful that the U.S.S.R. had never fully honored the previous agreements of 1944 and 1945 under which the bulk of the persons under consideration should have been repatriated. Various political motives played a role in this Soviet failure, including the fact that many of the potential repatriates were Jews. Most of the Polish Jews repatriated under the provisions of the 1956 agreement subsequently emigrated to Israel. A majority of the non-Jewish Poles repatriated at the same time were resettled in the former German territories in the west and north of Poland.

Similarly, official emigration figures exclude the 10,000 to 15,000 Jews who have departed since 1967, as well as the estimated 30,000 ethnic Germans repatriated since the signature of the Polish-West German treaty in December 1970.

Despite the Polish regime's efforts to stimulate the return of expatriates, it continues to take pride in the contribution to other societies of ethnic Poles who emigrated in great numbers for economic and political reasons over the past two centuries. Official 1970 Polish figures, for example, list over 10 million Poles living abroad, including in this definition those of the first and second generation, as well as others reputedly claiming Polish as their mother tongue. The majority of Polish expatriates so defined, or about 6.5 million, reside in the United States. Other countries with sizable numbers of such persons include the U.S.S.R. with 1.2 million, France with 750,000, Brazil with 840,000, Canada with 324,000, West Germany and the United Kingdom with about 140,000 each, and Australia and Argentina with about 115,000 each.

A nationality agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union concluded in March 1965 theoretically opened the way for the repatriation of the majority of the 1.4 million Polish nationals who, according to the 1968 Polish data, resided in the U.S.S.R. in 1962. As of 1972 there was no reliable information concerning the number repatriated under this agreement. In the absence of corroborating evidence, it is doubtful that the difference between the Polish official figures published in 1968 (1.4 million) and those claimed to reflect 1970 data (1.2 million) is indicative of actual repatriation. Natural attrition, reclassification of such persons by both Soviet and Polish authorities, and statistical correction are the more probable reasons.

Wartime population losses and postwar territorial shifts transformed Poland from a prewar mosaic of ethnic minorities constituting nearly one-third of the total population into an ethnically homogeneous state. The size of the minority population of Poland is not accurately known, since Polish authorities ceased publishing this data in the early 1960's. According to available estimates, Poles constituted nearly 98.5% of the population in 1969, with the following distribution of the minority groups:

	Number	Percent
Ukrainians	180,000	0.6
White Russians	160,000	0.5
Germans	75,000	0.2
Great Russians	20,000	
Slovaks	20,000	
Gypsies	18,000	
Jews	12,000	0.2
Lithuanians	10,000	
Greeks	9,000	
Czechs	2,000	
Total	506,000	1.5

The slow decline in the ratio of the minority population to total population has been caused by natural attrition and assimilation, as well as by sporadic spurts of emigration. This pertains particularly to Jews and ethnic Germans. Prior to the Polish regime's politically motivated encouragement of Jewish emigration after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, there were an estimated 25,000 Jews in Poland. This figure, which had been relatively stable earlier in the postwar period, had diminished to about 8,000 to 10,000 by 1972. Because most of those remaining are elderly, the absolute number of Jews is not expected to decline further except by attrition. Most Polish Jews continue to reside in urban areas.

Prior to the 1969 bilateral moves that ultimately led to the negotiation and conclusion of the Bonn-Warsaw accord of 1970, the Polish government consistently held to the grossly understated figure of 3,000 for the German minority in Poland. Conversely, West German estimates of as many as 1.2 million were

exaggerated. This discrepancy reflects fundamental differences in the criteria used in the identification of Germans and Poles, particularly as this relates to persons of mixed nationality. At the time of the Polish occupation of the former German territories, Polish authorities reclassified some 1.3 million inhabitants as Autochthonous (literally "sprung-from-the-soil") Poles, who were thereby exempt from being transferred to Germany. This group of persons, considered German by German sources, consists mainly of bilingual people of Polish-German ancestry. About 80% of them live in Silesia, with the remainder in Gdansk province and in Olsztyn province (the major part of former East Prussia). Over 300,000 Germans and/or Autochthons are believed to have left Poland since about 1955 for both West and East Germany. Polish officials privately estimated that as many as 75,000 ethnic Germans were still residing in Poland in mid-1970. Nearly all of the 30,000 Germans repatriated by 1972 were probably from this category. The number of such Germans, together with persons of mixed ancestry in Poland in 1972 probably was under one million.

The 180,000 Ukrainians in Poland form the largest minority in the country and reside in 11 of the 17 territorial provinces of the country. Before the war, most Ukrainians within present Polish boundaries lived in Rzeszow province in the southeast, but because of forcible resettlement after 1947 into the former German territories, the Ukrainian minority still residing in Rzeszow province accounted for only an estimated 1% or 2% of the population in 1969. In Olsztyn and Koszalin provinces, however, they accounted for 5% to 7% of the population, with some isolated districts having a proportion as high as 25%. In contrast to the widely distributed Ukrainians, most of the 160,000 White Russian minority resides in Bialystok province in eastern Poland.

The remaining smaller minority groups are located chiefly along the periphery of the country: Slovaks in southern Krakow province, Lithuanians in northeastern Bialystok province, and Great Russians in Bialystok and Olsztyn provinces. Poland's Gypsy minority, residing mainly in the southern provinces, increased from about 17,000 in 1964 to 18,000 in 1967. During the same period, however, the percentage of nomadic Gypsies decreased from 50% to 4%, according to official Polish claims. Most of the Greek minority, constituting in the main refugees from the Greek civil conflict in the late 1940's, are settled in the former German territories in western Poland, while the small Czech minority is concentrated in the southern portions of Katowice and Opole provinces.

4. Vital trends

Despite heavy wartime losses among both sexes of all age groups, in the early postwar period Poland had one of the most rapidly growing populations in all Europe and was first among the countries of Eastern Europe (Figure 11). The postwar "baby boom" as well as the unusually heavy wartime losses of persons of childbearing age are illustrated by the fact that in 1970 the number of 20- to 24-year olds was more than 30% above those in the 25- to 29-year-old category (Figure 12). Between 1949 and 1955 the very high birth rate was accompanied by a marriage rate unsurpassed since the early 1920's, stimulated to some extent by settlement of the former German territories. An important factor in the overall population growth has been an almost steady decline in Poland's death rate from a high of 14.1 per 1,000 population in the immediate prewar period to a low of 7.3 in 1966. The slow increase since then, to 8.1 per 1,000 population in 1970, reflects the gradual, relative rise in the numbers of persons age 65 and over. Especially large reductions have been achieved in the infant mortality rate which, standing at 139 per 1,000 live births in 1938, was second only to Romania in Europe. Although this rate was reduced to a figure of 33.4 per 1,000 live births in 1970, it nevertheless remained among the highest in Europe. In Eastern Europe, Poland's infant mortality rate is exceeded only by Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary, in that order. Comparable rates in Western countries range from 20.8 in the United States, 18.8 in the United Kingdom, and 16.4 in France, to the world's lowest, 12.9 in Sweden.

The relatively rapid decline in Poland's birth rate since 1955 has been the most significant aspect of the country's vital trends (Figure 13). It reached its lowest recorded level of 16.2 per 1,000 population in 1968. Over the same period, 1955-68, Poland's rate of natural increase has shown an even more marked decline. In 1969 a somewhat increased birth rate of 16.3 per 1,000 population was outweighed by a higher death rate to produce the lowest rate of natural increase in the postwar period—8.2 per 1,000 population, or the same as that of the United States in that year.

Although Poland no longer ranks among the fastest growing countries in Europe, its rate of natural increase still exceeds that of most other countries in Eastern Europe. Poland's relative standing in this respect compared to selected countries in 1969 is shown in Figure 14.

The primary causes of the decline in the birth rate have been the slow but tangible improvements in the



FIGURE 11. Vital rates, Poland and five European Communist countries, 1950 to 1969 (U/OU)

levels of living, rapid urbanization with an attendant weakening of the Roman Catholic ethic among the urban population, an endemic housing shortage, and, since 1956, the government's policy of encouraging family planning through both the legalization of abortion and encouragement of contraceptive practices. Contributing factors also include the decreasing fertility coefficient of rural as well as urban women of childbearing age, the significant if apparently temporary decrease in the marriage rate during the 1956-65 decade, and a divorce rate which more than doubled between 1955 and 1970.



FIGURE 12. Age-sex distribution, Poland and the United States, December 1970 (U/OU)

Until 1963 the combined effects of wartime deaths and migrations and the trends in birth and death rates produced a population structure with a rising percentage of persons either under or over the working-age group of 15 to 64 years, i.e., a society with a slowly rising dependency ratio (Figure 13). In 1960 nearly 40% of the population fell in this category. Since 1963, however, the ratio of persons under 15 years of age has been decreasing and by 1990 is expected to constitute about one-fourth of the population in contrast to more than one-third in 1960. Although the number of persons over 65 years of age will continue to rise, reaching an expected 9.9% of the total population in 1990, the increasing percentage of persons within the working-age group will contribute to a slowly declining dependency ratio. By 1990, this ratio is expected to be the same as it was in 1950.

The median age of the Polish population has remained relatively low compared with other European countries, advancing only slightly, from 23.4 to 26.2 years between 1931 and 1950, and even more slowly, to the figure of 27.3 in 1970. According to the 1970 census, exactly one-half of the Polish population in that year had been born since 1943. Life expectancy at birth has slowly risen in conjunction with a declining infant mortality rate, and in 1968 registered 66.0 years for males and 73.8 years for females. Poland continues to have one of the lowest overall sex ratios of males to females in Europe, about 95 males per 100 females in 1970. This represents an

FIGURE 13. Vital statistics (U/OU)

	BIRTHS	DEATHS	NATURAL INCREASE	MARRIAGE	DIVORCE	INFANT MORTALITY*	TOTAL POPULATION
	Per 1,000 population						*Thousands*
1936–38 (prewar average)	25.3	14.1	11.2	8.2	*na*	139.0	**34,849
1955	29.1	9.6	19.5	9.5	0.49	82.2	27,550
1956	28.1	9.0	19.1	9.4	0.50	70.9	28,080
1957	27.6	9.5	18.1	9.1	0.55	77.2	28,540
1958	26.3	8.4	17.9	9.2	0.55	72.1	29,000
1959	24.7	8.6	16.1	9.5	0.53	71.4	29,480
1960	22.6	7.6	15.0	8.2	0.50	54.8	29,893
1961	20.9	7.6	13.3	7.9	0.56	53.2	30,133
1962	19.6	7.9	11.7	7.5	0.59	55.0	30,484
1963	19.2	7.5	11.7	7.2	0.64	48.5	30,940
1964	18.1	7.6	10.5	7.4	0.67	47.2	31,339
1965	17.4	7.4	10.0	8.4	*na*	41.5	31,551
1966	16.7	7.3	9.4	7.1	0.77	38.6	31,811
1967	16.3	7.8	8.5	7.5	0.85	37.9	32,163
1968	16.2	7.6	8.6	8.0	0.91	33.4	32,426
1969	16.3	8.1	8.2	8.3	1.01	34.4	32,671
1970	16.6	8.1	8.5	8.5	1.05	33.4	32,605

na Data not available.
*Per 1,000 live births.
**1938, within prewar boundaries.

improvement, however, from the postwar low of 88.4 males per 100 females in 1950, when male losses in the two world wars were most perceptible. Older age groups account for nearly all of the disproportion. While in the marriageable age group of 20 to 29 years the ratio is 103 males per 100 females, in the 40 to 44 age group the ratio declines to 94 men per 100 women and sharply thereafter to 53 males to 100 females at age 75 and over. The general sex ratio is expected to improve, however, to about 97 males per 100 females in 1990.

5. Population policy and projections

From the end of World War II until the mid-1950's, it was in the Polish regime's interest to accelerate the rapid natural growth rate in order to recoup wartime losses, populate newly gained territories, and provide the manpower needed for the planned extensive industrialization drive. During this period the government offered incentives in the form of special allowances for large families. This policy was particularly successful as it coincided with the sanctity-of-life concept of the dominant Roman Catholic religion in Poland. By about 1955, however, the government became aware of the economic need to slow down the natural growth and rising dependency ratio of the population because almost one-fifth of the industrial labor force was underemployed and constituted a major obstacle to planned increases of labor productivity. In addition, the concern of the regime over its ability to satisfy the material needs of future generations prompted the adoption of laws in late 1956 to legalize abortion on medical and economic grounds and the promotion of family planning. The 1956 laws, however, were subject to varying interpretations, the Catholic Church vigorously opposed them, and numerous doctors refused to observe them fully. For these reasons the number of abortions did not rise markedly until after 1960, when a modification of the laws made abortions more easily obtainable, church interference with this practice was specifically proscribed, and other measures to limit the size of families were instituted. The reported number of abortions reached a peak of almost 272,000 in 1962 but declined to about 220,000 in 1970. Since the birth rate has generally continued to decline throughout this period, it can be surmised that contraception, which has been promoted vigorously, has supplanted abortion as the principal device for implementing family planning.

The marked and often unforeseen impact of fluctuating economic, social, and other factors on vital trends has produced a wide range of continually revised projections for future population trends in Poland. In 1965, for example, Western sources projected a population of about 41.2 million by 1985, providing fertility, mortality, and other trends then pertaining were maintained. Four years later, changes



FIGURE 14. Vital rates, Poland and selected countries, 1969 (U/OU)

in these and other factors, however, resulted in a lowered projection from the same sources of 39.9 million by 1985, and a population of 42.1 million by 1990. By mid-1972, Western estimates were adjusted still further downward, and posited a population of only 37.3 million by 1985.

Polish demographic sources have long been even more markedly pessimistic. An official projection of October 1969 estimated that Poland's population would not reach the figure of 40 million until the year 2000. This study reportedly was based on the most favorable of three assumptions concerning operative vital factors. By contrast, the least favorable set of assumptions produced projections of 34 million by 1975, about 36 million in 1985, and no more than 38 million by the year 2000. These latter figures were predicated largely on the assumption of a considerable slowdown of the natural increase of the population, not exceeding about 133,000 annually in the last 10 to 15 years of this century. Assuming that the declining fertility of women, especially in rural areas, observed in the late 1960's will continue, Polish demographers indicate the possibility that by the first or second decade of the next century the rate of natural increase in Poland will be zero. The latest available projections by Polish demographers indicate a further adjustment, in which two assumptions concerning vital factors resulted in a projected population in the year 2000 of only 39.4 million and 38.6 million respectively. These projections reportedly will be subject to further change as a result of detailed study of the 1970 census data.

There was no indication, however, that these projections might impel the Polish Government to revise its population policies, although a decline in publicity for family planning has been noted. The government apparently feels that, in the short run, measures to encourage larger families are unwarranted. Some Polish authorities argue that the natural trend toward smaller families in industrializing societies is often reversed when a specific level of material affluence has been reached.

D. Societal aspects of labor (C)

1. The industrializing society

In post-World War II Poland, as in other rapidly industrializing societies, the social—and by derivation, economic and political—impact of changing occupational trends has been marked, and has presented the Communist rulers with a constant challenge to the theoretical underpinning of their system. The regime's drive during the postwar period to mold a large class of skilled industrial workers conscious of its role in society has, perhaps, been only too successful. In December 1970, this class—favored in theory but ignored in practice—ousted an inept and top-heavy regime and, though within the context of the Communist system, opted for efficiency, consumer welfare, and a role for itself in national life.

The process of growth that transformed a predominantly conservative peasant society ruled by a thin crust of various elites—the military, clergy, aristocracy—into a postwar society predominantly nonagricultural—but still ruled by a similarly

FIGURE 15. Selected age-sex characteristics of the population (U/OU)

	DISTRIBUTION BY AGE GROUPS							
	All ages	0–14	15–39	40–64	65 and over	MEDIAN AGE	MALES PER 100 FEMALES	DEPENDENCY RATIO*
	Percent					Years		
1950	100.0	29.7	39.2	25.6	5.4	26.2	88.4	542
1960	100.0	33.8	35.8	24.4	5.9	26.9	93.7	660
1970	100.0	28.0	38.4	25.8	7.8	27.5	94.5	555
1990	100.0	25.2	37.8	27.0	9.9	32.4	97.0	542

NOTE—Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.
*Number of persons under age 15 and those age 65 and over, per 1,000 persons of ages 15 through 64.

unrepresentative, ideological elite, has been gradual. Although in 1970 agriculture was still the single largest occupation in Poland, the chief characteristic of the postwar period has been the continued decrease in the proportion of the total population dependent on agriculture as a means of livelihood (Figure 16). Whereas at the beginning of this century about four-fifths of the population depended for its livelihood on the land, this proportion fell to about two-thirds when Poland reemerged as an independent state in 1918, and to about one-half at the end of World War II. By 1970 this accelerating trend resulted in a population about 70% of which was drawing its livelihood from nonagricultural pursuits.

This major shift in occupational orientation has gone hand-in-hand with urbanization, industrialization, rapid and forcible changes in social patterns, and a politicization of virtually all aspects of national life. These developments have not only molded the social role and characteristics of Polish labor in the postwar period, but have also been influenced in return.



FIGURE 16. Total population by source of livelihood, selected years 1921–70 (U/OU)

Poland's actual labor force in the postwar period has been characterized by a markedly high participation rate—about half of the total population and about four-fifths of the population within the working age of 15 to 64 years. The postwar growth in the labor force, however, has been due primarily to demographic changes rather than to changes in the pattern of labor force participation. The growth was much more rapid in the 1960-70 decade than before and closely paralleled the increase in the number of persons of working age.

In contrast to Western usage, Polish criteria for working age are 18 to 64 years for men and 18 to 59 years for women. Although these criteria have been in use throughout the postwar period, they have become particularly useful to the Polish regime in statistically minimizing the growing problem of providing new jobs for large increments to the working-age population in the Western sense (i.e., 15-64 years) since the mid-1960's. This working-age population rose by almost 15% between 1960 and 1970 and will continue to grow rapidly as the members of the postwar "baby boom" enter the labor field. Providing employment, vocational training, and additional academic opportunities as ways of easing a labor surplus have been high on the list of commitments by the Gierek regime since 1970. Changes in the relative proportions of working to non-working age population since 1950 is shown in Figure 17.

The relatively rapid growth of the labor force as a whole—almost exclusively in the nonagricultural sector and coupled to a decline in agricultural employment—has resulted in little change in the proportion of women in the labor force despite a higher female participation rate. The activity rate for males has been about average for a European country, but the female rate has been substantially higher and



FIGURE 17. Shifts in working-age population, 1950, 1960, and 1970 (U/OU)



*Socialized agriculture employs only about 10% to 20% of the agricultural labor force.

FIGURE 18. Female employment in socialized sector, 1950 and 1970 (U/CU)

results chiefly from the classification of most rural housewives as economically active. Labor force participation rates for Polish women are much lower in the cities than in the countryside, since fewer married women with families find it possible to take jobs outside the home. A significant increase in the number of urban women in the labor force would require government attention to their general lack of skills and adequate training; to the relatively slow growth of the branches where women most easily find employment (handicrafts, services, trade); to the limited availability of part-time work; and to overburdened child-care centers.

Most women continue to find employment in those occupations that have traditionally had a high proportion of females, despite the official government policy of nondiscrimination by sex and marked postwar changes in traditional, conservative social attitudes toward female employment in the professions and in industry. The slow but steady increase in female employment among different occupations is shown in Figure 18.

As in other Communist societies, unemployment in Poland has been either denied or underestimated for most of the postwar period. Indeed, during the initial postwar period, it did not appear to be a major problem. The relative importance of agriculture and construction resulted in a substantial degree of seasonal unemployment, and frictional unemployment was also fairly high because of the Polish worker's tendency to change jobs frequently; the long-term unemployed were much less numerous. Employment problems are increasingly acknowledged in the press, however, for Polish manpower planners have been plagued since about 1963 by the problem of creating sufficient jobs for youths entering the labor market.

Official data on unemployment include jobseekers who have registered at government employment offices. Polish estimates suggest, however, that actual unemployment is about five times as great as registered unemployment, for many jobseekers fail to register. Most registrants, many of them women, have limited industrial skills. The ratio of youths under 18 to total registrants is low and has declined since 1965 despite the influx of young persons into the labor market. Even the official data reflect a situation that worsened markedly in the late 1960's and contributed to the labor unrest that culminated in the 1970 explosion of discontent. Official unemployment data for 1960 and 1965-70 are shown in Figure 19.

Some farming areas and virtually all industrial sectors suffer from excess employment. The formerly chronic problem of rural overpopulation is less acute as the result of the postwar territorial settlement and the steady rural-urban population trend. In the eastern provinces, however, the population on the land is considerably in excess of actual labor requirements, and nonagricultural job opportunities are relatively scarce.

Polish occupational patterns differ from those of most other East European countries in that a substantial portion of the employed work in the private sector of the economy. Moreover, the bulk of this employment is in agriculture, which still constitutes the single largest branch of economic activity. The relative size of the private sector is declining, however, in favor of the nonagricultural,

FIGURE 19. Registered unemployment, selected years (U/OU)

YEAR	REGISTERED UNEMPLOYED						AVAILABLE JOBS	
	Total	Blue collar		White collar	Under 18	Women	Total	For women
		Skilled	Unskilled					
1960.....	67,309	4,396	26,070	4,294	2,606	29,943	46,452	6,751
1965.....	116,459	7,318	43,608	6,006	5,062	54,465	52,925	12,131
1966.....	109,817	6,932	41,283	5,936	3,505	52,161	64,229	13,626
1967.....	99,406	6,185	36,533	6,799	2,453	47,436	58,169	11,864
1968.....	102,355	6,311	35,260	8,841	2,687	49,256	76,664	15,852
1969.....	135,454	10,138	42,176	16,157	2,647	64,336	33,618	8,867
1970.....	150,698	12,770	49,798	14,588	2,207	71,335	39,492	8,539

predominantly socialized sector of the economy. This downward trend is expected to continue, chiefly because of the rapid expansion of the nonagricultural branches, which offer relatively few opportunities for private employment, and because of the gradual decline in private agricultural employment resulting from the death and retirement of older farmers and the exodus of rural youth.

In the postwar period, Poland has made considerable progress in transforming a predominantly agricultural economy into one with a diversified industrial base. A substantial and continuing decline in the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture has resulted, but the absolute decrease in agricultural employment since 1950 has been moderate. It results chiefly from labor recruitment for industrial and construction projects during the early 1950's, and, more recently, from the attractions of urban employment and urban life. There has been no large-scale flight from the countryside such as accompanied the intensive collectivization drives launched in other Eastern European countries, because collectivization never assumed major proportions in Poland. Polish agriculture is characterized by a predominance of small, privately owned farms producing a wide variety of crops. Large, mechanized farms in the socialist sector, i.e., state and collective farms, occupy only about 15% of the land under cultivation. Since the mid-1960's the government, by strengthening educational and monetary incentives, has sought to stem the migration of rural youth to cities and does not foresee before 1975 a decline much below the 1968 level of about 6.2 million engaged in agriculture.

Most of those who have left agriculture have been in the younger age groups, and this is reflected in the aging of the agricultural labor force. The increasing proportion of females in agriculture reflects the tendency of men on small farms to take up nonagricultural jobs, leaving women to maintain the family holding. These trends, together with the emergence of the "worker-peasant" who combines part-time agricultural activities with full-time industrial employment, have had an adverse effect on the quality of the agricultural labor force.

Employment in the nonagricultural branches of the economy nearly doubled between 1950 and 1970, standing at nearly 11 million in the latter year. Indeed, throughout the postwar period the nonagricultural branches have absorbed nearly all of the annual increment to the labor force, in addition to providing employment for those released from agriculture. The socialist sector, which accounts for approximately 97% of nonagricultural employment, sets the main employment trends outside agriculture. Within the socialist sector, the relative composition of nonagricultural employment has changed little since 1950. Industry (manufacturing, mining, and power production) employs the largest number. Services follow, then construction, transportation, and communications and trade.

The private sector accounts for about 3% of total nonagricultural employment, and is relatively most important in industrial handicrafts and in services. Private shops are numerous in such service activities as cleaning and dyeing, photography, and hairdressing. The remainder of those in the private sector work mostly in the building trades.

Private handicraft activity is much diminished compared with prewar Poland. The destruction of the Jewish population during the war and the suppression of the private sector in the early 1950's reduced handicraft employment drastically. Critical shortages of services and supplies developed, especially in the rural areas, and the government moved to encourage craft activities. Employment rose significantly until 1958, but then stagnated until 1964, when the government again moved to encourage private crafts.

In an effort to absorb the anticipated high annual increment to the labor force, the authorities reduced taxes on private establishments and provided favorable loans for craftsmen. Since 1970 the Gierek regime's commitment to consumer welfare, as well as the need to absorb large new increments into the labor force, has resulted in an expansion of such sectors as services, and the growth of private or semi-private (state franchise) enterprises—most noticeably in catering and automobile service stations.

Because a large proportion of the Polish nonagricultural labor force, particularly in industry, was recruited in the countryside, types and degrees of skills are generally below the standards of an industrialized Western country. To meet its needs for skilled labor, the government has appropriated sizable funds for general and vocational education.

The educational qualifications of workers in the socialist sector have improved considerably since 1958 (Figure 20). The proportion of the work force with secondary school or university degrees in 1968 was highest in education (18%), public administration (18%), and health and welfare (13%). Among workers in agriculture and forestry, over 30% had not completed primary school. Approximately 49% of the workers in industry had finished at least 7 years of primary education and 26% had received additional vocational training, while less than 8% were graduates of academic high schools or universities. This is characteristic of Poland's urban labor force, for the 8-year compulsory schooling law is strictly enforced in the cities and vocational training accounts for much of the worker's background.



FIGURE 20. Educational level of employees in the socialist sector of the economy (U/OU)

The geographical distribution of the nonagricultural labor force is uneven. The highly urbanized Silesian basin, and especially the province of Katowice, constitutes the industrial heartland of the country. With barely 3% of the total land area, Katowice accounts for approximately 16% of the nonagricultural labor force and 21% of the industrial labor force. Other high concentrations of nonagricultural employment surround the cities of Warsaw, Lodz, Wroclaw (formerly Breslau), Krakow, Poznan, and increasingly the shipping and shipbuilding centers along the Baltic coast—Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin (formerly Stettin). Lowest concentrations are found in the predominantly agricultural provinces bordering the U.S.S.R—Bialystok, Lublin, and Rzeszow.

2. Labor as catalyst to change

When party leader Edward Gierek took over the leadership of the country from his predecessor, Wladyslaw Gomulka, on 20 December 1970, it was after a week of the gravest political crisis in the history of postwar Poland. Although the workers' demonstrations and riots which toppled Gomulka were ignited by the folly of the former regime in raising the prices of food and other staples by some 15% to 20% just before the Christmas season, the workers were further embittered by the prevailing view that once again they were to bear the brunt of the economic and social inequities inherited from the past. The new leadership subsequently acknowledged in assessing the December events that

> the protests took such violent form as a result of social discontent which had been accumulating for a long time; it was caused by many factors, and particularly by the worsening economic situation of the country, serious neglect in social policy, the stagnation of real wages, shortages of supplies, and the rising cost of living. . . . The December events have shown that any disruption of the bond between the party and the working class . . . can cause a serious political upheaval in our country.

Despite the Gierek regime's correct insight into and understanding of the causes of the December 1970 explosion, the initial months of his rule were spent in putting out the fires of discontent and taking stopgap measures to alleviate the most evident worker grievances. By early 1973 the leadership had taken many new steps to catalogue the errors of the past and to institute new policies earning the respect of the working class as well as of society as a whole, but the

social, economic, and particularly labor situation is still in a state of change.

Fundamentally, however, the changes initiated by Gierek are a reaction to the situation that he inherited from Gomulka, and understanding of the present position of labor must be based on an examination of the situation in which the average Polish worker found himself on the eve of the December 1970 events.

a. The anatomy of mismanagement

In the late 1960's some of Poland's endemic economic problems became more acute. In agriculture conservatism continued to be at cross purposes with efficiency, even though the drift of the population to the cities during the postwar period, combined with rising agricultural investment, had raised agricultural productivity above the prewar level. By 1970, however, several bad harvests had combined to produce a serious shortage of major food items—including meat, which in Poland is considered a staple.

The nonagricultural sector fared even worse. Disorganized by sporadic reforms and conflicting directives, industry was unable to adapt its output to changing patterns of industrial and consumer demand. Uneconomic utilization of manpower was reflected in overstaffing and the assignment of workers to jobs for which they were over- or underqualified. In the economy as a whole this took the form of simultaneous shortages and surpluses. Labor redundancy on the enterprise level was virtually built into the system, for fulfillment of production goals was encouraged even at the cost of exceeding the wage fund or the employment plan. Moreover, favoritism in hiring was rampant. Industry's problems were further intensified by the generally inadequate skill levels of the labor force, and the lack of labor discipline. The movement of the population to urban areas required farm workers to transfer to nonagricultural occupations, where they were inexperienced and unskilled, and many found it difficult to adapt to the demands for reliability, punctuality, and diligence necessary to an industrial production schedule.

Despite major improvements, working conditions were poor in many branches of industry, and industrial health and safety precautions compared unfavorably with those in Western countries. Excessive heat, noise and vibration, poor sanitation and lighting, and inadequate ventilation ranked among the most frequently criticized safety problems in Polish industry. Little advance was made in these basic areas of worker comfort and protection, despite a fourfold increase between 1955 and 1970 in expenditures to promote labor safety. There had been a gradual reduction of the workweek since 1968 to 46 hours (8 hours on weekdays and 6 hours on Saturdays) for most workers. But many workers—especially those in industries, such as shipbuilding, where delivery deadlines have a profound effect on the pace of work, habitually worked overtime at complex wage rates more often geared to output than to hours worked.

Moreover, complex and often arbitrary wage rates became a focus of labor dissatisfaction. In assessing the economic background of the events of December 1970, the Gierek leadership in February 1971 admitted that:

> **during the years 1966-70, Poland had the lowest rate of increase in real wages of all the countries of CEMA (Council for Economic Mutual Assistance) . . . There were some groups of workers which actually suffered a decline in their real wages.**

Indeed, although marked improvement took place after 1956, the low income level in Poland remained a source of intense dissatisfaction. A small group of public figures—leading government and party officials, prominent scholars, scientists, artists, composers, and others—received generous salaries and valuable fringe benefits. For the average worker, however, income was low relative to prices, and the purchase of a suit or a radio set required careful budgeting. Most families found it difficult to make ends meet on a single salary, and urban wives frequently worked out of economic necessity. Family income was supplemented in other ways: by moonlighting, renting rooms, or raising fruits and vegetables at home, and sometimes illegally, by operating a nonlicensed repair shop, engaging in currency speculation, or selling blackmarket goods.

The minimum wage in 1970 stood fixed by law at 850 zlotys a month, although admittedly this legal minimum had little effect on prevailing wage rates and the average worker earned much more. Wage scales favored workers employed in mining, construction, or heavy industry. Polish coal miners have been traditionally well paid. Since 1960 their earnings have been at least 50% higher than the average industrial wage, and in 1970 average monthly wages in coal mining were about 4,281 zlotys, compared with 2,515 zlotys for industry as a whole. Workers in metallurgy, too, by common practice are paid more than most other industrial workers, earning 3,200 zlotys monthly in 1970. Average monthly wages in construction were 2,986 zlotys and somewhat less in machine building, metalworking, chemicals, and other heavy industry branches. Wages in light industry ranged from an average 2,000 zlotys monthly (textiles)

to 2,300 zlotys (printing) in 1970. As is true in most industrialized countries, textiles and apparel were near the bottom of the industrial wage scale. Unskilled workers, many of them women, predominate in these branches, thus lowering the average wage level.

In other nonagricultural branches, average monthly wages in 1970 were highest in transportation and communications and lowest in health and in trade, as shown below (in zlotys):

Transportation and communications	2,479
Public administration and justice	2,423
Finance and insurance	2,395
Municipal services and housing	2,342
Education, culture, and art	2,167
Trade	2,094
Public health and welfare	1,841

In the 1960's, data on industrial wages by occupational grouping revealed the favored position of engineering-technical personnel, and showed a perceptible improvement in the earnings of administrative-clerical personnel. In 1970 the average monthly wages of engineering-technical personnel in industry were 3,847 zlotys, compared with 2,552 zlotys for administrative-clerical personnel and 2,515 zlotys for blue-collar workers. The indexes of earnings of each group, with those of blue-collar workers as the base, are shown below:

	1955	1960	1970
Blue-collar workers	100.0	100.0	100.0
Engineering-technical personnel	156.5	159.5	153.0
Administrative-clerical personnel	98.9	103.8	101.4

The slight decline in this favored position during the last 2 years of the decade reflected a policy of gradual leveling of earnings, as well as more than proportionate increases in blue-collar wages. This is a trend to which the new Gierek regime is even more forcefully committed.

Money wages rose steadily after World War II, but real wages rose much more slowly. Money wages and real wages moved in opposite directions in 1952-53 and again in 1960 (Figure 21), as sharply rising prices outstripped the average increase in pay. In 1965, a modest pay increase was wiped out entirely by higher prices, and real wages failed to rise. The annual rate of increase in both money and real wages fluctuated erratically during the 1950's, and until 1958 was frequently very high. Since 1960 both rates have tended to stabilize at a much lower level. Money wages rose at an average annual rate of 3.7% in 1960-70, and real wages at a rate of 1.8%.

The ill-timed price rises of 13 December 1970 were, in fact, part of a series of economically defensible



FIGURE 21. Index of money wages and real wages in the socialist sector of the economy (U/OU)

attempts by the Gomulka regime to initiate economic reform and to tackle the country's deep-seated malaise. Indeed, since taking power, the Gierek regime has not totally repudiated the general basis of Gomulka's reform program, but it is changing the scope, thrust, and emphasis of the reform and, above all, is seeking to avoid the errors of its predecessor: that of extreme insensitivity to the social and political context within which reforms must be implemented.

This insensitivity was illustrated by the events of late 1970. Although in May 1970 the party had approved a new system of material incentives based on the principle that workers' earnings should reflect the economic performance of individual enterprises, Gomulka had postponed any wage increases until mid-1972 because of the unexpected food shortages and the perennial shortage of other consumer goods. To the workers, especially those in the shipyards, the new system clearly seemed to be the same as a 2-year wage freeze. When this explosive mixture of popular discontent was ignited by the December 1970 price increases, Gomulka looked on the revolt as a counterrevolution which should be suppressed by force. However, a coalition of certain members of Gomulka's own leadership, a portion of the party apparatus, and the army hierarchy opposed this

response and acted to remove Gomulka from office. Gierek immediately repudiated Gomulka's thesis of a "counterrevolution," called the events a justified protest movement of the working class, and undertook to placate the rebellious workers with immediate material concessions and the promise of changes in the economic and social policies pursued by his predecessor.

b. Labor and the new managers

The first step taken by the new government was to freeze retail prices for 2 years, to "suspend" the controversial wage freeze, and to lift all employment restrictions. A week later the government announced a combination of measures designed to compensate low-paid workers and low-income families for the December increase in the cost of living. The statutory minimum wage was increased from 850 zlotys to 1,000 zlotys a month, and workers earning less than 2,000 zlotys were to receive raises ranging from 30 to 80 zlotys a month, retroactive to 1 December 1970. Family allowances were raised for families having two or more children and a net per capita income not exceeding 1,000 zlotys a month. Minimum pensions and disability payments were raised by 60 zlotys a month. According to the official announcement, the wage and pension increases affected 5.2 million people, and the increased family allowances benefited 4.7 million children.

The essential defect of these initial measures was that they offered nothing to skilled industrial workers who already had a job and earned more than 2,000 zlotys a month. (By February 1971 the average monthly wage of industrial workers was 2,537 zlotys. Most important perhaps, the shipyard workers who sparked the riots earned between 2,800 and 3,400 zlotys.) Although the promised 2-year price freeze and possible future wage increases would ultimately benefit them, the workers sought immediate relief from the December 1970 increase in their cost of living. As a result, the industrial workers continued to press for either across-the-board wage increases or rescission of the December price increases, and a new wave of protest strikes swept across Poland. A 3-day general strike occurred in Szczecin on 22-24 January 1971, and on 12 February a general strike was launched in Lodz, a major textile center. The government responded with pleas for restraint and cooperation and with promises to improve the working people's standard of living. These promises, however, failed to budge the workers and the regime was forced to yield. On 15 February it was announced that Soviet credit obtained "during the last few days" permitted a total nullification of the December 1970 price increases.

The simultaneous announcement of the price rollback and of the Soviet credit which had made it possible occurred while the Lodz strike was still underway, and there are reasons for believing that the firm stand of the Lodz workers may have had a decisive influence on the decisions reached in both Warsaw and Moscow. Lodz has occupied a special place in the fighting tradition of the working-class movement not only in Poland but in Russia (to which Lodz belonged until 1918). A general strike in Lodz (bloodily suppressed by Tsarist troops) was a highlight of the 1905 Russian revolution.

The concessions that the Gierek regime made to labor were not only expedient steps to quell popular discontent, but were also symptomatic of the new leadership's determination to develop a pattern of social and economic development based on a new relationship of trust between the working class and the government. The new socioeconomic philosophy rested on the precept that development of the national economy and the material welfare of the people are not mutually exclusive, and that one rests upon the other. In the words of a ranking member of the new party leadership in November 1971:

> **. . . increased consumption is an important and necessary factor in the process of economic growth, a factor which stimulates production and technological progress, improves organization, and results in greater labor productivity.**

This pragmatic, consumer-oriented approach reflected the long-held personal convictions of the new party leader, Edward Gierek, whose concern for the material well-being of workers as a stimulant to economic performance was well-known. Following his early years as a miner and a trade union organizer in the Communist movement in France and Belgium, Gierek's outlook was further developed during his efficient stewardship from 1957 to 1970 as party chief of Katowice, Poland's key industrial province, where he demonstrated his belief that a just reward for good work and close touch with the needs of labor generates a self-sustaining cycle of economic development. In December 1970, the fortuitous circumstances that brought Gierek into power also made his deeply held socioeconomic views acceptable both to the Polish and Soviet parties.

The long-range improvements that the Gierek regime sought in its relations with labor began with a revision of the 1971-75 economic plan in the light of new priorities. The revised plan, presented in mid-1971, called for a 38% increase in personal consumption over the plan period, and a rise of 18% in real wages, i.e., an average annual growth of 3.4%—twice the rate of the 1961-70 decade. Housing construction targets were increased by 25%. Finally, the regime pledged itself to find 1.8 million new jobs in the 1971-75 period. This figure represents the net increase in the number of jobs necessary to absorb the total contingent of some 3.5 million workers entering the labor market during this period.

In addition, the regime is committed to create more jobs for women and youth, and to take full advantage of the qualifications of workers already on the job. It has also undertaken a gradual but thorough revision of the wage and salary system basically designed to make take-home pay less dependent on bonuses. Proposals put forward also call for a reduction of wage disproportions among different classes of workers but without eliminating monetary incentives; indeed, individual wage scales would be correlated with productivity, quality of work, responsibility, qualifications, and seniority.

The peasantry, who would have to provide the food that the new regime had promised the workers, was not neglected. The new deal for Poland's private farmers was announced in mid-April 1971 in the form of an eight-point agricultural program. The main features of this new agrarian policy included: abolition, as of January 1972, of all compulsory deliveries; improved procedures and increased prices for the purchase of agricultural products by the state; the grant of property titles to "more than a million private farmers"; changes in existing land taxes to compensate the state for the end of compulsory deliveries, but also to facilitate expansion of private holdings by purchase of state land; and introduction of a comprehensive free health service for private farmers and their families. These measures gave the individual peasants a sense of security, economic respectability, and social usefulness that had not existed under Gomulka. In addressing the concrete issue of increasing the output of food, the new leadership had in effect futher consolidated private ownership in the countryside, and thus had exhibited a willingness to subordinate idcological to pragmatic considerations.

The favorable response of the peasantry to these measures, in addition to heavy imports of food, permitted the regime to improve living standards. There were no persistent shortages of food or consumer goods in 1971, although sporadic nonavailability of certain items in selected parts of the country—blamed on distribution shortcomings—continued to cause local irritation.

More important in many ways than these tangible changes, however, is the regime's measured success in convincing labor, especially young workers, that communication between the people at the working level and the country's rulers has been restored and that they will continue to have a voice and a stake in national development. While most of the former institutional forms have been retained, Gierek's moves to streamline and energize the bureaucracy when possible, and sidestep it when not, appear to have convinced the majority of the initially skeptical and militant workers to participate in the "process of national renovation" that is the motto of the Gierek regime.

3. Trade unions and labor relations

In a major sense, labor relations and their institutional basis have been the most important and most sensitive aspects of the domestic policies of the Gierek regime since its assumption of power after the workers' revolt in December 1970. As a result of its success in overthrowing the former Gomulka regime, labor has remained acutely aware of its political clout. Gierek's conciliatory moves in raising wages, improving living standards, and promising a greater role for labor in shaping economic and social policy reflect the new government's awareness of its dependence on the good will of the working class.

Yet, the new regime has evidently no intention of meeting the demands for independent trade unions that were voiced by the striking workers in December 1970, and organizationally there has been virtually no change in the trade union structure since then. In 1970 there were 23 trade unions organized according to sector of economic activity, all under the central direction of a parent organization, the Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ). Regionally, the CRZZ supervises the work of the individual trade unions by administrative division down to the district (county) level, as well as the activities of trade councils or cells in all major enterprises and places of employment. Total trade union membership in December 1970 was 10,101,700 members. Manual workers represented about 43% and women about 40% of the total. The following tabulation lists Polish

trade unions by size of membership, in thousands, in 1968:

Trade Union	Number of Members
Trade and Cooperative Workers	983
Engineering Industry Workers	935
Construction and Construction Materials Industry Workers	782
Miners	667
Agricultural Workers (socialized sector only)	663
Textile, Clothing, and Leather Industry Workers	640
Communal Economy and Local Industry Workers	604
Cooperative Handicraft Workers	597
Teachers	573
Railway Workers	528
Health Service Workers	458
Chemical Industry Workers	430
State and Social Administration Workers	383
Food Processing and Sugar Industry Workers	356
Foundry Workers	320
Road and Transport Workers	274
Forestry and Wood Industry Workers	263
Communications Workers	208
Power Industry Workers	151
Mariners and Longshoremen	127
Culture and Art Workers	76
Typographical Industry Workers	54
Publishing, Press, and Radio Workers	33

The Communist regime has always regarded the determination of labor policy, including the allocation of manpower resources, as falling legitimately within the purview of state economic planning, although the implementation of central planning in the field of labor has been more inconsistent in Poland than in some other Communist countries. After 1956, for example, the forced and centrally directed allocation of labor along geographical and industrial lines of the Stalinist period was replaced by a flexible system permitting individual enterprises to do their own hiring; this has, in fact, resulted in persistent competition for skilled labor. Overall manpower planning is supervised by the State Planning Commission, with implementation devolving upon the various levels of local government in cooperation with specific enterprises and under the coordination of the Ministry of Labor, Wages and Social Affairs. In addition to being assigned the task of implementing government policies in the areas of productivity, wages, norms, and working conditions, the trade unions have been given increasing responsibility for the administration of social security programs and, together with the public health service, wholly administer and supervise a system of recuperational institutions as well as workers' recreational activities.

In December 1970, much of the workers' ire was directed at the trade union apparatus which, like other facets of the former regime's bureaucracy, had become authoritarian, inflexible, unresponsive to the popular will, and unrepresentative of its membership. These deficiencies were rooted in the basic concept of trade unions under communism. Claiming an identity of interests between the workers and the state, the government acted as final arbiter in all those fields of labor relations and legislation traditionally within the purview of the trade unions and management: hiring practices, wage scales, working conditions, and labor disputes. Polish trade unions, which during the interwar period had a record of effective internal democracy and promotion of the workers' interests, were thus transformed into instruments of state control over the labor force, implementing but not forming policy in the labor field.

With both management and the trade unions being, in effect, component parts of the state machinery for the utilization and exploitation of labor, workers in postwar Poland have made little use of the formal trade union apparatus for raising and remedying their grievances. This apparatus, which consists of regional and basic or enterprise arbitration commissions, equally divided in membership between trade union and management representatives, deals with individual or group grievances concerning such matters as unjust dismissals and wage scales. To bring a grievance before the arbitration commission, however, the individual worker is in practice dependent on the influence and good will of intermediate level supervisors for whom he has little respect; foremen and even shift managers have little real authority outside their immediate production responsibility and tend to be wary of bringing their shop to the potentially adverse attention of the trade union functionaries and management. Skilled workers and workers with good production records, therefore, usually register their complaints directly with the plant manager and generally tend to be spokesmen for the unskilled and below-average producers. In view of the passivity and even obstructionism of the trade union apparatus in dealing with workers' interests, Polish workers have tended to make increasing use of the regular court system, or to organize informally outside the framework of the trade union apparatus and, leapfrogging over its local organs, deal directly with higher echelons of the party machinery.

This tendency of the skilled workers to take matters into their own hands bore fruit during the December 1970 revolt on the Baltic coast, when the formal trade union apparatus was not only ignored but was vocally

and physically attacked. In its place sprang up numerous strike committees which became the backbone of the workers' effort to articulate their grievances and to force the newly inaugurated Gierek leadership to deal directly with the workers over the head of the largely collapsed trade union organization. Many of these committees still function in an informal manner, though their existence is not publicly recognized by the government.

These organizational efforts by the workers in December 1970 are unlikely to lead, however, to a formal rebirth of Poland's once renowned workers' councils which sprang up spontaneously after Gomulka assumed power in 1956. These councils, which for a time gave workers in key plants a genuine voice in management, were soon subordinated to and made component parts of the so-called Workers Self-Government Conferences created by the regime in 1958. In addition to the representatives of the emasculated workers' councils, these organs included representatives of the trade unions, which coordinated their entire activity, and representatives of the enterprise party organization, the Union of Socialist Youth, and management. These organizations, therefore, evolved into the main instruments of the regime's labor policies at the local level.

Since December 1970, Gierek's approach to the trade union movement has reflected his tendency to take a pragmatic and tolerant position coupled with a firm effort to retain existing institutional forms and, through them, to retain ultimate control. This approach has not been wholly successful, however. The still unsettled relationship between labor and the regime was demonstrated during the trade union congress in November 1972.

Although the congress witnessed no open clash between the regime and the workers' delegates, both sides apparently were heard and scored points. Above all, the regime made clear that the December 1970 workers' goal of trade unions independent of the party would not be tolerated. In Gierek's own words at the congress:

> From the very beginning the party has been bonded with the class trade union movement by close links. Its activists and members have been leading the movement for tens of years. This close link between the party and trade union movement is the source of strength of the working class and the socialist state, and we will never allow it to be upset.

Symbolizing the regime's determination to retain ultimate control over trade union activity was the reelection at the congress of conservative politburo member Wladyslaw Kruczek as chairman of the CRZZ.

In addition, the regime's other central point at the congress was that while it rejects the trade unions' former role as mere transmission belts downward, it would equally strongly reject any efforts to make the trade unions a tool of labor in opposition to the regime. CRZZ chairman Kruczek voiced this new regime view of the trade union as representing both labor and the government in equal measure and of serving as a means of both downward and upward flow of information, in these words:

> The trade unions, serving man in socialist conditions, will protect his interests whenever they might be impinged, but at the same time they must and will help create material goods, improve the economy and the methods of modern production. Last but not least, they are called upon to educate those who failed to grasp the interpendence between the public good and the personal interest of the individual.

In concrete terms, what is new in the role of the trade unions amounts to a commitment by the Gierek regime—an extension of a promise made in December 1970—to bring workers, through the trade union apparatus, into the decisionmaking process before and not after the fact. Nevertheless, once a decision affecting labor has been reached, it is clear that as hitherto the trade unions are there to enforce the party's will, albeit by means of persuasion rather than coercion. How well this will work remains to be seen, especially in view of the regime's concurrent stress on labor discipline and its continued effort to imbue the Polish worker with a stronger work ethic.

The rest of the trade union congress proceedings illustrated the delegates' unwillingness simply to rubber stamp the regime's proposals. Despite reportedly strong objections by some delegates, the conclave did approve the draft of a new trade union charter, whose main provisions were described as formal abolishment of the legal distinction between blue- and white-collar workers, the creation of a new trade union local unit on a multifactory basis, the strengthening of regional trade union organs, and the abolishment of the CRZZ executive committee, i.e., streamlining the leadership which now rests only in the presidium and the secretariat of the CRZZ.

Contrary to expectation, however, the congress failed to approve a new labor code whose draft had been in preparation for almost 6 years; the draft underwent basic revision under Gierek's tenure and could be considered a creature of the new regime. Serious work on a new labor code started only in 1968, and was designed to codify in one document and to update the compendium of disparate prewar laws and postwar Communist amendments which constitute Poland's labor law. A first draft reportedly was

completed in late 1969, but, because of the intervention of the December 1970 crisis, it was never submitted to the CRZZ for formal approval. The revision of the draft under Gierek's regime was never widely publicized nor debated, but it was evidently to include provisions on working hours and leave, hiring and dismissal, wages, working conditions, industrial health and safety, apprenticeship, labor discipline, grievances and disputes, and trade union activities. It was expected to break little new ground in labor legislation, however, with the exception of sterner provisions in the area of labor discipline violations—such as abuse of sick leave, which is prevalent—and in the area of working time, where a workweek of 44 hours or less was likely to be formally promulgated as a goal.

Not surprisingly, in view of the controversy the draft labor code engendered at the congress, its provisions were barely publicized. Reporting on the proceedings of the congress' subcommittee on the labor code, the Polish press stated that while delegates "spoke approvingly" of some of its aspects, other provisions "gave rise to controversy." Trade union sources privately stated that the congress delegates were in fact very critical of the draft labor code, and found its guarantees of worker and trade union rights too narrow and too vaguely defined. As a result, the code will have to be redrafted.

Apart from dissatisfaction with the labor code, there was reportedly also heated discussion in other congress subcommittees as well. These events together confirm other evidence that while Polish labor is pleased with improved economic conditions and with Gierek's emphasis on consumer welfare, it is determined to exercise and to safeguard its newly found political influence. The regime's effort to boost trade union prestige has been designed in part to encourage the workers to view the unions as a legitimate vehicle for the articulation of the grievances, and thus to institutionalize, and gain control over, the workers' activity. In this effort, the regime apparently succeeded only too well; the rejection of the labor code attests to the workers' willingness to use the trade unions to make their views known, even to the discomfiture of the regime.

This willingness of the workers to make their voices heard and of the regime to tolerate them illustrates dramatically that it is not new institutional forms but rather a changed political climate that differentiates Gierek's Poland from that of Gomulka. By keeping the top echelons of the trade union movement structurally unchanged and ensuring party control, Gierek maintains the movement's ideologically orthodox public image. At the same time, he has encouraged the lower echelons of the trade unions to become more representative of and a voice for, the workers' interests—ultimately helping the party to keep a thumb on the pulse of labor in ways that Gomulka never believed necessary.

The new system already shows promise. Labor disputes continue to exist, and are apparently resolved in a give-and-take manner. Sporadic work stoppages and strikes (which were banned under Gomulka although no legal prohibition against them exists) continue to occur and are tolerated. Moreover, such methods apparently are used by workers, in moderation, to get minor grievances settled, and no one is punished. These innovative developments in the labor field, while always holding some danger for the image if not the power of the regime, illustrate the new pragmatism of the Gierek regime, which is tolerating and in some ways encouraging the growth of a more unorthodox and vital society.

E. Living conditions and social problems

1. Material welfare (U/OU)

The revolt of the consumers that shook Poland to its political roots in December 1970 was the direct result of pent-up popular frustrations arising from the awareness that despite the postwar acquisition of valuable industrialized territory in the former German Silesian areas and a vast industrialization drive by the Polish Communist regime, the material welfare of the people remained well below the level commensurate with national resources and productive capacities.

Although the regime has claimed consistent increases in the indicators of material welfare throughout the postwar period, there has been a marked gap between the growth of the per capita gross national product (GNP) and the increase in per capita consumption. This gap has been only a partial measure of the persistent priority granted to investment in heavy industry—at the expense of the consumer—despite some reduction in this ratio in favor of consumer goods after 1956. The tangible measures taken and the socio-economic commitments made since December 1970 by the Gierek regime indicate that these priorities will be modified in order to allocate a greater share of national resources to production of consumer goods and services.

The December 1970 upheaval was not caused by unbearable living conditions or hunger; indeed, the position of the consumer had improved steadily during the previous decade, and the average Pole was better off in 1970 than at any previous period. Nevertheless,

levels of living continued to be low by Western standards, while the rate of improvement lagged even in comparison to other Eastern European countries. In this context, it was the Gomulka regime's failure to meet the rising expectations of the population, rather than some arbitrary standard of adequacy, that provided the fuel for the revolt.

The immediate postwar economic development of Poland, like that of other Eastern European countries, was characterized by successive spurts of inflation aggravated by government deficit spending. Large cash balances were accumulated by the peasantry and by middlemen profiting from the dire economic conditions of the immediate postwar years; the urban wage earners were the hardest hit. Following a series of currency reforms which virtually wiped out the cash savings of the population, the regime promulgated a wage and price reform in 1953 designed to redress imbalances in purchasing power and reduce profiteering. Rationing and dual price system were abolished; the prices of formerly rationed goods were raised and free market prices somewhat reduced. The simultaneous rise in money wages was small, however, and real wages dropped to their lowest level since 1949.

After 1956 a relative improvement in the material welfare of the average worker was brought about partly by wage increases and the liberalization of economic policies by the Gomulka regime but mainly by government acceptance of the spontaneous breakup of agricultural collectives, a development which resulted in a marked rise in farm output. Another factor was a proportional increase in production of consumer goods consumption as opposed to investment goods.

The disproportionate role of agricultural production in determining Polish material welfare has been consistently evident from the influence of poor harvests on general economic conditions, especially in the late 1960's. This led directly to the serious shortages in major food items, mainly meat, that helped impel the regime to raise prices in December 1970 and thus spark the workers' riots. Despite heavy government investments in state agriculture and efforts to increase peasant incentives, agricultural production fluctuated sharply. Weather was often a factor, but the uneven performance in agriculture was also the result of the individualism of the peasantry, together with its resistance to modern farming techniques, and a lack of tangible incentives under the former regime's collection and marketing policies. The Gierek regime has addressed these controllable variables in farm output by a series of new measures designed to gain the confidence of the peasantry. These measures, especially the abolishment of compulsory deliveries and guaranteed land ownership has already stimulated farm output.

Other factors endemic to the Communist regime which have for long affected the material welfare of the consumer include chronic problems in the distribution of products, widespread corruption within the economic bureaucracy, and the low labor productivity of the Polish worker, which is exacerbated by a rapidly growing labor force. As in the case of the peasantry, the Gierek regime's fundamental commitment in this sphere is to eliminate the ills of the past, introduce institutional measures to prevent their repetition, and focus on the interrelationship of consumer welfare and the general economic development of the country. (The specific steps undertaken by the Gierek regime to establish labor confidence and stimulate its welfare are discussed more fully above, under Societal Aspects of Labor.)

Industrialization together with Communist economic and social policies have markedly altered the prewar pattern of material welfare among different groups of the population. Generally, the most adversely affected were the former urban professional, merchant, and artisan classes, and, to the ultimate misfortune of the Gomulka regime, the skilled workers. Although developing economic factors often allowed selected individuals from these groups, especially professionals and some private "entrepreneurs," to be relatively well off, most such individuals must work harder, and more members of the family must be employed, to obtain their proportionate share of consumer goods. Peasants who have productive medium-size farms are better off than they were in the interwar period, consuming more food and consumer goods than ever before. The Gierek regime's farm incentive program is in part designed further to increase the consumption of durable consumer goods by the peasantry and thus reduce the existing gap between rural and urban living standards.

A more marked, but still relative, improvement took place in the level of living of the new members of the industrial labor force, recruited from the ranks of the poorer peasantry. Although their consumption of both food and manufactured products increased, these increases were still below their expectations. The principal beneficiaries of a higher level of living were the members of the "new class," i.e., the government and party bureaucracy. To what extent the more egalitarian policies of the Gierek regime will reduce these disparities over the long term remains to be seen, but its promise to do so and some concrete moves in

this direction appear to have already reduced social tensions.

Life for the average urban family has significantly improved since early 1971, especially in Warsaw and other large cities which give the appearance of relative prosperity. The food supply is more than adequate, although in some areas of the country lack of variety and periodic shortages continue to exist. The supply of clothing is also adequate, although most mass-produced products still suffer from lack of style, poor quality, and high prices. Nevertheless, middle-class urban dwellers, especially the youth, are style-conscious, and appear to spend an increasing proportion of their budget on privately made clothes along Western styles. Although the quality of durable consumer goods remains below Western standards, the sale of such items has increased rapidly, in part because of the existence of a limited but well-developed system of installment buying. In 1970, for example, the percentages of blue-collar and white-collar families owning selected durable goods were as follows:

ITEM	BLUE-COLLAR	WHITE-COLLAR
Radio	81.1	84.5
TV set	65.9	72.6
Electric washer	77.2	75.5
Refrigerator	24.9	50.0
Vacuum cleaner	31.6	59.4
Sewing machine	45.7	36.0
Motorcycle or scooter	8.9	8.5
Bicycle	29.9	23.1

The government claims that by 1971 the average industrial worker's family spent less than 50% of its total budget on food, and that improvements in the availability of consumer durables have resulted in proportionately greater budgetary allowances for these items. Although these claims may not be accurate, some change in consumption patterns undoubtedly has occurred. The following tabulation shows the percentage spent by an average worker's family from its total budget on selected items in 1965, and the trend of changing expenditures by 1971:

ITEM	1965	1971
Food	50.1	46.6
Clothing and shoes	17.8	15.1
Housing (including furniture and appliances)	7.9	10.2
Fuel and light	4.9	4.1
Health	4.5	4.1
Recreation and culture	8.4	6.8
Alcohol	4.1	2.1
Transportation and services	2.3	2.1

The gradual but measurable increase in the availability of durable consumer goods has paralleled the increasing willingness of the government—even before December 1970—to take a consumer-oriented position when measuring levels of living. For example, after long considering private ownership of automobiles an irrelevant measure of material well-being, Polish authorities began in 1967 to offer comparative statistical data attesting to Poland's progress in this regard. This followed a decision to expand domestic automobile production significantly with Western aid, such as the long-range deal for the production in Poland of Italy's Fiat automobiles. The Gomulka regime's halfhearted commitment to expanded auto production, however, pales in comparison to the well-publicized and highly popular new policy of the Gierek regime to produce family cars in such quantities as to "motorize Poland"—a drive that has Soviet blessings as well as precedent.

Although exorbitant prices—generally equivalent to several years' wages of an industrial worker—still confine ownership of automobiles to the privileged members of the party bureaucracy and to the managerial elite, the number of privately owned cars in Poland grew more than eightfold between 1950 and 1969, standing at 13 per 1,000 population in the latter year. This ratio, however, is still the lowest in Eastern Europe, with the exception of Romania and the U.S.S.R. (five autos per 1,000 population) and, certainly, Albania for which data are unavailable. In 1969 comparable ratios of automobile ownership per 1,000 population stood at 430 in the United States, 276 in Sweden, 246 in France, 208 in West Germany, and 205 in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the Polish postwar achievement in this regard must be measured against the ratio of 0.9 automobiles per 1,000 population in Poland in 1938. Figure 22 shows selected indicators of consumer goods availability in Poland and other Eastern European countries in 1969.

FIGURE 22. Selected indicators of consumer goods availability, Poland and Eastern European countries, 1969 (U/OU)
(Per 1,000 population)

COUNTRY	TELEPHONES	RADIOS	TELEVISIONS	PASSENGER CARS
U.S.S.R.	53	375	128	5
East Germany	124	350	254	65
Czechoslovakia	132	271	208	58
Hungary	76	246	155	19
POLAND	54	174	118	13
Bulgaria	49	269	98	21
Yugoslavia	31	163	76	39
Romania	30	152	64	5



FIGURE 23. New workers' housing, Katowice (U/OU)

After World War II the housing shortage in Poland was more severe than in other Eastern European countries, popular discontent with housing shortages was higher, and the effect of cramped living quarters on economic and social life was more pervasive. Even before the war, average urban housing was substandard by Western criteria, and overcrowding and inadequacy of proper sanitary facilities were widespread. The wartime destruction of about 40% of the dwellings on the present territory of Poland and the serious deterioration of the remainder presented the postwar government with a problem of unprecedented magnitude. Initial measures concentrated on the repair of salvageable buildings. Since the early 1950's the growing rate of new construction by the government and by building cooperatives has improved conditions significantly.

Official claims that housing construction in the late 1960's exceeded population growth appear to be borne out by the declining average number of persons per room, which dropped from 1.75 in 1950 to 1.66 in 1960 and to 1.37 in 1970. Recent data on the average area of living space per person are not available. Most of the new construction has occurred in response to rapid urbanization in the growing industrial centers of Silesia (Figure 23) and in the Warsaw area (Figure 24). New construction is being stressed in the former German territories, although there it has consistently lagged behind the rest of the country and some examples of wartime damage are still evident in many cities in the area. The majority of dwellings in rural areas have improved little over the level prevalent during the prewar period (Figure 25).

Since 1967, the cooperative sector of housing construction has consistently exceeded the state sector in the number of housing units completed; indeed, the state sector has registered a parallel decline. Moreover, this trend has paralleled the growth of entirely private housing construction. Construction of housing units (in thousands) by different sectors since 1965 is shown in the following tabulation:

Year	State	Cooperative	Private
1965	92.8	33.3	44.4
1966	77.8	51.6	46.6
1967	58.7	77.3	49.7
1968	46.7	92.1	50.5
1969	47.0	98.1	51.9
1970	45.1	95.5	53.6

Since the advent of the Gierek regime both the cooperative and private construction sectors have been further encouraged by such means as exempting all private one-family houses and apartments in cooperative housing from public control in terms of rents and allocations. These policies are but a part of the government's acute awareness that dissatisfaction with lack of housing has not only been endemic throughout the postwar period, but it was one of the



FIGURE 24. Old and new housing, Warsaw (U/OU)



FIGURE 25. Typical rural dwelling, central Poland (note the television antenna) (U/OU)

central issues focused on by the workers in December 1970. As a result, housing construction, with the increasing help of a growing nongovernment sector as indicated, is one of the new regime's top priorities. Official goals include an apartment for every family by "the mid-1980's," and "to complete by 1990 a basic modernization of old housing resources." To reach these goals will require the construction of between 4.5 and 4.8 million new apartments by 1985, and a total of 6.6 to 7.3 million apartments—new and rebuilt—by 1990. These goals reveal the magnitude of the current housing shortage as well as the regime's determination to tackle the problem.

2. Social security and welfare programs (U/OU)

Like many other European countries, Poland had a comprehensive, centrally administered system of social insurance for nonagricultural workers even before World War II. The postwar government rapidly reconstructed the prewar system and expanded it to include that small part of the agricultural population employed on state farms. The citizen's right to social security insurance was formalized by guarantees contained in the constitution of July 1952. The entire social insurance system is administered by the state, as is the bulk of noninstitutionalized public welfare aid. The virtually cost-free coverage applies automatically to all gainfully employed persons in the socialist sector of the economy and their dependents. Legislation in the late 1960's extended coverage to selected groups of workers in cooperative and private sectors of the economy. In 1970, the system covered a total of 10,868,000 directly insured persons, of whom 223,000 were employed outside the socialized economy. Including the dependents of the insured, the number of persons covered was 78% of the total population, in contrast to 47% in 1950 and 60% in 1960.

In line with the Gierek regime's policy of increased attention to the socioeconomic welfare of the population and the real need of the regime for wider popular support, steps taken since 1971 include an expansion in eligibility for social security coverage to many categories of self-employed persons previously considered ineligible; included is the important category of writers, as well as some journalists and others in selected professions. The numerous private peasantry continues to be ineligible for actual social insurance coverage such as pensions, disability payments, and family allowances, but as part of the regime's liberal agricultural policy, it has made available to them comprehensive, virtually free, medical care (which is not formally a part of the social insurance system, and is discussed below under Health). As of 1972, it is estimated that 80% to 90% of the population is covered by all or some provisions of the social insurance system. In addition, persons who remain ineligible for such automatic coverage have access to state-sponsored individual coverage on a premium basis, although the number so covered is negligible.

Social security coverage includes sickness and maternity insurance, family allowances, and the use of health resorts, as well as old-age, disability, and survivors benefits and pensions. Although unemployment insurance provisions dating to 1924 have not been removed from the statute books, they have been allowed to remain largely inoperative, since the Communist regime denies the existence of classical unemployment in a "workers' state." Temporary, frictional unemployment has been admitted to exist since 1957, however, when a relaxation of previously rigid policies of labor allocation resulted in significant, and continuing, labor mobility. Lump-sum payments for such frictional unemployment were instituted at that time, and are administered outside the framework of the social insurance system. In practice, however, the administration of these benefits has been sporadic, and the authorities prefer to direct claimants to job assignments—often disregarding qualifications and skills.

Social security benefits are generally liberal in comparison with the average wage and have afforded a relatively high degree of security to those who follow the pattern of economic activity imposed by the regime. A family budget survey conducted in the late 1960's showed that 87.1% of annual income in wage- or salary-earners' families (excluding agriculture) was derived from base pay and supplemental payments; another 8.4% from social security payments (family allowances, sick pay, maternity grants, old-age, disability, and survivors' pensions), unemployment or public assistance benefits, and scholarships; and 4.5% from property sales, rents, prizes, gifts, and so forth. In low-income families, social security payments and other "social benefits" assumed even more importance, accounting for 10% to 15% of family income in households of 12,000 zlotys or less per year.

Although the expanded system has resulted in some nominal economic gains by the workers since World War II, it has also been transformed into an instrument of the government's economic and social policies. The system has thus been used for raising or lowering incentives among different categories of workers and social classes. Higher benefits, for example, are afforded to exemplary workers and to those certain high-priority and traditionally favored sectors such as mining and construction. In mid-1962 old-age pension coverage was extended to members of collective farms and their families as an apparent incentive—largely ineffective—for private peasants to join collectives. Similarly, the law of 29 March 1965 extended social security coverage to all persons and their families engaged in private handicrafts and services, in line with the government's policy of inducing a portion of the labor surplus to enter private service occupations, especially in rural areas. Although there are no legal provisions for withdrawing social security benefits from "undesirables," the firing of an employee normally results in annulment of his social security coverage. Changes instituted in the system by the Gierek regime are in part designed to reduce its discriminatory aspects, and to deflect former charges that it is a tool of political, economic, and social policy. In general, however, the postwar welfare state has won wide popular approval, although the majority of the population views the government's policy in the field of public welfare as an expansion of an already existing concept rather than an innovation of a new social order.

The determination and drafting of government policy on social insurance matters was vested in the government Committee on Labor and Wages in coordination with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare until March 1972, when a governmental reorganization upgraded the committee to ministerial rank. Since then social insurance matters have been within the purview of the new Ministry of Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs, coordinated as before with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, and implemented administratively through the Social Insurance Administration. The organization of the latter agency parallels that of the trade unions, through which it works down to the local level. Auxiliary agencies in charge of social insurance attached to local trade union units are responsible for the actual adjustment of insurance claims. Bookkeeping and other work are usually done by the staff of the individual enterprise, which bears the administrative costs involved. Disputes arising under the social insurance system are adjudicated by regional and local social insurance courts in the first instance and by the social insurance tribunal, a component chamber of the Supreme Court in Warsaw, acting as a court of final appeal.

In 1970 the state contributed about 85% of the total cost, and the remainder was borne by the individual enterprise. Until 1968, when a reform of pension insurance resulted in changes in the methods of accounting of pension insurance receipts and outlays, all categories of social insurance were specified in the annual state budget. Total budgetary expenditures for social insurance as a percentage of the national budget rose steadily throughout the 1950's, but after 1958 they generally remained stable in a range of 10% to 12%. In 1970 this was the equivalent of about US$1 billion. This figure is likely to have risen substantially since the implementation by the Gierek regime of the expansion of social insurance coverage as well as the raising of average payments. (The cost of providing medical care, as distinct from sickness and maternity benefits payable during hospitalization, is not included in the expenditures for social security insurance since it is a component, not separately identified, of budgetary allocations for the public health system as a whole.)

In January 1968, a 2-year, three-stage reform of the pension program was initiated by the government in concert with the trade unions. The need for new legislation had long been recognized, since the low ceilings set on many categories of pensions by the previous law of 1954 had been outpaced by rises in average wages and the cost of living, and interim stopgap legislation had become excessively cumbersome and ineffective. The new law thus provided for substantially higher average pensions, financed not only by the state and the enterprise as hitherto, but

also by a small payment—averaging 3% of the total—levied on the individual worker. These contributions were funneled into the newly created Pension Fund subordinate to the Social Insurance Administration. Since 1968 the receipts and expenditures of the Pension Fund have not been included in total outlays for social security published in the state budget; they are handled separately on the ground that the pension system is administered and financed by "non-governmental" agencies, i.e., the trade unions in conjunction with the Social Insurance Administration.

Pension benefits are graded by category of employment, age, length of service, and possible disability. On the average, however, an employee is entitled to retirement benefits after 25 years of employment and at age 65 (after 20 years and at age 60 for women). Benefits range from 60% of the last year's earnings to 100% in the case of severe disability. The impact of the pension reform begun in 1968 and completed in early 1970 was most marked on the lowest categories of pensions. As a result, average pensions rose from the equivalent of about 38% of the average gross industrial wage in 1965 to 62% in 1970 before the increases implemented by Gierek. Maternity benefits include prenatal and postnatal care. Cash benefits during time of illness average about 70% of the basic wage or salary, excluding premiums and bonuses, and are paid on a daily basis. Family allowances are graded by number of children in the family and the family's per capita income. One-time cash funeral benefits generally equal the average monthly wage in industry.

The increased benefits instituted by the new government in December 1970 in the area of pensions hinged on an increase of the minimum old-age and disability pensions by about 15%, i.e., to 960 zlotys (equivalent of US$44 at the non-commercial rate of US$1 = 22 zlotys[2]) for old-age pensions, and to a range of 1,210 to 1,810 zlotys per month for disability. Pensions higher than the minimum were also raised on a sliding scale. By January 1971, the average old-age pension payment was 1,615 zlotys per month, and average disability pension stood at 1,043 zlotys.

Family allowances and sickness benefits (payments made to the insured while hospitalized or convalescing, not intended to cover the cost of medical care which is free) were also raised, with the largest benefits going to families with a per capita income of less than 1,000 zlotys per month. Family allowances in 1971 ranged from 110 zlotys per month for a family with one child to 450 zlotys to a family with four children, with 210 zlotys per month for each additional child. In 1972 proposals were made for an additional liberalization of cash payments during time of illness; the average such payment in 1971 was 52 zlotys per day of hospitalization.

In addition to the social insurance programs, public welfare services include a system of nurseries for young children of working mothers and institutional as well as noninstitutional care of mothers and their children up to the age of 3 years. Nurseries and other institutions and programs such as old-age and nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, and workers' recreation resorts are administered by the trade unions in cooperation with individual enterprises and local government organs. Other public welfare services, such as social work with adolescents and aid to indigent adults, are limited in resources and are generally available only in urban areas. The rising incidence of juvenile delinquency in the postwar period is still considered generally a matter for the police, the courts, and the corrective institutions on the one hand, and for ideological indoctrination by mass youth organizations on the other. Until the advent of the Gierek regime, official denial of the existence of social and economic frictions under socialism precluded the development of social work in the Western sense. Although the new regime has not taken concrete steps in this direction, discussions concerning the possible need for such an effort—within the context of existing institutions—have been underway in professional circles concerned with social problems.

Some private and semiprivate activity in the sector of public welfare still exists in Poland, unlike most other Communist countries, but government policies limit its scope. Despite economic, political, and other pressures exerted by the Gomulka regime on the activities of the Roman Catholic Church on the parish level, the church continued to operate a significant number of welfare institutions. According to church sources, in 1966 these included 160 institutions described as hospitals, 31 orphanages, 61 old-age homes, and more than 220 special institutions of various kinds for children and adults. In view of the significantly improved church-state relations since December 1970, it is likely that the church may expand somewhat the scope of its work in this area.

Several independent agencies dating from the immediate postwar period also continue to operate, but they are under full government control. Among these are *Caritas*, formerly the main Roman Catholic welfare agency, and the League of Women and the

[2]U.S. dollar equivalents in this section are calculated at this rate because of 1970 data. In February 1973, as a result of U.S. dollar devaluation, the new rate became US$1 = 19.92 zlotys.

Friends of Children Society (merged in 1971). After 1956, aid from abroad, dispensed either by various organizations such as the Jewish Relief Committee or received in the form of individual packages and remittances, constituted a sizable part of private welfare activity. In addition, U.S. Government donations of surplus food were distributed by three U.S. charitable agencies: CARE, Church World Service, and American Relief for Poland. This last program, which had been in operation since 1957 and resulted in the distribution of several million pounds of food, was phased out by 1969.

Several mass organizations, theoretically independent but actually controlled by the government, provide recreational facilities and limited welfare services for its members. The Polish Red Cross does not formally conduct welfare work, but together with civil defense organizations it gives training in first aid and renders material aid to victims of natural disasters.

3. Social problems (C)

a. Social strains

The unprecedented social dislocations of World War II and the subsequent advent of totalitarian Communist rule caused or intensified most of the country's social problems. Apart from the heavy losses of both individual and national property, the unparalleled losses in population included a high proportion of the political, social, intellectual, and moral elite upon whom postwar social reconstruction would have normally depended. The disruption of the traditionally strong Polish family was severe; the average family lost at least one member. Moreover, the general futility of resisting the organized atrocities of the occupying Nazi regime fostered cynicism toward all social order. This cynicism, together with theft and mendacity, were considered commendable traits among those who did resist the wartime occupation. For most, it continued to be an asset during the immediate postwar period of political violence and social lawlessness which accompanied the advent of Communist rule. Among many—but not all—members of the older generation and among most of the younger generation, the miasma of totalitarian rule and its unresponsiveness to public opinion fostered a continuing disrespect for the concept of property and social order. During the 1960's, crime and social conflict emerged as an issue not only between the regime and the population in general, but between those members of the older generation who as a reaction to the past put a premium on law and order and those, mainly the youth, who tended to equate defense of freedom with resistance to all authority.

The years between the consolidation of the Communist government and the beginning of the post-Stalinist period in 1954 brought few significant improvements in economic and political conditions upon which the reestablishment of stable behavioral standards could be based. Many people lost what remained of their property through confiscation; numerous families were disrupted by the political imprisonment of one or more of their members; and a great many formerly acceptable modes of behavior were prosecuted as acts against the state. Rapid industrialization brought large numbers of young peasants into the overcrowded cities, creating a serious problem of personal adjustment and morals. The entry of large numbers of women into the labor force disrupted established family patterns even more, with particularly serious consequences for the traditionally patriarchal society. Moral leadership, except from the persecuted Roman Catholic Church, was virtually nonexistent.

The curbing of police terror at the end of the Stalin era and the initial exuberance of the population over the installation of Gomulka in 1956 resulted in an increased incidence of politically and economically motivated antisocial behavior. After 1957, the retrogressive political, economic, and social policies of the government resulted in turn in a growing apathy among the people in general and of a resistance to "socialist" moral values among the youth. Widespread apathy and cynicism were manifested outwardly by disrespect for authority, alcoholism, corruption, and low moral standards.

Nevertheless, there was, especially among the young people, a general search for new social principles and values that would help Poland to become a truly modern, efficient, technological society. This search was accompanied by the belief that fundamental reform of the Communist order was needed. This, in turn, contributed to the existing alienation between the generations and to existing social strains that increasingly assumed political overtones.

By the late 1960's longstanding grievances over the regime's political and cultural policies were being voiced more openly, foreshadowing the simmering unrest that was to explode in December 1970. The disorders and violence in early 1968 by a coalition of students and intellectuals began largely as a spontaneous expression of genuine grievances in the academic milieu and related issues of individual liberty. The more fundamental cause, however, was the pent-up pressure of Polish youth for recognition,

responsibility, and a role in shaping the country's future. What most student leaders sought to make clear was that the target of their movement was not so much—or not only—the Communist ideology, which they regarded as a dead letter irrelevant to the issues facing the country, but rather the stagnation, exclusiveness, corruption, and repressiveness of the regime irrespective of its ideological pretensions. The failure of the students and intellectuals to gain widespread support from the working class and from the older generation in general—segments of society which, in the absence of economic issues in 1968, were fearful of upsetting the status quo—was the single most important factor in the regime's successful suppression of the demonstrations. Lingering anti-intellectualism among the Polish workers, together with the fact that students of worker and peasant backgrounds apparently were the least involved in the disturbances, also contributed to the failure to form a revolutionary student-worker coalition. The disappointment of the youth in 1968 to effect significant change by frontal attack led to a resurgence of apathy and division of opinion among them. At least some of these factors were still operative in 1970 when the working class, this time motivated by bread-and-butter issues, erupted into revolt and, while the students and intellectuals generally stood back, toppled the Gomulka regime.

Although the spark igniting the workers' revolt was economic, the underlying social strains that fueled their dissatisfaction were much the same as those protested by the students in 1968—inefficiency, stagnation, exclusiveness, corruption, and unresponsiveness to public opinion by the ruling clique. Few Poles would say with certainty that the succeeding regime of Edward Gierek was likely to find lasting remedies for all these ills inherited from the past, but most people credited the regime with a new commitment to tackle these fundamental problems as well as to remedy immediate grievances. This in itself was unprecedented in postwar Poland and, if the Gierek regime holds to its purpose, could result in a social climate less susceptible to periodic, violent release of pent-up strains.

b. Crime

Postwar regimes have generally depended more on disciplinary than preventive measures to curb crime, chronic economic corruption, and lax moral standards. Despite the Gierek regime's new emphasis on rehabilitation of criminal offenders, a public relations program designed to achieve what might be termed improved police-community relations, and a general emphasis on "socialist legality" equally dispensed to all citizens, there is a concurrent and strong emphasis on increased social discipline.

In its efforts to enlist the support of the people for law and order, and to imbue this concept with justice, the Gierek regime is burdened by the legacy of the past. During the Stalin era of the early 1950's, the majority of prosecuted criminal acts were actually political in nature. Most crimes of violence were also politically motivated and were especially common during the assumption of Communist power in the late 1940's, during the most intense period of forced agricultural collectivization between 1951-55, and during the spontaneous breakup of collectives in late 1956. After 1958, however, deepening political apathy and the resurgence of police power significantly reduced the incidence of political crimes of violence, except among the youth. Sporadic cases of such crimes continue to be reported from isolated rural areas when regime officials run afoul of peasant individualism.

Official statistical data on the incidence of crime published since the advent of the Gierek regime graphically reflect the government's more candid attitude toward acknowledgment and remedy of social problems. Since December 1970, changed criteria for the reporting of criminal offenses and transgressions of all kinds have resulted in a wholesale revision upwards, by some 20% to 25%, of the incidence of crime during the 1960's. For example, according to information published in 1968, there were 383,000 crimes of all kinds committed in that year, or an incidence of 118.6 crimes per 10,000 population. Revised data published in 1971, however, list the 1968 figure at 468,602 crimes, or an incidence of 145.1 per 10,000 population.

The new, and apparently more credible figures, show that crime fluctuated during the 1960 decade, reaching a high point in 1966 with 525,540 crimes, declining somewhat in 1968, rising again in 1969 to almost 500,000 crimes and falling significantly in 1970—the latest available figure—to 424,217 crimes, or a rate of 129.3 per 10,000 population. The largest category of crimes (49%) continued to be robbery and theft—mostly of public property—which showed a rate of 64.7 per 10,000 population in 1970. The 486 registered cases of murder and the 153 cases of attempted murder represented together a rate of just under 0.2 per 10,000 population.

Juvenile delinquency, as distinct from politically and intellectually motivated unrest among the youth, has been rising in postwar Poland as in most other countries, and is one of the most serious concerns of the government in the area of public order. General



Prices of alcoholic beverages, especially vodka, were raised by an average of 10% to 15% in 1961, 1963, and 1969. Although such increases tend temporarily to discourage at least some of the least affluent habitual users, they mask rather than remedy the underlying causes of alcoholism—the bleakness and persistent frustrations of everyday life in Poland.

Some limited measures have been taken, however, to identify and rehabilitate chronic alcoholics. A system of overnight "sobering-up-stations" exists in most of the larger cities, and most cases of public intoxication unaccompanied by criminal behavior have tended to be treated as medical problems rather than problems of public order. This more realistic attitude toward the problem has been carried forward by the Gierek regime, whose willingness to publicize social ills as part of its search for remedies is revealing for the first time the magnitude of some of these problems. The government's Commission for the Struggle Against Alcoholism indicated in August 1972 that there were some 500,000 hard-core alcoholics, of whom 80,000 are "ripe for hospitalization" and another 400,000 require "immediate treatment." The commission criticized the inadequate number of treatment centers in the country, and called for the construction of additional "sobering-up stations," as well as special hospitals to which alcoholics could be legally committed for treatment.

Prostitution, legal in prewar Poland, has also increased despite official claims to the contrary, and it is most prevalent in newly developed industrial centers and seacoast towns and resorts. Postwar laws against prostitution, together with poor economic conditions in some cases, have led to increasing numbers of part-time prostitutes, i.e., those who use prostitution to supplement regular income. There is some evidence that a number of full-time, relatively affluent prostitutes are employed by the government in seaports and major tourist centers as a means of obtaining hard currencies, and for intelligence purposes.

Although data on the abuse of narcotics and drug addiction are not available, it is not believed to be sufficiently widespread to constitute a social problem by the standards of some Western countries where the problem has so rapidly grown during the past decade. By Polish standards, however—drug addiction was virtually unknown before the mid-1960's—the problem apparently is serious enough to warrant an ever increasing propaganda campaign in the public media, prosecution of juvenile and adult gangs of suppliers, and appeals for understanding by the public that the problem is medical and social rather than moral.

Apart from an apparently small quantity of processed narcotics and drugs smuggled into the country—mainly by foreign seamen along the Baltic coast—most of the supply appears to be of domestic origin, i.e., diverted from legal pharmaceutical production. In 1968, Polish officials claimed that there were only "several hundred" addicts, mainly adults who had become addicted through treatment of chronic disease with painkilling drugs. At that time, morphine was said to be the most frequently abused drug, since it is produced in Poland from domestically grown poppies. Since then, however, especially since 1970, publicity on the problem has made it increasingly clear that the number of addicts has grown into the thousands, that most of them are juveniles or young adults, that most of them began the habit on their own and not as a result of medical treatment, and that the variety of abused drugs has proliferated. Although legislation controlling the manufacture, distribution, and retail sale of not only drugs but also their chemical components calls for severe penalties, charges have been made that implementation of the law is far too lax in practice.

F. Health

1. Health conditions and medical care (C)

Much of the impetus for the rapid postwar recovery and physical reconstruction of Poland came from the government's alization of the debilitating effects of World War II evastation on the health of the people and on public health facilities. Hospitals have been rebuilt and new ones added, although modernization of facilities is not keeping pace with their expansion. A rapidly expanding program of training physicians and medical assistants has resulted in an improved doctor-to-patient ratio, but the persistent geographical maldistribution of physicians tends to hamper medical services in rural parts of the country. The general level of medical care and hygiene, however, is vastly better than during the pre-World War II period, and health conditions have approached the high level of those in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Despite rapid strides in preventive health measures and a more equitable distribution of medical care, congested urban living conditions and still inadequate sanitary facilities in most rural and in some urban areas result in a relatively high incidence of communicable diseases. The most prevalent of these include enteric infections, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, infectious hepatitis, and helminthiasis. Despite a program to eradicate poliomyelitis in the

late 1960's, this disease is not yet fully controlled. In 1968, for example, there was a serious outbreak of Type III strain. The outbreak, however, was reportedly associated with unpublicized clinical testing of a genetically unstable Type III strain vaccine of Czechoslovak manufacture supplied to Poland by the World Health Organization.

Conditions in rural areas are often substantially below those prevailing in urban centers. In some areas, diphtheria is prevalent, and tick-borne diseases are common. Despite the government's programs in adult health education, general inattention to personal, animal, and environmental hygiene and sanitation still prevails among the private peasantry and has been the basic reason for keeping animal health conditions and farm sanitation on a low level in comparison with most Western European countries. The incidence of diseases among the large cattle, hog, and horse population is relatively high, despite increasing remedial measures by the growing Polish veterinary service. Outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease, for example, occurred fairly regularly during the 1960's, although they were rapidly and successfully confined.

The death rate among adults declined markedly in the postwar period, from 14.1 per 1,000 population in 1938 to a low of 7.3 in 1966, increasing again somewhat to 8.1 per 1,000 population in 1970 as a consequence of the slowly rising proportion of persons 75 years of age and older within the total population. The order of the leading causes of death among adults has not shifted appreciably since 1960, although their incidence shows marked changes, as illustrated by the following tabulation of death rates per 10,000 population:

	1960	1970
Heart and circulatory disease	10.5	27.1
Cancer	8.9	13.7
Diseases of the central nervous system	3.5	3.8
Tuberculosis	3.9	2.6

Although Poland's infant mortality rate is still among the highest in Europe, standing at 33.4 per 1,000 live births in 1970, this represents a marked reduction from the rate of 139 per 1,000 live births in the immediate prewar period when it was Europe's second highest (after Romania). This reduction, together with the postwar decline in the death rate and greatly improved medical care, has resulted in a rise in life expectancy at birth from 48.2 years for males and 51.4 years for females in 1931 to the figures of 66.9 and 72.8, respectively, in 1966. Life expectancy at birth in several selected countries is shown below:

	Male	Female
POLAND (1966)	66.9	72.8
Sweden (1967)	71.9	76.5
Bulgaria (1967)	68.8	72.5
France (1966)	68.2	75.4
Czechoslovakia (1966)	67.3	73.6
Hungary (1964)	67.0	71.0
United States (1967)	67.0	74.2

Wartime destruction of medical facilities, losses of personnel, shortages of medical supplies, and general social disruption significantly increased the incidence of disease, and food supply was inadequate to maintain or rebuild public health. Tuberculosis mounted rapidly during World War II, and venereal diseases became widespread during the immediate postwar period; both were also spurred by social changes inherent in rapid industrialization and urbanization. Both categories of diseases were objects of government antiepidemic drives during the postwar decade, and their incidence reached a low point in the mid-1950's. Since then, the total number of registered cases of tuberculosis has continued to decline, but that of venereal disease has steadily and alarmingly increased, as shown in the following tabulation:

	Tuberculosis		Venereal Diseases	
Year	Total cases	Per 10,000 population	Total cases	Per 10,000 population
1960	667,670	223.4	34,790	11.8
1965	603,382	191.2	53,217	16.9
1970	383,175	117.5	73,532	22.4

The total number of tuberculosis cases continues to decline, as does the death rate from tuberculosis, but public health officials attribute this abatement mainly to prompt and effective care and a high rate of cure, and not to a significant decrease in the number of newly registered cases. Indeed, in late 1969 these officials revealed that some 40,000 new cases were being registered annually; they were particularly alarmed at the slowly increasing rate of new cases among 15- to 18-year-olds.

The marked increase in venereal disease in the late 1960's generally parallels with the late adolescence and early adulthood of those born during the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the immediate postwar period. Although a breakdown by type of venereal disease is not available, the number of registered syphilis cases reportedly grew fourfold between 1964 and 1970. In the latter year, 23,646 cases of syphilis and 49,884 cases of gonorrhea were registered. These alarming increases prompted the

Polish Government to set up a venerological institute in January 1970 and to mount a greatly expanded program of preventive mass examinations.

Despite a steady improvement in the availability of medical care, the number of doctors and hospitals is still inadequate in most areas of the country outside of the major cities. While the ratio of medical personnel and facilities to the total population appears relatively favorable, their geographical distribution partially offsets their growing numbers; over 90% of all medical doctors, for example, live in cities and industrial areas, preferring to avoid the isolation and generally still primitive living conditions of the countryside. Since the Gierek regime came to power in December 1970, however, an increased effort has been underway to expand and improve the system of rural medical centers and consultation stations, as well as to develop a system of incentives that would induce fully trained medical personnel to practice in these areas.

Shortages of professional medical care in rural areas, however, have been mitigated to a large extent through the still widespread use of *feldshers*, i.e., trained medical assistants and technicians who are competent to deal with routine treatment or preventive health measures. This system, however, is being phased out in favor of professional care. Many peasants who are far from available medical facilities and personnel continue to rely on the traditional system of midwives not only in cases of childbirth but also for routine medical care of all members of the family. The shortage of professional medical care in rural areas was, until 1971, largely a result of the ineligibility of persons employed in private agriculture—about one-fourth of the population—to receive free medical care. The extension of this care to the private peasantry by the Gierek regime is likely to improve medical care in the countryside in the long run, but to cause short-term strains as the system seeks to overcome years of relative neglect in these areas.

Efforts are being made to remedy the existing maldistribution and quality of hospitals. Although the number of hospital beds may be comparable to or above the European average in metropolitan areas, hospitals in rural areas are undermaintained and understaffed, and equipment, facilities, and sanitary standards even in some city hospitals fall considerably below the Western European standard. Because of heavy wartime destruction, the number of hospitals—despite rapid postwar construction—was only 516 in 1950 compared to the 1938 total of 632, and reached the prewar total only in the late 1950's. Since then, state expenditures on medical plant have tended to be focused on existing facilities rather than constructing new ones. However, these funds have generally been insufficient in most cases even to maintain and refurbish aging and obsolescent facilities. The following tabulation shows the availability of medical personnel and facilities in 1970:

	Number	Per 10,000 population
Medical doctors	49,283	15.1
Dentists	13,611	4.2
Pharmacists	12,298	3.8
Feldshers	4,840	1.5
Nurses	102,838	31.5
Midwives	12,171	15.1
Civilian hospitals	673	*na*
Hospital beds	205,200	62.9

na Data not available.

The above data for the number of hospitals and hospital beds included some 31 hospitals with 36,400 beds devoted exclusively to the care of mental illness, but excluded some 43 military hospitals and rehabilitation centers. The number of nurses includes 81,429 fully trained registered nurses, with the remainder being nursing assistants and student nurses. The overall trend in the availability of medical personnel and hospital facilities is shown in Figures 26 and 27, respectively.

The competence of professional physicians and their training are believed to be good by European standards, although their skill is often handicapped by the lack of specialized drugs and of modern diagnostic and other hospital equipment. The Polish Medical Society is a general professional association and there are also a large number of associations comprising members of the various medical specialties active in



FIGURE 26. Health personnel per 10,000 population (U/OU)



FIGURE 27. Hospital beds by category of treatment (U/OU)

their respective fields. Most of them have long been urging greater selectivity among candidates for medical schools in order to raise professional standards. Their efforts may have played a role in the relatively constant number of students enrolled in medical academies between the early 1950's and the late 1960's, a period when total enrollment in higher education more than doubled.

Medical practice and facilities, including ambulance and other emergency transportation, are nationalized and centrally controlled by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, which administers the system through appropriate sections of the provincial, district, and local government bodies. Although private medical practice is permitted, such practice is theoretically restricted by, among other factors, the requirement that physicians give priority to the daily 8 hours of work within the state system. In practice, however, many physicians earn a significant portion of needed income by private practice, and the tendency even among less well-paid persons seems to be to seek private rather than state medical services. A program of state-administered compulsory health insurance automatically covers all employees in the socialized sector of the economy and members of their families. In the nonsocialized sector, the majority of organized handicraft workers are covered, and in 1971 the system of nearly free medical and hospital care was extended to most members of the numerous private peasantry. As a result there is no major segment of the population which is not covered. Medical benefits include hospitalization, doctor's care, and dental care, all provided at nominal cost, and between 70% and 100% of the cost of prescribed medicines and drugs.

The cost of providing such medical care, as distinct from sickness and maternity benefits payable during hospitalization, is not included in the budgetary expenditures for social security programs. Rather, it is a component, not separately identified, of budgetary allocations for the public health system as a whole These allocations, of which about 97% go for operating expenses with the rest for expansion, amounted in 1970 to an equivalent of US$1.37 billion (at the rate of US$1=22 zlotys).

The government maintains a system of emergency medical assistance, including stockpiles of equipment and supplies, which covers the whole country. The system includes a network of provincial, district, and local first-aid centers administered by the medical service in cooperation with the Red Cross and local civil defense organizations. Each of the 17 territorial provinces has an ambulance aircraft at its disposal, and emergency landing strips are designated in each rural district. Although the organization of emergency medical aid appears to be adequate, its facilities, and effectiveness are poor. The death rate from auto injuries, for example, is reportedly far higher than even in neighboring Eastern European countries. This is seen by senior medical officials in the government as a reflection of serious inadequacies in the ambulance system. Moreover, continuing shortages of personnel and supplies and a probable lack of communications in rural areas would further hinder the operation of the system in time of natural disaster or other crisis.

2. Sanitation and utilities (U/OU)

Although rapid strides have been made in the availability of water and sanitation services both in urban and rural areas, serious inadequacies remain. In 1950, for example, nearly half of Poland's urban areas lacked a central water and sewerage system; in 1970, between 20% and 25% of urban areas still were not equipped with these utilities. Moreover, many of the existing central waterworks and central sewerage systems are in poor condition, and a shortage of equipment for water purification exists. Except in the large cities, the potability of water remains below Western standards. In most rural areas, water is obtained from open wells, springs, and streams; contamination is frequent because of proximity to human and animal waste. During the regularly occurring flood seasons, contamination of water, even in urban areas, is widespread. As part of the consumer welfare programs of the Gierek regime, ambitious plans exist to construct water reservoir and other flood

control systems, build new water purification and sewerage treatment plants, expand and modernize existing facilities, and hook up additional urban housing to existing networks of these and other public utilities.

In the urban areas the availability of modern utilities, such as running hot and cold water, central heating, and laundry facilities, is increasing. Nevertheless, the mass housing projects of the immediate postwar period accorded relatively low priority to modern plumbing and the distribution of other utilities. For this reason, the average urban multiple-unit housing project in the smaller towns still lacks many of the utilities considered essential by Western standards. In 1970 the following percentages of urban housing were equipped with the utilities listed:

Central water system	80.3
Sewerage system	76.2
Electricity	100.0
Gas	36.8
Central heating (by steam from central plant)	35.1

Some housing units, particularly older housing, are not connected to these utilities even in urban areas where all of them were centrally available. The smaller cities and towns, mainly under 50,000 in population, where lack of central utilities is more prevalent, are the main factors in depressing the average figures in the above tabulation. In 1970 only three of the 51 cities with a population over 50,000 lacked any one of the utilities listed; in these three, a fully developed gas network did not exist.

The electrification of urban areas was officially declared completed by 1965. The most marked progress, however, was made in rural electrification, which was of negligible proportions in the prewar period and had extended to almost 90% of all rural communities by 1970.

The issue of environmental protection has been slow to arise in Poland; economic development, rather than safeguards against its environmental effects, apparently remains the chief concern of the country's leaders. In some regions, such as in the heavily industrialized province of Katowice, the old textile center of Lodz, and even in the Warsaw area, air pollution—primarily of airborne ash and coal soot—chronically remains at alarming levels. This is compounded by the widespread use of high-sulphur-content coals. Better grades of coal continue to be reserved for export. The situation with respect to surface waters is even worse. In 1972 the government revealed that only 25% of all such waters meet municipal requirements, and 30% of the total river length was below "admissible pollution standards."

Nevertheless, proliferating central and local government study groups have paid increasing attention to water and air pollution within the framework of the Gierek regime's effort to improve the quality of life, and Poland probably leads the East European countries in discussion of environmental controls. The revised 1971-75 economic plan includes ambitious goals of developing new industrial technologies to curb air and water pollution, and calls for such systems to be included in the planning of new industrial enterprises. Western observers, however, are pessimistic with regard to the implementation of any really ameliorative measures in the near future.

3. Nutrition (U/OU)

After years of deprivation and want among the citizenry, the economy had recovered sufficiently by 1955 to provide a daily intake of between 3,100 and 3,200 calories. Nevertheless, some nutritional deficiencies continue to exist, due largely to a disproportionate amount of starches and fats in the diet. This nutritional imbalance is largely the result of periodic shortages and high prices of such protein- and mineral-rich foods as meat, milk, fruits, and vegetables, but it is also the result of ingrained dietary habits, especially among the peasantry. Despite these factors the Polish diet compares favorably in most respects with those obtaining in other East European countries, especially in the relative intake of milk and dairy products, although it lags in most respects behind the best-fed countries of Western Europe and the United States (Figure 28).

Polish dietary attitudes differ from those elsewhere in Eastern Europe primarily in the consideration of meat as a staple. Despite government efforts to popularize greater dietary variety, especially of fish and other protein foods, the average Pole is still predisposed to use the relative availability of high-quality pork and veal as a basis for judging the overall level of his diet. For this reason, government data citing rising consumption of meat, which is said to have increased by nearly 50% between 1950 and 1970, have been used to bolster claims of improved living conditions. Nevertheless, maldistribution and spoilage not only of meat but of other food supplies aggravate periodic natural shortages and diminish in the popular mind whatever real increases in per capita consumption are made on a yearly basis. Indeed, one of the key economic factors underlying the December

FIGURE 28. Daily per capita food consumption, selected countries (U/OU)

		CALORIES	PROTEIN	CEREALS	MILK AND DAIRY PRODUCTS	MEAT
				In grams		
U.S.S.R.	(1964–66)	3,180	92	428	476	106
East Germany	(1964–66)	3,040	76	270	316	171
Czechoslovakia	(1964–66)	3,030	83	348	356	167
Hungary	(1968)	3,140	97	362	317	147
POLAND	(1964–66)	3,140	93	383	552	138
Bulgaria	(1964–66)	3,070	91	532	236	109
Romania	(1964–66)	3,010	87	500	319	105
Yugoslavia	(1967)	3,200	93	514	281	85
Albania	(1964–66)	2,370	71	435	255	84
United States	(1968)	3,240	96	178	671	299
France	(1967)	3,180	100	225	601	227
United Kingdom	(1968–69)	3,180	88	202	595	205
West Germany	(1966–68)	2,920	79	192	522	193
Spain	(1968–69)	2,680	82	242	322	115
Greece	(1967)	2,900	99	331	448	111
Turkey	(1964–66)	2,770	78	474	219	39

1970 workers' revolt was the worsening shortage of meat throughout the country in the fall of that year. Painfully aware of the role of meat in the Polish diet and its importance to the people in determining their relative well-being, the Gierek regime immediately on taking office authorized large-scale imports of meat and initiated measures to stimulate domestic meat production in order to assure larger supplies in the future.

A notable postwar achievement has been the marked equalization of the urban and rural diet as compared with the prewar period. In 1938 the average peasant's consumption of meat and fats amounted to about one-fifth of that consumed by the urban dweller, but by the early 1960's rural consumption had reached and in many instances exceeded the level of the urban regions.

As distinct from shortages and maldistribution, marked seasonal variations in the availability of some foods are expected and accepted by the people. This is due to the prevalent practice of home storage and preservation of such periodically out-of-season foods as potatoes, fruits, vegetables, and even eggs. Although the increasing availability of home refrigerators is altering the traditional pattern of food purchasing, the continuing lack of refrigerated bulk transport of foods, together with outdated food processing, packaging, and distributing facilities, still necessitates frequent purchases of small quantities of perishables from local sources.

Although new self-service supermarket facilities and smaller outlets of the same type are gradually appearing in urban areas (Figures 29 and 30)—permitting shopping "under one-roof" and stimulating the demand for packaged, preprocessed foods—most retail purchases of food are still conducted through specialized shops or at open-air, private, peasant stalls (Figure 31). Sanitary supervision and control over foodstuffs is officially exercised in major municipal centers and is well-developed in food export enterprises. Elsewhere, however, existing controls at the wholesale level are often offset by poor handling at the retail level. As a result, the meticulousness of the Polish housewife in food purchasing and the prevalence of thoroughly cooked food in the diet remain the best safeguard of the consumer.

G. Religion (C)

Poland's 1,000-year-old Roman Catholic tradition and the consequent strong ties with Western Christian culture are the basic causes of the gulf between popular values and aspirations and the goals of the Communist regime. Moreover, the conceptual unity of the church and nation, the link between Polish patriotism and Roman Catholicism, is explicit in such expressions as "Hail Mary, Queen of Poland." This refers to the defeat of the Swedes at Czestochowa in 1655 through the alleged miraculous intervention of the holy painting known since as the Black Madonna, so called because of its charred color which is said to have resulted from a fire set by the besieging Swedish forces (but is in fact the result of a patina of old varnish). A grateful Polish king, restored to his throne,

FIGURE 29. Supermarket in Warsaw (U/OU)

proclaimed the Madonna as Queen of Poland, an appointment renewed each year on 26 August at the Jasna Gora monastery in Czestochowa in the presence of pilgrims from throughout Poland (Figure 32).

In the Middle Ages, Polish forces fighting under the sign of the cross stemmed the advance of the Turks and the Tatars into Europe on several occasions. Later, the aggressive actions of a Lutheran Prussia and an Orthodox Russia strengthened the identification between Roman Catholicism and the Polish nation. During the subsequent period of Poland's partition among its neighbors, the church as an institution remained intact and, in the absence of a Polish state, formed the most important unifying factor among the Poles. In consequence of this historic background, the Communist efforts after World War II to uproot religious belief and remove the institutional church as a competitor for the allegiance of the people—some 95% of whom are Roman Catholics and about three-quarters are practicing believers—became in the popular mind nothing less than the assault by a foreign power against the whole national identity. Thus, despite a generation of Communist rule, for most Poles the church still incarnates legitimate nationhood, and the Communist regime merely its institutional form. Not surprisingly, sporadic tests of strength and will have characterized church-state relations throughout the postwar era, with periods of truce occurring when both were acting in Poland's national interests.

Since December 1970 the regime of Edward Gierek has taken several unprecedented, conciliatory steps toward the church which, taken together, suggest a new basis for Polish church-state relations under Communist rule. Gomulka and earlier Communist leaders believed that Poland's religious tradition and the development of socialism were mutually exclusive and sought to demolish the former by a series of confrontations alternating with grudging truces. The Gierek regime—though no less committed to atheism—appears to have realized the identity in the popular mind between Poland's statehood and its Roman Catholic heritage. As a result, the new leadership has sought at least the passive support of the church hierarchy and laity. Within 3 days of assuming power on 20 December 1970, the new regime publicly offered to "normalize" relations with the church. In March 1971 Premier Jaroszewicz personally met with Poland's Roman Catholic Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski; since then a series of discussions has taken place not only between the church and state officials, but also between the Polish Government and the Vatican. The latter

FIGURE 30. Self-service grocery typical of most urban areas (U/OU)

FIGURE 31. Open-air peasants' market, Warsaw (U/OU)

FIGURE 32. As many as one-half million pilgrims attend the annual August religious services in Czestochowa. Many have walked in procession (above) from Warsaw, about 120 miles away. (U/OU)

negotiations could lead to a formal agreement and, according to some sources, eventually to a concordat establishing diplomatic relations.

Even under Gierek's predecessors, the ubiquitious presence of the church in Poland and its influence in national affairs was never seriously threatened. In fact, periods of frontal attack by the regime generally strengthened the support of "the flock for its shepherd," in the words of Cardinal Wyszynski. Unique in the Communist world in its ability to withstand the onslaught of totalitarianism, the church in Poland remained throughout the postwar period not only a spiritual symbol of opposition to Communist rule but, unlike its traditionally weaker counterparts in some other Eastern European countries, periodically and generally successfully challenged the regime for the allegiance of the people.

The Roman Catholic hierarchy in Poland under the leadership of Cardinal Wyszynski—who also holds the positions of Archbishop of Gniezno and Warsaw—consists of two additional cardinals—Karol Cardinal Wojtyla of Krakow and Boleslaw Cardinal Kominek of Wroclaw—two additional archbishops, and some 65 bishops (Figure 33). Ecclesiastical administration includes 27 dioceses, subdivided into 6,346 parishes (Figure 34). In 1970 there were nearly 12,000 churches and chapels, and 13,765 diocesan priests. In addition, there were some 148 orders which operated 47

FIGURE 33. Leading members of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy in Wrocław Cathedral, May 1970. From left: Archbishop Baraniak of Poznań; Karol Cardinal Wojtyła of Kraków; Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński of Warsaw, Primate of Poland; Archbishop Kominek of Wrocław (elevated to Cardinal in March 1973); and Bishop Kałwa of Lublin. (U/OU)



FIGURE 34. Administrative divisions, Roman Catholic Church, 1972 (U/OU)

theological seminaries, 550 monasteries with 7,756 monks, and 2,630 convents with 27,507 nuns. The church also operates the prestigious Catholic University of Lublin—the only religious institution of higher learning in the Communist world—and a number of schools, orphanages, old-age homes, and other institutions of social welfare.

In sharp contrast to the interwar period when the nature of the state and the fundamental laws of the land insured the Catholic Church a privileged secular as well as religious position, the postwar Communist regime effected not only a separation of the church and state—a principle which is contested by Cardinal Wyszyński—but sought to eliminate the church as an institution wielding social and political influence. In this, the regime's policy was, as it continues to be, formulated on the highest levels of the party leadership, and implemented by the governmental Office of Religious Affairs. This office is directly subordinate to the Premier, but is known to have closely cooperated with the Polish security apparatus at times of church-state tensions. In this conflict with the church, the regime also has used several specialized organizations and institutions, generally dedicated to promulgating proselytizing under the guise of a rationalist philosophy. Among these is the quasi-Catholic and economically strong PAX organization, which under the leadership of its charismatic and ex-Fascist leader, Bolesław Piasecki, generally supports regime positions but is known to seek power for its own sake. Like its weaker offshoot, the so-called Christian Social Association, PAX is not connected with the Roman Catholic Church and has been unsuccessful in diluting the influence of the church among the people. Similarly, the regime has had little success in promoting the concept of "patriotic priests," i.e., generally parish-level clergy who would support regime positions in contravention of the official stand by the Roman Catholic episcopate. Wholly secular mass organizations propagating antireligious views included, until 1960, the Association of Freethinkers and Atheists and the Lay School Society. The two merged in April of that year to form the Society for the Propagation of Lay Culture. The merger was in fact a regime effort to reverse the poor record of achievement of the two organizations working separately.

In contrast to the multifaceted antireligious apparatus of the state, the church for many years has been deprived of virtually all means of speaking out except from the pulpit—but it has used this right with telling effect. There are no mass Catholic organizations in the country. Of the few lay Catholic organizations, the most significant is the group of Catholic parliamentary deputies *Znak* (Sign). In the immediate post-1956 period, *Znak* was the closest

approximation to an organized political opposition to exist in any Communist state, but in the later years of the Gomulka regime, its value was largely symbolic. Finally, the Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals, lay groups which were also most active during the post-1956 period, continue to exist but have generally shunned controversial issues.

Despite the official postwar policy of repressing the church as an institution and as a moral force, the Polish people have never been denied freedom of worship. Attendance at Mass, baptism, religious weddings, last rites, and funerals are freely observed by the majority of the population. Moreover, regime policy toward religious observances by those who hold responsible party or state positions has been uneven, and generally related to the "public visibility" of such behavior. Many such persons have lost their jobs because of religious practice, and most risk doing so, but few are known to have been persecuted any further as a result. The public commitment by the Gierek regime to eliminate social, economic, and political discrimination because of one's religious practice suggests a further expansion of this pragmatic policy.

The peak of religious repression during the Stalinist period of the early 1950's coincided with a religious revival which served as an expression of popular hostility toward the state. Although periodic confrontations between the church and state thereafter generally served to bolster popular support for the church, they also served to weaken the moral authority of both sides among that part of the population which was uncommitted to either. That this fact was not lost on either of the protagonists was perhaps the single most important reason for the gradual though halting improvement of church-state relations in the late 1960's.

After Gomulka returned to power in 1956, Cardinal Wyszynski, who had been removed from office and held in secret confinement since 1953, was released from detention. An agreement between the church and state in December 1956 to remove certain points of friction was hailed by both parties and resulted in limited church support for the new regime in the January 1957 elections. In mid-1957 Cardinal Wyszynski formally received the red hat of a cardinal from Pope Pius XII during a 6-week visit to Rome. The rapid stabilization of Gomulka's power, however, soon heralded a virtual nullification of most of the guarantees contained in the 1956 accord. In contrast to the previous practice of overt physical repression, the Gomulka regime accomplished its goals by a flexible policy of gradual encroachment on church influence. It was relatively successful in encouraging a growing secularization of Polish life through restrictions on religious activities. These restrictions included the elimination of religious instruction from state schools in 1961, the closure of virtually all Catholic schools (with the significant exception of the Catholic University of Lublin), seizures of church property, exorbitant taxation, barring public religious processions except when permits were issued by the state, harassment of religious orders and seminaries, elimination of the church press, and the use of relatively sophisticated antireligious propaganda.

The most serious church-state confrontation of the past decade took place in 1966 during the simultaneous celebrations of a thousand years of Christianity in Poland and of Polish nationhood. The regime's vehement reaction to the church's extensive program of activities included the party's main charge that the Polish episcopate was intent on using the millennium observances to stress the church's traditional position as a "bulwark" of Western civilization against encroachments from the East. This charge, the church's strong defense from the pulpit, and rival government observances of the state's millennium provided occasions for friction and for several confrontations throughout the summer of 1966.

By the end of 1966, however, both sides were making serious efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to the resolution of some of their differences. A direct dialogue between the church and the state was reestablished with several meetings of a joint church-state commission, and exploratory talks concerning a possible future accommodation between the regime and the Vatican were initiated.

Thus, in the late 1960's, church-state relations entered a more hopeful stage in which both sides apparently believed that a truce would redound to their advantage. A mutual renunciation of polemics resulted in the church's neutrality during the regime's internal political crisis in mid-1967 and throughout 1968, when Cardinal Wyszynski abstained from strong condemnation of either official anti-Semitism in Poland or the regime's participation in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. This forbearance apparently was the main reason he was given government permission to visit Rome in late 1968, the first time he had been permitted to leave the country since the events of 1966. Moreover, in August 1969, Cardinal Wojtyla was permitted to travel to Rome and then to visit ethnic Polish communities in Canada and the United States, a trip originally scheduled for, but denied to, Wyszynski in 1966.

The situation in church-state relations that was inherited by Gierek in late 1970, therefore, was not wholly bleak, but needed to be imbued with additional good will and trust on both sides. There were early indications by the Gierek regime that several major symbolic gestures were being considered. An important sign was renewed speculation both in Warsaw and in Rome that Pope Paul VI would visit Poland, a papal trip that also was planned for 1966 but scuttled by the church-state crisis of that year. Moreover, new possibilities were raised in 1972 for the long-postponed visit to the United States by Cardinal Wyszynski. An invitation for such a visit was proferred to Wyszynski by John Cardinal Krol of Philadelphia, when he visited Poland in October 1972. The notably warm welcome extended to Cardinal Krol by Polish officials as well as by the church reflected also the generally improved U.S.-Polish relations in the wake of President Nixon's visit to Poland on 31 May-1 June 1972.

Good will alone, however, would not have permitted the Gierek regime to seek a meaningful improvement in church-state relations were it not for a confluence of other events; the most important of these was the ratification by West Germany in 1972 of a treaty with Poland which it had signed 2 weeks before Gomulka's downfall in December 1970.

Throughout the postwar period, the Vatican had consistently adhered to the Western position that the permanency of Poland's postwar borders could be established only by a peace treaty. The attitude of the Holy See toward the ecclesiastical administration of the former German territories under Polish control (Figure 34) was a major irritant both to church-state relations in Poland and to the regime's relations with the Vatican. Both the regime and the Polish episcopate, in fact, had pressed the Vatican to "regularize" ecclesiastical administration in the former German territories in line with postwar territorial changes. In 1951, Cardinal Wyszynski, then an archbishop, persuaded the Vatican to appoint Polish bishops to the dioceses in these territories. The Polish regime of the period, however, spurned the papal nominees, and it was only in 1956 that they were permitted to assume their posts. The territories in question were subsequently administered by these "temporary" Polish bishops under Cardinal Wyszynski, but with only the *de facto* and not *de jure* Vatican recognition of diocesan boundaries corresponding to postwar political frontiers. Thereafter, the Vatican attempted to deal with the legal and emotional dilemma of its position, noting that church-state relations in Poland suffered because of this unresolved issue. In May 1967, Pope Paul VI took steps designed in part to withdraw this issue from contention by appointing the "temporary" bishops in these territories as apostolic administrators directly subordinate to the Holy See. This move, together with the simultaneous appointment of an additional Polish cardinal, the former archbishop of Krakow, Wojtyla, tended to introduce new blood into the Polish hierarchy and to blur Cardinal Wyszynski's dominance of the episcopate. Wyszynski reportedly welcomed these moves as leading to diminished pressure from the regime; the latter, however, continued to maintain that the Vatican position on the issue of Poland's borders was essentially as unsatisfactory as before.

By early 1970, when negotiations on the West German-Polish treaty were underway, there were renewed hopes among Polish church sources that any form of West German recognition of Poland's western frontiers would ultimately affect the Vatican's position on this issue. In June 1971, the new Gierek regime took another major step toward the church—perhaps seeking to influence the Vatican's stand on the border issue in advance of West German ratification of the treaty—by granting the Polish church legal title to the former German church property in the territories gained by Poland after World War II. These properties were generally used by the church, but legally were part of all those former German properties accruing to the Polish state after World War II.

The Vatican was not swayed, however, and only following the treaty's ratification took the step, on 28 June 1972, of appointing the existing titular prelates, acting as apostolic administrators, to the status of bishops ordinary, and of reorganizing the diocesan administration in the former German territories to conform to the state frontiers. In general, the diocesan boundaries temporarily established after World War II in these territories remained intact. Three of the four dioceses in question—Opole, Wroclaw, and Warmia—retained their boundaries unchanged, while the fourth—Gorzow—was divided into three new dioceses—Gorzow, Szczecin-Kamien, and Koszalin-Kolobrzeg (Figure 34). From the Vatican point of view, however, four new dioceses were created: the three formed from the former diocese of Gorzow, plus the diocese of Opole which was the only newly created one among those temporarily established after World War II. The dioceses of Wroclaw and Warmia, by contrast, were created in the years 1000 and 1243, respectively. The elevation of the Archbishop of Wroclaw, Boleslaw Kominek, to Cardinal at the papal consistory in March 1973 seemed further to underscore

the Vatican's decision to regard the former German territories, for ecclesiastical purposes, as permanently Polish.

Despite the church's newly hopeful position in 1972, friction continues to exist between the authorities and the hierarchy, and particularly between the authorities and the parish clergy. Moreover, some of this friction is self-generating, and stems from the church's acknowledgment of Catholicism's weakening ideological position, especially among the increasingly skeptical younger generation. As a unique blend of nationalism and religion, Catholicism in Poland has long been strong as an institution and weak as a philosophy; it is virtually invincible to an open assault carried out in the name of an alien ideology, but relatively vulnerable to piecemeal encroachments under the cover of a nationalist philosophy. The lines of philosophical conflict were intensified over the years as a large segment of the Polish intelligentsia combined its formal adherence to Catholicism with growing anticlericalism and skepticism, while at the same time most priests, usually drawn from the peasantry, have maintained their attachment to the dogmatic rather than the intellectual side of Catholicism. The postwar Communist regimes have sought to exploit these weaknesses and to charge that Cardinal Wyszynski's concept of the "church militant" in Poland has been deliberately used to incite church-state clashes as a means of counteracting growing religious indifference.

The Polish hierarchy continues to be deeply steeped in traditionalism and conservatism and is wary of even accepted innovations within the Roman Catholic Church since the reign of Pope John XXIII. Many apparently feel that change of any kind would weaken the church's ability to continue its major role within an antagonistic secular framework. At the same time, there is some evidence that younger elements within the Polish clergy are seeking ways to overcome the weaknesses of the Polish church, and to imbue it more with the spirit of ecumenism emanating from Vatican II. By doing so, they hope to recapture the national allegiance of the youth and the intellectuals, as well as the growing numbers of the uncommitted and indifferent.

Although Cardinal Wojtyla's loyalty to the concept of church unity in general and to Cardinal Wyszynski in particular is not questioned, there are signs that some younger prelates consider Wojtyla as embodying more than Wyszynski (the two prelates were 51 and 71 years old, respectively, in 1970) the ecumenism and intellectual content of Catholicism that they feel will be needed in coming decades. Because of the existence of the Communist regime as an external protagonist, notwithstanding the new attitudes of the Gierek leadership, the potential for future conflict between conservatism and liberalism within the Polish church is small. Nevertheless, the character of this potential conflict within the Polish church mirrors the situation of Roman Catholicism in some Western European countries—the dilemma of imbuing old forms with new content without compromising the catholic nature of the church as an institution. Figure 33, showing a 17th century church in rural Krakow province and a new church in industrial Silesia, symbolizes in some ways the old and the new forces at work within Polish Roman Catholicism.

The traditional dominance of Roman Catholicism in Poland was further heightened as a result of wartime population losses and territorial shifts. These changes reduced or eliminated the sizable prewar ethnic minorities who were generally identical with the religious minorities. The estimated 2% to 3% of the population that is not Roman Catholic belongs to some 18 other officially recognized religious denominations. The most sizable of these include approximately 100,000 adherents of the Uniate Church, which follows the Greek Catholic rite but acknowledges the authority of Rome. Protestants number about 300,000, the majority of whom are Lutherans. Followers of the Greek Orthodox Church have been variously estimated at between 100,000 to 350,000, most of whom reside in the former German territories and some in the extreme north and east. The Polish (National) Catholic Church, which was formed in 1870 by a Polish group in the United States in protest against the doctrine of papal infallibility and later spread to Poland, is estimated to have about 80,000 adherents. It has been unsuccessfully used by the Communist regime as a pawn in the struggle with the Roman Catholic clergy at lower levels. In addition, there are small numbers of Calvinists, Methodist, Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, and Muslims. There were more than 3 million Jews in prewar Poland, but Nazi extermination policies and postwar emigration has reduced their number to an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 in 1972. Interreligious frictions have virtually disappeared because of the negligible number of non-Roman Catholics, but latent anti-Semitism, which has both social and political origins, remains a problem.



FIGURE 35. Contrasting styles in church architecture. A 17th century wooden church at Grywald, southern Poland (top), and a new church at Drogomysl, also in southern Poland (bottom). (U/OU)

H. Education (C)

1. The national context

The major educational goals of the postwar Communist regimes in Poland have been twofold: first, to mold a new "socialist man" whose strong ideological convictions would lead him to virtually automatic support of regime policies, and second, the expansion of mass education, combined with the reorientation of students in higher schools from the traditional academic disciplines—such as the liberal arts, law, and the social sciences—toward technical studies and economics. Over the years, the government has succeeded in achieving the second goal, but its success, paradoxically, has been the main reason why it has failed to achieve the first.

Historically, Poland's educational system has been deeply steeped in humanist tradition along French and German philosophical lines, decidedly influenced by religion, and supported by the state. Despite periods of internal turmoil and pre-World War I domination by Germany, Austria, and Russia, the interwar Polish Government succeeded in a remarkable assimilation of diverse educational principles, and on the eve of World War II Poland's academic system was regarded as one of the best in Europe. Despite the widened accessibility of educational opportunity, however, schools of higher learning during the interwar period were still characterized by a high degree of ingrown exclusiveness and overemphasis on legal and humanistic studies far exceeding the needs of the society. As a result, interwar Poland had problems with a qualified, unemployed, and often alienated intelligentsia long before the term became current elsewhere. In keeping with the rapid postwar industrialization and urbanization, the Communist government mounted a massive campaign to expand schooling facilities, to eliminate the exclusiveness of higher schools, and to put major emphasis on scientific, technical, and vocational education. The resultant virtual explosion in the numbers of educated youth within the framework of a social and political system unwilling and unable to satisfy either their material or spiritual demands has been central to the regime's conflict with the younger generation, and therefore, has been largely of its own making.

The government's postwar educational goals were hindered by the unprecedented physical destruction of the wartime period, by the rapid rise in the numbers of school-age children due to the postwar "baby-boom," and by the shortages of qualified teachers and pedagogues who, as members of the educated elite, were systematically eliminated by the Nazi occupiers. In general, the government has succeeded in all these sectors not only in overcoming the impact of the wartime period, but in creating a greatly expanded system of mass education.

Consistently rising outlays for education including an extensive program of school construction and rapid

Modern kindergartens, Warsaw

Warsaw University, inside main gate

General secondary school, Grabowek, Gdansk province

FIGURE 36. School buildings (U/OU)

strides in pedagogic training have resulted in generally good facilities in all but some rural areas. Adequacy of trained personnel has been a more persistent problem. In October 1969 the government announced that for the first time in the postwar period there was no shortage of teachers in Polish elementary schools; at the same time, however it was admitted that secondary education was short of some 20,000 teachers. Figure 36 shows postwar kindergarten and secondary school buildings, as well as traditional buildings flanking the main court of Warsaw University.

The government's emphasis on mass education is illustrated by the data in Figure 37 showing the number of schools, students, and teachers in the prewar and postwar periods. Since the mid-1960's about 10% of all children of preschool age have been enrolled in either creches (day nurseries) or kindergartens, although there is a wide discrepancy in this figure between urban and rural areas; in the latter case, there are indications that less than 1% attend such preschool centers. Greatest strides have been made in the compulsory stage of education—the 8-year basic school—which is attended by over 99% of children ages 7 through 14.

School construction has been rapid and has often been inadequately reflected in statistical data. The decline in the absolute number of elementary schools in the postwar in contrast to the prewar period, for example, reflects not only wartime destruction and Poland's territorial losses, but also the elimination of small, one-room, substandard rural schools which have been replaced by larger buildings with a larger number of classrooms.

The rise in vocational and adult education has been particularly significant. This rise has paralleled the government's campaign to eliminate illiteracy between 1949 and 1951, when the problem was officially declared nonexistent. Latest official data show that in 1968 illiteracy amounted to less than 2% of the total population. When measured as a percentage of persons 15 years of age and older, the illiteracy rate averaged 4.6% during the decade of the 1960's. This is below the European average of 5.8%, but somewhat above that of developed Western European countries. The effective elimination of

FIGURE 37. Number of schools, students, and teachers by type of school, selected years (U/OU)

	1937/38			1955/56			1970/71		
	Schools	Students	Teachers	Schools	Students	Teachers	Schools	Students	Teachers
		Thousands			*Thousands*			*Thousands*	
Preschool	1,659	83.3	*na*	8,466	377.8	*na*	8,906	498.2	*na*
Elementary	28,778	4,865.3	76.6	23,223	3,386.4	102.5	26,126	5,257.0	211.5
General secondary	777	221.4	*na*	799	201.4	10.4	858	401.3	17.5
Vocational-basic	*na*	207.5	*na*	966	154.4	31.1	6,176	905.3	34.9
Vocational-secondary	*na*		*na*	1,348	348.6		3,550	805.4	28.7
Adult-basic	226	14.6	*na*	2,028	71.8	1.4	389	46.8	0.6
Adult-secondary	*na*	*na*	*na*	189	53.8	0.6	317	135.5	1.6
Higher education	32	49.5	*na*	78	157.5	18.3	85	330.8	31.9
Total*	31,472	5,441.6	76.6	37,097	4,751.7	164.3	46,407	8,380.3	326.7

na Data not available.

*Excludes both regular and vocational schools for the handicapped. In 1970/71 there were 559 such schools with an enrollment of 86,200, and staffed by 5,800 full-time teachers.

illiteracy, especially among working and peasant class adults, resulted in the marked decline in the number of elementary (basic) schools for adults in the 1960's (Figure 37). Increasingly since then, adult education has concentrated on the secondary school level, and on higher education where it is being integrated into regular evening, part-time, and correspondence courses conducted by established institutions.

All public education, whether at the compulsory or the optional level, is tuition-free. In addition, full-time students of institutions of higher education who do not live within commuting distance are provided with free housing (dormitories) and with stipends for living expenses. Such stipends and other assistance was provided to 27% of the students of higher education in 1970/71. Elementary and secondary education is financed entirely through the central government. In 1970 state outlays for education represented about 9% of total budgetary expenditures. Virtually all teachers in the state system belong to the Polish Teachers Union, a component of the state-controlled trade union movement. A majority of teachers are Communist Party members through necessity if not by conviction.

2. The educational system

a. Organization and reform

Public education is virtually a state monopoly. The sole exceptions are the Roman Catholic University of Lublin and a negligible number of lower level schools operated by religious and charitable institutions; all of these have been brought under increasing government control, and some have been eliminated entirely. Until late 1966 control over general elementary and secondary schools was vested in the Ministry of Education, and institutes of higher learning were administered by the Ministry of Higher Education. In November 1966 the government merged the two ministries into the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. This organizational move probably was designed primarily to achieve the stated purpose of more efficient use of state educational funds and better continuity of education through the coordination of curriculums, but it also permitted the regime to put new life into its consistently flagging drive toward a "socialist" educational system via tighter central control of the entire structure.

Following the coming to power of the Gierek regime, the educational system has come under serious scrutiny, with a major overhaul scheduled for completion by 1975. As a first step, the governmental reorganization of March 1972 included the creation, once again, of two separate cabinet portfolios with responsibility for education. General education through the secondary level, including all vocational schools, is under the purview of the Ministry of Education and Training, while all higher education is administered by the new Ministry of Science, Higher Education and Technology. The nomenclature of the latter ministry graphically underscores the new regime's emphasis on the integration of higher education with the scientific and technical development of the country.

Organizationally, the educational system has been in an almost continuous state of flux throughout the post-World War II period, primarily because of changing political, social, and economic pressures

Numerous efforts from 1950 to 1956 to bring organization and curriculum closer to Soviet models seriously reduced the quality of education on all levels. Thereafter the attempts of the Gomulka regime to place emphasis on qualitative improvements consistent with what it regarded as minimum ideological criteria suffered from periodic setbacks primarily as a result of the tendency of the system toward ideological backsliding. The major educational reforms [illegible] of July 1961 affected primarily the elementary [illegible]dary school system and attempted [illegible] greater internal continuity. Similar [illegible] instituted in other Eastern European [illegible] law (which was gradually implemented [illegible] 63 and 1968) extended the length of compulsory schooling by 1 year. Elementary schools were expanded from seven to eight grades, and some courses in secondary schools were shortened from 5 to 4 years. By 1968, over 96% of all elementary school children attended schools with a full 8-year syllabus.

Higher education bore the brunt of the 1968 reforms, which were undertaken by Gomulka largely as a reflex action to the university student disturbances in March of that year. These changes represented another attempt at reinvigorating ideological indoctrination in higher education, reducing the autonomy of university "chairs," and putting new stress on the preferential selection of students with worker and peasant backgrounds. Except for the organizational shifts, these changes have again been largely nullified by simple noncompliance or impracticability. (Discussed further below, under Higher Education). The organization of the overall educational system is shown in Figure 38.

The study undertaken by the government leading toward eventual reform of the educational system was begun by the Gierek regime in January 1971 with the creation of a Committee of Experts, reporting directly to the government. The committee works integrally with the Polish Academy of Science's Committee for Research and Prognoses, which is officially dubbed Poland 2000 because it is tasked with drafting multitudinous proposals for the economic, social, scientific, educational, and sociopolitical development of the country up to the year 2000 and beyond.

The work of the Committee of Experts on educational reform has been laid out in several phases. Its initial report, presented for professional review and discussion in late 1972, concerns primarily, though not exclusively, draft plans for the further standardization of curriculums in elementary and secondary education. Subsequent phases of the study are slated



FIGURE 38. The educational system (U/OU)

to include some organizational changes, long-range expansion plans, and detailed correlations between demographical projections, economic development, and educational needs. After a "public discussion," the initial proposals are to be submitted to parliament to be put into law. Realistically, however, whatever reforms are approved will probably not begin to be implemented before 1974; in mid-1972 the Minister of Education and Training stated that implementation depended on the general progress of other developmental plans subsumed in the work of the *Poland 2000* committee.

Published discussions of the scheduled educational reforms have not been adequate to determine the basic intent of the Gierek regime. Unofficial comment, however, focusing on an analysis of the general shortcomings of the present system, reveals the probable direction of the reformers. Teacher training, for example, is still inadequate; there is built-in

rigidity in the system's approach to teaching and learning methods; professional snobbery is still rampant; there is lack of cohesion between the basic schools and some kinds of vocational training; and insufficient organization and control parallels an unresponsive bureaucracy and inflexible administration at all levels. Seeking remedies for all these ills appears to be the main goal of the studies underway since 1971. Most importantly, however, new approaches to teaching involving the selective but not uncritical importation of Western ideas may be included in the reform.

b. Programs and curriculums

Preschool education is divided into two stages. Creches (nurseries) for children up to the age of 3 are normally provided by factories and similar enterprises. Children between the ages of 3 and 7 can enter kindergartens. Most of these are directly run by the state, but an increasing number are organized by local communities under the auspices of local branches of mass organizations. Despite steady expansion of facilities, demand is still greater than available space. Preference is given to children with both parents working, and account is taken of the size of families, housing, and income.

Schooling is compulsory from the age of 7 through 14, and is provided in the basic 8-year school (*szkola podstawowa*). It is divided into two phases; from grades one to four the curriculum (Figure 39) consists mainly of Polish and mathematics, with some music, physical training, and combined art and practical work, and is taught by general teachers. Some specific subjects are introduced during this stage, such as nature study and geography. The greatest change is in grade five, when teaching turns to subject specialization. Russian language study enters at this point, as does history; other subjects, like biology, physics and chemistry, come at various points during the second phase, grades five through eight. Time is found for the additional subjects partly at the expense of others (Polish dwindles from 8 hours a week in the first year to 5 in the eighth), but mainly by the gradual increase in the number of teaching hours per week, from 18 in the first grade to 33 in the eighth grade. In the second phase it is also possible for a pupil to add extra subjects to his curriculum, such as sports, instrumental music, school choir, or a second foreign language—a choice of English, French or German.

Compulsory education ends with the basic school, and it is possible to enter employment at this point although there are legal restrictions on the type of occupations for persons under the age of 16. The great majority of basic school graduates go on to some kind of further schooling. Of the 566,709 graduates in 1970/71, 87.2% went on to other schools; 53.6% to

FIGURE 39. Basic (elementary) school curriculum, in hours per week (U/OU)

SUBJECT	GRADES I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	Total
Polish language and literature	8	10	9	9	7	7	5	5	60
Russian language	.....	.....	.....	.....	3	3	3	2	11
History	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	2	2	2	8
Citizenship	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	2	3
Nature study	.....	.....	2	2	2	.....	.....	.....	6
Biology	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	2	2	6
Geography	.....	.....	.....	2	2	2	2	2	10
Mathematics	5	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	45
Physics	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	3	3	8
Chemistry	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	2	4
Practical/technical instruction	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	16
Art			1	1	1	1	1	1	8
Music	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
Physical education	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Class teacher's period	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	1	1	1	4
Total hours weekly	18	21	23	25	29	31	33	33	213
Additional subjects:									
Western European language	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	3	2	2	7
School choir	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	.....	2
Music ensembles	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	.....	2
Sports	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	.....	2

basic vocational schools, 15.7% to secondary vocational-technical schools, and 17.9% to general secondary schools (*lyceums*).

The general secondary *lyceum* is the only academic secondary school, with a 4-year course leading to a final certificate (*matura*), which entitles the holder to apply for higher education. In some cases, basic schools and *lyceums* are organized together as 12-year schools, although this is rare and there is still a distinct break after the eighth grade. The 1961 reforms that extended the basic school to 8 years—in effect making what had been the first year in the *lyceum* into the last year of the basic school—also necessitated revised curriculums in the secondary schools. These changes emphasized updated teaching materials, the natural sciences, the polytechnical content of the courses, and additional electives (Figure 40). The changes, however, were not designed to differentiate the school into separate arts and science sectors, as happens in many other European countries, but rather to make more time available to concentrate on chosen fields while retaining the basic course for all students.

According to 1967/68 data, about two-thirds of all students who began general secondary schools successfully completed the final year with a certificate. The remainder was made up of repeaters (9%), dropouts (5.5%), and those who stayed to the end but failed to get the certificate. Of those who graduated with the *matura*, 63% went on to some form of higher education; 28% entered universities, and the rest enrolled in technical or other specialized institutions of higher learning.

Vocational and technical schools are of many types, but may be classified broadly under two categories according to the level of instruction. Basic vocational schools provide 3-year courses of training for pupils leaving the basic school at age 15. Some general educational matter is included in the curriculum, but the emphasis is overwhelmingly on mastery of the theory and practice of a particular trade, augmented by practical work in factory and workshop. Agricultural schools, with 2-year courses on average, could also be included in this category. More advanced vocational education is given in the secondary vocational-technical school, which is the equivalent of the *lyceum* and is also open to 15-year old graduates of the basic school. This provides a 5-year course (though there are some variations) with a combination of general education and vocational training in over 100 special fields—engineering, agriculture, economics, administration, health service, communications and a host of others. The final

FIGURE 40. General secondary school curriculum, in hours per week (U/OU)

SUBJECT	GRADES I	II	III	IV	Total
Polish language	4	4	4	4	16
Russian language	3	3	3	2	11
English, French or German	4	4	3	3	14
History	3	3	3	.....	9
Social study	.....	.....	.....	3	3
Biology	.....	.....	3	2	5
Hygiene	.....	.....	1	1	2
Geography	3	3	.....	.....	6
Mathematics	4	4	4	3	15
Physics	3	3	3	2	11
Astronomy	.....	.....	.....	1	1
Chemistry	2	2	2	.....	6
Technical education	3	3	3	3	12
Art and music	2	1	1	.....	4
Physical training	2	2	2	2	8
Premilitary training	1	2	2	.....	5
Options	.....	.....	.....	4	4
Total hours weekly	34	34	33	30	131
Additional subjects:					
Latin	2	2	2	2	.....
Choir or ensembles			*2		.....
Sports			*2		.....

*Activities are organized in intergrade groups from Grades I to IV.

examination covers both the vocational qualification and the *matura*, and can lead to higher or further education. There are also technical and vocational schools for students who have completed the *lyceum* or equivalent, with courses of from 1 to 3 years, depending on the special field. Unlike the vocational-technical schools, they are solely concerned with vocational instruction.

3. Higher education

There were 85 institutions of higher education in Poland in 1972, ranging from the 600-year old Jagiellonian University of Krakow to the postwar universities at Lodz, Torun, and Lublin—the last of these a state university existing alongside the Catholic University which deals mainly with theology and canon law. The newest university, at Gdansk, was formed in 1970 from the merger of higher schools of pedagogy and of economics in the area. The total number of institutions has fluctuated over the years—from 32 in the prewar period to a peak of 83 in 1951, then declining through a series of mergers to 75 in 1960, and rising again through new construction and upgraded accreditation of existing schools to the 1972 figure.

Enrollment in institutes of higher learning has increased even more significantly: from 49,500 in 1937/38 (a ratio of 14.1 per 10,000 population) to 330,800 in 1970/71 (a ratio of 101.4 per 10,000 population). The 1972 ratio is about 30% of the U.S. figure. The following tabulation gives the type and enrollment of the institutions of higher learning in the 1970/71 school year:

	Number	Students
Universities	10	97,543
Higher technical schools	18	124,855
Higher schools of art	16	5,237
Medical academies	10	22,851
Agricultural academies	7	33,515
Higher schools of economics	5	25,021
Pedagogic institutes	3	11,098
Physical education institutes	6	4,965
Theological academies	2	1,145
Teachers colleges	6	3,657
Maritime academies	2	902
Total	85	330,789

By far the greatest number of Polish higher school students are enrolled in technical and related fields of study. The extent to which students have been reoriented from the prevalent prewar academic disciplines, as well as subsequent differences in emphasis on various courses, is shown in Figure 41. The annual number of graduates of universities and



FIGURE 41. Graduates of institutions of higher learning by major fields of study, selected years (U/OU)

other schools of higher learning has fluctuated: from 21,722 in 1950/51 to a low of 16,114 in 1958/59 to a postwar high of 47,117 in 1970/71.

Nowhere have the Communist regime's problems with "bourgeois morality" and the failure of its own indoctrination programs been more persistent than in the field of higher education, which has been the most rapidly expanding area of Polish education as well as a hotbed of periodic ideological dissent.

Persistent dissent among university students in Warsaw and several other major university centers boiled over in March 1968 into open demonstrations and riots, which began as calls for the redress of genuine academic grievances and related issues of individual liberty but soon widened into broad political and economic demands. Caught off guard, the Gomulka regime took several long-range steps to reinstitute control and prevent a recurrence. Among the most important measures introduced were a newly revitalized point system for university entrance favoring children of worker, peasant and other "socially desirable" backgrounds; a new law for higher schools designed to strengthen party control at the expense of faculty power and independence; an administrative reorganization of some higher schools;

a strengthened system of mandatory classes in Marxist philosophy at the higher schools; and a compulsory manual labor program for students in higher education. In addition, influential liberal professors, many of them Jews, were purged immediately following the government's suppression of the student demonstrations by the end of March 1968. Together with the general antiliberal and anti-intellectual atmosphere which pervaded the 1968 political crisis, these measures had a cumulative deleterious effect on university students and faculty alike.

The point system, which weights university entrance examinations in favor of students of peasant and worker origin, was a direct outgrowth of party concern over the persistently disproportionate number of higher school students who were of a white-collar background. The point system as a concept in Poland was not new; what was new in 1968 was the regime's apparent determination to implement it in practice, as well as the heavy weighting given to the worker and peasant candidates. The system had never been as widespread in Poland as in the U.S.S.R. and some other Communist countries even during the Stalinist period, and after 1956 it virtually disappeared. In 1965 it was reintroduced, largely unheralded, but it was soon generally circumvented by both the regime and the students in cooperation with willing faculty. One reason for the failure of the regime prior to 1968 to implement a system which was on the books appeared to be its own realization that in many ways it ran counter to government efforts to increase markedly the number of technically and professionally qualified personnel. The same overriding factors appeared to vitiate the system soon after 1968, and the stress now placed by the Gierek regime on skill whatever its origins suggests that these provisions have again become largely dormant. As early as 1969 there were signs of evasion of the point system, particularly since widespread opposition to it included party intellectuals who felt that their own children were unjustly deterred from pursuing higher education while untalented individuals were favored. In fact, data published for the first time in 1971 revealed that little change in the social background of students in higher education had occurred between 1965/66 and 1970/71, as shown by the percentages in the following tabulation:

	Worker	Peasant	White-collar
1965/66	27.2	17.0	50.4
1970/71	29.9	15.5	50.3

Organizationally, the October 1968 legislation on higher education was designed to implement the party's resolve to establish control over the universities, and particularly to curb the power of the semi-independent faculties to shape the character of a school through their control of the curriculum, teacher selection and development, and general supervision and discipline of the student body. The operative provision of the law was, therefore, the reversal of the power positions of the rector on the one hand and that of the faculty senate and those academicians holding the traditional "chairs" or *katedry* on the other. The rector and deans are now appointed by the government rather than, as previously, elected from the senate and faculty councils. In several academic areas, such as history and philology at Warsaw University, the traditional "chairs" have been abolished along with their prerogatives—such as independent hiring of assistants, direction of their graduate study, and budget control—and incorporated as sections into newly created institutes under a party-approved director. Although the stated reason for these structural changes was the fragmentation and overlapping of research conducted by self-serving professors (in some cases true), the main aim clearly was political control. Between 1967 and 1970 the number of *katedry* in all institutions of higher education declined from 2,064 to 232, while the number of institutes rose from 62 to 598. This aspect of the 1968 reforms, although initially resisted and still unpopular among those who stood to lose their authority, seems to have the support of younger assistants and instructors and is one part of the 1968 reforms that apparently has been successful on its own terms.

The same cannot be said of ideological education and of the program of student labor. The regime decision in 1968 to revitalize ideological indoctrination in the schools included the reintroduction of mandatory Marxist-Leninist philosophy studies in the higher schools, consisting of a 4-hour, once-a-week lecture and seminar. This concept also is not entirely new; in late 1964 the regime called for the resumption at the university level of Marxist-Leninist courses which had been discontinued in 1956. The course then introduced, entitled "Rudiments of Political Science," was soon virtually nullified by the massive apathy of the students and the lack of qualified teachers. At its fifth congress in November 1968, the party called for the introduction of compulsory, paid "physical labor" for higher school students during their first three summer vacations. Such student labor, to be accomplished at farms or in the factories, had not existed in Poland since shortly before World War II when certain categories of students were obliged to work in the summer preceding their entry into a

university. The 1968 concept apparently has been successful only in cases where the practical work has involved the students' own fields of study, such as work in medical clinics, laboratories, research centers, and similar institutions. Elsewhere, however, the concept has met circumvention and abuse in practice on the part of the students, as well as by mixed feelings on the part of farm and factory managers resentful of paying wages to inexperienced and frequently malingering students. Similarly, Marxist-Leninist studies, though remaining a compulsory subject, are being vitiated by the poor quality of instruction (they are frequently given by nonprofessional party hacks) as well as by circumvention and the use of the idea of "flexibility of course content" by professional, nonparty instructors.

4. Extracurricular activities

Because of the normally heavy demands of the formal curriculum at institutions of higher learning, extracurricular activities in the general Western sense are extremely limited. Moreover, except for the very affluent, the students cannot financially afford those activities requiring special clothing or equipment. Organized sports and school teams that so actively engage the imagination and energies of many American college students normally do not exist in Poland. Most students, therefore, tend to spend such free time as they have in apolitical recreational activity and in part-time jobs to supplement their stipends.

Most extracurricular activity, whether purely recreational or more directly related to academic or practical experience, is conducted within the framework of one or another of the government-sponsored mass youth organizations. Often, such activities tend to parallel or are combined with the requirement since 1968 of practical, physical labor during summer vacations. In general, the price paid by the students for the organizations' sponsorship or underwriting of simple recreational activities is a certain amount of "socialist" activity or ideological proselytization, which varies according to organization. Most students find membership in mass organizations—and later in the party—useful if not indispensable for future career advancement, but they have generally ignored the ideological content of the activities offered by these organizations. Immediately after the disorders of 1968, the party once again made strong efforts to increase the impact of these organizations on student activities and outlook, primarily under the guise of expanding the activities of student government bodies. The regime also purged the leadership of these organizations and installed the few Communist zealots available. This was particularly true of the Polish Students Association (ZSP), a university-level organization whose activities were the most ideologically barren of all and generally confined to catering to the student's material and recreational needs. Most Polish students belonged to this organization in preference to the wider-based Union of Socialist Youth and the small Union of Rural Youth.

In early 1973 the regime took steps, in the face of some student opposition, to merge the student membership of all the existing youth organizations into the Socialist Union of Polish Students (SZSP), an organization designed to improve party control and pursue a more energetic and uniform ideological indoctrination program. The ultimate structure and effectiveness of the new organization remains to be seen, but it is expected that some of the more popular activities (Figure 42) will be continued in order to attract student support.

FIGURE 42. Weekend camping trips in areas near Warsaw proved popular with students when sponsored by the now defunct Polish Students' Association (U/OU)

5. Foreign students and exchanges

Since 1957 student exchanges with other Communist countries have been augmented by the operation of several educational exchange programs with non-Communist countries, including the United States. The latter have been negotiated both on a bilateral government basis and on a direct basis by individual colleges, universities, and research centers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Science, Higher Education, and Technology exercise joint supervision over these programs in Poland, although other ministries and government agencies cooperate in the selection of students for training abroad and in the sponsorship of foreign students in local institutions of higher learning. Figure 43 shows the fluctuations, but general rise, in the number of foreign students enrolled in Polish higher schools during the decade of the 1960's by selected countries of origin. Of the total of 2,576 foreign students acknowledged by the regime in 1970/71, 45% were said to be enrolled in higher technical schools, and 1.5% in medical academies.

On the basis of published data, Poland's effort to train foreign students—especially those of developing countries—and to reap political or other benefits thereby, has never been as extensive as that of some other Eastern European countries; even Bulgaria, for example, hosted over 3,000 foreign students in 1970/71. Nevertheless, the overall total as officially made public probably understates the number of foreign nationals undergoing some form of training and schooling in Poland by as much as 150%. The total of 2,576 in 1970/71, for example is known to exclude all vocational trainees, and certainly such categories as full-time students of Communist theory and practice sponsored by party-to-party programs. Moreover, a highly developed program for young North Vietnamese has been in operation since the mid-1960's; this includes theoretical schooling as well as practical training in factories, shipyards, research institutions, and medical facilities. In 1970/71 the contingent of North Vietnamese trainees of all kinds was variously estimated at between 2,000 and 4,000. The total number of Polish students abroad is not available; the number of postgraduate students studying abroad has fluctuated from a high of 1,640 in 1956 to a low of 321 in 1960. In the 1970/71 academic year there were 803 Polish students engaged in university studies abroad, the largest single group being in the U.S.S.R.

FIGURE 43. Full-time foreign students enrolled in Polish higher schools, selected years (U/OU)

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	1961/62	1965/66	1970/71
Albania	13	0	0
Bulgaria	71	184	154
People's Republic of China	42	20	5
East Germany	14	20	135
Czechoslovakia	5	73	113
North Vietnam	60	43	725
France	11	25	19
Cuba	0	69	26
Nigeria	0	50	96
Sudan	25	87	118
Syria	30	73	129
U.S.S.R.	8	21	103
Other countries*	369	699	953
Total	648	1,364	2,576

*Generally developing countries of the third world.

I. Artistic and cultural expression

Polish artistic and intellectual expression throughout the country's history has been largely the adaptation of Western European trends to national needs and aspirations. Polish culture reached the peak of its development in the first half of the 19th century, during the period of Partition, when writers and artists fused an intensely patriotic spirit with the principles of Western European romanticism. But in every century of the past millennium the major intellectual movements and artistic styles stirring the West have been the decisive forces in Polish art and learning. Shortly after World War II, the traditional pattern and structure of cultural development became threatened by a Communist regime determined to substitute Soviet for Western models in the arts and sciences, Marxism-Leninism for Roman Catholicism and Western humanism, and regimentation for intellectual freedom. With the initial liberalization of Communist rule after October 1956, Polish artistic and cultural life reentered the Western mainstream. Seemingly, the creative intelligentsia were in a unique position to synthesize East-West views and so serve as a bridge between the two worlds. Although this concept of Poland's cultural role soon collided with Soviet reassertions of its own primacy in ideological matters, it has continued to inspire the work of much of the creative intelligentsia. The regime of Edward Gierek, in power since December 1970, has made no significant formal departures in cultural policy, but its liberal interpretation of standing "rules," willingness to harness cultural traditions in the national interest even when they clash with Marxism-Leninism, and a pragmatic attitude toward the creative intelligentsia



FIGURE 44. These 14th century liturgical articles for the celebration of Holy Mass show the skill of Polish artisans in the decorative arts (U/OU)

all suggest that Polish artistic and cultural expression may be newly revitalized, at least in comparison with the deadening cultural impact of Gomulka's last years. (C)

1. Historical development (U/OU)

The cultural history of Poland became part of the European mainstream in the 10th century with the nation's conversion to Roman Catholicism; the consequent adoption of the Latin alphabet and of Latin as the literary language provided the foundations for an ever-increasing Western orientation. Early growth was marked by the dominant influence of the church in all branches of art and learning. The Gothic style flourished in the architecture, sculpture, painting, and ornamentation of the 14th and 15th centuries (Figure 44), finding perhaps its finest expression in the work of the sculptor Wit Stwosz of Krakow; that city was the seat of the royal court until 1596 (Figure 45). The University of Krakow (later Jagiellonian University), founded in 1364, became a center of mathematical and astronomical learning and gave to Western science one of its greater astronomers, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543); major observances of the 500th anniversary of Copernicus' birth are scheduled for 1973 (Figure 46). In the 16th century, the growth of Poland's political might and economic prosperity and such impulses as Italian Renaissance humanism and Protestantism stimulated an artistic and intellectual development that marked the period as the "golden age" of Polish culture. Particular achievement took place in literature, with Mikolaj Rej (1505-68) producing the first truly original writing in Polish and thus earning the title "father of Polish literature." The following century saw the gradual decline of Polish culture. Only architecture continued to flourish; the baroque style, introduced by the Jesuits, proved congenial to the Polish spirit and was used extensively in the construction of palaces and churches. Beginning in the mid-18th century an "age of enlightenment," inspired by close contact with France, brought a revival of intellectual life. As part of an extensive educational



FIGURE 45. Wawel, the Royal Castle in Krakow (U/OU)

FIGURE 46. The United States also joined in the festivities honoring Copernicus' 500th anniversary by issuing a commemorative stamp and by participating in a series of prestigious gatherings among the scientific community (U/OU)

reform, Polish replaced Latin as the language of instruction in schools. An interest in drama led to the founding of the Polish National Theater in 1765. In poetry, two important trends in the classical tradition of the "golden age" appeared—one of a rationalistic nature under Ignacy Krasicki (1735-1801), the other of a lyric-sentimental nature under Franciszek Karpinski (1741-1825). An awakening of national and social consciousness introduced sweeping political reform, which came too late, however, to forestall the final partition of Poland in 1795.

In the period of Partition, the continued existence of the national spirit manifested itself in a great creative outpouring, especially in literature. The first of three main literary movements of this period was inspired by the romanticism of Western Europe, where most of the Polish cultural elite lived in exile after the uprising of 1830-31. Dominating the Polish romantic movement were three outstanding exiled poets whose work propagated a messianic role for Poland and a concept of patriotism that became the "religion of the fatherland"—Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), leader of the movement and Poland's greatest writer; Juliusz Slowacki (1809-49), who was also a distinguished dramatist; and Zygmunt Krasinski (1812-59). In Poland, the most representative figure was Jozef Ignacy Kraszewski (1812-87), a prolific author of historical novels. Romanticism also produced Poland's greatest musical genius, Frederic Chopin (1810-49), whose compositions are associated with such national musical expressions as the mazurka and the polonaise (Figure 47).

After the abortive 1863 uprising against Russia, there developed a movement known as positivism, which renounced armed resistance for constructive work and generally gave voice to a rationalistic rather than romantic outlook. Typical of this view was the scholarly work of the Krakow historical school, which expounded the thesis that Poland's downfall was caused by its own shortcomings. In literature, numerous distinguished novelists appeared, among them Boleslaw P (1847-1912) and Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846-19. 5), author of the internationally

FIGURE 47. Frederic Chopin (U/OU)

known *Quo Vadis* and winner of the 1905 Nobel Prize. An historical trend in painting found its most illustrious representative in Jan Matejko (1838-93). Toward the end of the 19th century, positivism gave way to a neoromantic movement called Young Poland, which developed in close association with Western European art and literature. The foremost literary personalities were Stefan Zeromski (1864-1925), a novelist intensely concerned with social and national problems; Wladyslaw Reymont (1868-1925), whose monumental epic, *Chlopi* (The Peasants), earned him the Nobel Prize in 1924; and Stanislaw Wyspianski (1869-1907), almost equally gifted in poetry, drama, and painting. In painting, impressionistic and symbolistic trends modeled after the French dominated, but they were tempered by the rediscovery of native folk art and architecture of the southern Tatry mountains.

Restoration of Poland's independence at the end of World War I released intellectual life from its almost exclusive preoccupation with political affairs. Freed from the "sacred burden" of pursuing national goals, writers in the decade of the 1920's focused their efforts on a lyric poetry which dealt with present-day life in the modern city and abounded in innovation and

experimentation. Among several poetic groups the foremost was *Skamander* (named after a literary monthly), whose main figures were Juljan Tuwim (1894-1954) and Antoni Slonimski (1895-). In the 1930's, the novel moved to the foreground, the human personality becoming the predominant theme. Representative of this period are the humanistic novels of Maria Dabrowska (1892-1965), whose masterpiece *Noce i dni* (Nights and Days) shows the influence of Western writers, including the Polish-born English novelist, Joseph Conrad (1857-1924). Of all literary genres in the interwar period, drama was weakest. Many trends in painting appeared, almost all having ties with the various "isms" fashionable in Western Europe. Architecture, the most neglected of the arts during the period of Partition, tended towards a monumental style possessed of little inspiration or originality. In music, Karol Szymanowski (1883-1937) won recognition as the greatest Polish composer since Chopin; like Chopin, he made use of native folk music, with which he blended modern idioms.

Polish scientists and scholars contributed substantially to all branches of learning, perhaps most notably to philosophy and mathematics. The work of Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), Tadeusz Kotarbinski (1886-), and others made Poland one of the most important international centers of research in logic, semantics, and the philosophy of mathematics. Leading scholars included Waclaw Sierpinski (1882-1969), who headed a famous school of pure mathematics in Warsaw; Leopold Infeld (1898-1968), a nuclear physicist who collaborated with Einstein; and Florian Znaniecki (1882-1958), head of a school of empirical sociology in Poznan and coauthor of a monumental study on the Polish peasant in the United States.

2. Development under communism (C)

Since World War II, artistic and intellectual life in Poland has passed through four stages related to the evolving political situation. The immediate postwar years saw the revival of arts and sciences and the reestablishment of international ties. The second phase, the Stalinist era, established Communist Party direction and control over all branches of art and learning, and ideological doctrines of socialist realism and dialectical materialism were imposed on artists and scholars. Denied the possibility of open resistance, the creative intelligentsia responded with silence, compromise, and submission. The third phase began with the "thaw" following Stalin's death, which permitted increasingly outspoken intellectual opposition to the concept of party direction of culture. This opposition helped to prepare the political climate for Gomulka's return to power in October 1956, and prompted a subsequent but temporary upsurge in intellectual activity which many Western literary critics have termed as some of "the most graphic European literary work of recent years, revealing a bold and desperate imagination." The withdrawal from this early Gomulka policy after 1957 and the resulting relative cultural immobilism has constituted the fourth phase of postwar cultural development. Whether the Gierek regime's loosened reins on the intellectual community and its public embrace of cultural tradition—symbolized in the decision to rebuild Warsaw's Royal Castle, which was heavily damaged by Nazi bombers in September 1939 and razed completely in 1944—signifies the beginning of a new phase in Communist cultural policy is not yet certain.

In its evolution after 1957, Gomulka's cultural policy steered a middle course between the repressive regimentation of the Stalinist era and a complete freedom of artistic and scientific pursuit, a course that, with modification, is still pursued by Gierek. On fundamental goals and principles, the views of Gierek and his predecessors are in general agreement. The primary task of both the arts and sciences is said to be to assist the construction of socialism: art, literature, and the social sciences must help shape the socialist consciousness of the nation, while the physical and technological sciences must advance the socialist economy. Inasmuch as the party regards itself as responsible for bringing about the socialist transformation of the country, it cannot be "indifferent" to the methods and contents of artistic and scientific work. The party stresses its support of the methods of socialist realism in the arts and the methods of dialectical materialism in the sciences—methods which allegedly in no way restrict the freedom of expression or research. Moreover it accepts "progressive and useful" work arrived at through other methods. In art and literature, the party calls for a content that focuses on contemporary problems and supports "the general trend of Poland's development mapped out by the Party." While disavowing any intention of dictating on matters of form and style, party spokesmen appeal for works that are "realistic" and intelligible to the general population. Although the Gierek regime now encourages scientific and cultural exchanges with the West, it still deplores instances of uncritical acceptance of Western styles and scientific findings. Unlike Gomulka, however, who soon resorted to strict censorship, various

economic pressures, and on occasion to arrest, demotion, and withdrawal of foreign travel privileges as means of taming errant intellectuals, the Gierek regime (while retaining censorship) has not only removed prominent writers from earlier blacklists, been more solicitous of their material welfare, and considerably eased restrictions on foreign travel, but has actively attempted to engage the cultural milieu in the process of "national renewal."

Many Polish intellectuals, particularly of the older generation, seem to accept Gierek's terms for a new relationship. Indeed, these terms benefit from the contrast with those imposed by Gomulka during the decade of the 1960's. During that period, disillusioned and frustrated writers and creative artists manifested their opposition both passively and actively. Halfhearted compliance, evasion, and inactivity were used to counter dictated production of socialist art, while new artistic forms flourished, often suffused with allegorical political overtones. Clandestinely procured and circulated books, pamphlets, tape recordings, and other articles of cultural expression, produced in the West, enjoyed great popularity among intellectuals. Active expression of antiregime dissent included the March 1964 public protest by 34 leading writers against censorship, the intellectual turmoil of late 1966, and the protests of both party and nonparty writers in early 1968 which led directly to the student demonstrations in March of that year and contributed to the general political crisis within the regime. The degree to which a relatively isolated event could unleash widespread cultural dissent which soon gathered its own social and political momentum was illustrated by the chain of events in the spring of 1968, which were triggered by the regime's closing in Warsaw of Mick play *Dziady* (The Forefathers) becau acclaim for the play's anti-Tsarist, eless, anti-Russian sentiments. The intellectual atmosphere accompany itical crisis in Poland, together with urges of leading academicians and artist in the fields of film, theater, and literature ushered in what many Polish intellectuals regarded as another, although temporary, period of cultural "dark ages." By contrast, therefore, the Gierek regime's easing of restraints and, most importantly, its commitment to alleviate the social and political strains in society that fueled cultural dissent, does seem to most intellectuals to be shaping *de facto* a new, pragmatic cultural policy.

a. Literature and art

Poland's postwar literature is largely the product of an irreconcilable conflict between traditional standards of artistic excellence and the Communist regime's ideological requirements. Although there has appeared no work of masterpiece caliber, either as judged by Western artistic criteria or by the values of socialist realism, much of the output has literary merit and much commands interest from a sociopolitical viewpoint. With some exceptions, the literature of the Stalinist era shows a high degree of adaptation to the required doctrine of socialist realism and is characterized by uniformity and stereotype. Most works of distinction belong either to the early postwar period or to the years of the "thaw" after Stalin's death, roughly 1954 to 1957. Many of them were harshly attacked by the Gomulka regime for having broken off "from the main current of the life of the nation," leaving unheeded appeals from the regime for a literature treating the contemporary man undergoing socialist transformation. Instead, they sought safety in historical themes, favoring in particular World War II and the German occupation.

Postwar literature includes important contributions to the novel, short story, poetry, and drama, made by both an older and younger generation of writers. Of several well-established prewar novelists writing in the postwar period, Jerzy Andrzejewski (1909-) has probably become the best known, largely, but not exclusively, through his *Popiol i diament* (Ashes and Diamonds). Published in 1949 and later made into a successful motion picture, this much-discussed novel deals in a skeptical manner with the clash between Communist and anti-Communist forces at the end of the war. Other productive prose writers of the older generation include Adolf Rudnicki (1912-), most of whose works explore the Jewish tragedy of World War II; Antoni Golubiew (1907-), whose *Boleslaw Chrobry* is considered one of the best postwar historical novels; and Tadeusz Breza (1905-70), whose works have attacked the bureaucracy of both the Polish state and the Vatican. Postwar poetry came to the forefront during the "thaw" of the mid-1950's. The outstanding poets of those years were Mieczyslaw Jastrun (1903-) and Adam Wazyk (1905-), whose *Poemat dla doroslych* (Poem for Adults) played a significant part in the intellectual ferment of 1955-56.

The younger generation of writers achieved prominence after October 1956. They are chiefly associated with a "black" literature trend condemned by regime critics for being "an awkward imitation of existentialism" and featuring elements of brutality allegedly copied from the U.S. novelist Ernest

Hemingway and Erskine Caldwell. Some observers view this type of literature as a reaction against the rosy optimism that socialist realism calls for. The first of the Polish "angry young men" was Marek Hlasko (1934-1969), whose *Osmy dzien tygodnia* (The Eighth Day of the Week), a short story published in November 1956, won international fame. Hlasko's successors include Ireneusz Iredynski and M. Nowakowski. Another member of the younger generation though not a follower of "black" literature, Slawomir Mrozek (1929-), has distinguished himself in several genres, especially drama. "Whatever form he chooses," states a non-Communist critic, "Mrozek's consistent aim is to lay life bare with a scalpel of virulent satire within a surrealist context." His best known play, produced in English as *The Police*, premiered in 1958 and later produced in various Western countries, probes with irony into the police system of an imaginary totalitarian state. As a playwright, Mrozek appears to owe something to Samuel Beckett, Eugene Ionesco, and others of the "theater of the absurd."

As with other artistic forms, the painting produced under the socialist realism dicta of the Stalinist era was characterized by monotony, banality, and sentimentality. Of the younger generation of painters using the socialist realism approach, only one, Andrzej Wroblewski (1927-57), achieved works of artistic distinction. With the lifting of cultural restrictions in the mid-1950's, artists renewed contact with the prewar traditions of Polish avant-garde painting and almost overnight found themselves in the mainstream of contemporary Western art. Some artists have continued prewar postimpressionist trends, but the most dynamic groups appear to be those following various abstractionist styles, including abstract expressionism. Others, by contrast, are experimenting with a blend of abstractionist and traditional styles, such as the neo-Byzantine religious art shown in Figure 48. Polish abstract art has been acclaimed at international exhibitions and has been received with particular enthusiasm in the United States and Canada, where it has been purchased in some quantity.

A particularly significant aspect of Poland's graphic art in the past two decades is its highly developed industrial graphics and poster design (Figure 49). Many Polish graphic artists turned to these forms for livelihood during periods when abstract painting was actively suppressed by the regime, and they have since developed a variety of innovative methods sought after by many other European countries, both East and West.

Postwar architecture was dominated until 1956 by the Soviet neoclassical style, exemplified by the towering—and popularly resented—(Stalin) Palace of Science and Culture in Warsaw (Figure 50), a "gift" from the Soviet Union. Post-1956 Polish architecture, however, has won international recognition for its functionalism and originality. The physical devastation of World War II generally contributed to the national awareness of the material aspects of the country's cultural heritage, of which, it is estimated, some 40% to 60% was destroyed during the war. In the process of reconstruction, much attention was given to duplicating in minute detail numerous monuments and even entire sections of cities, such as the Old Town of Warsaw (Figure 51), that were deemed to be vital components of national culture.

b. Theater, music, and folk art

The theater, both professional and amateur, has always been a popular form of entertainment as well as a vehicle for the perpetuation of national traditions and values. Despite a shortage of outstanding native playwrights, contemporary Polish theater is flourishing. Since 1956, when the 1949 ban on plays of Western or "bourgeois" origin was lifted, the repertoire of Polish theaters has been among the richest in Europe, ranging from Greek tragedy to French and English avant-garde. In some seasons the percentage of plays translated from Western languages has run as high as 90% of the total repertoire.

Postwar developments in music have also been characterized by a rejection of socialist realism and an intense interest since the mid-1950's in extreme avant-garde styles. In the Stalinist era, composers were encouraged to emulate Soviet achievements, rid themselves of Western influences, and make greater use of folk motifs. The esthetics of socialist realism, however, found no active followers among the leading composers and made no imprint upon the style and character of Polish music. Rather, composers of both the older and younger generations continued to write in the Bartok-Stravinsky "modernist" idiom adopted in prewar Poland. Since about 1954, however, the most dynamic musical language has been the 12-tone style of the Schoenberg Viennese school and its *pointilliste* interpretation, fathered by Anton von Webern. Younger musicians have also embraced electronic music and progressive jazz. Although critical of the extreme avant-garde Western trends in Polish music, the regime's cultural officials have not acted to suppress them. Such trends have become an increasingly prominent feature of the International Festival of Contemporary Music, informally called



FIGURE 48. Neo-Byzantine art in Catholic church at Jelonki, near Warsaw (U/OU)



FIGURE 49. Exhibition of posters, Warsaw (U/OU)



FIGURE 50. Palace of Culture, Warsaw (U/OU)

"Warsaw Autumn," which has been held annually in the Polish capital since 1956.

Folk art is no longer a vital force in national expression but is artificially kept alive to serve propaganda and commercial ends. Traditionally important in peasant life, folk art in all its forms (song, dance, woodcarving, pottery, weaving, embroidery) was characterized by marked regional and local variation. Since World War I, such forces as urbanization, the development of mass media, and improved transportation have promoted a cultural homogeneity in which Western styles and customs are dominant. Although intent on eliminating regional and local differences, the Communist regime has fostered the development of folk art for commercial purposes and as a means of identifying itself with national values. Folk art and tradition is best preserved among the Gorale, highlanders of the central Carpathians, who lived in virtual isolation until the end of the 19th century. The fashionable holiday resort of Zakopane affords tourists an opportunity to see the Gorale in their folk costumes, enjoy their songs and dances, and purchase folk art wares (Figure 52). Of more importance, the rediscovery of the Zakopane style in the 19th century initiated a widespread movement for the employment of folk motifs in the applied arts. This movement continued throughout the interwar period and still flourishes under the regime's encouragement. The regime, moreover, sponsors two folk song and dance ensembles, Slask and Mazowsze, both of which have given numerous performances abroad, including tours of the United States.

c. Popular participation

In carrying out its cultural goals, the regime is concerned not only with having a say in the character of contemporary artistic expression but also with broadening the cultural opportunities of the general population and shaping its esthetic tastes and values. Traditionally, the cultural product in Poland was made by the upper classes for their own consumption; it began filtering down to the emerging middle class at the end of the 19th century. Later, especially with the development of mass media after World War II, it became accessible to all social groups. In an effort to popularize culture, the Communist regime has provided an expanding network of theaters, music establishments, museums, and libraries, and has



FIGURE 51. Old Town square, Warsaw, 1945 (top), 1965 (bottom) (U/OU)

FIGURE 52. Mountaineers near Zakopane preparing Christmas puppet shows (U/OU)

sponsored an amateur artistic movement of a mass character. In 1970, there were 93 professional theaters throughout Poland, 20 of them in Warsaw. In addition, there were 39 concert halls and other facilities for musical performances, where the country's 19 symphony orchestras, nine opera and nine operetta companies perform, usually to full houses. The regime's effort in bringing culture to the people has been particularly marked in the postwar proliferation of so-called houses of culture, which range from well-developed urban institutions combining such facilities as a theater, meeting hall, library, motion picture theater, and lecture hall, to modest rural clubs generally engaging in similar activities tailored to local interest. Moreover, the number of museums and exhibit halls (335 in 1970) continues to increase; over 18 million persons annually visit such institutions. In addition to the 32,195 school libraries in existence in 1970, there were 8,621 public libraries—including branches and mobile book centers—and 326 major state libraries and archives, including such prestigious institutions as the Jagiellonian Library in Krakow housing some of the original manuscripts of Copernicus.

Rejecting the idea of two separate cultures—one for the general public and one for the elite—the regime has sought to provide a uniform product of "high ideological and artistic value" that at the same time would be comprehensible to consumers of widely differing experience. In theory, a uniform culture is needed to achieve the Communist goal of eliminating social differences and class divisions.

Traditional popular tastes and values appear to have undergone little or no change under communism; if they sometimes clash with the regime's esthetic views, they also clash with some contemporary styles of expression. Interest in the avant-garde in painting and music is largely confined to creative circles. The average citizen neither understands nor cares to understand abstract art, preferring, like the regime, "good old realism." In music, most people are unaware of 12-tone technique, but among the youth there is great enthusiasm for jazz and rock-and-roll, which the regime tolerates lest it intensify interest. The theater has traditionally been popular among the Poles and now commands an annual audience of about 18 million, including a relatively large number of skilled workers. Inasmuch as theater attendance, unlike cinema attendance, has not declined with the advent of television, audiences are presumably satisfied with contemporary theatrical fare. While the regime desires a reader interest in serious native literature concerned with contemporary problems, popular tastes run to the 19th-century novel, particularly the work of Sienkiewicz and Kraszewski; contemporary "escape" literature, such as adventure stories, crime thrillers, and stories about the German occupation; and the novels of leading contemporary Western authors.

J. Public information (C)

1. The role of government

The Communist regime controls all informational media—the press, publishing houses, radio, television, and films. Although the degree of control and its administrative channels vary, all media—whether or not they are direct organs of the Communist party—are ultimately subject to the same criteria of content and are, therefore, expressive of government policy.

The party has relied heavily on all news media, especially the press, radio, and television, to further its political, economic, and social goals. Rapid postwar expansion of radio and TV broadcasting facilities, together with the increasing availability of radio and TV receivers, has made these the most important channels of public information. Newspapers, periodicals, and books are also major sources. As in other Communist countries, there is also a heavy reliance on word-of-mouth communication, with the prevalence of rumor and gossip being in proportion to the degree of censorship imposed by the party on formal media.

Despite controls over the form, content, and dissemination of public information, the regime has had little success in curbing the anti-Communist attitudes of the people, and their desire to seek out unbiased information. As part of the de-Stalinization campaign after 1954, censorship controls waned and relative freedom of expression by the individual and the press—nourished by the political ferment of 1956-57—emerged for the first time since the Communist takeover. Censorship control of all media was soon reapplied and became increasingly stringent during the 1960's. Party control of all media tended to become more direct but, in response to intraparty political fluctuations, more arbitrary and the content more unreliable. Nevertheless, when judged against the standards of control and objectivity existing elsewhere, for example, in the U.S.S.R., the Gomulka regime's policy toward the information media was relatively permissive.

Most of the shifts in public information policy undertaken by the Gierek regime stem from the lessons learned during the workers' revolt of December 1970, i.e., that public trust rests on more honest information provided by the government to the people, coupled to evidence of governmental responsiveness to public opinion. Although Gierek has clearly retained firm control of the media, he feels that more open discussion of domestic problems serves as a safety valve for popular dissatisfaction, a means to overcome public apathy, and a catalyst for constructive change. Soon after he took over, Gierek established a permanent cabinet-level post of Under Secretary of State for Information who regularly reports to the press on the proceedings of the government, and submits to questions—often pointed—by journalists. Gierek has also tolerated, and in some cases encouraged, publication of mildly provocative articles in the press. Although the media do not question the role of the party or the permanence of the socialist system in Poland, they have prompted discussion of long-range social and economic options facing the country. In this way Gierek has brought public discussion to bear on the tasks that are being thrashed out within the regime. Moreover, the public dialog is open, and employs methods that are unique in the Communist world. For example, cabinet ministers, party leaders, and leaders of mass organizations have submitted to critical interviews on radio and television, including questions submitted by the listening audience while the program is on the air.

Formally, however, the apparatus of control over the media has remained unaltered. Regime control over public information is exercised by a number of methods, the chief among them being the mandatory prior clearance of the contents of a publication by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications, and Public Performances, popularly known as *cenzura* (censorship) in Warsaw, and by its provincial and municipal branches throughout the country. *Cenzura's* powers also extend to all verbal and graphic media, i.e., radio, television, and films. The dominant source of current news distributed to all media is the official Polish Press Agency (PAP), constituting in itself a form of censorship. Film censorship is facilitated by the regime's control over all domestic film production and over the export and import of films. While *cenzura* is theoretically a government agency, in practice it is subordinate to the Press Bureau of the party's Central Committee, which sets the political line for all informational media.

The basic themes and approach for the media in their role of supporting the regime's domestic and foreign policy goals are, therefore, decided at the highest party level. They are then further elaborated by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee and transmitted to key party individuals in the press, radio, television, government agencies such as the main censorship office, and various ministries and mass organizations. How well this detailed guidance is implemented is dependent on the competence of the individual responsible for such implementation within each organization, as well as

on the responsiveness of the organization's leadership to his dictates. This has been particularly true of the editorial boards of the press and other informational media as well as of the many social organizations used by the Communist Party as transmission belts to specific interest groups within the population.

Consistency, in terms of long-range objectives, and frequent tactical swings are dual features of the regime's propaganda effort. This is particularly true in domestic policy, where popular resistence to such long-term goals as socialized agriculture and the victory of the materialistic world outlook over religion has rendered direct propaganda on these long-term themes ineffective. Moreover, the Gierek regime, mindful of the increased sophistication and skepticism of the populace, is committed to rational persuasion on the basis of informed discussion, rather than the simple but massive distribution of predigested official views to an unquestioning audience. As a result, the task now facing the party's control apparatus and the public media is vastly more complex; it requires imaginative ideas and methods from a propaganda bureaucracy not accustomed to provide either, and responsible presentation by media personnel. The latter's well-developed capacity for self-imposed control is in large part to be credited with the fact that the enlivenment of the public information system under Gierek has remained within ideologically acceptable limits.

2. Radio and television

Radio and TV transmission facilities are owned, operated, and their output determined by the government through the Committee for Radio and Television Affairs, attached directly to the Council of Ministers (cabinet). In technical matters the committee cooperates closely with the Ministry of Communications, but in terms of policy guidance on programing it is merely the executive arm of the Communist party's Central Committee.

The rapid growth in radiobroadcasting is reflected in the steadily increasing numbers of radio subscribers until the late 1960's, when the concurrent and even more rapid growth of television began to make inroads on the further expansion of broadcasting (Figure 53). The majority of listeners live in urban areas, especially in Warszawa province and in the urban centers of Silesia and the western parts of the country. In early 1973 there were 28 AM stations and 25 FM stations. The majority of these were regional stations rebroadcasting one or more of the three main program services originating in the studios of Warsaw radio, although many originate independent programs of local interest. Ownership of multiband radio receivers is rapidly supplanting the once widespread system of wired loudspeaker sets, which are limited to preset domestic reception; these account for only 17% of all subscriptions. Because all radio and television is noncommercial, subscribers must pay an annual fee determined by the type of set owned. Since the late 1960's transistor sets and automobile radios need not be separately licensed if the owner is already a registered subscriber.

Although television is still not as widespread in Poland as in comparable Western countries, it has been the most rapidly growing medium of public information in the country. In early 1973 there were 18 main TV stations and 26 relay transmitters in operation, covering between 80% and 90% of the country and approximately the same percentage of the population. The central TV studios in Warsaw originated over half of all programs, with studios in Katowice, Wroclaw, Gdansk, Krakow, Poznan, Lodz, and Szczecin—in that order—accounting for most of the remainder; other cities, however, originate short

FIGURE 53. Radio and TV broadcasting and numbers of subscribers (U/OU)

YEAR	Hours	SUBSCRIBERS		
		Thousands	In urban areas	Per 10,000 population
	Thousands		*Percent*	
Radio:				
1960	42.3	5,268	*63.5*	1,760
1965	42.3	5,646	*64.8*	1,790
1970	52.9	5,657	*66.8*	1,735
Television:				
1960	3.8	426	*86.4*	140
1965	4.1	2,078	*83.9*	660
1970	5.3	4,215	*74.4*	1,290

programs of local interest. In 1970 Warsaw television inaugurated a second channel, devoted mainly to educational and special interest programs.

The declining percentage of total TV subscribers in urban areas indicates the rapid growth of the medium in the countryside, a factor which, since the late 1960's, has caused a commensurate small decline in the number of radio receivers registered in rural areas. Government plans call for the construction of several additional high-power TV stations and a considerable increase in the number of relay transmitters. Along with the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European countries, Poland has adopted the French SECAM (*sequential memoire*) system of color TV broadcasting; the first experimental color telecasts occurred in late 1969. Although progress toward actual color programing started slowly, color telecasts are being introduced at an accelerating pace. Polish television is linked to the Eastern European-Soviet system of Intervision and through it has access to Western Europe's Eurovision telecasts. In 1971 Polish radio and television had exchange and cooperation agreements with over 100 broadcasting corporations and 50 TV companies in about 60 foreign countries, more of them in the so-called third world. It also has exchange agreements with several specialized international organizations in the field of radio and TV broadcasting and is a member of the International Organization for Broadcasting and Television.

Even before the advent of the Gierek regime, the government had made efforts to increase the quality and popularity of radio and TV broadcasting, tailoring it to the growing sophistication of the general subscriber as well as to the interests of special groups, mainly the youth. Figure 54 shows radio and TV programing in 1970. The encouragement of listener and viewer response to various programs, especially those dealing with current social and other problems, had long been official policy, but this aspect of public opinion feedback has become meaningful only under the Gierek regime. The use by Polish radio and TV of Western sources, including news film clips and other informational material supplied by the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw is more significant than in most other Communist countries. Embassy-supplied material was particularly effective during the extensive coverage by Polish radio and television of the U.S. manned landing on the moon in 1969.

Among the populace, reliance on Western news and political commentaries broadcast to Poland has always been widespread, increasing significantly during periods of domestic or foreign crisis. For this reason the regime has periodically attacked Western broadcasts



FIGURE 54. Radio and TV programing, by type of program, 1970 [U/OUO]

in Polish to Poland for interfering in the country's internal affairs, singling out *Radio Free Europe* for particularly vehement censure. The Polish regime ceased regular and massive jamming of *Voice of America* and British Broadcasting Corporation transmissions to Poland in 1957 and those of *Radio Free Europe* in 1962. Sporadic jamming on a selective basis of these and other Western broadcasts has occurred since then, especially at times of crisis such as the December 1970 workers' riots.

Polish radiobroadcasting directed abroad has remained a major part of the regime's propaganda effort, despite a reduction since 1953 of foreign-

language broadcasts in favor of Polish-language programs for expatriates and for Polish seamen on the high seas. In mid-1972 this effort was conducted by means of nine shortwave transmitters and totaled 336 hours per week. Of this total, 24.5 hours were devoted to musical programs introduced in various languages, and 101.5 hours to broadcasts in the Polish language for Poles abroad. The net total of foreign-language programs—broadcast in 11 languages—was 210 hours per week in 1972 as compared with about 157 hours in 1966. Much of this increase was accounted for by the initiation of Arabic-language programs after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Czech-language programs after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the doubling of German-language programing and an increase in English-language broadcasts, both an aspect of Poland's detente policies. Simultaneously, a token 1-hour per week Russian-language program was discontinued. Major radiobroadcasts to and from Poland are shown in Figure 55.

3. Press, publishing, and film

Newspapers and periodicals, which for a short time in 1956 displayed a liveliness and unorthodoxy unequaled in the Communist sphere, soon thereafter became largely stereotyped and exhortative rather than informative in content. Since the advent of the Gierek regime in December 1970, the official stress on two-way communications between the people and the government has enlivened most publications in terms both of their informative content and many nonpolitical, special interest features. Although censorship remains, and the self-regulatory approach of most editors has generally precluded the reappearance of ideological unorthodoxy, the press has regained at least some part of the influence it had before the rapid expansion of radio and television in the 1960's. The range of special interest publications, many of them popularly oriented and wholly nonpropagandistic, has always been greater in Poland than in most other Communist countries.

According to official data, 55 newspapers (43 dailies) and 1,903 periodicals were published in 1970; the latter included 117 weeklies, 575 monthlies, and 452 quarterlies. The average daily circulation of all newspapers combined was claimed to be 8.3 million, and overall circulation of periodicals, 23.8 million. This compares with data for 1955 when 45 newspapers and 593 periodicals had a circulation of 5.4 million and 12.7 million, respectively. Warsaw is the press and publishing center of the country; in 1970, 18 of the 55 newspapers, and 1,298 of the 1,903 periodicals were published in the Polish capital. The industrial



FIGURE 55. Major radiobroadcasts to and from Poland, 1972 (U/OU)

province of Katowice in Silesia ranked second, and Poland's ancient cultural center of Krakow third; all provincial cities, however, publish at least one local daily newspaper, most of them publish two or more. Publishing of newspapers and periodicals has been centralized since 1957 in the Workers Publishing Cooperative *Prasa* (Press), which directs a network of publishing cooperatives. Distribution of newspapers and periodicals, including foreign imports, is handled by a state monopoly, *Ruch* (Motion), which is subordinate to the Ministry of Communications. In November 1972 legislation was introduced to centralize the activities of *Prasa*, *Ruch*, and the book publishers KiW under one cooperative supervised by the Ministry of Culture and Art. Details on selected major newspapers and periodicals are presented in Figure 56.

Since World War II the government has systematically stimulated book publishing through expansion of printing and distribution facilities, extension of the library system, low prices, and publicity and pressure for the sale of literature approved by the regime. Overemphasis on ideological works and propaganda literature in the pre-1956 period resulted in heavy reader resistance and a significant percentage of unsold books. Since that time, the production of nonpolitical and general popular literature has been separate from that of books

FIGURE 56. Selected newspapers and periodicals, 1970 (U/OU)

Name and place of publication	Circulation[a]	Remarks
	Thousands	
DAILIES		
Trybuna Robotnicza (Workers' Tribune), Katowice.	496	Regional party organ in Katowice province; reputed to be best Communist daily in Poland.
Express Wieczorny (Evening Express), Warsaw	454	Most popular nonparty daily.
Trybuna Ludu (People's Tribune), Warsaw	494	Main organ of the PZPR.
Życie Warszawy (Warsaw Life), Warsaw.	378	Popular nonparty daily; frequently carries authoritative regime commentary.
Kurier Polski (Polish Courier), Warsaw	na	Main organ of the Democratic Party.
Dziennik Ludowy (People's Daily), Warsaw	na	United Peasant Party.
Sztandar Młodych (Banner of Youth), Warsaw.	228	Main organ of the Socialist Youth Union.
Głos Pracy (Voice of Labor), Warsaw	na	Main organ of the Central Council of Trade Unions.
Słowo Powszechne (Universal Word), Warsaw	na	Main organ of the pseudo-Catholic, progime organization PAX; not connected with the Roman Catholic Church.
Żołnierz Wolności (Soldier of Freedom), Warsaw	na	Style armed forces daily published by the Ministry of National Defense.
PERIODICALS		
Przyjaciółka (Girl-Friend), Warsaw	1,373	Most popular weekly feature magazine oriented to youth in general; independent.
Przekrój (Cross-section), Krakow	350	Popular regional feature weekly; independent.
Perspektywy (Perspectives), Warsaw	na	Combined feature and newsmagazine introduced in 1969; independent although a vehicle for regime views.
Polityka (Politics), Warsaw	na	Weekly organ of the PZPR Central Committee.
Za i Przeciw (For and Against), Warsaw	na	Weekly feature magazine; independent.
Sztandar Stranicy (Green Banner), Warsaw	na	Semiweekly organ of the United Peasant Party.
Chłopski Dzień (Peasants' Way), Warsaw	na	Semiweekly PZPR organ for rural Communist leadership.
Forum (Forum), Warsaw	na	Independent weekly; reprints translations from foreign press.
Nowe Drogi (New Paths), Warsaw	na	Main theoretical monthly of the PZPR Central Committee.
Życie Partii (Party Life), Warsaw	na	Monthly for PZPR functionaries and activists.
Kultura (Culture), Warsaw	na	Progime cultural weekly.
Tygodnik Powszechny (Universal Weekly), Krakow	na	Extracultural Roman Catholic weekly.
Żołnierz Polski (Polish Soldier), Warsaw	na	Ministry of National Defense feature weekly.

na - Data not available.

[a]Circulation data are available and are not truly indicative of popularity, since some Communist publications are distributed without regard to demand, while nonparty publications are often subject to various restrictions.

with ideological themes, to the benefit of the former category in terms of new titles published and actual sales.

In 1970, some 9,086 books and 1,901 brochures were published in 95.9 million and 19.9 million copies, respectively, a considerable increase over the total output of 7,974 books and brochures published in a combined total of 29 million copies in 1937. Almost 90% of the books published were in Polish, with about half of the remainder in English. Over 85% of all publishing in 1970 involved new titles, and total production was divided by category, as follows:

	Percent of titles	Percent of copies
Scientific	37.7	5.3
Professional	25.8	17.1
Higher school texts	10.6	2.5
Popular literature	10.3	16.7
Belles-lettres	8.2	19.8
Schoolbooks	4.4	24.5
Children's books	3.0	14.1
Total	100.0	100.0

Since the mid-1950's the Polish regime has been importing increasing numbers of non-Communist publications and films, including selected Western European and U.S. newspapers and periodicals, although in the 1960's the numbers of specific periodicals fluctuated because of both fiscal and political considerations. Nevertheless, in 1970 some 42.6 million copies of 13,270 newspapers and periodicals from 22 foreign countries were imported, more than double the 20 million copies of 9,395 such publications imported in 1960. Much of this material consists of professional and technical periodicals, but also includes several major Western dailies which are imported in limited numbers for government and party use as well as for the larger libraries and for sale at selected tourist outlets. The most important countries of origin of such imports, by number of different titles, are West Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the U.S.S.R., in that order. Although the Soviet Union accounts for only 11% of the titles imported, it provides about 86% of the total number of copies of imported publications. Much of this Soviet material, however, comprises political and other propaganda in the form of pamphlets which are disseminated without regard to demand.

Despite the inroads of television on the role of movies as a medium of information and entertainment, film presentations, especially documentaries and short subjects shown by various mass organization at "houses of culture" (see above under Artistic and Cultural Expression) retain an important place in the public information system. By contrast, however, the number of regular motion picture theaters declined from 3,418 in 1960 to 3,285 in 1970; attendance fell over the same period by more than one-third, to 137.6 million in 1970.

The film industry, nationalized in 1945, is administered by the Main Office of Cinematography subordinate to the Ministry of Culture and Art. In 1970 there were eight major units for the production of full-length feature films and filmed TV productions, operating out of three main cinematographic studios: in Warsaw, Lodz, and Wroclaw. In addition, there were six other film "ensembles" for the production of documentaries, cartoons, and educational films.

Domestic production of feature-length films rose from four in 1950 to 28 in 1970; in the latter year 35 additional films were made expressly for television by regular film studios. In addition, several hundred short and medium-length films were produced for television by the Television Film Production Enterprise, directly subordinate to the state-monopoly Polish Radio and Television. The majority of imported films continue to be of Western origin. Of the 450 full-length films (including productions for television) imported in 1970, 125 were U.S., 48 Soviet, 77 British, 57 French, 26 East German, and 23 Italian; the remainder were imported from 14 other countries. Attendance figures indicate that U.S. films continue to be the most popular, followed closely by domestic Polish productions, French and British films. An increasing number of short and medium-length film imports have been specialized, technical presentations, predominantly from Western countries.

K. Selected bibliography (U/OU)

Professor Alexander Giejsztor's (*et al.*) *History of Poland* (Warsaw, 1968) is a sociologically oriented view of Polish history through Polish eyes, although propagandistic at times in its treatment of the sociological and political changes of the postwar period. Konrad Syrop's *Poland* (London, 1968) is a somewhat more narrowly conceived sociological and political profile of the Polish people against a historical background, but constitutes a good, short introduction to Polish society and its characteristics.

Other sociological analyses include Waclaw Lednicki's *Life and Culture of Poland* (New York, 1944), which centers on the historical aspects of Polish culture as reflected in and molded by literature, its heroes, and myths. Gertrude Godden's *Murder of a Nation: German Destruction of Polish Culture*

(London, 1943) gives insights into the scope and impact of losses suffered during the initial war years, and helps explain some of the persistent traumas affecting Polish society.

Maria Kuncewicz (ed.), *The Modern Polish Mind* (Boston, 1962) is a representative anthology of contemporary essays and stories illustrating Polish life and thought. *The Captive Mind* (New York, 1953) by Czeslaw Milosz is an analysis by a disillusioned Communist intellectual of the motivation of his colleagues who tried to accommodate to Communist rule during the early Stalinist period; it is valuable in its examination of Polish intellectuals as a class, and their traditionally important social and political role in Polish society. Milosz's *Native Realm* (New York, 1969), a more general retrospective look at Poland, is in many ways a sequel to his earlier work. *Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today* (New York, 1969) by Leszek Kolakowski, a former professor of philosophy at Warsaw University, seeks to reconcile Communist practice and humanist ideals. Kolakowski, now residing in the West, was a prime contributor to the intellectual upsurge of the 1956 period and a gadfly for the Polish regime until the late 1960's.

A unique and multifaceted view of the social, political, economic, and cultural development of postwar Poland as seen through the critical eyes of exile intellectuals is available in *Kultura Essays,* and *Explorations of Freedom: Prose, Narrative, and Poetry from Kultura* (New York, 1970). Both are anthologies, compiled by one of Poland's most prestigious writers now living in the West—Leopold Tyrmand—of articles and works from the Paris-based exile cultural journal *Kultura.*

Few good accounts of the historically important secular role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland exist in English. Walerian Meystowicz, *L'Eglise Catholique en Pologne entre les deux guerres* (Rome, 1945), discusses the social and political importance of the church during the interwar period and provides the necessary background for understanding the development of church-state relations in the postwar period. A guide to prominent social, cultural and political personages up to the outbreak of World War II is available in Stephen Mizwa's *Great Men and Women of Poland* (New York, 1942).

Basic reference works include the annual statistical yearbook, *Rocznik Statystyczny,* whose abbreviated version, *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny,* is available in English. The *Rocznik Polityczny i Gospodarczy* is the Polish Government's annual narrative and statistical review of political, social, economic, and cultural activity within the framework of official institutions.

Glossary (u/ou)

Abbreviation	Foreign	English
CRZZ	*Centralna Rada Zwiazkow Zawodowych*	Central Council of Trade Unions
KiW	*Ksiaszka i Wiedza*	Book and Science
PAP	*Polska Agentura Prasowa*	Polish Press Agency
PTL	*Polskie Towarzystwo Lekarskie*	Polish Medical Society
PZPR	*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*	Polish United Workers Party
SZSP	*Socjalisticzny Zwiazek Studentow Polskich*	Socialist Union of Polish Students
ZMS	*Zwiazek Mlodziezy Socjalistycznej*	Union of Socialist Youth
ZMW	*Zwiazek Mlodziezy Wiejskiej*	Union of Rural Youth
ZSP	*Zrzeszenie Studentow Polskich*	Polish Students Association

Places and features referred to in this chapter (u/ou)

	COORDINATES			
	°	'N.	°	'E.
Baltic Sea (*sea*)	56	00	18	00
Białystok (*prov*)	53	30	23	00
Bydgoszcz (*prov*)	53	00	19	00
Carpathian Mountains (*mts*)	49	30	20	30
Częstochowa	50	48	19	07
Drogomyśl	49	52	18	46
Gdańsk (*prov*)	54	30	18	30
Gdańsk	54	21	18	40
Gdynia	54	30	18	33
Gniezno	52	33	17	36
Grabówek (*sec popl*)	54	31	18	30
Grywald	49	27	20	22
Jelonki	52	53	21	48
Katowice (*prov*)	50	45	19	00
Katowice	50	16	19	01
Kielce (*prov*)	51	00	21	00
Koszalin (*prov*)	54	00	16	30
Kraków (*prov*)	50	00	20	30
Kraków	50	05	19	55
Łódź (*prov*)	51	30	19	30
Łódź	51	45	19	28
Lublin (*prov*)	51	15	23	00
Lublin	51	15	22	34
Majdanek	51	14	22	36
Oder (*stream*)	53	32	14	38
Olsztyn (*prov*)	54	00	21	00
Opole (*prov*)	50	30	17	55
Oświęcim	50	02	19	14
Poznań (*prov*)	52	30	17	00
Poznań	52	25	16	58
Rzeszów (*prov*)	50	00	22	00
Silesia (*region*)	51	00	18	00
Szczecin (*prov*)	53	26	15	10
Szczecin (*Stettin*)	53	25	14	35
Tatry (*mts*)	49	10	20	00
Toruń	53	02	18	36
Vistula (*stream*)	54	21	18	57
Warsaw	52	15	21	00
Warszawa (*prov*)	52	30	21	00
Wroclaw (*prov*)	51	06	16	35
Wroclaw (Breslau)	51	06	17	02
Zakopane	49	18	19	58
Zielona Góra (*prov*)	52	00	15	30

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