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Government
and Politics

India

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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INDIA

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Government and Politics

A. Introduction (U/OU)

India, one of the first of the new Asian and African states to cast off Western colonial rule, has been more successful than most in maintaining a democratic political system. In more than two decades of independence, parliamentary democracy, based largely on the British model, has been adapted to India's more hierarchical and authoritarian political milieu. The political road, however, has not been smooth.

Although in one sense a new nation, independent India has behind it a long history and a very complex cultural tradition. With the possible exception of China, the Indian subcontinent has been the home of the oldest continuous civilization of a high level that history records. Several important features of this heritage are relevant to modern India's policy. Political unity has never been part of the Indian experience. Never in its long history has the whole Indian subcontinent been united politically from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from the Khyber Pass to the Naga Hills.¹ For brief periods, under several ancient emperors and more recently under British colonial rule, the whole country has been loosely controlled, but never has it been entirely integrated politically. Unity of the subcontinent even eluded the Indians at independence in 1947 when the territory was partitioned into two separate and antagonistic states—India and Pakistan—basically along Hindu and Muslim religious lines. A second relevant factor in the Indian political heritage is that the indigenous governmental traditions of both the Hindus and the Muslims are authoritarian. The strong, but not necessarily predominant, tradition of democracy has resulted mainly from the impact of modern Western ideas and the experience under colonial rule of operating representative institutions, however limited and imperfect their nature. Natural inclinations toward representative government,

¹For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map itself.

springing from religious traditions or non-Western-influenced historical experiences, are conspicuously absent.

Western influences on modern Indian political development are perhaps more readily discernible—especially to the Western observer—but are probably less deeply entrenched than many other influences out of India's past. Whatever their faults and failings, the British nevertheless had a profound impact that basically, and perhaps permanently, altered India's political development. During 150 years of colonial rule, the British introduced new technology, institutions, knowledge, beliefs, and values, producing radical and lasting changes which gradually laid the foundations for a modern state. They surveyed the land, settled the revenue, created a modern bureaucracy, army, and police, rationalized the legal system, developed communications, set up a Western-oriented system of higher education, and introduced English as the universal language of administration. Even more important, perhaps, the Indians were also given a substantial measure of experience with self-government in those areas of administration which did not directly threaten the security of the British colonial system. Thus, when India gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1947, it possessed many advantages and prerequisites for orderly democratic political development that many of the other new states of Asia and Africa never had.

Almost as a matter of course, independent India adopted a system of parliamentary government patterned largely on British lines but also incorporating federalism (many aspects of which existed under British rule) as a means of accommodating diverse regional interests. Despite the disruptive social upheaval precipitated by the partition of the subcontinent and other serious problems attendant to the birth of the new Indian polity, at least three major stabilizing factors were present: a democratically motivated, mass-supported political party—the Indian National Congress—dominated the political system; a thoroughly apolitical army existed to defend the country; and a well-developed bureaucracy was already functioning.

Until the mid-1960's, independent India enjoyed a remarkable degree of political stability, which gave the country time to nurture fragile democratic institutions. The barriers to democratic political development, however, are very great. India, in many respects, is the sort of a nation that Europe would be if that continent were a single state; it combines within its boundaries as many ethnic groups and subcultures as Europe, and it contains people speaking more than a dozen major languages and several hundred dialects. The general quality of Indian democracy can be characterized by the fact that democratic political institutions have been superimposed by a relatively small Westernized elite on a massive traditional society that is rigidly hierarchical in its structure and authoritarian in its most basic attitudes. The structure of political influence still tends to be along hierarchical lines, set by a social system in which subservience to authority and the acceptance of one's role in life are the most important values.

Nevertheless, profound social and political changes are taking place. There has been a considerable shift of political power from urban to rural areas, due to universal suffrage, improved communications, and the gradual spread of education and new ideas. The rural areas are increasingly becoming politically conscious, and rural caste groups have assumed political functions in many cases. This basic shift in power is most obviously reflected in the character of the state legislative assemblies and in the growing political revolt of the more backward castes against upper caste political control. Coming gradually to the fore at both the state and national levels are the more tradition-oriented, less educated, and vernacular-speaking politicians whose personal power bases are in the rural villages and are associated with specific castes.

Accompanying the shift of popular political power to the rural areas has been the increasing importance of the small but growing group of men who are development- and technology-minded and who work for such organizations as the government, research institutes and universities. This small Western-influenced and English-speaking intelligentsia is the key driving force behind India's development efforts. Its members are generally attracted to politics and exert considerable influence on the government's policies, especially in the vital realm of economic planning.

There also is a growing diffusion of political awareness throughout Indian society. Increased political involvement has resulted in a rapid rise of organized interests, be it in the form of political parties, economic groups, or groups with traditional

loyalties to caste, religion, community, or culture pattern. The influence exerted by these groups affects not only the formulation of public policy but particularly the implementation of policy. Frequently they exert a negative, often disruptive, pressure on the government and the development process—preventing legislatures from enacting laws and the executive from carrying out legislative decisions, disrupting university operations, paralyzing docks and cities, and stopping railroads from running.

Public violence has come to be a complex, serious, and continuing political problem in modern India. In stark contrast to the methods urged by Mohandas Gandhi, violent protest has come to be generally accepted by many as not only a useful but also a desirable way to bring about social and political change. Some political parties, playing on the emotionalism of communal conflict and the potent forces which exploit cultural and linguistic differences, have incited violence for essentially political ends. The maintenance of law and order has become a major governmental problem in many areas of the country, especially in the densely populated urban areas, and frequently armed police and sometimes army units have been called in to put down mob violence.

The Congress Party, which has controlled the central government from the beginning, has been deeply committed to modernization, to bringing about profound economic, political, and social changes through democratic rather than authoritarian means, and to doing something about the country's staggering problems of poverty, inequality, hunger, disease, and ignorance. This commitment on the part of the party's leaders accounts for many visible and invisible changes that have taken place in India since independence. It also accounts for the very high priority assigned to economic development. Much of this effort has fallen short of realizing its goals, but some progress nevertheless has been made. Ideologically, most Indian leaders favor "the socialist pattern of society," although this is only vaguely defined and means considerably different things to different people. The ideological reverence for socialism, however, has been an important influence on India's political development. It has created public ownership and management of a considerable number of key industries and services, while at the same time producing a great reluctance to use the free market mechanism as an instrument of economic policy. Finally, it has implanted in official planning and policymaking personnel a desire to create a thoroughgoing welfare state, despite a clear lack of adequate resources to bring this about.

After 4 years of declining fortunes, the Congress Party was restored to political dominance by the national and state elections of 1971 and 1972. The political instability which had resulted from the Congress Party's decline was halted, and the restoration of the party to a preeminent position reestablished the majorities so vital to the functioning of the parliamentary system in India. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi—whose popularity soared following India's crushing victory over Pakistan in the December 1971 war—emerged as the preeminent national figure. Her successful gamble to hold parliamentary elections in 1971—a year before constitutionally required—was a personal triumph. Reflecting her immense popularity throughout India, it placed Mrs. Gandhi in an almost unassailable position in the party and government at both the national and state levels and gave her almost absolute control over Indian politics. She has handpicked people for key positions in the party and in the central and state governments for their intelligence and promise, but more importantly for their loyalty to her and their lack of an independent political base. At the same time she has eroded the power even of those politicians whose loyalty she commanded and has replaced those she regarded as threats. Whether her handpicked state chief ministers, none of whom have a local political base, can long survive local rivals for power was becoming increasingly problematical in 1973.

Inability to achieve her campaign promises to eliminate poverty, bring about radical change, and institute pragmatic and effective programs to deal with India's other problems could diminish Mrs. Gandhi's great popularity and dissipate the Congress Party's power. In its quest to overcome inertia, Mrs. Gandhi's government must at least give the impression of movement. Indeed, she is attempting to direct her party along more radically socialistic lines. Her goals will be difficult to achieve, however. In the past India's problems have been so enormous that even extraordinary efforts to bring about change often have appeared to be merely gestures. Lack of significant progress in solving these problems could be exploited by the small but vocal opposition groups, which barely survived the Congress Party tidal wave in the early 1970's, to achieve a comeback before India's next scheduled general elections in 1976.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (U/OU)

India, which became a self-governing member of the British Commonwealth on 15 August 1947, has been an independent republic since 26 January 1950, although it remains within the British Commonwealth and still formally recognizes the British monarch as "head" of that body. It is a federal union of 21 states and 9 union territories (Figure 1). The status of Jammu

FIGURE 1. Administrative divisions, 1972 (U/OU)

STATES	UNION TERRITORIES	PROTECTORATES
Andhra Pradesh.....	Andaman and Nicobar Islands.....	Sikkim
Assam.....	Arunachal Pradesh.....	
Bihar.....	Chandigarh.....	
Gujarat.....	Dadra and Nagar Haveli.....	
Haryana.....	Delhi.....	
Himachal Pradesh.....	Goa, Daman and Diu.....	
Jammu and Kashmir*.....	Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands.....	
Kerala.....	Mizoram.....	
Madhya Pradesh.....	Pondicherry.....	
Maharashtra.....		
Manipur.....		
Meghalaya.....		
Mysore.....		
Nagaland.....		
Orissa.....		
Punjab.....		
Rajasthan.....		
Tamil Nadu.....		
Tripura.....		
Uttar Pradesh.....		
West Bengal.....		

*Status in dispute with Pakistan.

and Kashmir is disputed with Pakistan, which occupies the northern and western portions (about 32,500 square miles) of this former princely state. Some 14,500 square miles in Ladakh—the far northeastern portion of this state—are occupied by China. The government of Jammu and Kashmir is like that of the other Indian states, except that it has its own constitution and is exempted from a number of the provisions of the federal constitution. The five states and two union territories of northeast India, long the scene of active or simmering independence movements, also have a status slightly different from the rest of the Indian states. In 1972 the Indian Government attempted to provide a final solution to autonomy sentiments by granting more local control under a regional system headed by a single governor, a partially unified administrative system, and a Northeast Council to advise on economic and security matters.

At both the national and state levels India follows the British form of parliamentary government (Figure 2). The Prime Minister and the chief ministers of the states and their respective cabinets are responsible to popularly elected legislatures. The chief of state is the President, an indirectly elected official who performs many of the same largely ceremonial functions carried out in some other Commonwealth countries by the Governor General (representing the British monarch) and within the United Kingdom by the Queen herself. The judiciary, which is independent of the executive and legislative branches, is headed at the national level by the Supreme Court, whose interpretation of the law is binding on all courts. India has a large and growing bureaucracy that, despite its many failings, appears to have contributed substantially to the political, and to a lesser extent the economic, development of the country.

1. The constitution

The constitution, which became effective on 26 January 1950, is one of the longest and most detailed in the world. It was painstakingly formulated by a Constituent Assembly after nearly 3 years of deliberation and at times heated debate. It provides for a strong central government with considerable direct and indirect control over the states and with potentially vast emergency powers. It also outlines in considerable detail the organization and functions of the state governments.

Many features of the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, such as representative legislatures, ministerial responsibility, a federal structure, and special representation for some minorities, were carried




FIGURE 2. Structure of Government (U/OU)

over to the new constitution. The overall pattern of government was based on British constitutional conventions, but there were borrowings from other democracies as well. The enumeration of fundamental human rights and the establishment of the Supreme Court with absolute authority to rule on constitutional questions were inspired by the U.S. experience. From the Irish Republic the Indians derived the idea of listing fundamental policy directives and goals toward which the government was to strive. The only typically Indian institution to be incorporated is the *panchayat*, or elected village council, which the government is directed to develop into an effective unit of local government.

Among the fundamental rights theoretically guaranteed by the constitution are those of equality before law; the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, creed, caste, sex, or place of birth; freedom of speech; freedom of religious worship; and protection of the interests of minority groups. The constitution also upholds the freedom to assemble peacefully, to form associations, to move freely and settle anywhere in India, to own property, and to engage in any occupation. However, it permits the government to impose "reasonable" restraints on these freedoms in the interests of state security or public welfare. The people are protected against *ex post facto* criminal laws, repeated prosecution and punishment for the same offense, and compulsory self-incrimination. The practice of "untouchability" is outlawed. The Indian constitution, unlike that of the United States, allows persons to petition the Supreme Court directly for enforcement of their fundamental rights.

The constitution lists "directive principles of state policy" which are not meant to be legally enforceable but to serve as guidelines to legislators and executives for realizing the national goals envisioned in the preamble. The goals listed include a social order in which justice permeates all institutions of national life and an economy in which ownership and control of resources are exercised in the interests of the common good. The directive principles urge both national and state governments to establish a uniform civil code, to separate judicial from executive administration, and to provide free compulsory education for all through the age of 14. International peace and security, honorable relations between nations, respect for international law, and the settlement of international disputes by arbitration are encouraged.

The constitution provides for division of powers between the Union and the states by demarcating three different areas of legislation: a Union List, a

State List and a Concurrent List. The national Parliament has exclusive authority to make laws in accordance with any of the 97 items on the Union List. In order to assure administrative uniformity throughout India, the national Parliament can also exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the state governments over any of the 47 subjects on the Concurrent List. The states have exclusive authority over the 66 items on the State List but can also exercise authority over the items on the Concurrent List.

The constitution enables the President of India to declare a state of national emergency in case of war, external aggression, or internal disturbance. Under such a proclamation the central executive can issue directives to state officials, and the national Parliament is empowered to legislate "with respect to any matter," including subjects on the State List. Article 19 of the constitution, which protects the rights of free speech, assembly, association, and movement, as well as occupation and property rights, is suspended during a state of emergency. Even where national security is not threatened, the President can assume temporary control over an individual state if he judges that its government is unable to function in accordance with the constitution.

Constitutional amendments may be adopted by two-thirds of the members present and voting in both houses of Parliament, provided that the affirmative vote in each house represents an absolute majority of the chamber's full membership. Amendments concerning presidential elections, state-central government relations, the central judiciary, state and territorial High Courts, the representation of states in Parliament, or the amendment process itself must be ratified by at least half of the state legislatures.

The Supreme Court held in 1967 that Parliament cannot amend the constitution to abridge or take away any of the fundamental rights enumerated in it. In late 1971, however, the 24th Amendment—first of three constitutional amendments, each forming a legal basis for the next—was promulgated. By early 1973 the 25th and 26th Amendments had also been adopted. This potentially far-reaching amendment package could pave the way for radical social legislation. The 24th Amendment gave Parliament the right to amend any section of the constitution, including the chapter on fundamental rights. The 25th Amendment bars judicial review of the amounts and means of compensation in nationalization cases as well as of changes made in property rights and in some other individual freedoms. Also not subject to judicial review is legislation in conflict with those fundamental rights but enacted in the name of the constitution's

heretofore unenforceable "directive principles of state policy"—especially those calling for distribution of material resources serving the common good and for preventing concentration of wealth and means of production. The 26th Amendment abolishes the princely purses and privileges. These amendments will overturn the 1967 Supreme Court decision, as well as the 1970 bank nationalization and princely purses cases, and generally will circumscribe the courts' authority over Parliament. More significantly, the government's social justice objectives will now assume primacy over fundamental individual rights. Mrs. Gandhi, however, has asserted that the directive principles are supplementary and complementary to the fundamental rights and has given assurances that the amendments, especially the 24th and 25th, will not affect fundamental rights except in the case of property. In a suit against the amendment package, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 24th and 25th amendments, the two crucial "enabling" amendments.

The constitution enjoys widespread respect, and government officials are usually careful to act in accordance with the letter, if not always the spirit, of constitutional law. The document, however, does have enough leeway for "reasonable" abridgment of normal procedure to enable the authorities occasionally to cloak arbitrary acts with constitutional respectability. Emergency rules, such as those promulgated after the Chinese attack in 1962, allow even greater latitude.

2. Central government

a. Executive branch

The President is the chief of state and the nominal supreme commander of the armed forces. He is elected for a 5-year term by an electoral college composed of the elected members of both houses of Parliament and the elected members of the lower houses of state legislatures. Voting power is distributed in such a way that the strength of the national Parliament equals the combined voting strength of all state legislators. The President may be removed from office by a vote of two-thirds of the total membership of each house of Parliament.

A Vice President is also elected for a 5-year term, but by an electoral college consisting of only the members of Parliament. He discharges the functions of the President in case of the latter's absence, death, or removal. He does not automatically succeed a deceased or dismissed President but merely serves as a substitute for a maximum period of 6 months, during

which time a new presidential election must be held. The Vice President is ex officio chairman of the Council of States (or *Rajya Sabha*), the upper house of Parliament. In 1969, Parliament enacted a law providing that the Chief Justice or, in his absence, the senior judge of the Supreme Court would be next in line behind the Vice President to temporarily perform duties as head of state.

The real locus of national executive power is the Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at its head. The President normally appoints as Prime Minister a person designated by legislators of the political party, or coalition of parties, commanding a parliamentary majority. He then appoints subordinate ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister. Ministers must either be members of Parliament or be elected or appointed to Parliament within 6 months of their selection. Ministers serve at the pleasure of the President and are collectively responsible to the lower house of Parliament (*Lok Sabha*).

The constitution is vague concerning the exact power relationship between the President and his Council of Ministers. It allows the council to "aid and advise" the President, and it states that the question of what advice, if any, has been offered on a given subject is not judicable in any court. This appears in theory to give the President wide discretionary powers. It was generally understood at the time the constitution was adopted that the intent of the drafters was to incorporate the British convention binding the head of state to the directives of his ministers. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that in time of stress a politically strong President could successfully override or ignore his ministers and take a direct hand in the administration of the country.

The constitution does not prescribe an organizational structure for the Council of Ministers, but the practice has been to rank its membership into three tiers: Ministers, lower ranking ministers of state, and deputy ministers. The ministers, of whom there have been from 12 to 19 at various times since the constitution was adopted, are generally in direct charge of government ministries. A few ministers have served without specific portfolio, however, and a minister is occasionally placed in charge of several otherwise unrelated departments that do not constitute a formal ministry. Changes in the scope and designation of the portfolios have been frequent. For example, the Ministry of Labor and Rehabilitation was previously two portfolios—the Ministry of Labor and Employment and the Ministry of Rehabilitation. All governments, however, have included such portfolios as External Affairs, Home Affairs, Defense,

and Finance.² By tradition, only the full ministers are considered members of the cabinet—a body with no constitutional sanction. It is actually the cabinet, rather than the entire Council of Ministers, that makes policy decisions.

Ministers of state usually assist ministers in the overall management of their portfolios, although some head separate departments under the general supervision of a cabinet minister and others have been given complete control over a ministry. Ministers of state are often invited to attend cabinet meetings when subjects in which they have an interest are under discussion. Deputy ministers often have no executive responsibility; they serve primarily as legislative aides to ministers, answering questions in Parliament and promoting desired legislation. Parliamentary secretaries have been sometimes appointed from among the governing party's legislators to help with parliamentary liaison duties, although this office has fallen into disuse.

The executive branch below the Council of Ministers level is grouped into ministries, departments, and secretariats in accordance with the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules. These rules are often amended at the request of the Prime Minister when there is a major reshuffling of cabinet responsibilities. Ministries are periodically merged or divided, and departments may be extensively redistributed among the ministries. The Indian Government has continued the British practice of placing the routine administration of each ministry and department in the hands of a senior civil servant. These nonpolitical secretaries are usually unaffected by reassignments among their ministerial supervisors, and therefore are able to provide a valuable degree of continuity during cabinet reorganizations.

A specially appointed Administrative Reforms Commission in September 1968 recommended changes in the functioning of the cabinet. In general, however, the commission, with minor changes, endorsed the present organization and failed to recommend alteration of the cumbersome procedures and the rigid compartmentalization which exist in the Indian Government and are more appropriate to the control mechanism of an alien ruler than to the operation of an independent democratic government. Some minor adjustments in the organization and

²For a current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

functioning of the cabinet have been made, but substantive changes had not been implemented by early 1973.

b. Legislative branch

Parliament, the legislative branch of the central government, consists of the President, who has legislative powers under certain circumstances, and the two houses—the upper Council of States (*Rajya Sabha*) and the lower House of the People (*Lok Sabha*). Parliament normally meets for about 24 weeks a year. It has three annual sessions—the winter and monsoon sessions of about 6 weeks each, and the budget session, which lasts about 12 weeks.

The Council of States consists of not more than 238 representatives of the states and union territories and 12 members nominated by the President because of distinction in the fields of literature, science, art, or social service. State representatives are chosen by the elected members of their respective state legislative assemblies. Only two of the union territories are represented in the *Rajya Sabha*. Pondicherry selects its delegation by legislative vote, while Delhi convenes a special electoral college consisting of members who have been elected by popular ballot. Members of the Council of States serve for a term of 6 years, with one-third of the members being elected every 2 years. The council can be prorogued, but not dissolved, by the President.

The House of the People can have a maximum of 527 members. Up to 500 of these are chosen for a 5-year term by direct elections from single-member constituencies within the states. The number of elected members from each state is in direct proportion to the population of the state at the time of the most recent census. The creation of the states of Manipur, Meghalaya, and Tripura in the 1972 reorganization will presumably necessitate a reapportionment of *Lok Sabha* seats to accommodate these new administrative areas in northeast India. A constitutional amendment to raise the 500 member ceiling has already been introduced. No more than 25 additional members are elected or selected from the union territories in a manner governed by parliamentary legislation. These limitations notwithstanding, if the President determines that the Anglo-Indian community is not adequately represented, he may nominate up to two members of that community to the *Lok Sabha*. In the March 1971 general election, 515 members were elected directly to the *Lok Sabha*. In addition, the President appointed one member to represent the then

North East Frontier Agency of Assam (now Arunachal Pradesh) and two Anglo-Indian members under special constitutional provisions. A number of regular elective state and union territory *Lok Sabha* seats are reserved for members of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes—specifically designated depressed groups which are deemed incapable of fending for themselves and whose education, economic uplift, and welfare are of special concern to the government. The number of reserved seats in each jurisdiction is proportional to the number of inhabitants belonging to "scheduled" groups.

The *Lok Sabha* may be either prorogued or dissolved by the President, and it is automatically dissolved 5 years from the date of its first sitting. New elections must be held and a new Parliament must convene within 6 months of the dissolution of the old *Lok Sabha*. Each new *Lok Sabha* elects a speaker and a deputy speaker to preside over its sessions. In the tradition of the British House of Commons, the speaker is generally nonpartisan.

Bills may be introduced in either house of Parliament, except for money and other financial bills, which must originate in the lower house. Legislation must normally be passed by both houses. If a bill is rejected by either, the President may call for a vote on the measure by a joint parliamentary session—a provision that works to the advantage of the lower house. Bills must be approved by the President before becoming law. If the President rejects a bill, however, it may be passed over his veto by a simple majority of both houses.

The President, normally acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, has important legislative powers which he may exercise when Parliament is not in session. Presidential ordinances, which may be issued on any legitimate national issue, have the same force as acts of Parliament. They must be submitted to Parliament when it reconvenes, however, and, unless confirmed by the legislature, presidential ordinances expire 6 weeks from the date both houses reassemble.

Parliament has been gradually falling behind on its legislative responsibilities. Each new session of Parliament faces a gradually lengthening list of pending legislative matters, some of which have been held over for two or more sessions. Indians tend to be great talkers, and their parliamentarians often seem to prefer discussion to action. Considerable time is given to special debates on current issues. Following the general election in 1967 and through the 1971 general

election, opposition parties frequently disrupted the normal flow of business with emotional and obstructionist outbursts. Since 1971, however, the opposition parties have been weakened and have generally ceased such practices in the face of the Congress Party's dominance. Often the house is only able to continue its business because no one challenges the required one-fifth of the membership quorum rule. Some of the legislative problems may be due to the gradual change in the nature of the membership. Lawyers dominated Parliament in its early years but have steadily declined from a high of 35% of the membership after independence to 17.5% of the pre-1971 *Lok Sabha*. Less sophisticated persons with agrarian backgrounds are the largest single occupational group in the Parliament today.

Other factors, however, may also impede the legislative process. Parliament is still regarded by many as a part-time job; the three short legislative sessions reinforce this concept. Staffs, moreover, are not provided, research facilities are meager, and salaries are too low to allow any but the more prosperous members to hire help on a regular basis. As long as these conditions continue, Parliament can not keep pace with its responsibilities. The absence of standing substantive committees to review and shape legislation impedes the development of some legislative expertise with which to screen the executive's proposals. Parliament is no match for the executive branch in expertise and, thus, can neither act as an effective rein on the executive nor as an effective legislative body. Parliamentarians are unfettered in their ability to raise questions on important substantive matters, and in fact do so regularly, but they can be satisfied by the most superficial explanations. Even the opposition often settles for responses which are wide of the mark, not responsive to the questions at hand, and seem calculated to hide the facts or deliberately mislead. As the personal strength of the executive has been increased and solidified behind Mrs. Gandhi, the effective power of the *Lok Sabha* seems to have decreased. To the extent that she retains her power nationally it may be expected increasingly to become a rubber stamp for her. Although ministers are also members of Parliament, Mrs. Gandhi has been very astute in selecting men who are loyal to and effective at presenting her viewpoint. Standing committees exist to retroactively review budgets and how public funds have been spent. Joint and Select Committees are

occasionally appointed to deal with specific legislation, but their approach is frequently superficial. There are also parliamentary advisory committees to the various ministries, but these are still embryonic. Parliamentary dilettantes are no match for full-time bureaucrats with large human and material resources at their disposal.

Other factors also work to the detriment of legislative effectiveness. Parliamentary government is essentially a coalition system, even if one party rules. In this respect, the multiplicity of parties in India acts as a hindrance. Even though there tends to be good rapport across party lines and a sense of "club" exists in both houses, the system would probably work better with fewer parties. Indeed, the Congress Party's smashing victory in the 1971 and 1972 elections may force some of the opposition parties eventually to amalgamate or to form workable coalitions.

The existence of two houses lends a certain amount of redundancy to the system. Although elected to represent different constituencies, they do not in practice function very differently. Originally the Council of States was intended to provide a chamber where the princes who had been displaced from their former territories could be heard on a par with the provinces of British India. Today this is anachronistic. No states, except perhaps Kashmir, approximates any of the former Princely States and the most important rajahs in the Parliament are in the *Lok Sabha*, having contested for office like ordinary people.

Despite its many weaknesses, the Indian Parliament is one of the freest legislative bodies in the world today. It is faithfully representative of the country as a whole. Parliament does influence the legislative program of the Prime Minister to some extent. Additionally, individual members of Parliament have influence and are heard, especially if a minority government is in power and needs support to pass legislation. If the legislature is to be responsive to the staggering problems of India, however, refinements are needed which might more readily respond to the multiparty, highly plural, and federal character of the system in which Parliament functions.

3. State, union territory, and local governments

a. The states

The pattern of state government organization is similar to that at the national level, except for a trend toward establishing unicameral legislatures in the

states. Executive power is vested in a governor, appointed by the President for a term of 5 years but serving at his pleasure. Although the President is under no constitutional obligation to do so, he normally accepts the Prime Minister's recommendations in selecting governors. A council of ministers, headed by a chief minister, advises the governor in much the same way as does the President's Council of Ministers.

Seven state legislatures—Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Mysore, and Uttar Pradesh—consisted of two houses in 1972, but some of these were considering abolition of the upper house. The other states have unicameral legislatures. The upper house of a state legislature is known as the legislative council (*Vidhan Parishad*), the lower as the legislative assembly (*Vidhan Sabha*). Assemblies generally consist of not more than 500 or fewer than 60 members, directly elected from single-member constituencies throughout the state. Nagaland, the sole exception, may have as few as 46 members in its assembly. Legislative councils cannot normally exceed one-third the size of the legislative assembly but must have at least 40 members. One-third of the council members are elected by the lower house, while the rest are selected by special electorates (e.g., local governments, teachers, or university graduates) or appointed by the governor.

Terms of office, officers, and activities of state legislatures are similar to those in the national Parliament. The governor may dissolve the legislative assembly, but the legislative council, like the Council of States, is not subject to dissolution. Legislation must be approved by the governor before becoming law. If he disapproves of a bill, the governor may either return it to the legislature for reconsideration or forward it to the President for his review. Bills returned to the legislature without being sent to the President can be repassed into law by a simple majority vote, but a presidential veto cannot be overridden.

b. The union territories

The union territories have less autonomy than the states, although over the years some of them have gained more power to administer local affairs. Union territories have been pressuring for full statehood in the Indian union, and the trend seems to be in that direction. The central government has declared as an ultimate aim statehood or merger with contiguous states for all union territories with the exception of Delhi, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and the Laccadives.

As part of a general administrative reorganization of the country in 1956, the Seventh Amendment to the constitution created six union territories that were given representation in the national Parliament but were to be directly administered by the central government. These original union territories were created for a variety of reasons. Like the District of Columbia, Delhi, as the nation's capital, was kept separate from the neighboring states. Some—such as Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Tripura—were small border areas which for geographical and cultural reasons could not be easily absorbed into neighboring states and which for defense reasons warranted special attention by New Delhi. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Laccadive, Minicoy, and Amindivi Islands, whose small, remote populations are unequipped to manage their own political affairs, came under direct central administration by necessity.

Subsequently, other small areas were acquired by the Indian Government. Because of their special problems and cultural distinctiveness, these areas could not be immediately merged with neighboring states. The accession of the former Portuguese territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli to the Union of India in August 1961 and the seizure of Goa, Daman (now Daman), and Diu in December of the same year necessitated the 10th and 12th Amendments to the constitution to include them as union territories. With the *de jure* transfer of the former French colonial settlements of Pondicherry, Karikal, Mahe, and Yanam to the Indian union, the Union Territory of Pondicherry was created by the 14th Amendment. The demand for a Punjabi-speaking state for the Sikhs led to a reorganization of the former Punjab State into new Punjab and Haryana States and to the creation in 1966 of Chandigarh as a union territory and joint capital for these states. In early 1970, the central government decided that Chandigarh would become part of the Punjab within 5 years and a separate capital would be created for Haryana. This matter was still in dispute in mid-1973.

The Government of Union Territories Act of 1963 gave five of the union territories more power to act on local affairs. Separate legislatures having 30 popularly elected representatives and not more than 3 nominated members were provided for Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, Pondicherry, and Goa, Daman, and Diu. Delhi and Chandigarh do not have legislatures, but their municipal governments have been given some fiscal and policymaking authority. In all cases, however, the central government has

concurrent legislative authority over subjects which are the exclusive concern of state governments and has greater control over administration and finances than is the case with the states.

The trend toward greater autonomy has continued. In January 1971 the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, in the northwest, was elevated to statehood. The same year Parliament authorized reorganization of northeastern India—which, since independence, has been all but isolated from the rest of the country by the interposition of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)—to meet demands of the inhabitants for greater control of their own affairs. The reorganization was formally inaugurated in November 1972. Seven administrative areas were affected. The union territories of Manipur, Tripura, and Meghalaya, became states. The State of Assam, which earlier had lost territory in the formation of Nagaland and Meghalaya lost its largest administrative district with the creation of the Union Territory of Mizoram from the Mizo Hills district. The Northeast Frontier Agency, a land of 25 tribes with widely differing languages and cultures, became the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh. It had previously been governed directly from New Delhi, although constitutionally it had been part of Assam. All seven units are under a single regional governor. An advisory Northeast Council, under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Gandhi, a common high court, and a partially unified administrative apparatus are planned to promote intraregional cooperation.

c. Local governments

Below the state and union territory levels of government is a pyramid of local government jurisdictions. The larger states are organized into administrative divisions, numbering between 3 and 22. Within each division (or directly subordinate to the state government in the case of some of the smaller states) are a number of districts, which are roughly equivalent to U.S. counties. Beneath the district are a number of units called *tahsils* or *talukas*, which are sometimes grouped together for administrative convenience into district "subdivisions." Finally, at the lowest level, there are the villages. Under British rule, officials at the upper three or four levels were appointed by the provincial government. Many officers had both executive and judicial functions. Since 1959 authority has been passing gradually into the hands of locally elected officials as states have begun to implement the Congress-inspired experiment

in *panchayat raj* (rural self-government by village councils).

The senior officer in the older, appointive hierarchy is the commissioner of an administrative division. His responsibilities are largely those of broad, general supervision and inspection. However, in many respects the key operational figure is the district officer, also referred to as the "collector" or "district magistrate." Although subordinate to the divisional commissioner and ultimately responsible to the state's chief minister and home affairs minister, the district officer has considerable discretionary authority over most governmental activities within his district. The district officer supervises several subdivisional officers who at least nominally direct the administration of the *tahsils* and *talukas*. These persons are often very junior Indian Administrative Service officers who are primarily understudying the district officer. Below the district and subdivisional officers are a number of clerks, tax collectors, and development officers who handle the routine administration of local affairs.

Under the *panchayat raj* system, elective bodies in rural areas are beginning to assume some control over local government. The program envisages decentralization of authority and restoration of elected self-government by the people at the village, *tahsil* or *taluka*, and district levels. The aim of the experiment is to encourage the villager to be more self-reliant and to give him both the authority and the means to increase local agricultural and industrial production.

Although the overall pattern varies somewhat from state to state, the basic unit of self-government is the village *panchayat* (council), elected at large by adult voters of one or more villages. This body, usually consisting of five to seven villagers, is empowered to make a variety of decisions affecting the management of village affairs, including economic development, health and sanitation, roads, wells, and in some cases primary education. Each of the village *panchayats* within a single community development block—an area containing about 100 villages and 60,000 to 70,000 inhabitants and roughly corresponding in area to a *ahsil* or *taluka*—sends a representative to sit on a *panchayat samiti*, the second tier of the *panchayat* system. The *panchayat samitis* have important planning responsibilities in the fields of elementary education, public health, minor irrigation, agriculture, the promotion of local industries, welfare work, the collection of revenues, and the maintenance of statistics. Their policies are implemented through the block development officer, a state official responsible for development programs at the local level. At the

apex of the *panchayat* structure is the *zilla parishad*, consisting of the elected presidents of each *panchayat samiti* within a district, as well as the district's representatives in the state and national legislatures. The *zilla parishad* advises the district officer on matters concerning district development and welfare, but it has no executive authority.

Village *panchayats* exist in all of the states and most of the union territories, and *samitis* and *zilla parishads* have been constituted in all of the states except Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, Jammu and Kashmir, and parts of Nagaland and Bihar. The *panchayat raj* experiment, however, generally has not resulted in the political, economic, and social change originally envisaged. Villagers tend to elect the same dominant caste leaders who have traditionally controlled village life, and the *panchayat's* deliberations strongly reflect local caste politics. Where the composition of the elected council departs radically from the traditional leadership structure, villagers frequently ignore its decisions. *Panchayat samitis* are hampered by a lack of technical competence and by inadequate financing. The district officer can usually veto programs he considers undesirable simply by withholding state funds.

In urban areas the pattern of local government is quite different from that prevailing in the countryside. Cities of over 20,000 persons have elective corporations or councils, which in turn elect a corporation president or mayor. These political figures establish policies which are implemented by the city executive, usually composed of state-appointed civil servants. Towns of between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants also have elected committees but enjoy less autonomy than the larger municipalities. Urban localities of between 5,000 and 10,000 residents have "notified area committees," members of which are normally appointed by the state government.

4. Center-state relations

The Indian constitution reflects an extensive effort to provide an institutional framework for reconciling the common interests of the nation with the special interests of individual localities. Given the strong centrifugal forces within the country, this reconciliation precludes either broad independence or excessive dependence of the states within the union. As viewed by the framers of the constitution, the demands of the Indian situation require a fairly high degree of interdependence between the central government in New Delhi and the governments of the states to facilitate political harmony and orderly economic progress.

The evolving federal relationship between the central government in New Delhi and the governments of the 21 states is of great importance for the ultimate viability of the Indian Union. There are inevitable strains in state-center relations, generated in part by the diverse nature of the states and inherent conflicts between national and local interests. These strains have often been eased, if not always resolved, by negotiations within the Congress Party which controlled both central and state governments. In the late 1960's, however, this channel for mitigating center-state conflicts had become less useful due to the rise of non-Congress Party state governments, divisions within the Congress Party, and a weakened Congress government in New Delhi. Considerable strain was placed on the country's fragile federal system, but power was restored to the center following the Congress Party's overwhelming victories at the polls in 1971 and 1972. In effect, Prime Minister Gandhi was the victor, having received the strongest mandate ever accorded an Indian Prime Minister to solve the country's problems. Direction from the center, accordingly, returned as a byproduct of this personal mandate rather than as a conscious expression of the people's will.

a. Legislative relations

The constitution spells out at great length the legislative relations and the division of legislative powers between the central and state governments. It embodies a careful and detailed balancing of powers and is obviously aimed at reconciling diverse national and regional interests. In practice, however, the system has been heavily weighted in favor of the central government—especially in times of emergency.

There are several methods by which the national Parliament can and does invade the broad legislative jurisdiction of the states. Some of these have been extensively employed; others have been used in unforeseen ways, or remain untested; and at least one—intervention by the *Rajya Sabha*—has been condemned to the constitutional scrap heap by the evolution of political realities in the country.

One of the best known means by which the central government can intervene in the states is through the power of state governors to withhold assent to state legislation by reserving a legally passed bill for further consideration by the President. The President, presumably acting on the advice of the national cabinet, in theory can cast a veto if the state legislature refuses to accept his proposed changes. To date, the presidential veto has not been used, although the threat was employed as a tactic to hasten the downfall of a Communist government in Kerala in 1959.

The upper house of Parliament (*Rajya Sabha*), which in theory represents the interests of the states, may also limit the power of the state assemblies. By a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, the *Rajya Sabha* can decide that it is necessary and expedient for Parliament to legislate on any matter constitutionally reserved for the states. Parliament's power is circumscribed, however, by a provision that when this authority, which must be renewed annually, finally expires, all such laws passed in the interim also expire within 6 months. During the high point of Congress Party power, these provisions were used only once, and then only briefly during a food shortage.

More importantly, the constitution gives the central government emergency powers that require no preliminary action by either house of Parliament, and the government relies heavily on these powers to limit and direct the legislative prerogatives of the states. Under emergency powers, the central government's invasion of state jurisdiction has at times been massive, although generally this has been within democratically justifiable bounds by Indian standards. Political risks for exercising these powers have been high during periods, such as the late 1960's, when the Congress Party could not count on obtaining the parliamentary majority necessary to continue emergency provisions. Additionally, the Congress Party's freedom of action has been somewhat restrained by the need to avoid arousing the opposition in some key states.

The emergency power used most often since the 1967 elections is so-called "President's Rule"—a constitutional device by which the central government can temporarily oust a state government under certain loosely defined circumstances. If, upon the receipt of a "report from the governor or otherwise," the President is satisfied that a state government can no longer function in accordance with the constitution, he may assume all of the state's executive functions and declare that Parliament will exercise all of the powers normally assigned to the state assembly. In practice, the party controlling Parliament assumes control of the state apparatus as well. "President's Rule" must be approved, after it has been declared, by a resolution of Parliament, and it has a life of only 6 months, after which it can be extended by 6-month increments for a maximum of 3 years.

The central government, reflecting the will and power of Prime Minister Gandhi, has not hesitated to invoke "President's Rule" whenever it deemed such action necessary. The breakdown of party discipline that characterized political developments in several states between the 1967 elections and early 1971 rendered the operation of stable parliamentary

government impossible in several instances. During those years "President's Rule" was imposed well over a dozen times—more than the number of times it had been imposed during the previous 17 years. With the Congress Party's resurgence, the need for employing "President's Rule" declined. If Mrs. Gandhi probably will show little reluctance to use it as a political tool if events warrant such action. Indeed, in early 1973 it was used to supersede a Congress government in Andhra Pradesh (racked by violence) and the Congress government in Orissa, where it lost its majority through defections. A non-Congress coalition in Manipur was similarly superseded in March 1973.

Parliament is also empowered to enact laws concerning any subject normally reserved for the states when a condition of general emergency is declared by the President. Like "President's Rule," the state of emergency must also be approved after the fact by Parliament, although it may remain in force indefinitely. A general state of emergency was proclaimed and approved following the Chinese attack in 1962, and far-reaching legislation preempting the normal state sphere was enacted. Although the emergency was not withdrawn until January 1968, its effect on center-state relations was limited largely to the period during and immediately after the Chinese attack. Use of the state of emergency technique appears limited to periods of grave national danger, but when this happens, India is quickly transformed from a federal to a unitary state.

b. Administrative relations

Under the constitution the states are required to comply with national laws and are expressly forbidden to impede or prejudice the working of the federal executive. As a necessary corollary, the central government is empowered to issue instructions to insure that its laws are properly enforced. This is especially important because many national laws are actually implemented by the state governments, and agencies of the central government are physically located in all of the states.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government has made its writ run in the non-Congress states, especially when vital interests are involved. It moved decisively in September 1968 when the Communist-dominated government in Kerala openly refused to obey instructions for implementation of a presidential ordinance banning a one-day token strike by central government employees. In an unprecedented move, Central Reserve Police, under control of the Ministry of Home Affairs in New Delhi, were deployed to

Kerala without prior consultation with the state government. Since then the central government has made very clear its intention to use central police forces at its sole discretion in the states.

The Kerala case has only partially resolved the long-lingering question over what the central government can do to insure that the states do not undermine its laws. New Delhi may not always choose to use its police forces, which are being gradually strengthened, to insure compliance with its laws and directives. Political conditions both in the state involved and in New Delhi remain the dominant influence on center-state relations. Failure of a state to implement a national law might in the future be conveniently overlooked or glossed over by the central government if it was dictated by political necessity. On the other hand, it could lead to the speedy imposition of "President's Rule."

Prime Minister Gandhi's government has been fairly flexible in coping with recalcitrant non-Congress state governments and has sought new ways to mitigate center-state conflicts. The constitution provides considerable scope for setting up formal problem-solving machinery, but these provisions have never been fully utilized. Of particular interest is an untested article providing for the establishment of a special council of state governments, limited strictly to an advisory role, to facilitate coordination between the states and possibly, by extension, between the central government and the states. The Congress Party's revitalization following victories at the polls in 1971 and 1972 has largely removed from the Indian political scene the need for considering such a council in the foreseeable future. It appears unlikely that such a mechanism would be initiated when it would only serve to duplicate work more easily done within the organizational framework of the Congress Party. The Congress Party's own internal channels of communication, which were severed in those states where non-Congress governments came to power and which in other cases were weakened by the Congress Party split in late 1969, will probably be repaired and emerge stronger than before 1967.

Periodic group and individual meetings of state ministers with the central government in New Delhi can also be expected to restore the institutional framework for the center-state dialogue that existed prior to 1967. Although these sessions were expanded to include the most important state and central government ministers, especially finance and agriculture, they more often than not produced more heat than light. Nevertheless, the scope of the dialogue has been widened and should provide a more

workable basis for future positive results, especially in the crucial area of economics. While periodic meetings of state governors and presiding assembly officers with the President and speaker of the *Lok Sabha* produced few tangible results in the last few years, they too could become more useful as a vehicle for New Delhi's policies and for convincing state leaders to implement them.

c. Financial relations

Center-state financial relations are always a major issue in India. The constitution divides certain taxation powers between the center and the states. The constitution requires that the central government collect taxes on nonagricultural income and property and certain other specified taxes, and share the revenue from income taxes with the states. In addition, certain taxes, while collected at the center, are turned over to the states. Excise duties "may be distributed" between the center and states if Parliament so provides. The center, "as Parliament may determine," may give direct grants-in-aid to the states. In each of the four 5-year plans and in each of the three annual plans, large sums have been designated for transfer to the states; these are in addition to the funds received by the states from shared revenues and grants-in-aid. Thus, the central government has always been the major provider of financial resources to the states. The states have become heavily dependent on such funds from New Delhi for operating expenses as well as for the bulk of funds for economic development. Instead of taking the necessary fiscal measures to mobilize their own resources, the states have increasingly blamed New Delhi for its stinginess and have virtually ignored its advice on improving their financial management.

State efforts to increase revenues over the past few years have been either anemic or nonexistent. Constitutionally, the states have the right to levy certain consumer taxes and to tax agricultural income. Since they depend on wealthy farmers for political support, however, local politicians seem loath to raise the generally nominal land tax or tax the rising agricultural income. As the rich few get richer, India's growing masses barely subsist. Recognizing this overwhelming problem, the central government has been moving toward seeking a constitutional amendment permitting it to levy an agricultural income tax. New Delhi has been forced to take an active hand in the states' financial affairs, and consequently it exerts influence on state policies through its increasing control of budget allocations. This process has placed great strains on the Indian

federal structure as states have competed for scarce funds. Presumably New Delhi's consolidation of national power through Congress' victories at the polls in 1971 and 1972 can be employed to deal more effectively with this situation. In the past, Mrs. Gandhi has been reluctant to take any action which might offend wealthy farmers lest they defect from Congress' ranks. It is likely, therefore, that any action from the center will be taken quite gingerly.

Large-scale development activity resulting from formal 5-year planning increasingly has undermined the slim measure of financial self-reliance and policy independence intended for the states. Autonomous and *ad hoc* finance commissions have been established—according to constitutional mandate—every 5 years to study and recommend to the central government how to distribute income revenues between the center and states and to make recommendations on grants-in-aid. These commissions have been limited in practice to dealing with non-plan resources. The powerful Planning Commission—directly under New Delhi's control—has no constitutional status, but it has vitally affected center-state financial relations. Charged with the responsibility for planning the comprehensive economic development of India, preparing the 5-year plans, and providing such discretionary assistance from the center as is outside the purview of the Finance Commission, this commission has played an important role in Indian financial affairs. Economic shortfalls in the Third Five Year Plan (1961-66), however, reduced its importance; the trend since about 1970 toward stronger executive control—especially by the Prime Minister's Secretariat—has continued its apparent decline. These factors have brought into question the relevance of the organization to the overall economic development process. The Planning Commission seems no longer to wield significant power in the decisionmaking process. Indeed, the direction of Indian financial relations from two different and often overlapping bodies, which have different criteria for operation and submit inconsistent estimates, has been brought into question. The center has refused to allow the states a greater role in the financial decision-making process and has been unwilling or unable to cajole them into taking politically and administratively difficult reform measures. In this atmosphere, New Delhi's tightening grip on the purse strings has been circumvented by the greatly increased spending levels of the states, both in absolute and relative terms.

States have increasingly resorted to borrowing from the center through the use of overdrafts drawn on the

Reserve Bank of India. Overdrafts are usually 90-day advances to permit a state to meet its obligations. The states often use their share of centrally collected tax receipts or their developmental assistance funds or accept *ad hoc* grants from the center—made in contravention of its own fiscal policy—to liquidate the overdrafts. A spiraling system of dependence on the center has evolved whereby New Delhi has in effect become the loan shark, allowing some states to repay their loans, and sometimes even interest charges, out of new borrowings. In this usurious atmosphere, unhealthy attitudes in both the giver and receiver have developed. Central government urgings to reform have often been either ignored or met with requests for more money. Paradoxically, the latter tactic seems to work to the advantage of those states with the largest overdrafts, since they seem to receive proportionately greater assistance from the center. In 1972, the Reserve Bank of India "banned" overdrafts and worked out repayment schedules with the states.

In order to correct this muddle, there has been growing interest in reforming the financial relations between center and states, but by mid-1973 nothing had been accomplished. Long-awaited action by the center to shut off overdraft facilities has not come to fruition, and significant pressure has not been brought to bear against the most delinquent states. The states have had legitimate grievances, however, which the center has not redressed. With little influence over planning decisions and small likelihood that they will obtain any in the near future, the states continue to harbor deep suspicions of the center. They believe that they should not be held financially responsible for centrally financed projects which are implemented within their borders but which are primarily of interest to the central government. In addition, they assert that government decisions, especially as carried out by the Planning Commission, have often been made for transitory, and often partisan reasons and have not been responsive to their individual needs. The resources presently available to the states for raising funds are comparatively few, and most states have been reluctant to risk jeopardizing their political situation by improving revenue-raising measures. On the other hand, the states often intensify the problem. Anxious to improve their popular support, many state governments have compulsively expanded their development spending programs and have continually exerted pressure on the center for more money. This apparent loyalty to local interests seems to transcend political party affiliation and could prove an obstacle to Mrs. Gandhi's attempts to reform, despite the Congress Party's virtually complete control of Indian politics.

d. The President and the governors

The major political actors—the President and the state governor—stand at the nexus of relations between the central government and each state and, as events have demonstrated, they have the power to affect this relationship drastically. Their ultimate importance and freedom of action, however, have long been the source of heated debate.

Precedents for presidential action are weak in the area of center-state relations because presidential action was seldom required during the first 17 years of the constitution's life. The increased resort to "President's Rule" following the 1967 elections built important precedents in this vital area, although some crucial gaps still exist. A Prime Minister, motivated by narrowly focused partisan political considerations, could advise "President's Rule," even when conditions in a state did not constitutionally warrant this drastic move. Indeed, it is conceivable that "President's Rule" could be used as a weapon by the Congress Party government to gain control of the few states not solidly under its control. Similarly, a President could be advised to grant or withhold assent to legislation that would directly impinge on the constitutional prerogatives of the states, or he be asked to use his veto power over state legislation as a means of imposing the central government's will on a politically unacceptable state. In such situations, it is conceivable that the President could conclude that it was his responsibility to ignore ministerial advice in order to protect the constitution and the integrity of the union. This could immediately create a constitutional crisis, since the President, as the head of state, does not represent the government of the day, but—having been elected by Parliament and the state assemblies—represents the interests of both.

The state governors are becoming even more pivotal figures in center-state relations than the President. Their crucial role as a bridge between the central government and the states, however, was obscured up to 1967 by the remarkable political stability resulting from almost exclusive rule by the Congress Party at both the national and state levels. For the most part, the governors were elderly Congress Party politicians put out to pasture in the state capitals as a reward for loyal service to the party, and they were little more than ceremonial figureheads. The rapid rise and fall of state coalition governments following the general election, in 1967, however, illustrated that governors could be much more than symbolic executives when political instability sets in. Sworn by an oath to "preserve, protect, and defend the constitution," the governors have several very important discretionary powers.

Topping the governors' list of drastic means to restore political order is "President's Rule." Although a governor may be constitutionally bypassed, all of the impositions of "President's Rule" since the 1967 election have come only on the recommendation of the state or union territory governor involved. At least once, a governor's advice has been rejected by the central government, but in all cases the governors' views appear to have been very influential.

Once representative government has been suspended in a state, experience shows that the governor suddenly assumes virtually dictatorial power. Although technically "President's Rule" derives constitutional authority from New Delhi, the governors have been essentially free to run the states after it has once been imposed. In several instances, the governors have become very important factors in the political situation before it had deteriorated to the point where representative government had to be superseded. Unstable political conditions in many states prior to 1972 allowed previously routine gubernatorial functions—such as the selection of a chief minister, the dismissal of ministers, and the summoning, proroguing, and dissolving of state assemblies—to become crucial acts directly affecting the life of state governments and the fortunes of contending political factions. Precedents for resolving highly controversial issues arising out of such situations were previously lacking and have only now begun to evolve.

5. Judicial system

The Indian court system is a unified, hierarchical structure which functions outside the normal federal-state division of power and is accountable to neither the central nor the state governments. At the summit is a Supreme Court, with a Chief Justice and up to 13 other judges appointed by the President. It is largely an appellate court, its original jurisdiction extending primarily to disputes between state governments and also to citizens' petitions for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The court may review the constitutionality of laws, and its interpretations are binding on all lower courts. Contrary to U.S. practice, the Indian Supreme Court can issue advisory opinions at the request of the President.

There is a High Court for each state, although occasionally two or more states share a single panel of High Court judges. Union territories may also have High Courts, but nearly all now fall within the jurisdiction of neighboring state High Courts. The High Court bench consists of a chief justice and a varying number of other judges appointed by the

President in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the governor of the state, and—in the case of associate judges—the state chief justice. High Courts supervise all courts and tribunals within their jurisdiction (except military panels), not only reviewing legal decisions but also overseeing the general administration of the courts. District criminal ("sessions") and civil judges are appointed by the governor in consultation with the High Court. The High Court also advises the governor on methods of recruiting the subordinate judiciary, which consists of first, second, and third degree magistrates, and village-level civil judges (*munstfs*).

The practice of combining judicial with executive functions, a legacy of British rule, has been abolished in seven states and partly eliminated or scheduled for elimination in most others. In some states, the district officer, as "district magistrate," still exercises first-class magisterial powers (i.e., he can pass sentences of up to 2 years' imprisonment in criminal cases); few actually conduct trials, however. All proceedings of the Supreme Court must be in English. State governors may authorize the use of Hindi or the official state language in the proceedings of their state's High Courts.

The Criminal Procedure Code contains provisions for jury trial, but retention of this British-introduced institution has been left to the discretion of the states. In most jurisdictions it has been abandoned as unworkable because of caste, literacy, and other problems. Even where the institution has been retained, actual jury trials are rare.

At the national level, there is a presidentially appointed Attorney General, whose primary function is to advise the government on legal matters. He has the "right of audience" in all Indian courts, but he does not normally participate in litigation. An advocate general in each state, appointed by the governor, provides similar services for the state government, although he does not enjoy the same access to the courts. The advocates general have no connection with the prosecution of criminal cases. Such prosecution is considered a police function and is usually performed by state police officers or by lawyers employed by the state government.

The judiciary, being smaller and less subject to political pressure than the executive, has had less difficulty maintaining the relatively high standards of the preindependence years. Judges and advocates usually act with integrity and impartiality, rendering unbiased decisions on thorny issues with political overtones. In late 1970 the Supreme Court exhibited its independence by invalidating the abolition of the

princely purses and privileges, thereby forcing the government to undertake procedures for a constitutional amendment. Politics have influenced judicial decisions in a few cases, however, and there is some laxity where the executive and judicial functions have not been fully separated. Despite high standards on the bench, nonjudicial court officials do not always share the values of their superiors, and bribery of court clerks is not uncommon. Moreover, a great and increasing volume of litigation has virtually swamped the court system, resulting in protracted delays.

6. Civil service

India inherited from the British a well-organized, though cumbersome, administrative structure, geared more to the maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenue than to economic and social development. Since independence, the national and state governments have taken on an increasing range of activities, and this has led to a rapid expansion of the number of government employees (from about 3.5 million in 1951 to almost 10 million in 1969), especially at the middle and lower echelon.

The Indian civil service is not a unified system but rather is comprised of different services, each with its own grade levels, pay patterns, and rules for promotion. The services are highly compartmentalized, and there is little movement between services even within comparable grades. There are three major categories of the public services: All-India Services, Central Civil Services, and the civil services of the individual states.

The All-India Services (including the Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service, Indian Service of Engineers, Indian Medical and Health Service, Indian Education Service, and the Indian Agricultural Service) have the highest governmental and social prestige and are designed essentially to staff the most important policymaking posts in both the central and state governments. They were created to insure uniform standards in certain vital fields of administration, to bring about effective coordination of social and economic development, and to encourage the development of a national approach to problems. Accordingly, the All-India Services are shared by the central and state governments and function under the general and ultimate authority of the union Ministry of Home Affairs, although those members assigned to the states are jointly controlled under statutory agreement with the state governments. Competition to enter the All-India Services is great, and recruitment is on a countrywide basis through

rigorous examinations. Generally, the prestigious and better paying All-India Services are able to attract the best qualified candidates.

The Indian Administrative Service (IAS), as the successor to the elite British-dominated Indian Civil Service (ICS), is by far the most prestigious and important of the All-India Services. IAS officers, some 2,200 strong, hold most of the top posts in the central and state government ministries, occupy about 80% of the district officer posts, and fill an even higher percentage of the divisional commissioner positions. The IAS cadre, which still includes some former members of the ICS, is a small and tightly knit fraternity of highly trained generalists imbued with many of the same traditions of praetorian leadership that characterized the former ICS. Their major failing is probably the fact that many of them, as products of modern Western influences, are out of touch with the thoughts and aspirations of the tradition-oriented masses. Moreover, the "achievement" examination basis of recruitment for a restricted age group is prejudiced in favor of English-speaking, well-educated, articulate, and Westernized urban people.

Unlike the All-India Services, the Central Civil Services are under the exclusive control of the central government and only staff central government jobs. The day-to-day administration of these services rests with the individual ministries. The Ministry of Home Affairs, however, determines the administrative nature of the terms of service, and the Ministry of Finance is concerned with fixing pay scales and other financial matters.

Each of the states also has its own locally recruited and controlled civil service. The state services have grown considerably over the years as the states have rapidly expanded their scope. Generally, state service cadres fill middle and lower grade positions subordinate to the officers of the All-India Services who are assigned to the states. Most of the state services are organized on departmental and functional lines. The most important services at the state level are the generalist Civil (or Administrative) Services, which have been modeled on the IAS and some of whose personnel are promoted into the IAS. The various state services, with few exceptions, are inferior to the All-India Services and the Central Civil Services, both in terms of the quality of their work and the conditions under which they operate.

The rapid expansion of India's bureaucracies since independence has resulted in a considerable decline in efficiency, especially at the lower levels of administration. Overstaffing has become a major problem, with supernumeraries at the lowest levels in

particular. It has resulted in low morale, low salaries, and standards based on personal gain rather than the public good. This situation in turn has led to duties half done, done incorrectly or not at all, as well as to corruption.

C. Political dynamics (U/OU)

1. Political forces

a. Historical, geographic, and cultural

India's political relationships have been strongly influenced throughout history by the intense regional and group loyalties of its heterogeneous inhabitants. These narrow allegiances are the product of complex geographic, racial, cultural, linguistic, and religious factors. They were apparent in the preindependence agitation by Muslims for a separate state, which culminated in the 1947 partitioning of British India into the two independent nations of India and Pakistan. Within independent India they continue to affect national policy decisions, to influence interstate relations, to determine the outcome of elections, and in general to shape political life from New Delhi to the most remote district.

Geographical and cultural factors have long frustrated attempts to establish and maintain extensive empires in the subcontinent. During most of India's history, effective authority has been exercised by the local rulers of patchwork principalities scattered across the land. The most successful regimes were those of northern rulers. Even these empires, some of which extended far to the south, were never able to gain control of all the territory now included in India. British dominance developed largely out of a gradual expansion of power from the earliest areas of influence in Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. Prior to partition in 1947, some 600 Indian rajas still ruled their domains with more or less a free hand, although they were bound to the British Crown by certain treaty obligations recognizing British paramountcy.

The periodic incursions into the south by northern empire builders strengthened basic north-south antipathies, and after independence political life continued to be dominated by northerners. Resentment of rule from the north has been a major element in southern political life. Beginning in the mid-1950's, and particularly following the death of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964, there was a decentralization of political power into the hands of regional and state leaders. Indira Gandhi, who by 1972 had gained popularity and power rivaling that of her father, apparently had begun to reverse this trend.

This has reestablished the influence of Hindi-speaking northerners, further enhanced the position of Congress Party leaders, and diminished that of most regional-based political parties.

Regional ties are reinforced by group loyalties, since the most important social groupings rarely extend beyond linguistic areas. Apart from family and clan, the individual is likely to identify most closely with others of his particular caste. Caste rivalries play an important part in the exercise of political power in most states, especially in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Mysore, and Tamil Nadu.

Political parties are usually careful to select candidates whose caste affiliations will harmonize with those of most voters in the constituency. Intraparty factionalism often centers on caste. State chief ministers generally strive to achieve a widely acceptable caste balance in their cabinet appointments. Failure to consider the interests of a prominent caste is politically hazardous, and a number of state governments have fallen as a result of defections by disgruntled caste groups. At the national level, caste is not so vital a consideration as region in the selection of cabinet members. Nevertheless, scheduled castes are usually represented by at least one cabinet member.

Religious differences have also long had important political ramifications (Figure 3). Friction between the majority Hindu population and the minority Muslims has influenced politics for 900 years. Though somewhat lessened in the years following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, this friction remains politically potent in several areas having large Muslim populations. In the Hindi-speaking north, Hindu-oriented groups attempt to play upon latent hostility toward the Muslim community. The Hindu-nationalist themes propagated by these groups strike a responsive chord, particularly among urban Hindus, although northern legislators were not noticeably reluctant to vote for a Muslim, Zakir Husain, who was elected President of India in 1967. Muslim dissatisfaction with Congress Party rule was an important ingredient in the party's 1967 election defeats in the states of West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Kerala. Muslims' desertion of the Congress Party usually has strengthened the communal parties, but it has most often boomeranged against Muslim interests. Opposition by many Kashmiri Muslims to that state's incorporation into India still presents the government with numerous political and security problems.

Religion, like caste, figures prominently in the determination of election slates and cabinet selections.

FIGURE 3. Sadhus demonstrating before Parliament for a national ban on cow slaughter (C)



The national cabinet almost invariably includes at least one Muslim and one Sikh. Governments of states with large religious minorities normally assign cabinet portfolios to members of those communities. In Kerala, for example, Christians and Muslims are usually included in the government.

b. Influential groups

The sources of power and influence are widely distributed in India's pluralistic society and democratic political system. The most important, though certainly not the only, politically influential groups in India are to be found in governmental structures, political parties, the intelligentsia, students, labor, and in rural development and administrative bodies. The role and interaction of these groups provide much of the dynamics of the Indian political system.

The bureaucracy, both at the national and state levels, has gradually become an increasingly important source of political power and influence. In a pluralistic society trying to cope with the demands of rising expectations, the size of government has grown tremendously. The bureaucracy is intimately involved with all aspects of economic and social development and hence with the detailed socioeconomic activities of all types of individuals. In many instances, the bureaucrats not only execute policy, but by virtue of their knowledge and experience effectively make policy.

The Indian armed forces, despite their large size, do not have the influence in India that the military exerts in many other less developed countries. To date, the military has shown virtually no inclination to play an autonomous political role. Because of the unsettled

nature of political life in India, however, it constitutes at least a potential political force of some consequence. The armed forces, unlike most other Indian organizations, command national rather than regional loyalties, have proven their power to maintain law and order, and on a relative basis of efficiency and organizational know-how in a society not greatly endowed with these qualities. The military thus remains an ever-present attraction to some of those dissatisfied with the way the politicians are running the government, although as yet its staunchly apolitical attitude has not been substantially eroded at any level.

India's intellectuals have a considerable amount of influence, since they had occupied commanding positions in the independence movement and have played a continuing role in the development process. They are active as political leaders and policymakers, as advisers to the government, as articulate opinion makers, and as the teachers of the country's future leaders. Politically they have usually been associated with left-of-center groups. Many links have grown between the government and the academic community, especially in the areas of economic planning and social and scientific research.

The intellectuals epitomized by Jawaharlal Nehru dominated the Congress Party during most of the independence movement, but since independence many of the urban intellectuals have been alienated from the Congress as the party has shifted its focus of power to the rural hinterlands where most of the voting population lives. Despite the general lowering of intellectual influence within the political parties, this influence is now more widely diffused because of the expansion of higher education, the growth of new

governmental bodies requiring intellectual input, and the gradual growth of intellectual consumers. The rapidly growing student population is playing an increasingly important role in Indian political life, although this role is frequently more disruptive than constructive. Students act as fairly effective, though often undisciplined, pressure groups on a wide variety of issues and constitute a source of recruits for political parties and partisan interest groups of all ideological stripes.

Gradual industrialization in India has increased the political influence of labor, although this is not comparable with the role of labor in the industrialized states of the West. Labor in India is too poorly organized and beset with rivalries to further its own particular interests in the political arena actively and successfully. The unions themselves are largely the instruments of political parties and are mostly led by professional politicians brought in from the outside.

Business, more than labor, has gained in political influence as the result of economic development, but its influence on policy and opinion is not commensurate with its economic power. Businessmen lack the prestige and general acceptance usually accorded to them in the West. Generally they are held in rather low esteem, partly because of their low status in the traditional social system and partly because of their reputation for sharp practices. Nevertheless, some business leaders exert considerable influence on the development of economic resources, since the economy is still predominantly in private hands despite the socialist orientation of the government. As members of official boards and development councils, progressive business leaders bring a palpable, albeit limited, influence to bear on the formulation of economic policies. Big business also exerts considerable indirect influence through its ownership of some leading papers and large contributions to political parties.

The political power structure in rural India, where about 80% of the population resides, is so complex and intricately compartmentalized that it virtually defies explanation. Its base is caste and community, and its power centers are more likely than not caste councils run by the more powerful caste, and, on the district level, the district officer or collector. On this massive tradition-bound structure, the government has superimposed *panchayat raj*, the three-tiered system of local government with the general purpose of democratic decentralization and rural, economic, and social development along Western-influenced lines. The rural leadership emerging out of this experiment has tended to be bureaucratic minded, power

motivated in its outlook, and of increasing consequence in politics at the all-important grassroots level. *Panchayat raj*, however, appears to be politically activating the rural masses.

2. Political parties

a. Strengths and weaknesses of the party system

Political parties, especially the Congress Party, wield a great deal of power and influence in India and serve as the major channel for recruitment and training of political talent. The party system as a whole, however, is not well structured to provide a solid foundation for the development of stable parliamentary democracy. Indians do not view political parties as election machines or simply as channels for mobilizing popular opinion behind candidates for public office. Somehow political parties are expected to be virtuous, have a clear-cut ideology, and be something to which one belongs with pride and fervor, even between elections. This viewpoint is especially prevalent among the old guard veterans of the independence movement (or products of its ethic), many of whom are leaders of India's variegated political parties. These people continue to have difficulty shifting gears from the kind of loyalties and policies demanded of independence fighters to those demanded of political organizers in a rapidly changing, highly pluralistic society. With few exceptions, political parties have endlessly debated such issues as whether or not to be caste-based, played dangerously with communal sentiment, or have insisted on patterning party organization according to administrative rather than electoral convenience. However, most have been unable to shape effective political organizations. Every political system has its traditions, and traditions die hard. The challenge in India's political party system is whether the parties will reassess their traditions—which expect and demand a consistency that the diversity of the system still precludes—and reorganize themselves to address the issues of the 1970's.

The Ruling Congress Party, with exceptionally strong leadership and solid organization, dominates the party system by virtue of its large majorities in Parliament (Figure 4) and control of almost all state governments. Congress domination was interrupted both nationally and locally between the general elections in February 1967 and those in early 1971. Without Congress' leadership, this 4-year period was characterized by a highly diversified multiparty system with all the structural weaknesses that such a system brings to a parliamentary system of government.

FIGURE 4. Party positions in parliament (U/OU)

NAME OF PARTY	LOK	RAJYA
	SABHA, 1971	SABHA, 1972
Ruling Congress Party	350	116
Organization Congress Party	16	20
<i>Jana Sangh</i>	22	15
Swatantra Party	8	9
Socialist Party*	8
Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP)	3	...
Praja Socialist Party (PSP)	2	**1
Communist Party of India	24	11
Communist Party of India/Marxist	25	7
<i>Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</i> (DMK)	23	12
Major regional parties	13	3
Independents	12	9
Indian Revolutionary Party (<i>Bharatiya Krantī Dal—BKD</i>)	1	5
Others	16	11
Nominated	3	12
Vacancies	3	4
Total	521	243

... Not pertinent.

*The SSP and PSP merged in August 1971 to form the Socialist Party.

**A few dissident PSP leaders in several states refused to accept the merger and retained their identity as PSP.

The Congress Party's victories in the 1971 general election in 1971 and the state elections in 1972 virtually decimated the political opposition in India. Opposition parties of widely varying ideologies as well as those with specific regional, religious, or communal appeals still exist but, at least temporarily, are on the decline. The Hindu nationalist *Jana Sangh*, for example, lost ground to Congress in the general elections and the conservative Swatantra Party did even worse. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Congress Party have emerged as primary national representatives, but there is still room for parties that appeal to a clearly defined regional minority, such as the *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* in Tamil Nadu. Such groups do not aspire to national prominence and represent no direct challenge to the Congress or Mrs. Gandhi. These opposition organizations can be expected to remain viable by attracting the loyalties of particular local groups, albeit in limited areas and with limited effectiveness. In order to foster the interest of the central government and to help preserve ties with New Delhi, the Congress Party has maintained a presence in those few areas where these regional groups are dominant. As long as a regional group does not overstep what Mrs. Gandhi considers a

reasonable level of political activity, she appears to tolerate it, content with attempting to dilute its strength over a period of time.

A few parties have confronted Congress with clearly delineated programs within a secular, noncommunal democratic framework, but none has had much success. In fact most have lost ground, especially since 1971. The Socialists, whose policies have been hardly distinguishable from those of the Congress Party, have not generated much mass appeal and, due to their apparently interminable squabbling, have been forced to unite in order to survive as a national organization. The Communists have also fared poorly, obtaining limited election victories, largely as the result of prior accommodations reached with Congress.

Opposition parties were unable to take advantage of the unique opportunity for closer cooperation either nationally or locally during the days of Congress Party's decline. With the Congress Party's reemergence, the outlook for most of the opposition appears bleak. Opposition will not totally fade away but for the foreseeable future it appears unlikely that any party is in the position to mount a significant challenge to the Congress. Most opposition parties have sought, generally unsuccessfully, for ways to recoup their losses. Should the Congress fail, however, to implement at least some of its promises of "progressive" measures, radical parties on the left and communal and nationalist parties on the right could gain new life. In either event, newly structured parties or alliances could spring up to mount some coordinated opposition to the Congress Party and to counter any attempts by Mrs. Gandhi to further weaken or destroy the remaining opposition parties.

b. Congress Party

The Indian National Congress, commonly referred to simply as the Congress, is India's oldest surviving political party. Founded in 1885 by Indian and reform-minded British professionals and civil servants, the Congress was converted into a broad-based agitational movement in the early 1920's under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi, called by his followers the *Mahatma* (Great Soul). The party's initial petitioning for greater Indian participation in policy councils gradually evolved into agitation for internal self-government and finally into a full-scale independence movement characterized by massive civil disobedience campaigns.

The Congress was highly successful at making the difficult transition from an agitational movement for independence into a modern nationwide political

organization capable of securing enough of the popular vote to dominate the political life of the country. Like the major U.S. political parties, the Congress became an aggregative organization seeking to hold together a maximum range of interests, with access to power and the perquisites of office providing the binding force. As such, Congress has always included left and right wings, its organizational leaders have often been at odds with the party's representatives in government at the state and national levels, and local interests have often conflicted with national party objectives. Under the charismatic leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress remained essentially intact despite occasionally conflicting regional loyalties and disparate political views ranging from Western-inspired socialism to indigenous Gandhian conservatism. In fact, the ability of the Congress to accommodate such wide diversity under the same organizational roof, stunted the growth of moderate opposition parties. These competitors were so fragmented that the Congress was able to win sweeping victories at the national level and in almost all of the states in the general elections of 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1971, even though its share of the overall popular vote never exceeded 48% (Figure 5). The fourth general election in February 1967, however, dealt a sharp blow to Congress Party fortunes, one from which the party was not able to recover for about 4 years.

The stunning setbacks in 1967 were attributable to a number of related causes. The opposition parties enjoyed unprecedented success in forming reasonably effective anti-Congress electoral alliances, especially for state assembly contests, at a time when voter faith in the Congress was weakened as a result of economic stagnation, rising prices, and serious food shortages. The Congress was also hurt by growing disunity within its own ranks, as intraparty squabbles were increasingly aired in public and provided the opposition with effective campaign ammunition. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, had become Prime Minister in January 1966, but she had neither the personal following nor the political muscle and appeal of her father and appeared unable to pull the party together. Factional feuds that had long raged in Congress Party organizations became even more intense, resulting in a large number of defections and the rise of small regional splinter parties in several states, drawing voters away from the parent organization.

Roughly coincident with the 1967 elections, the long-time leaders of the party came under attack from

a small, vocal group of younger members of Parliament—the so-called “Young Turks”—some of whom were over 50. The members of this amorphous group were characterized by their distance from the seats of power, the fact that they were too young to have participated in the struggle for independence, and by their strong inclination to see radical socialism as the cure for the party's and the country's problems.

Following defeats in the national elections of 1967 and again in state elections in 1969, disagreements grew stronger between Mrs. Gandhi and other party leaders—mainly the powerful group of senior party “barons” or “bosses” and the informal caucus within it popularly known as the “syndicate.” These men controlled the party organization and had chosen Mrs. Gandhi for the post of Prime Minister in 1966. They resented her increasingly imperious approach, her efforts to strengthen her position by encroaching on their domains, and her attempts to restrict their exercise of power within the national government.

The smouldering situation within the Congress finally burst into flame in July 1969. In a direct challenge to Mrs. Gandhi's power and possibly as a first step in a plan to oust her, the bosses, over the Prime Minister's objection, pushed through the party's Parliamentary Board their nominee for Congress candidate to succeed the deceased President of India. Mrs. Gandhi refused to support the party's choice and backed V. V. Giri, who ultimately won a narrow victory in the presidential election. Following the elections, instead of the usual attempts by the leadership to paper over party differences, the struggle between Mrs. Gandhi and the bosses for party supremacy continued and intensified. Finally in November, after a tumultuous few months of maneuvering and consolidation by Mrs. Gandhi, the party formally split into the Organization Congress Party (OCP), dominated by the “syndicate,” and the New or Ruling Congress Party. Mrs. Gandhi emerged as the dominant force in the latter and immediately began to fill party vacancies, including the position of party president, with her own supporters. In the subsequent vote of confidence in the *Lok Sabha*, which she won, Mrs. Gandhi was opposed principally by the OCP and two rightwing parties—Swatantra and *Jana Sangh*. Her support came from her own Ruling Congress, from leftists—including Communists—and from regional parties, and independents. For a period of about 2 years she depended on support of these groups as she slowly, methodically, and shrewdly began to consolidate her personal power and to rebuild the Congress Party in her image.

FIGURE 5. Results of general elections to the lower house of parliament, 1952-71 (U/OU)

	1952 105.9 MILLION VALID VOTES CAST, 46% OF THE VOTES POSSIBLE UNDER A MULTIMEMBER CONSTITUENCY SYSTEM*		1957 120.5 MILLION VALID VOTES CAST, 47% OF THE VOTES POSSIBLE UNDER A MULTIMEMBER CONSTITUENCY SYSTEM*		1962 115.2 MILLION VALID VOTES CAST, 52% OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS*		1967 145.7 MILLION VALID VOTES CAST, 58% OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS		1971 145.8 MILLION VALID VOTES CAST, 54% OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS	
	Percent of valid vote	Number of seats won or uncontested	Percent of valid vote	Number of seats won or uncontested	Percent of valid vote	Number of seats won or uncontested	Percent of valid vote	Number of seats won or uncontested	Percent of valid vote	Number of seats won or uncontested
Congress**	44.9	364	47.8	371	44.7	361	40.7	284	43.7	350
Ruling Congress Party									10.5	16
Organization Congress Party						***22			8.1	8
Swatantra Party					8.2		8.7	44	7.4	22
Jana Sangh	8.1	3	5.9	4	6.4	14	9.4	35	4.8	24
Communist Party of India†	8.1	16	8.9	27	9.9	29	5.2	23	5.2	25
Communist Party of India/Marxist							4.2	19	1.1	2
Praja Socialist Party	††6.3	20	10.4	19	6.8	12	3.1	13	2.4	3
Sanyukta Socialist Party							4.9	23		
Dravidian Progressive Federation (DMK)							2.0	7	5.4	23
Other	32.6	86	27.0	73	22.0	49	20.0	54	16.4	†††42
Total	100.0	489	100.0	494	100.0	494	100.0	520	100.0	515

*The potential electorate numbered 173.21 million in 1952 and 193.65 million in 1957, but because of certain double-member constituencies some voters had more than one vote. Up to 231.8 million votes therefore could have been cast in 1952 and 258.6 million in 1957. This accounts for the fact that there were more valid votes cast in 1957 than in 1962. Single member constituencies were stipulated in a 1961 law.

**The Congress Party split in 1969 into the Ruling Congress Party and the Organization Congress Party.

††Four seats were won by a local party of Orissa State, which merged with the Swatantra Party just before the polling.

†††The CPI and CPI(M) were one party until 1964.

††††Combined vote and seats of two socialist parties which merged to form the Praja Socialist Party in 1953.

†††††Excludes three seats nominated by the President and three vacancies.

The single most important member of the Ruling Congress Party remains Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (Figure 6). She is India's only truly national figure and is recognized throughout the nation. She is charismatic and projects an aura of power, independence, self-confidence, and determination. Although she has surrounded herself with a coterie of congenial younger advisers who advocate left-of-center policies, she is dependent on no one. She has shown loyalty to her friends, but she has not hesitated to remove them when she considered it expedient to do so. Unlike her father, who relied heavily on the advice of others, Mrs. Gandhi appears to use her advisers primarily to enhance her own political ends. Her advisers are generally characterized by intelligence and the ability they have developed in specific fields, but even more by their lack of any personal political base and complete loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi. Key advisers include Minister for Industrial Development, C. Subramaniam; Minister of Planning, D. P. Dhar; Ambassador-designate to the United States, T. N. Kaul; Secretary to Mrs. Gandhi, P. N. Dhar; Minister of Home Affairs, U. S. Dixit; and Mrs. Gandhi's retired former Secretary, P. N. Haksar. All are important to her, but none are indispensable, and no one person is her confidant on all matters.



FIGURE 6. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (C)

The Congress Party's landslide victories in the 1971 general and 1972 state elections were personal victories for Mrs. Gandhi. She gambled that chances of winning a parliamentary majority would be best in 1971, a year before the constitution required elections. She campaigned vigorously throughout the nation and won a two-thirds majority in Parliament and a 5-year mandate to improve the lot of India's masses. Her success in the gamble resulted in an almost unassailable position for her in both party and government. The 1972 state elections put the icing on the cake. The Congress Party, riding the crest of Mrs. Gandhi's personal popularity, which had been heightened by her handling of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani crisis, won over 70% of the seats and control of all but 3 small entities among the 16 states and 2 union territories electing assemblies (Figure 7). The comparatively slight increases in representation achieved by the Communist Party of India (CPI) and minor regional parties were largely accomplished as a result of arrangements with the Congress Party or agreement by the Congress not to contest certain seats. All other national parties suffered a substantial reduction in seats held.

The OCP, perhaps the hardest hit by Ruling Congress Party election victories, has virtually collapsed. Its strength in the lower house was reduced in 1971 from 65 to 16 seats, while it only won 86 seats in the 1972 state elections, a considerable drop from the 217 seats previously held. Many ambitious OCP members, including some party leaders, have defected to the Ruling Congress Party since it appears there is little future in the OCP, presumably diluting its organizational strength and presaging its eventual dissolution.

These sweeping state victories gave Mrs. Gandhi virtually unique domination over India's politics. Most incumbent Congress state chief ministers, as well as new appointees to those posts, owe their jobs to Mrs. Gandhi's favor and not to their base in the state party organization. Presumably, center-state relations could now become more pliable, with differences being reconciled at the party level. Under the stimulus of Mrs. Gandhi's success, Congress has broadened its appeal, especially to the underprivileged and youth, and at the same time it has centralized and revitalized its control over the nation. General support for both party and government has halted the trend toward splinter politics dominated by regional and local interests. Once again the Congress Party has become the principal arena for political competition. Enhanced national authority has somewhat inhibited the politically inspired violence and divisive

FIGURE 7. Results of state legislative assembly elections, 1972 (U/OU)

STATE/UNION TERRITORY	NUMBER OF SEATS	RULING CONGRESS PARTY	ORGANIZATION CONGRESS PARTY	JANA SANGH	SWATANTRA PARTY	CPI	CPM	SOCIALIST	OTHER PARTIES	INDEPENDENTS
Andhra Pradesh	287	219			2	7	1		2	56
Assam	114	95			1	3		4	5	6
Bihar	318	167	30	36	2	35		33	13	12
Gujarat	168	139	16	3		1				8
Haryana	81	52	12	2					4	11
Himachal Pradesh	68	51		5			1		1	7
Jammu and Kashmir	75	57		3					5	9
Madhya Pradesh	296	220		48		3			7	18
Maharashtra	270	223		5		2	1	3	12	24
Manipur	60	17	1			5		3	18	16
Meghalaya	60	9							32	19
Mysore	216	105	24			3		3	2	19
Punjab	104	66				10	1		24	3
Rajasthan	184	145	1	8	11	4		4		11
Tripura	60	41				1	16			2
West Bengal	280	216	2			35	14		8	5
Goa, Daman and Diu	30	1							28	1
Delhi	56	44	2	5		3			1	1
Total	2,727	1,927	86	105	16	112	34	50	162	228

tendencies which characterized the late 1960's in such states as West Bengal.

With consolidation of power, personnel changes in the Congress Party and government have been initiated. The process of recasting the national party in the image of a more tractable, youth-oriented, and reform-minded organization has begun. It is through a newly structured party that Mrs. Gandhi apparently hopes to engage the masses and move India forward economically and socially with direction from the center, while at the same time serving national and local political interests as she perceives them. Although Congress hegemony exists over the states, Congress Party politics are likely to remain fluid. However, the Ruling Congress for the time being must rely at the state level on local "fat cats," particularly wealthy farmers. At the local level, most Congress Party branches are characterized by factionalism, regionalism, and caste considerations. Factional tension, to some extent ideologically motivated, as well as compromise could color Congress Party politics until the new chief ministers consolidate their positions. It is not likely, however, that factionalism will grow to unmanageable proportions as long as Congress Party direction flows from the center.

The Indian people expect Mrs. Gandhi to fulfill her campaign promises to provide forceful "progressive" leadership and to initiate dynamic and pragmatic programs for dealing with India's highly visible problems. These include a burgeoning population, widespread unemployment, economic stagnation, an antiquated tax system, land reform, social injustice, labor strife, and inadequate education. Constrained by political and economic considerations, she probably will not be able to institute the sweeping reforms she desires and will likely continue her basically pragmatic but moderately left-of-center approach to these massive problems. Failure to at least begin to solve these problems could rapidly dissipate the present power of the Congress Party. In India, efforts to bring about change, even when done on a nationwide basis and utilizing millions of dollars, often may not even make a dent in the problem. The bureaucracy is cumbersome and talent is short. Even with Congress Party control at the center, the ability of the states to implement policy varies widely. Additionally, imaginative planning, should it come about, can be thwarted by traditionalism and resistance to change at every level.

The Congress Party had about 11 million members according to figures available in the late 1960's, some 208,000 of whom were considered "active members," i.e., those having the right to hold party office. The

party is the most broadly based political organization in India, drawing its membership from all regions and levels of society. Finances are obtained from membership dues and public contributions, largely from wealthy landowners and industrialists who have considerable behind-the-scenes influence.

The Congress Party is a many-tiered organization that includes several small but extremely important party organs. Overlapping membership in organizations within the party and the government—in both executive and legislative branches—assures that party control resides in the hands of the Prime Minister and a few other top Congress leaders and that the dialogue between party and government continues. In descending order of subordination, the All-India Congress Committee (AICC), Pradesh Congress Committees (PCC), District Congress Committees (DCC) and Bloc (Mandal) Congress Committees form the basic party units at the national, state, administrative district and local levels. In addition, there may be committees, subordinate to the DCC's, above or below the bloc committees as determined by the PCC concerned. Bloc committees and DCC's are directly elected by the active members at each level, while the PCC's and AICC are indirectly chosen by their respective subordinate units. All committees include members coopted from functional groups representing labor, youth, peasants, and castes.

The Working Committee (WC) is the supreme policymaking and executive authority of the party. The formal structure of authority is highly centralized and oligarchic. Nominally responsible to the AICC, the WC carries out the policies and programs of the party, has the power to direct and control all subordinate Congress committees, and is the final authority on all matters regarding interpretation and application of the Congress Party constitution. It consists of 20 members plus the party president who are either members of the AICC or, as in the case of appointees, are elected to it within 6 months of their appointment. A number of permanent "special invitees"—nine in 1972—are appointed to the WC by the party president. This device serves to expand the membership beyond the official limit of 21 and provides a place for other leading party members at top party deliberations. WC meetings are also attended by chief ministers of Congress-led states, thereby facilitating communications between national and state leaders. In practice, the WC is an instrument of the Prime Minister, since 10 of its members are appointed by the party president in consultation with the Prime Minister. The president, in turn, has been elected by the AICC, which has perfunctorily ratified

the Prime Minister's choice. The WC includes a Parliamentary Board, which frames rules for the regulation and coordination of the party's legislative activities, and a Central Election Committee (CEC), which has the final authority over selection of candidates for central and state legislatures. The CEC may not only overrule recommendations of lower committees but may nominate a candidate who has not even applied for a ticket.

Although not mentioned in the Congress Party constitution, the Congress Parliamentary Party (CPP), composed of Congress members of both houses of Parliament, performs several important functions. Assuming the Congress either is the majority party in Parliament or leads the governing coalition, the elected CPP leader becomes Prime Minister. An Executive Committee, whose members may also be on the WC, controls the CPP, monitors major legislation, and coordinates ministerial and party programs so that they conform to basic party lines. A plenary session of AICC is ordinarily held biannually, at which time state-level committee delegates debate and approve the Congress' basic policy and program.

The Congress Party ideology in the immediate postindependence era was shaped largely by Jawaharlal Nehru, and many of his ideas continue to be influential. Nehru, the son of a prominent and wealthy Western-educated lawyer and himself a graduate of Harrow and Cambridge, urged the application of Western socialist concepts to the massive problem of improving the living standards of the Indian people. Thus, the party formally adopted as its goal the establishment of a "socialist state" based on parliamentary democracy. It championed secularism in government and equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of race, religion, caste, or sex. Among its economic goals were rapid industrialization through a mixture of government and private undertakings, a more equitable distribution of wealth, redistribution of land to accommodate the landless, and increased food production. These and other objectives have been incorporated into the government's successive economic plans, which began with the inauguration of the First Five Year Plan in April 1951. Dogged adherence to socialist ideological objectives, however, has sometimes resulted in policies that are politically and ideologically sound but often inefficient in the Indian context. Despite the urgent need for pragmatism, recent pressures have caused Congress leadership to seek more "progressive" socioeconomic reform programs to deal with India's multifarious problems. In order to retain her political grip on the

party, however, Mrs. Gandhi must be a moderating force. She has had to balance the ideological differences within the Congress Party's broad-based membership by selectively undertaking some socialist programs—such as bank nationalization—along with more practical economic measures. The result has often been slow economic progress overlaid with inefficiency. Apparently wedded to its ideology, entrenched in politics, and mired by a series of persistent contradictions, the Congress Party's leadership seems unable to prevent ideological disputes from blocking many of the practical steps which many democracies and developing economies have accepted and used effectively. Political and ideological constraints have kept the Congress Party from advocating policies which would compromise the goal of achieving economic self-sufficiency. Such constraints have prevented the effective exploitation of either the public or private sectors of Indian industry as a force to promote technological change and capital accumulation. In addition, these constraints retard the use of foreign capital, technology, and management skills. Politically attractive calls for "progressive" reorientation of the party, accordingly, have met with more favor than calls for the hard measures which a strictly pragmatic approach entails. Nevertheless, Congress leaders realize that foreign capital is desperately needed. They have been unable, however, to develop a satisfactory policy which can reconcile the apparent inconsistency of accepting massive foreign capital and advocating self-sufficiency.

Internationally, the party has advocated nonalignment between the West and the Communist world, but there have been considerable shifts in the thinking of party leaders as they have grappled with the problem of winning great power aid to cope with India's economic problems and to meet the threat from China. Despite the Congress Party's noticeable tilt toward the Soviet Union and away from the United States in 1971—in line with Mrs. Gandhi's policy—and despite its endorsement of the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in August of that year, the Congress staunchly maintained its adherence to nonalignment. Congress leaders assert that the treaty was in India's national interests and that India can and will assert its own course in international affairs. By 1972 many party leaders seemed to favor a policy that would keep aid flowing from both the Soviet Union and the West, while preserving enough independence and flexibility on international questions to ward off charges of a sell-out to the major powers. The party has been divided

over the years in its attitude toward Pakistan. Many leaders have favored firmness toward the neighboring Islamic state, but others have encouraged easing of Indo-Pakistani tensions. Divisions became sharper throughout the 1971 East Pakistan crisis, but Congress leaders generally favored Mrs. Gandhi's efforts in supporting Bangladesh.

c. Bharatiya Jana Sangh

One of the few parties to emerge intact, albeit weakened, from the sweeping election victories of the Congress Party in 1971 and 1972 has been the Hindu nationalist *Bharatiya Jana Sangh* (Indian People's Party), often simply called the *Jana Sangh*. Until recently, its electoral record had been one of sustained growth. Although its success was spotty in 1971-72, the *Jana Sangh* managed to win 22 seats in the *Lok Sabha* and 105 seats in the state legislative assemblies—a loss of 11 and 100 seats, respectively. Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan (where the party slightly increased its state legislative seats), however, accounted for well over 75% of its victories in both national and state elections. Traditional Hindu sentiment is strong in these areas and, in the latter two states, former princely rulers flocked to the party in reaction to Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to abolish their special privileges. Without the backing of the princes, it is likely that the *Jana Sangh* would not have done as well since it lacked a strong popular base and the organization to support its efforts. The *Jana Sangh's* now discredited 1971 opposition alliance with the Organization Congress Party, the conservative Swatantra Party, and the radical socialist Samyukta Socialist Party (now merged into the Socialist Party) thus gained only marginal results in the national and state elections.

The *Jana Sangh* was founded in 1951 as the political offshoot of the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (National Volunteer Corps—RSS), a militant and xenophobic cultural organization that was banned from political activity after Gandhi was assassinated in 1948 by a former member. The *Jana Sangh* is structurally separate from the RSS, but in many important respects the RSS provides the party's organizational backbone and ideological inspiration.

Overtly, RSS activities are now cultural in character, but in reality the organization remains politically active through the *Jana Sangh*. Most of the *Jana Sangh's* political leadership has come from the highly indoctrinated RSS ranks, and RSS cadres, many of whom are also *Jana Sangh* party members, are essential to that party's organizational work and electoral campaigns. In marked contrast to Hinduism

generally, the RSS is a tightly organized, proselytizing movement with strong martial overtones. It recruits widely among younger people and maintains a high sense of commitment and cohesion among its members through drill sessions, uniforms, army-style summer camps, and emphasis on physical fitness and discipline. The RSS rejects all foreign ideology and technology, arguing that the far richer Hindu cultural heritage contains all the ingredients for creating a strong, modern state. RSS members are often accused of stimulating communal violence, partly because they tend to inflame Hindu passions that can be turned against Muslims. From the RSS point of view, all non-Hindus are essentially foreigners and should be allowed to stay in India only if "subordinate to a Hindu nation, claiming nothing and deserving no privilege." Pakistan, the RSS asserts, should be reincorporated—by force if necessary.

Public positions taken by the *Jana Sangh* have been less extreme than those of the RSS and, especially since the 1967 general elections, there has been a trend toward moderation on domestic issues. At its 1968 annual congress, the *Jana Sangh* backed away from its longstanding demand for Hindi as the sole official language and agreed that civil service examinations might be taken in regional languages. As a symbol of its change of mind, the party congress itself was held in the southern state of Kerala, rather than as usual in the northern Hindi-speaking heartland. The former *Jana Sangh* President, A. B. Vajpayee, was one of the principal architects of the party's slow evolution from extreme nationalism to relative moderation, at least on the national level. A. L. Advani has led the party further from its communal, *petit bourgeois* origins since becoming party president in January 1973.

Internationally, the *Jana Sangh* program is ultranationalistic, sometimes even bordering on xenophobia. It calls for greatly expanded defense preparation against Pakistan and China, including the manufacture of atomic weapons, and takes a very hard line against these adversaries. The *Jana Sangh* also urges that India remain aloof from all world power blocs, although its hostility toward Communist countries is greater than that toward the West. Its policy of nonalignment is tempered by a willingness to enter into bilateral accords if they clearly serve India's strategic interests. The party asserts that it would discourage foreign capital in all but the highest priority industries, and it favors a reorientation of development programs to phase out foreign aid. The party has deplored the concentration of economic power in the hands of the state or even of a few individuals. It maintains, however, that the state

should participate in basic industries necessary for defense and economic development, but should seek the cooperation of private enterprise in the interest of more efficient and cheaper production.

The trend toward moderation of the *Jana Sangh's* domestic program results from the party's desire to expand its base of popular support outside northern and central India. There also appear to be many within the party who no longer identify closely with the RSS's traditionalist and north Indian Hindu nationalist concepts and who would prefer that the party move toward reducing its Brahmin image by becoming a moderate, broad-based political force. There are still, however, definite limits as to how far the *Jana Sangh* can move away from its RSS moorings. Beyond the fact that the RSS provides the party with organizational muscle, *Jana Sangh* support has traditionally come mainly from the Hindu urban middle class of salaried workers and retail tradesmen, and small landowners in the Hindi-speaking areas of central and northern India. The party's greatest support has been in Hindi-speaking northern states such as Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Delhi, and among Hindi-speakers in Bihar, Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, and southern Jammu and Kashmir. Outside of the Hindi heartland, it has done well only in Maharashtra, one of its early strongholds. Despite all its talk about national unity, the *Jana Sangh* is still basically a potentially important regionalist party based on high-caste, middle class, north Indian Hindu concepts and ideals.

The *Jana Sangh* is far from united on the wisdom of collaboration with rightist parties and individuals not bound by its own tight concepts of discipline and program. Nevertheless, in the late 1960's it investigated the prospects for merger with like-minded parties. The results were inconclusive. The party can be expected zealously to protect its identity regardless of any cooperative arrangements it may enter. The *Jana Sangh's* distinct gradualist approach in past merger discussions has led many observers to believe that the party could be developing a calculated plan eventually to absorb weaker parties rather than to effect mergers between theoretical equals.

d. Swatantra Party

The conservative Swatantra (Freedom) Party, largest opposition party after the 1967 general election, was virtually eliminated as a national party in the 1971 general election. It lost all but 8 of its 35 *Lok Sabha* seats and was further humiliated by the defeat of its co-founder and president, M. R. Masani, who resigned the presidency under fire. The state

legislative assembly elections in 1972 were even more disastrous, with the party retaining only 16 of the 175 seats gained at the last poll. Prior to June 1972, Swatantra led a fragile coalition government with the regional Utkal Congress Party in Orissa, but the government fell under Congress Party pressure that month. Swatantra's potential for winning votes among the non-privileged majority—a crucial sector to electoral success in India—has been severely limited by its image as the party of industrialists, princes, and guardian of upper-class interests. Internal differences among the leadership over the party's conservative philosophy threatens to destroy it as a viable organization. The party is unlikely to benefit either nationally or locally from Congress Party shortcomings.

The Swatantra Party was formed in 1959 to contest the Congress Party's welfare state program. It deplores the "statism" toward which it sees the country moving under Congress Party rule. Frankly espousing the cause of the middle-class businessman and private enterprise generally, the Swatantra Party calls for a maximum of individual freedom and minimum interference by the state. It favors private ownership of land as opposed to cooperative farming, incentives for higher production in industry, the relaxation of governmental controls over business, the continuation of government-owned enterprises only when they can be run profitably, and the elimination of monopolies, both public and private. On foreign policy the party is pro-West.

Swatantra is led by disaffected former Congress and Socialist Party leaders—the most notable of whom was the late former Governor General of India, C. Rajagopalachari—as well as by some prominent industrialists and financiers. H. M. Patel, a member of Parliament, was elected President in September 1971, but he was succeeded in late 1972 by Piloo Mody, also a member of Parliament. Swatantra is also actively supported by a number of the maharajas of former princely states, many of whom still enjoy the loyalty of their erstwhile subjects, and on whom the party is heavily dependent for electoral support. As of 1972, Swatantra was still topheavy with leaders but short on rank-and-file support outside the states of Orissa, Gujarat, and Rajasthan. Even in Orissa, Swatantra strength rests largely on the appeal of former Chief Minister Singh Deo's locally rooted *Ganatantra Parishad*, which flies the Swatantra flag but which pays little real attention to "national" Swatantra affairs. Organizationally, Swatantra has had a rather flimsy structure, has been riven with high-level disputes, and has lacked real cohesion. In contrast to

most other Indian political parties, Swatantra organizational activity since the 1967 elections appears to have slackened rather than increased in tempo.

The Swatantra Party also has a serious image problem. Its ideology is too Westernized to attract a broad-based national following, and it has failed in practice to present a sharply differentiated alternative to the Congress. At the same time, Swatantra's appeal to disgruntled conservatives faces strong competition from more vigorous regional parties, while unhappy nationalists are more likely to turn to the *Jana Sangh* or the Socialists.

e. Socialist parties

India's socialist parties have always had a difficult time competing with the Congress Party and in mid-1972 were on the decline. The Congress Party's own socialist line—particularly since 1955—has upstaged their efforts, sapped their vitality by stripping them of many issues, and deprived them of many potential adherents. More importantly, socialists have been so beset with internal leadership struggles, splits and mergers, and tactical disputes that they have been unable to offer a credible alternative to the socialism of the Congress Party. The socialists, in the general election of 1971, managed to retain only 5 of the 32 *Lok Sabha* seats previously held by the two major socialist parties—17 by the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) and 15 by the Praja Socialist Party (PSP). These parties were forced in late 1971 to merge once again, as they had nearly 20 years before, in order to survive as a national force, but even this could not prevent a few dissident PSP and SSP members from retaining their identity. The combined socialists, under the banner of the Socialist Party, retained only 50 of 160 seats in the 1972 state elections, 33 coming from Bihar where the SSP had limited strength. The new party incorporated the SSP, most of the PSP, the Indian Socialist Party of Kerala, and small socialist splinter groups from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. After a period of ferment, characterized by intense infighting among a multiplicity of individualistic leaders, none predominant, the socialists split once again in April 1972 into several groups, each claiming to be the "real" Socialist Party.

The socialists have had disproportionate strength among students and labor. They have capitalized on the anti-establishment, idealistic, and theoretical tendencies of students. Their youth groups have effectively challenged other party youth organizations of all political stripes. In the labor field, the socialists

form a significant component of the non-Communist, non-Congress oriented trade union movement.

The SSP and PSP have played major roles in the complex history of socialism in India. Factions have tended over the years to group around the basic tenets espoused by the SSP or the PSP. Even these general groupings, however, have not prevented dissident subfactions and splinter groups from forming to further muddle the situation.

The SSP has tended to be the larger and more radical group. Beyond its adherence to socialism, the SSP has taken an exaggeratedly anti-Congress posture and has been even more fundamentally committed to unseating Congress wherever, whenever, and with whatever means possible. Its appeal is aimed at the downtrodden, especially the so-called "backward-class" elements, and is enriched by invective, a strong dose of reckless iconoclasm, and a northern Indian communal bias. Its leadership has tended toward opportunism, as illustrated by its willingness to join alliances—such as a rightist-oriented one during the 1971 general election—and to participate in coalition state governments where, because of the relative strength of the parties, the SSP had little chance of influencing policy. SSP leadership and organization never recovered from the death of its founder, Ram Manohar Lohia, in 1967. Competition for his mantle has preoccupied the SSP since then. Raj Narain, George Fernandes, and Madhu Limaye carry Lohia's brand of socialism into the 1970's.

Despite its pretense to be a national party, most of the SSP's strength is in the northern Hindi-speaking states, especially in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In that area, the SSP is very influential in student politics. The party's major affiliated front organizations, except for its trade union organization—the *Hind Mazdoor Panchayat* (Indian Labor Council), exist mostly on paper.

The PSP, in contrast, has been relatively moderate in its socialism, and national rather than regional in its approach. Intraparty squabbling, especially over ideology and tactics, has divided the party and threatened to destroy it from within. Now under the leadership of N. G. Goray and M. Dandavate, the PSP has never fully recovered from the defection of its most prominent leader, Asoka Mahta, and his followers in 1964. Many PSP members believe that their goals are best served by foregoing compromise, mergers, or coalitions, no matter how much this might consign their party to an isolated, permanent opposition role. Realistically, however, many PSP units are in favor of and have engaged in limited cooperative agreements over the years. Individual members, and at times party

leaders, have found "areas of agreement" with the Congress Party, but trafficking with Congress has usually resulted in added strength for the Congress Party rather than the PSP. The PSP's policy of "meaningful dialog" with Congress prior to the 1971 general election ended in PSP isolation and near extinction as a parliamentary force. PSP organizations in Kerala, Bihar, and West Bengal, where the party had participated in coalition governments, and in Orissa, where it had hoped to participate, were dashed when the renewed Socialist Party decided to forego governmental alliances with other parties. Dissident PSP units in several states, in fact, refused to go along with merger of Socialist parties and retained their identity as PSP.

Unsuited by political power and position, the PSP has had significant influence in the labor field through its affiliate trade union, the *Hind Mazdoor Sabha* (Indian Labor Congress). PSP youth organizations have also been effective in engaging student sympathies. Party revitalization, which is imperative for PSP survival, could be sought from these sectors.

f. Communist parties

India's organized Communist movement—one of the first outside the Soviet Union—began with the formation of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in early 1921. The party was first affiliated with the Communist International in 1921 and, after a break of an undetermined period, reaffiliated in 1930. The Communist movement struggled through uncertain years characterized by organizational difficulties and repression from Anglo-Indian authorities, but it grew, albeit slowly, until 1935. In that year Indian Communists adopted the Communist International policy of cooperation with legal, liberal, and non-Communist radical organizations while simultaneously infiltrating them in order to gain control. By espousing an anti-imperialist line which was attractive to the Indian people, the Communists gained influence in the trade union movement and even in the Indian National Congress. The CPI acquired legal status as a political party in 1942. The Communists' appeal in India is limited, both geographically and in terms of mass popular support. Although the Communists have managed consistently to win the backing of 8% to 10% of the Indian electorate, they have been unable to expand their following significantly for over a decade.

Mos. Communist support comes from poorer sections of the population, but many members are drawn from the middle class and from the educated unemployed. Radical factions have recruited heavily

from both the upper-middle class population as well as from the ranks of professional thugs. The largest Communist constituencies are usually found in West Bengal, Kerala, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu, where high population density and poverty make life a constant struggle. In West Bengal, for instance, the Communists are heavily supported by Calcutta's middle class clerical workers, in Kerala by its caste landless agricultural workers, and generally in Maharashtra by industrial workers in the Bombay area. In Andhra Pradesh much of the Communist leadership comes from the *kamma* caste, whose members are predominantly landowning peasants living in the Krishna and Godavari river deltas, but the party also draws considerable support from the unpropertied tenant farmers and agricultural laborers in the same general area.

Communist strategy in India has varied considerably over the years. The German attack on the Soviet Union during World War II resulted in open support by Indian Communists for the British war effort. The simultaneous imprisonment of many Congress Party leaders because of their noncooperative attitude gave the Communists greater latitude in building their organization and cadres. After India achieved independence in 1947, the Communists, with Moscow's support, felt strong enough to incite violent revolution but were able to sustain a rebellion only in the Telengana area of what is now Andhra Pradesh. By 1951 this effort had clearly failed, and the party fell back on its stronghold among the labor unions in urban areas. Despite the party's post-rebellion disorganization, it became the largest opposition party through a skillful placing of candidates in the general election of 1952.

The hard-line Communists were unreconciled to the shift to parliamentary tactics, but its value appeared to be borne out in the 1957 elections, in which the Communists gained control of the newly constituted State of Kerala, the first time that the Communists had come to power by popular ballot anywhere in the world. The subsequent collapse of the Communist Kerala government in 1959, following Congress Party-inspired disorders, rekindled the intra-party dispute between the moderates and the militants. The party's activists, who were sympathetic to Maoist militancy without fully supporting the Chinese tactics, argued that the Congress Party reactionaries would never permit a peaceful Communist takeover and that the parliamentary approach was dulling the Communists' capacity for more forceful action. Party moderates, for their part, were restricted by their loyalty to Moscow, which was even then attempting to cement close ties

with the Congress Party government. The 1962 Chinese attack on India further embittered the quarrel, when the moderates strongly backed the Indian Government and many of the militants were arrested.

The final split came in 1964 when the militants, with about half of the membership of the CPI, broke off from the parent organization to form the separate Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPM). The CPM found itself in control of the movement in West Bengal and Kerala, the two states where the united party's organization and leadership had been the strongest. The factions were about equal in two other traditional areas of Communist strength, Andhra Pradesh and Madras (later renamed Tamil Nadu). The CPI had the edge in most other states, but none of these had ever been a Communist stronghold. The CPI and the CPM each have an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 active members, although each claim many more.

Both Communist parties contested the fourth general election in 1967. The CPI, which had abandoned its earlier policy of cooperating with "progressives" in the Congress Party, decided on total opposition to the ruling party. The CPM leadership, despite its rejection of the parliamentary approach to power, opted to participate in the elections on the grounds that Indian conditions required participation in the constitutional system while mass support was gradually being developed for future revolutionary activity. The degree of electoral cooperation and competition—often bitter—between the two major Communist parties varied widely from state to state. The CPI fared slightly better in Parliament than the CPM, whereas in state contests the CPM had the edge. The CPM victories were concentrated in Kerala and West Bengal, however, giving the party a far more decisive role in those states than the CPI had elsewhere. In the post-election period the CPI joined in anti-Congress coalitions in the state governments wherever possible (Kerala, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh). Following the failure of most coalitions, however, the party reverted to its earlier policy of cooperation with the Congress. This posture heightened the antipathy between the CPI and the CPM.

Although the two major Communist parties, when taken together, received less harsh treatment at the polls in 1971 and 1972 than other opposition parties, their limited successes distort their actual mediocre performance. The two parties combined increased their *Lok Sabha* seats only slightly from 43 to 49 (173 candidates entered) and managed to retain only 146 of

203 seats previously held in the state assemblies. A significant number of CPI victories in both elections were actually achieved, however, as a result of Congress largess. Of the 24 seats the CPI retained in the *Lok Sabha*—the same number it held before elections—all but two resulted from prior noncompetition arrangements with Congress. Although the CPI, with 112 seats, emerged from the state assembly elections as the largest opposition party, the story of victory was much the same as the previous year. The party benefitted where it had arrangements with Congress, i.e., Bihar, West Bengal, Punjab, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Delhi, gaining 95 seats through this partnership. Bihar and West Bengal, however, accounted for 35 seats each. In states where the CPI ran in opposition to Congress it managed to win only 19 seats. In 1971 the CPI claimed a membership of about 232,000.

The CPI's position in Indian politics was weakened by Mrs. Gandhi's refusal to enter into national election agreements in 1971 which would place her in debt to the CPI, and her decision to enter agreements in 1972 only where Congress supposedly needed either pooled organizational and voting strength or a united leftist vote against rightists. Mrs. Gandhi's overwhelming control of Parliament and almost all state assemblies has rendered CPI support far less necessary than in previous years when her position was more vulnerable. The CPI's partial alliance with Congress has limited its agitational capability and revolutionary potential. On the other hand, the agreement has served the interests of the CPI as well as of the Congress against the CPM in the latter's Kerala and West Bengal bases.

The CPI has been torn by dissension over the direction the party should take in the immediate future. At its Ninth Party Congress in October 1971, the leadership seemed to recognize that the party's best means of survival rested on its continuing close association with the Congress Party, despite the danger of losing the party's identity in such a liaison. A dissenting minority opposed both the alliance and adherence to the parliamentary process while urging closer cooperation with the CPM and the adoption of more revolutionary methods. To placate them CPI leaders retained the right to criticize the "wrong policies" of the Congress and to explore avenues for joint action with the CPM. Nevertheless, in mid-1972, the CPI was too emasculated to criticize Congress with any vigor and remained ideologically alienated from the CPM.

The CPI was the only party other than Congress which increased its *Lok Sabha* seats in 1971, growing

from 19 to 25, but its overall position has deteriorated. The party had run 88 candidates. Twenty of the victors came from West Bengal, where the Marxists were a very strong political force. This limited success in 1971 was soon offset by the staggering defeat the CPM suffered at Congress' hands in the 1972 state assembly election. The party retained only 34 of 129 seats it formerly held. Most importantly, the CPM lost almost 100 seats in West Bengal and managed to salvage only 14 seats in a state which the party had dominated since 1967. The only other sizable CPM victory was the 16 seats it won in Tripura, where the party had built up modest strength over the previous two years.

The defeat in West Bengal was particularly crushing for the CPM. Prior to the state assembly election, the party had good organization, leadership, and finances and was the only significant political force in the state other than the Congress. Mrs. Gandhi, however, was determined to end CP/M-inspired instability in West Bengal—the 1972 elections were the fourth in five years—and install a government responsive to her programs. This determination amounted to a resolve to destroy the CPM as an effective political force. In order to insure victory, the Congress entered into a formal written electoral agreement with the CPI—the first time in India's history that a written agreement bound political parties—called the Progressive Democratic Alliance (PDA). The election took place amid election irregularities, political killings and gangsterism—the way politics is usually played in West Bengal. The PDA proved its ability to meet and better the Marxists at political violence. Pro-PDA “goondas” (goons) reportedly harassed CPM candidates, intimidated voters, and tampered with ballots. Additionally, Mrs. Gandhi exploited her emotion-charged appeal as liberator of Bangladesh. When the dust had settled, the CPM was a heavy loser. Even CPM leader Jyoti Basu lost by a huge number of votes in his own constituency to a CPI adversary. The CPM's task of rebuilding its strength in strategically important West Bengal to pre-election levels could be severely hampered by Mrs. Gandhi's apparent determination never to willingly relinquish control.

The CPM has followed a fairly pragmatic policy over the years, more influenced by the rapidly changing Indian political situation than by dogmatic ideological considerations. The party has always recruited selectively, preferring to keep a low, active membership—about 107,000 claimed in 1972—in order to maintain strict organizational control. From its inception, the CPM has been burdened with severe

intraparty friction over the use of parliamentary versus revolutionary methods. The success scored in the 1967 elections actually strained party unity to the breaking point by touching off a fresh round of debate on this issue. Most of the revolutionary extremists were either purged or had pulled out of the party to form parallel units in some of the states. In fact, prior to 1972 little distinguished the CPM from the CPI in terms of immediate tactics, although the CPM, unlike the CPI, continued to tout violent revolution, abandonment of the constitution, and “mass struggle” outside the parliamentary process as part of its longer range strategy. Ironically, the party has continually participated in the democratic political process: it seeks to destroy, especially in Kerala and West Bengal where it led coalition governments. Prior to the imposition of President's Rule in West Bengal in late June 1971, it held the largest number of seats in the legislature. However, significant numbers of CPM cadres apparently began to go underground prior to the state assembly elections in anticipation of electoral defeats in 1972. Additionally, there apparently had been considerable agitation within the party to employ more revolutionary methods. Following the 1972 state assembly elections, the CPM boycotted both the West Bengal assembly and the by-elections held in two West Bengal districts, charging election irregularities.

By early 1973, the CPM had not yet abandoned the parliamentary process, but there was much debate over the direction the party should take and the methods it should employ. While the CPM has lost its former level of political power, its leaders probably believe that a low profile, including legal political activities in legislatures, labor organizations, and front organizations, would better serve party interests than going underground or taking a more violent approach. Some nominal concessions may have to be made to more radical elements, however, and the party might have to seek support from the Maoists, who form a third group within the Indian Communist movement.

In May 1969, some revolution-minded defectors from the CPM announced the formation of another Indian Communist Party, the Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist (CPI/M-L). CPI/M-L members are known as “Naxalites,” a name derived from a region in West Bengal where they led an abortive guerrilla and terrorist uprising in 1967. The CPI/M-L castigates both of the older Indian Communist parties for trying to achieve power within India's constitutional system. It plans to prepare for revolutionary guerrilla activities along Maoist lines; favors stirring up peasant and tribal revolts rather than

trouble in the cities; and permits participation in mass movements only for the purpose of sustaining tension and recruiting new members. Many of the extremists were previously joined loosely in a national coordinating committee, but this organization was unable to provide cohesion for the disparate extremist groups that had proliferated within the individual states. The CPI/M-L has continually faced the same problem. In early 1973, ideological and organizational differences were so deep that no agreement could be reached on any concerted course of action.

India also has a number of mini-Marxist parties, including among others the Forward Bloc, the Revolutionary Socialist Party and the Peasants and Workers Party, that are primarily splinter or front groups with ultimate aims similar to those of the CPI/M-L. Recent attempts to unify Communist extremist groups, particularly in Kerala have failed. The CPI/M-L has shown some willingness to take others into its organization but has refused to compromise its ideology or leadership. The major point of contention within the CPI/M-L and among extremist groups has been whether to engage in guerrilla action immediately or to build a stronger guerrilla organization for action in the future. Disorganization, defections, and repression—as the result of Mrs. Gandhi's desire to end extremism in India—threaten all such groups with extinction.

g. Other parties

Numerous other parties dot the political landscape in India, most of which operate almost exclusively within individual states or regions and many of which are based on linguistic, religious, caste and other social distinctions. A few have achieved considerable success within their restricted localities and will probably continue to play an important role in local Indian politics on selective issues, but they face a period of reduced participation and influence in state governments following the return of Congress Party political domination. Despite their persistence in Indian politics, other parties have tended to disappear as a charismatic leader dies, or as a primary goal is either achieved or co-opted by a national party.

(1) *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam*—The largest and most influential of the regional parties is the *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (Dravidian Progressive Federation—DMK) which is based essentially on regional loyalties of the Tamil-speaking people of southern India, chiefly in the state of Tamil Nadu. Appealing to the Tamils' long-standing resentment of what they regard as high-caste Brahman domination and north

Indian discrimination, the DMK stands against the imposition of Hindi as the sole official working language of the central government and is strongly anti-Brahman and anti-north. The party has an enthusiastic following among urban poor, both rural poor and landowning castes, and youth and students, and has been growing steadily since its inception in 1948.

The DMK contested the 1967 general election in coalition with several other parties of various ideological stripes. To its surprise, it routed the Congress from its former stronghold in Tamil Nadu. The party's successes carried over to the national level where the DMK *Lok Sabha* delegation, entirely from Tamil Nadu, became the fourth largest, with more members than either of the two Communist parties or the two socialist parties. Since then the DMK, faced for the first time with the practical problems of governing a state and of having to compromise some of its principles while maintaining the zeal of its following, has had remarkable success. The DMK overcame a leadership struggle occasioned by the death of its popular founder-leader, C. N. Annadurai, in 1969. In New Delhi, it allied with Mrs. Gandhi's minority government late that year and won favors in return, particularly Congress' pledge not to make an all-out effort in Tamil Nadu in the 1971 elections. In what turned out to be a masterful political maneuver, party leader and Chief Minister, M. Karunanidhi, against the wishes of Mrs. Gandhi, insisted on holding both *Lok Sabha* and state assembly elections simultaneously. By agreement, Congress refrained from contesting any assembly seat as a *quid pro quo* for DMK support for Congress candidates in nine selected *Lok Sabha* constituencies. As further insurance, the DMK allied with several minor parties as it had in 1967, but extreme rightists and leftists remained outside. Impressive as the 1967 victory had been, it paled in comparison with 1971. The DMK gained 183 of 234 state assembly seats (DMK allies won 26 more) and 23 of 39 *Lok Sabha* seats. The magnitude of the state victories indicated that the party could have won on its own. An increased confidence diminished the DMK's feeling of indebtedness to allies, and led to a break with Congress in February 1972. In late 1972, M. G. Ramachandram, a popular film star and treasurer of the DMK, left the party to form a splinter group, the Anna-DMK, so named in honor of the DMK's founder, Annadurai.

The very popular DMK posed a formidable regional challenge to Mrs. Gandhi's all-India supremacy. The party has traditionally espoused liberal causes and has

no need to join the Congress' "progressive" bandwagon. It apparently has no national ambitions—indeed its pre-1971 national leverage is gone—and will likely continue to espouse regional themes, especially calls for greater autonomy. Although Mrs. Gandhi may attempt to maneuver the DMK out of its commanding position, it would be very difficult to loosen the DMK's hold on its constituency, and any concerted attempt to compete with or to wrest control from the DMK could prove counterproductive.

(2) *Shiromani Akali Dal*—In the Punjab, the *Shiromani Akali Dal* (Army of the Servants of God) claims to speak for the state's Sikh religious community. A 10-year campaign by the *Akali Dal* for a Punjabi-speaking state culminated in the 1966 partition of the state in such a way that the Sikhs now comprise a slight majority in the reconstituted Punjab. The new Punjab's voters showed no overwhelming gratitude in the 1967 elections, and the splintered *Akali Dal* won less than a quarter of the state assembly seats. The Congress Party, however, failed to gain a majority of assembly seats and as a result the *Akalis* were able to join an ill-fated anti-Congress coalition. After a spell of "President's Rule" following the collapse of representative government in the Punjab, new state assembly elections were held in February 1969. The Congress Party was again unable to get a majority and, although the now united *Akalis* did not do as well as they had expected, the *Akali Dal* did emerge at the head of a new coalition state government. Despite leading the Punjab government prior to the 1971 *Lok Sabha* elections and receiving almost one-third of the popular vote, the party won only one out of 13 seats. *Akali* representatives in the Punjab assembly deserted to the Congress Party, causing the government's fall and the institution of "President's Rule." In the 1972 state assembly elections the party repeated its mediocre 1967 performance; Congress won a solid majority and was to form a government. The *Akali Dal* has never been a power outside the Punjab. Although the party has ample funds from the Sikh religious community, unless its members can cease bickering and unite behind a secular program which can appeal to a wider electorate, the *Akali Dal* could decline even further.

(3) *Bharatiya Kranti Dal*—The initial success of a number of dissident groups which broke away from the Congress Party in early February 1967 encouraged some of their leaders to launch a new all-India party, the *Bharatiya Kranti Dal* (Indian Revolutionary Party—BKD) in May of that year. The BKD, made up of separate organizations formed as a result of local

personal and caste-based conflicts, lacks any real cohesion and is little more than a loose confederation of semiautonomous rebel Congress groups. The most successful BKD unit, that in Uttar Pradesh, lost nine of its 10 seats in the 1971 *Lok Sabha* poll, including that of its popular leader Charan Singh. BKD leaders have apparently recognized that the party lacks the resources to compete on a national scale and have begun to concentrate efforts in selected local areas where major parties are not well entrenched. Significant numbers of BKD politicians in Uttar Pradesh have been defecting to the Congress Party. Continued large-scale defections would further reduce the BKD's political strength, perhaps beyond recovery.

(4) *Communal parties*—A number of small communal parties thrive in India, some of which are important in local politics but none of which has significant influence on the national level. One of the better known of these is the Muslim League, which was founded in 1906 and agitated successfully for the creation of a separate state of Pakistan in 1947. Today, the Muslim League's remnants in India survive as a significant political force only in northern Kerala and Bombay. Although anti-Marxist, the Muslim League opportunistically joined the CPM-dominated electoral front that fought the 1967 election in Kerala and later joined in the coalition government that this group formed; it also joined the CPI-led coalitions in 1969 and 1970. The Muslim League participated in the last coalition in West Bengal—before the initiation of "President's Rule" in June 1971—but had very little strength in comparison to the other parties there. The Muslim League won two of Kerala's 19 seats in the 1971 *Lok Sabha* elections. The Muslims have not been successful in forming an all-India organization, although efforts have been made to organize a national Muslim group which might establish a consensus on political and practical matters. Although the Muslim League contested the 1972 state elections, seeking adjustments where it could in order to gain strength, its victories were almost negligible.

The *Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha* (Greater India Hindu Assembly), a rabidly communalist party, was formerly a major rival to the *Jana Sangh* but has faded considerably since the mid-1950's. The Republican Party of India, which seeks to become the political voice of the "scheduled castes," *i.e.*, untouchables and other deprived groups, is of marginal importance, although it does exert some influence in a few areas, such as Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh.

The *Telengana Praja Samiti* (TPS) was formed by separatists from the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh who rebelled against the Congress Party's

state unit which opposed any division of the state. The TPS contested the 1971 *Lok Sabha* elections, won 14% of the Andhra Pradesh vote, and secured 10 seats. Due to Mrs. Gandhi's astute political maneuvering in 1971, however, the Telengana separatist issue was largely defused, with almost all TPS leaders reintegrated into the Congress and supporting the Prime Minister. Former TPS members in the Andhra Pradesh Congress Party, however, will likely press for special measures for Telengans in order to allay charges of discrimination against Telengans in the distribution of government jobs and development resources, an issue which is still alive and a source of popular dissatisfaction. The Supreme Court's review and approval in later 1972 of the "Mulki Rules" rules under which Telengans are favored for low-level state jobs—led to an upsurge of violence among coastal Andhrans, many of whom seek bifurcation of the state. Because of growing disaffection and revival of the demand for a separate Telengana state, Andhra Pradesh was put under "President's Rule." Talks on the state's future were underway in early 1973, but the outcome is still not clear. The Congress Party has suffered heavy—although probably only temporary—losses over the bifurcation issue. Many other caste and communal organizations tend to take on aspects of political parties, especially when their direct parochial interests are threatened and when elections are held.

(5) *The Senas*—Since the 1967 elections more than 60 militant and chauvinistic organizations styling themselves as *senas* have proliferated in India. Most of the *senas* claim to be nonviolent, although the Hindi word "*sena*," meaning organization or army, includes a sense of militancy. The activities of these organizations have frequently been marked by violence, particularly since the causes with which they are involved are usually laden with emotion. At least one of the *senas*, the *Shiv Sena* of Bombay, has gradually taken on the trappings of a political party, and most of the others are performing essentially political functions in expressing special regional and local discontent. The *Shiv Sena* unsuccessfully ran five candidates in the 1971 *Lok Sabha* elections but retained a position as a local party when its candidate was elected mayor of Bombay in April 1971. Although it only won one of Maharashtra's 270 state assembly seats in 1972, the party's core strength in Bombay and its voice in politics there were reinforced when it retained 35 of its 41 seats in the 140-member Bombay Municipal Corporation elections. In early 1973, it improved its position to 39 seats and ranked second in number to the Congress Party. Although the party has shown strength among younger Maharashtrians, who

presumably are taken with its commitment to find jobs for Maharashtrians, its influence outside of Bombay is negligible.

3. Electoral system (U/OU)

Supervision and control of all elections and related matters are vested in a nonpartisan, independent Election Commission, appointed by the President of India, with membership subject to parliamentary approval.

There is one general voters' list for each parliamentary or state constituency, and no person is denied the franchise solely because of religion, race, caste, or sex. Electoral rolls are revised before each general election and before each by-election in a constituency. Elections to the lower house of the national Parliament and the state legislative assemblies are by adult suffrage, all citizens 21 years of age or over being eligible to vote. General elections are held every 5 years, but by-elections may be held whenever necessary. The number of parliamentary seats allocated to each state is reviewed and readjusted after every decennial census. A similar provision applies to state legislative assemblies. The entire country is divided into a number of territorial divisions for electoral purposes called constituencies. While each constituency elects a representative to the state legislative assembly, five or more state assembly constituencies are grouped together to form a parliamentary constituency. A 1961 law stipulates that all candidates are to run from single member constituencies. Candidates for the national Parliament need not be residents of the state in which they run. State assembly candidates must be state residents.

Easily recognizable voting symbols for each candidate and his party are used to overcome the high illiteracy rate among voters. Much electoral campaigning consists of familiarizing voters with the symbols and identifying these with the party. While established parties may reserve symbols, new parties may obtain symbols by applying to the Election Commission.

All five general elections have been relatively peaceful. Voting in some states is spread over several days because of transportation difficulties and the limited availability of election officials. Polling booths are located generally so that no voter has to travel more than 3 miles to vote. The polling stations are manned by civil service personnel acting as agents for the Election Commission. Poll watchers may be assigned by interested parties. A voter may cast his ballot only at the polling place assigned to him. An indelible ink mark is applied to the forefinger of each

voter to prevent double voting. The voting is secret and the voter is required to put a mark with an inked rubber stamp next to a candidate's name or symbol on a ballot. He then folds and inserts the ballot in a sealed ballot box under the scrutiny of the presiding officer.

The election machinery appears to operate honestly; charges of malfeasance on the part of election officials are rare. Most parties indulge in vote buying during election campaigns, but this practice appears to be geared exclusively toward influencing the voter before he enters the polling station. In May 1969 Y. B. Chavan, then Minister of Home Affairs, announced in the *Lok Sabha* that an Intelligence Bureau investigation revealed that "there is reason to think that funds obtained from foreign sources were used in the last general election." Despite charges of both Western and Communist meddling, no firm evidence exists of foreign interference. Replying to a parliamentary question in April 1971, Deputy Minister of External Affairs Surendra Pal Singh exonerated Soviet and other diplomatic missions from charges of interfering in the 1971 *Lok Sabha* elections.

A limit is prescribed on election expenses and all candidates, successful or not, must file a statement of expenses with the district election officer within 30 days after election results are declared. To discourage frivolous nominations, candidates are required to post a specified amount with authorities which is refundable only upon securing one-sixth of the valid votes in the constituency.

The verdict of the voters has been accepted nearly always with good grace by both the Congress Party and its opponents. In the state where the Congress Party could not form a government, the party has allowed opposition coalitions to take control.

The electorate which numbered 170 million in 1952 had grown to 271.8 million by March 1971. In the 1971 parliamentary elections, 145.8 million voters, or 54% of the qualified electorate, actually cast valid votes. Voter participation appears to be greatest at the village level, where often virtually all adults vote in local elections; it is somewhat less for state elections or for candidates to the national Parliament.

D. National policies

1. Domestic (U/OU)

The Indian Government since independence has been strongly committed to political, economic, and social development within the context of parliamentary democracy. These broad goals have been most vigorously promoted and supported by the propor-

tionately small, Westernized, and educated elite. The implementation of specific programs related to these goals has generated considerably less enthusiasm, however, from the still largely tradition-oriented rural masses.

To turn their goals into reality, many of the top decisionmakers and opinion molders have been trying for many years to eradicate traditional behavior patterns in favor of more modern values and attitudes that can support their Westernized concepts of what a modern Indian state should be. This effort at social engineering has not been outstandingly successful, and often it is characterized by a large gap between what the government claims it has accomplished through legislation of its objectives and what has actually occurred in the process of implementation. In some areas where national policy runs directly counter to deeply held local convictions and vested interests, the national elite has not placed overwhelming priorities on its implementation. Such items as land reform and the abolition of untouchability are prominent examples of unenforceable and largely unenforced legislation. In other areas where national policies are congruent with local interests, programs have been successful, but not always in the way originally envisaged. Community development, for instance, was started as a production-oriented program but actually evolved into a social benefit program for the privileged of the rural communities.

The Indian Government for over two decades has been attempting to create an integrated national community. The first essential step was to forge territorial unity. By September 1948, with the exception of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir which is still in dispute with Pakistan, over 560 semiautonomous princely states of British India were successfully incorporated into the independent Indian Union through cajolery, financial inducements, political pressure, and in two instances by armed "police action." The five small French enclaves were absorbed peacefully on a *de facto* basis by agreements reached between 1952 and 1956, though *de jure* ratification of the agreement by the French Assembly was delayed until 1962. The three small Portuguese territories were taken by force, beginning with portions of Damao (now Daman) and Diu in 1954, and concluding with Goa and the remainder of Damao and Diu in December 1961. The small, strategic Himalayan mountain kingdom of Sikkim came under Indian suzerainty by treaty in December 1950, after that country's ruler requested the Indian Government to send troops to help quell popular unrest. Sikkim is now an Indian protectorate with no independent

foreign or defense policy and with extensive Indian involvement in its administration. Neighboring Bhutan remains an independent kingdom, but it is bound by an August 1949 treaty to be "guided" by the advice of India in the conduct of its foreign policy. The Indian Government is heavily involved in developing Bhutan's economy and is prepared to defend this small Himalayan country in case of attack by China.

Having achieved nearly complete territorial unity, the Indian Government has turned to the even more complex and difficult task of forging a sense of national identity and loyalty. The bureaucracy has been greatly expanded over the years, and it has taken on an increasing range of public services very largely programed to replace traditional, religious, and familial ties with loyalty to secular-oriented institutions. The extension of regularized legal norms, the increased density of police posts, and the spread of the road system are all part of this pattern, as are the more obvious symbols of nation building in the economic sphere. Paradoxically, however, while the government refuses to accept local rivals for authority, the democratic system tends nevertheless to give power to local leaders who sometimes fail to respect the national bureaucracy and thereby perpetuate the historic pluralism of authority in the country. Parochial authority is being eroded in many areas, but traditional beliefs die slowly since they are central to the individual's identity. New roles can be created and filled much easier than old identities, and beliefs can be changed to support the nation-state concept that the Western-influenced elites are trying so hard to create.

From the beginning, the government has vigorously tried to instill a sense of national identity in the people of India, and high officials frequently rail against the evils of regionalism and communalism. They are highly aware that India as a nation is an artificial concept, evolved during the independence struggle, and is yet to be fully achieved. In June 1968, after a 6-year hiatus, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi revived the National Integration Council in an effort to achieve fuller integration of India's multicultural and multilingual society and to examine the major impediments to this end. There had been a marked upsurge of communal violence and regional chauvinism after the 1967 general election, and it was felt that there was a need to focus attention on these serious problems in a broader context than that of the continuing stream of *ad hoc* measures, gestures, and recriminations. Mrs. Gandhi set the government's policy line and expressed the council's consensus in

stressing the need for "purposeful action" against communalism, regionalism, and lack of equal opportunity, the main impediments to genuine national integration.

Having consolidated her power following the 1971 and 1972 election victories, Mrs. Gandhi has cautiously begun to attempt needed reforms. By mid-1972 the most notable endeavor was the Indian Government's effort to reduce ceilings on land holdings. Land ceiling legislation, a prerogative of the states, has been in force in India for years, but it has been circumvented by a variety of legal and illegal means. As a key to meaningful socioeconomic change in India, land reform was one of Mrs. Gandhi's most fervent pledges in the elections and has become a significant test of her political credibility and performance. While the trend toward achieving other reform measures has been growing, strong opposition from those who favor the status quo is likely to inhibit the pace of change in land policies.

Because of the effects of the drought and rapidly rising food prices, in late 1972 the government asked the state governments to take over the wholesale trade in foodgrains in 1973. This massive program, designed to keep foodgrain prices within reasonable limits, will test the political will of the Congress Party and the administrative capabilities of the bureaucracy to the fullest. Most state chief ministers tacitly oppose this takeover.

Limiting India's massive population remains a critical issue for Indian leaders. Programs to raise living standards and the concomitant problems involved with resource allocation have been and will continue to be conditioned by the government's ability to deal with this problem. Family planning has been an integral part of developmental plans since 1951, but it was not until 1964 that comprehensive program was launched. The government continues to offer incentives for adopting birth control techniques, and has expanded its family planning services, including information programs and clinics. In April 1972 a comprehensive Termination of Pregnancy bill, which legalized abortion, became effective. Indian leaders realize that, as health measures become more effective and life expectancy is improved, checking population growth becomes an even more crucial problem. Recognizing the danger of a letdown in the population control effort, the government is working to develop a more effective population policy to deal with the problem. (See chapter on The Society, Section C, Population)

The Congress Party governments have always been deeply committed to doing something constructive

about India's staggering problems of population, poverty, inequality, hunger, disease, and ignorance. Their efforts, which in many areas have fallen short of the needs, have been mainly channeled into a series of comprehensive 5-year development plans, the fourth of which was launched in April 1969. The strong socialist strain in the Congress ideology has led to the public ownership of a considerable number of key industries and to a reluctance to use the free market mechanism as an instrument of economic policy. Congress Party socialism, however, is not doctrinaire and has a considerable degree of pragmatism that generally makes an allowance for political and economic realities and provides for considerable leeway in the making of specific policies. Thus, the earlier heavy emphasis on building up the heavy industrial sector has largely shifted to increasing agricultural production, and checking the population explosion.

The Fourth Five Year Plan (1 April 1969-31 March 1974) reflects the Indian Government's latest orientation in development policy. The Planning Commission took good advantage of a 3-year hiatus (1966-68) in 5-year planning to make a fundamental reassessment of the economy's capabilities and requirements after 15 years of planned development effort. The most striking difference from past plans and performance is the increasing attention to agricultural development programs and to reducing dependence on external aid and deficit financing. The redirection of effort and realignment of priorities was most clearly seen in the increased attention given to raising food production to the level of self-sufficiency. Other significant changes in comparison with earlier development planning in India were a curtailment of public sector investment in industry and mining, and within this sector, a deemphasis on heavy engineering and coal, accompanied by sharply increased investments in fertilizer production and nonferrous metals, and greatly increased attention to newly recognized needs for family planning, improved nutrition, and storage facilities for agricultural products. In general, the plan, which aims "to step up the tempo of activity to the extent compatible with maintaining stability and progress toward self-sufficiency" has been pragmatic and fairly realistic.

The mid-term *Appraisal of India's Fourth Five Year Plan*, a government report released in mid-1971, indicated that the plan had thus far achieved mixed results. Overall growth rates for the agricultural, defense, and public administration sectors as well as some other sectors of the national product were satisfactory. In contrast, the overall performance of

industry was unsatisfactory, due largely to the expected failure to achieve the planned levels of production. Despite overall growth of agriculture, it too was expected to achieve lower outputs than had been planned. Accordingly, many goals were revised downward. Despite shortcomings of the plan, Indian leaders have shown a better understanding of their economy and have continued a pragmatic approach designed to break bottlenecks and to achieve realistic goals, particularly in industrial growth. The economy made modest progress in 1971, despite the influx of about 10 million Bengala refugees and the war with Pakistan. While there had been some previous grounds for optimism in New Delhi, the annual *Government of India Economic Survey for FY1972-73* reported that overall growth of the Indian economy has been unsatisfactory since 1971. Issued in February 1973, this survey was generally more pessimistic than the earlier mid-1972 appraisal. The poor economic performance was attributed to the shortfalls in agricultural production resulting from the 1972 drought.

2. Foreign

Since independence the basic tenet of Indian foreign policy has been nonalignment, an ambiguous term that the Indians have continuously redefined to meet the changing requirements of the country's foreign policy. As originally developed and expanded by Jawaharlal Nehru, nonalignment involved staying scrupulously aloof from the "cold war" and building a "third force" grouping of Afro-Asian states that could serve as a bridge between the Communist and Western power blocs. It involved considerable international moralizing at the United Nations and in other international forums, and it included the dominant themes of neutralism, anti-imperialism, and peaceful coexistence. India was suspicious of most Western policies, believing them in one way or another to be aimed at regaining a foothold in South Asia or at retaining power in Southeast Asia, the Far East, and Africa. Leadership of the Afro-Asian states was actively pursued, and China was approached as a brother Asian state with which peaceful coexistence was desirable and possible. The dominant aims were to create an atmosphere of world peace in which India could devote its energies to achieving self-sustaining economic development and to secure a place in world affairs for India, a goal desired for its own sake, apart from any relationship it might have with economic development. (U/OU)

Nonalignment is still the publicly proclaimed cornerstone of Indian foreign policy, but in the 1970's

it has come to have quite a different meaning in several important contexts. A subtle redirection of the concept has evolved as a result of the Indian leaders' appreciation of the changing nature of world conditions and international relations as well as of the increasingly more complex domestic economic and security situation. Mrs. Gandhi's pragmatic style and guiding influence have increasingly become the benchmarks for action. Faced with two hostile neighbors—Pakistan and China—and preoccupied with serious social and economic problems at home, Indian policymakers for years assiduously sought a balanced relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States that could maximize diplomatic, economic, and military support from both superpowers. This balance was upset by deterioration of relations with the United States in 1971 resulting from the events of the Indo-Pakistani war. Moreover, by 1972 India had developed a greater sense of self-confidence, and a go-it-alone attitude had become pervasive in foreign policy considerations. Achieving self-reliance by 1979, has become an important goal. India currently defines self-reliance as "zero net foreign aid," a concept that assumes India will continue to receive foreign aid to cover debt repayments. According to Mrs. Gandhi, nonalignment has come to mean the pursuit of national interests in total freedom from outside interference. The new view implies that cooperation with any nation is possible as it becomes necessary and clearly alters the concept of neutrality that nonalignment formerly suggested. Mrs. Gandhi and most Indians still retain a strong emotional and intellectual dedication to the old concept, at least in the abstract. Although new decisions continue to be clothed in the garment of nonalignment, the term has been redefined to fit into the circumstances of the 1970's. Indian policymakers still regard themselves as spokesmen for the developing countries, although the demonstrated lack of tangible benefits from wooing Afro-Asian states resulted in a decline of interest in this kind of activity following Nehru's death in 1964. Indian policymakers today believe that they can still follow a middle course, albeit more involved and active than that followed in recent years, which will serve to convince the big powers that they can no longer exert pressure on smaller countries. (C)

The Indians have come to realize that the Soviet Union and the United States will always pursue their own changing interests and that these will not necessarily coincide with what India perceives to be in its vital interest. This was evident, for instance, when India opposed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty—essentially on the grounds that signature was

detrimental to its long-range security interests—and for the first time found itself on the side opposite both superpowers. (U/OU)

India favors, at least in principle, worldwide nuclear disarmament and an effective ban on all nuclear testing. The government has declined to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, however, as it is concerned about the Chinese nuclear testing program and Peking's refusal to sign the treaty. India has continued a program of nuclear development. Although India possesses the technical capability of testing a crude nuclear device within a short period after the decision to do so, it has not yet detonated a nuclear device, apparently preferring to keep its options open for the future. India probably sees its ultimate defense against a potential Chinese nuclear threat as resting primarily on its ability to gain the support of both the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and it has thus far relied on developing conventional capabilities. There has been considerable public discussion of developing a nuclear capability, but security considerations and the very high cost of an effective nuclear deterrent, including a delivery system, are strong inhibiting factors. The Indians are relatively advanced in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, however, and under the aegis of their Atomic Energy Commission have ventured into applications of nuclear power to such fields as agriculture, biology, industry and medicine. In addition to an advanced atomic energy program, India has an active space research program and hopes to develop a domestic satellite launcher by 1976. (S)

India's military victory over Pakistan in 1971 and its emergence as the dominant power on the subcontinent has revived the ebullience and self-assurance of the Nehru period. Mrs. Gandhi pledged in early 1972 to make India strong enough to influence world events and to shape a foreign policy which would accomplish that goal. The confidence on which such a promise was based reflected a new-found nationalism, possibly tinged with xenophobia, and at the same time demonstrated the Indian leaders' decreasing tolerance of outside direction. The Indians are increasingly sensitive about recognition and acceptance of what they believe to be their new role in regional and international affairs, a role commensurate with India's size and potential. Indian leaders have shown a growing ability to resist pressures from the big powers, which appear to them as impediments to achieving their objectives or slurs on their self-respect. Despite the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty of 1971, India has indicated that it will not be the camp follower of any power and has apparently disagreed with the Soviets

over policies affecting its primacy in the Indian Ocean area and its relationship with Bangladesh. Indeed, New Delhi has shown a growing interest in increasing its influence in Asia and in concluding bilateral or multilateral treaties with other Asian nations. (U/OU)

a. Indo-Pakistani relations (C)

India's relations with neighboring Pakistan have been consistently antagonistic since these two achieved independence in 1947. In the months following the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, however, both governments seemed sincerely determined, for the first time, to turn their embittered history of confrontation in the direction of lasting peace and friendship. Although efforts to reach a *modus vivendi* bogged down, leaders of both countries remained optimistic that positive results could eventually be achieved. Following the December war, the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, historically a major point of contention, has been defused as a burning issue because of India's clear military superiority and Pakistan's apparent agreement to solve outstanding disputes by peaceful means. A final settlement of the Kashmir issue, however, is still crucial to peace and stability in the subcontinent. The dispute, whose roots go deep into the turbulent political and communal history of the Indian subcontinent, is much more than a normal territorial dispute over a strategic area.

The partition of India in August 1947, intended to ease traditional Hindu-Muslim tensions by creating a Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan, acted instead to perpetuate this basic problem. Immediately after partition, the mass migrations of Hindu and Muslim minorities from the new countries—at least 10 million persons were involved—were accompanied by massacres on both sides of the borders that left as many as two million of the fleeing migrants dead. The sizable minorities which remained in each country, however, have often borne the brunt of mob violence and discrimination stemming from the lingering animosity created by those days of terror.

Under the terms of the partition agreement, Kashmir, along with 600 princely states, had the right to join either India or Pakistan. When independence came, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir delayed his decision, apparently hoping to achieve substantial autonomy. By mid-October 1947, however, a revolt had broken out among the overwhelmingly Muslim population, several thousand Pathan tribesmen had invaded Kashmir from Pakistan, and a provisional Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) government, supported and recognized by Pakistan, had been established.

The ruler acceded to India on October 26 and immediately sought assistance from New Delhi to suppress the local agitation and to expel the Pakistani invaders. The subsequent intervention by Pakistani army troops intensified the first military confrontation between newly independent India and Pakistan.

When a cease-fire halted fighting in 1949, India controlled about two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir—an area with a population that now numbers over 4.6 million people, of whom some 70% are Muslims. Included under Indian control was the highly coveted Vale of Kashmir, a level to gently rolling fertile valley some 85 miles long and 25 miles wide. Srinagar, the largest and by far the most important political and commercial center, dominates the Vale. India also controls the more densely populated (mostly by Hindus) plains to the south and about 75% of the forests—the state's most important natural resource. The remaining one-third under Pakistani control has a population of about 1.2 million and is a mountainous area of little economic value. The Pakistanis have organized a part of their area of the disputed territory, called Azad Kashmir, under a separate provisional government, the "Azad Government of Jammu and Kashmir," but actually it is controlled by Islamabad. The Indian-held portion of the disputed territory has been incorporated into the Indian union as a regular state, although constitutionally it has somewhat more autonomy than the other Indian states.

As Indo-Pakistani relations deteriorated in 1964 and early 1965 due to worsening developments in Kashmir and increasing East Pakistan border incidents, an accidental encounter led to military clashes on the desolate salt marshes of the Rann of Kutch. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson prevented the conflict from spreading to general war by arranging a cease-fire and persuading both powers to submit the dispute to international arbitration. Militarily Pakistan had actually beaten India, but the hostilities only further increased frustrations on both sides over ancillary issues such as Kashmir.

Pakistan's frustrations over its inability to wrest the Indian-held portion of the disputed territory—especially the prized Vale of Kashmir—from India through the auspices of the United Nations led to the risky decision to send infiltrators into the area in early August 1965. The ensuing 3-week war in September 1965 quickly spread from the 1949 cease-fire line down to the established international border in the Punjab. Until the outbreak of the 1965 hostilities, economic and political relations between India and Pakistan functioned largely within the overall framework of normal diplomatic and commercial

practice. Enmity, suspicion, fear, and hostility, which had accumulated over 18 years of bitter controversy about Kashmir, distorted day-to-day relations, but there remained real, if diminishing, willingness to maintain those ties of trade, travel, and communication that had existed since the partitioning of the subcontinent in 1947. The September war, however, destroyed virtually all these important links. Trade and payments came to a halt, telecommunications and postal services were suspended, property belonging to the nationals of the other country was seized, and air, rail, and road services were completely suspended.

A U.N. resolution brought an end to the war in late September 1965, and in January 1966 Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan met under the auspices of the Soviet Union at Tashkent. Under considerable Soviet pressure, the two leaders agreed to a series of measures designed to begin the process of restoring normal relations. The list of actual Indo-Pakistani accomplishments through early 1971 concerned relatively minor issues, and in many cases represented only qualified success.

In late January 1971 the hijacking and subsequent destruction of an Indian airliner in West Pakistan soured Indian relations with Pakistan but, despite an emotion-charged atmosphere, both countries sought to avoid confrontation. However, the attempt that West Pakistan began on 25 March to re-establish government authority in East Pakistan—now independent Bangladesh—precipitated a series of events which ultimately led to the Indo-Pakistan war in December.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, India was basically concerned about two major issues in East Pakistan that New Delhi believed threatened its vital interests. Ten million refugees had crossed the border into West Bengal and other states on India's northeast frontier, creating an unacceptable burden and great domestic pressure for action. Even more important was New Delhi's fear that a radical left regime would emerge on the borders of West Bengal, traditionally India's most unstable state. Following months both of increasing border violations and Indian support of Bengalee independence fighters, a 2-week war erupted.

India emerged the victor and the dominant military power on the subcontinent. Pakistan lost some 93,000 military and civilian prisoners of war; about 6,000 square miles of territory along the border of India and West Pakistan; and East Pakistan, which became the new nation of Bangladesh. Indian prisoner and territorial losses were minor in comparison.

After several months of preliminary sessions, Prime Minister Gandhi met in early July 1972 with Pakistani President Bhutto in Simla, India, for the first bilateral peace negotiations at the summit between India and Pakistan since partition in 1947. Although the Simla Agreement made progress on a number of issues—especially affirming what amounted to a no-war pact between India and Pakistan—little movement occurred in the following months. India's charges of Pakistani violations of the spirit of Simla—which to them implied, among other things, speedy Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh—have been met with Pakistani countercharges that India has failed to execute the letter of the agreement. Meanwhile, apart from the issues raised by the war, the basic issue of Kashmir, which has poisoned the diplomatic atmosphere in the past, remains unresolved.

India has held steadfastly to its position affirming the legality of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India effected by the Hindu Maharajah in 1947. Since 1956 New Delhi has also maintained that it no longer considers itself bound by its agreement to conduct a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir as called for in U.N. resolutions. The Indians assert that the demilitarization of all of the territory—another element of the resolution—has never taken place and that this was to be a necessary prerequisite for a plebiscite. They also hasten to point out that five "free" state and national elections have been conducted in the Indian-held portion of the territory, giving the Kashmiris ample occasion to express their will. Actually, strong-arm tactics and legal maneuvering have governed the outcome of all five elections. Strong and growing Indian nationalist sentiment opposes any settlement with the Pakistanis that would involve compromise.

Pakistan's position from the beginning has been based primarily on extending to the disputed territory the principle of religious separation underlying the 1947 partitioning of the subcontinent. Pakistanis argue that the people of the Indian-held portion, who are predominantly Muslim, should have a free opportunity to incorporate their land into Pakistan. Pakistan's argument is not altogether altruistic. If so predominant a Muslim area were to remain uncontested in the Indian union, the principle behind the original partition would be undermined. As in India, no government in Pakistan could abandon entirely a strong stand on Kashmir and survive. Following Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war, however, President Bhutto's options may be limited.

In the peace negotiations following the hostilities in 1971 it became clear that neither side was prepared to abandon its claim, but the new cease-fire line in

Kashmir that emerged from that war began to look more and more like a *de facto* international boundary. Indian leaders have long admitted in private that they would be willing to accept such a resolution of the dispute. The Pakistanis, of course, cannot publicly accept any such ending to their quest for Kashmir but, in the light of the results of the 1965 and 1971 wars, they appear unable to change the status of the disputed territory by force and may decide quietly to let the issue fade. In August 1973 one thorny issue was resolved when India and Pakistan agreed to release most of the 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held in detention in India since December 1971.

Over the years, India's relations with Pakistan have been adversely affected by Pakistan's adherence to western military pacts—The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)—and its relations with China. India has regarded multilateral military pacts incompatible with its own as inimical to its nonaligned position and hostile to the principles of making the subcontinent a "zone of peace." New Delhi has been deeply suspicious of Chinese intentions toward India, especially since the 1962 hostilities, and fears Chinese-Pakistani collusion. New Delhi believes that prospects of improving Sino-Indian relations have been impeded by Pakistan's relations with Peking. Additionally, as long as the close relationship between China and Pakistan continues, India cannot discount the possibility of another Chinese military attack and has been forced to divert money and manpower which are needed elsewhere to the defense against China.

b. Bangladesh (C)

India is, in effect, Bangladesh's sponsor and— together with the United States—one of its two leading benefactors. Following the West Pakistani crackdown on what was then East Pakistan, India's involvement with the Bengali independence movement grew steadily. As a result of its extensive military and political support, India exercised considerable control over the Bengali resistance movement. Despite continuing support, particularly economic, once the People's Republic of Bangladesh came into existence on December 16, 1971 it became increasingly clear that the degree of control inevitably had to decline and that strains would develop in the relationship.

India has sought to maintain a low profile while still playing a major role in Bangladesh's rehabilitation and future. One of India's early moves was to sponsor Bangladesh for membership in the United Nations. Indian troops who had provided assistance in

maintaining law and order were withdrawn from Bangladesh by early March 1972, with New Delhi apparently even more anxious than Dacca for the soldiers to depart. An Indian Army contingent that returned to help suppress unrest in the remote Chittagong Hills border region had left Bangladesh territory by mid-May. Some Indian military and technical advisers have remained in Bangladesh to assist in the restoration of communication and transportation facilities, but no combat units are known to be in the country.

In late March 1972 the two countries concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty provides for immediate consultation between the two governments if either party is threatened with attack by another country. It also provides that neither party will enter into alliances directed against the other, that regular contacts will be maintained on major international problems affecting both, and that they will cooperate in science, culture, economics, trade and water usage. A subsequent trade agreement seeks to facilitate trade and transportation between the two countries, long obstructed by unfriendly relations with previously united Pakistan.

Although Indian popularity was still high in the fall of 1972, an undercurrent of discontent flowed through Bangladesh about some aspects of its relations with India. Some Bengalees have alleged that the Indians have aggravated the new country's difficulties. Businessmen have complained that the trade agreement is weighted in India's favor, and some Bengalee leftists have excoriated India for allegedly failing to inhibit rice smuggling to India and for foisting shoddy consumer goods on Bangladesh. Many Bengalees probably fear that Indians might regain the predominant position in Bengalee commercial affairs that they held before partition in 1947. The charges of general Indian domination of the Bangladesh Government and its military forces, as well as other anti-Indian sentiments, are probably rooted more in the Muslim suspicions and antipathy against Hindus that smoulder beneath the surface than in any situation which has actually materialized. The tendency among Bengalees to blame foreign powers— especially India—for the country's massive difficulties seems to have increased as problems remain unsolved and reinforce fears of future domination.

New Delhi would prefer a stable Bangladesh on its eastern border, and Indian troops would probably be called upon to return to Bangladesh should events occur which Dacca's security forces could not handle. The Indians recognize, however, that Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman's ability personally to hold the

government and country together in the face of severe internal pressures could be affected by their own actions. Indian leaders, therefore, have gone out of their way to avoid the appearance of excessive interference. Despite Indian sensitivity to the domestic situation in Bangladesh and genuine efforts to allay Bengalee fears, deep-seated mutual suspicions could inhibit smooth future relations.

c. The Himalayan buffer states and Sri Lanka (C)

India has devoted considerable attention to its relations with neighboring Nepal. This sovereign but economically primitive and geographically compartmented nation has strategic importance as a buffer between India and China along some 500 miles of its border with Tibet. India has extended economic and military aid to Nepal, but this has been partially offset by Chinese aid and diplomatic initiatives. The Nepalese are suspicious of both Indian and Chinese intentions but have been particularly resentful over their dependence on Indian trade and aid. Additionally, earlier Indian tacit support for antigovernment activities by dissident Nepalese politicians residing in India has been a source of friction.

New Delhi has been fairly successful in convincing Kathmandu that India intends to exercise its predominance on the subcontinent—at least *vis-a-vis* Nepal—in a restrained and reasonable manner. At one time, India maintained intelligence gathering posts on the Tibetan border of Nepal, but at Nepalese insistence it had removed its troops from these posts by early 1971. Moreover, Indian leaders appear to regard King Birendra—who ascended the throne in January 1972—more favorably than his autocratic father. They have assured him that they will try to increase aid, will act to prevent subversion by dissident Nepalese politicians in India, and will not permit Nepalese insurgents to operate from Indian territory. Although relations had entered a new stage of cordiality by late 1972, King Birendra was still extremely wary of India's past preference for a "democratic" or, at least, a more liberal regime in Nepal.

Bhutan is a vulnerable link in India's frontier with China and, as such, poses a potential threat to Indian security which New Delhi has sought to minimize. According to the Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 1949, Bhutan conducts its own foreign relations but is required to follow India's advice when given. Although India has no responsibility for defending Bhutan, New Delhi considers Bhutan's internal security and territorial integrity essential to the defense

of northern India and, accordingly, provides substantial military aid. India established the Indian Military Training Team, with a staff of several thousand, to assist in training the Bhutanese army, but this organization also could be used to stem internal disorders. Additionally, several thousand Indian troops are responsible for most of the extensive roadbuilding projects in Bhutan and presumably could be called upon in an emergency. Bhutan is almost totally dependent on India for economic assistance and developmental aid. The Bhutanese Government has been uncomfortable over the very visible Indian presence, fearing that it was risking its image of independence and running the possibility of provoking the Chinese. Relations are also somewhat easily inflamed by the fact that Bhutanese consider Indians racially and culturally inferior. Despite considerable resentment by some Bhutanese toward the relatively large number of Indians engaged in Bhutan's economic, administrative and military affairs—especially in the ebullient period following Bhutan's admission to the United Nations in 1971—the Bhutanese Government apparently does not feel that India threatens its special brand of sovereignty. In time, Bhutan could perceive the need to demonstrate its independence by occasionally voting differently from India in the United Nations or by pressing India on small matters related to its sovereignty. While modifications in the symbiotic relationship can be expected over the long term, relations in late 1972 were developing satisfactorily for both partners, and the King of Bhutan—who ascended the throne in July following his father's death—claimed no desire to revise the Indo-Bhutanese treaty arrangement.

The small but strategically located Himalayan border state of Sikkim is closely tied to India. It became a protectorate of British India by a treaty negotiated in 1861, and this status was continued by a treaty between newly independent India and Sikkim signed in 1950. The treaty provides that Sikkim's external relations, defense, and communications are to be conducted solely by India, and it permits the placement of Indian officials in prominent positions throughout the Sikkimese Government. In exercise of its defense responsibility, India maintains about 27,000 troops in Sikkim to guard against Chinese incursions along the Sikkim-Tibet border.

In May 1973, the already limited powers of Sikkim's titular ruler, Maharaja Paldem Thondup Namgyal, the Chogyal of Sikkim, were further curtailed as a result of a new agreement with India. A month earlier, India responded to the Chogyal's appeal for help in curbing civil disorders fomented by the ethnic Nepalis,

who constitute a majority of the population. The Nepalis have long sought democratic reforms in the government and an end to various discriminatory practices against them. New Delhi stepped in, ended the disorders, and quickly mediated a new agreement that enhances both its own position and that of the Nepalis. Although the Chogyal remains titular head of Sikkim, he retains direct control over only palace affairs and the small palace guard.

Indian control over Sikkim's internal administration has been tightened by creation of an Indian "chief executive" appointed by New Delhi. He is required to seek the Chogyal's consent for decisions, except in emergencies when the situation will brook no delay. Conflicts between the Chogyal and the chief executive are to be resolved by New Delhi. The new agreement also provides for the creation of an expanded legislature, the State Council, elected every 4 years on a one-man, one-vote basis. This replaces the previous system of government that was weighted in favor of the Bhutia-Lepcha ethnic minority which supports the Chogyal. An executive council, similar to a cabinet, will be selected with Indian approval by the State Council. An independent judiciary will also be established.

The new agreement should mute, at least temporarily, the Chogyal's determination to seek greater autonomy for Sikkim in its relationship with India. He has desired a revision of the 1950 treaty, membership in international organizations, and greater control over Sikkim's internal and external affairs. The Chogyal and his American-born wife (the former Hope Cooke of New York) have long resented India's role and probably will continue to complain privately of what they consider Indian meddling.

Over the long run, India may face problems in controlling the Nepalis, particularly the youthful extremists who seek a Nepali-dominated government without a hereditary monarch. Trouble may also develop along communal lines, reflecting religious differences and economic disparity between the Buddhist Bhutia-Lepchas and the poorer Hindu Nepali laborers in southern Sikkim. In any event, New Delhi is unlikely to tolerate prolonged political instability and, if necessary, will use force to prevent it.

India has maintained a traditionally relaxed policy toward Sri Lanka (Ceylon). The main point of contention in the past has been the Ceylonese Government's treatment of its Tamil minority—descendants of south Indian laborers and merchants who migrated to Ceylon over a period of several centuries. Both governments are aware that Sri

Lanka's restive Tamils have many sympathizers in south India. The accords reached in 1965, providing for repatriating to India the "displaced" Tamils and more equitable treatment of those who chose not to return, have not been implemented to the satisfaction of either country and the issue remains an irritant. Indian leaders fear the development of any insurgent movement in Sri Lanka which could create trouble in south India or give any foreign power an excuse for entering into the affairs of its southern neighbor. Indeed, New Delhi aided Colombo's efforts to suppress the 1971 insurrection by youngsters of the country's Sinhalese majority, and favors efforts to contain young Tamil extremists. India's enhanced power position in South Asia, as a consequence of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, has heightened Ceylonese fears that India might interfere in its domestic affairs, possibly by fomenting Tamil unrest. The depth of Ceylonese suspicion of Indian intentions is shown by the concern of some Ceylonese officials over improved relations between New Delhi and Moscow. The Ceylonese apparently believe the Soviets somehow abetted the 1971 insurrection, despite a lack of concrete evidence. New Delhi has sought to allay Colombo's fears about the Indo-Soviet relationship and to convince it that India intends no interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs.

d. Sino-Indian relations (S)

Until the outbreak of serious hostilities along the Sino-Indian border in October 1962, India had doggedly followed a policy of accommodation and conciliation toward China. Despite territorial and border problems, Nehru relied primarily on moral suasion and compromise to protect India's interests *vis-a-vis* the Chinese. Since the Chinese military attack in 1962, however, Sino-Indian relations have been characterized by mutual animosity, periodic flareups along their long border, and little real movement toward a substantive settlement of their differences. There is, however, a growing inclination on the part of the Indian Government to normalize relations with Peking.

Until the 1962 attack, India was often the chief backer of the Chinese in their efforts to gain acceptance in the international community. Despite formerly close ties with Chiang Kai-shek, India extended diplomatic relations to China in 1949 on the grounds that the Communists controlled the country and that India was more concerned with a strong, stable, united China than with the government's ideology. India pushed for the seating of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations and was against

the General Assembly resolution branding them as aggressors in the Korean war. Nehru visited Peking and Chou En-lai several times went to India.

Despite the Indian willingness to be accommodating, border problems between the two countries loomed almost from the beginning of their relationship. India formally protested when the Chinese first invaded Tibet in 1950 but settled in 1954 for a nonaggression agreement, which expressed the lofty principles of coexistence as Nehru saw them, and for a treaty virtually eliminating India's influence in Tibet. Minor boundary differences only rippled the otherwise placid waters of Sino-Indian relations until the end of 1958, when the Indians belatedly discovered that in 1956-56 the Chinese had constructed a road through the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh without their prior knowledge. An even bigger problem arose in January 1959 when the Chinese asserted that the so-called McMahon line (Figure 8), which India claimed was the border in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) (now Arunachal Pradesh) was illegal. Shortly thereafter (March-May 1959) the Chinese suppressed the abortive Tibetan rebellion, but not before the Dalai Lama had fled to India, where he was given political asylum but no official recognition for his cause.

Negotiations over the boundary dispute, including direct talks between Nehru and Chou En-lai in April 1960, continued inconclusively until 1962, with the Indians insisting on Chinese acceptance of the McMahon line in NEFA. The McMahon line had been worked out by the plenipotentiaries of the British Indian Government (Sir Henry McMahon), Tibet, and China in 1914 at Simla, where all three had initialed a draft convention. Later, however, the Chinese Government refused to ratify the agreement on the grounds that it was unfair and was imposed on them. The draft convention, with a map attached, was signed only by the British and by Tibetan representatives, who recognized the overlordship of the Chinese. Therefore, the Chinese contended in 1960-62—and for that matter still maintain—that no central Chinese government ever recognized the McMahon line and that Tibet had no right to enter into any agreement with a foreign power. India's main argument is that the McMahon line "merely formalized the traditional and customary boundary between India and Tibet." The United States has also recognized the McMahon line.

Against this background, the Chinese launched a full-scale attack on two fronts, in Ladakh and in NEFA, on 20 October 1962 and rather quickly seized




FIGURE 8. Area of Sino-Indian dispute over the McMahon line in northeastern India (C)

much of the territory they had claimed. After giving the Indian troops a severe thrashing, the Chinese, with the oncoming winter threatening to disrupt their lines of communications and logistics, withdrew voluntarily behind the positions which they had actually controlled on 7 November 1959, calling at the same time on India to negotiate. A diplomatic impasse developed, however, since the Indians insisted that the Chinese pull back beyond the line of control as of 8 September 1962, which reflected gains India had made by that time in regaining previously lost territory in Ladakh (Figure 9).

In December 1962, six nonaligned states—Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana—met in Colombo to seek ways of resolving the border dispute between India and China. With regard to the "Western Sector" (Ladakh), these states appealed for the withdrawal of Indian and Chinese troops to positions 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) behind the line of actual control which existed on 7 November 1959, as proposed by Chou En-lai to Nehru in November 1962, thus leaving China in control of much of the territory it had seized in late 1959. The administration of the demilitarized zone was to be bilaterally controlled by both governments through civilian checkpoints. As for the "Eastern Sector" (NEFA), the Colombo conference's vague

proposals were later clarified to mean that the Indian forces would be free to move right up to the McMahon line. With regard to the "Middle Sector" (Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh), the Colombo conference requested that the *status quo* in this area be maintained, since there had been no hostilities there. India accepted the proposals after clarifying them sufficiently to meet its minimum demands, despite strong opposition in Parliament castigating the Colombo proposals as offensive to the country's honor and dignity. Peking's response was so conditional as to amount to virtual rejection. Apart from the Colombo proposals, Nehru suggested that India was prepared to refer the frontier disputes with China to the International Court of Justice or to impartial arbitration.

Since the 1962 conflict, India's approach to China has become increasingly complex. India has maintained diplomatic relations with the Chinese, and as of mid-1973 had a charge d'affaires accredited to Peking. New Delhi consistently supported and voted in favor of granting Peking the Chinese seat in the United Nations. On the other hand, India still views Peking with deep suspicion and is convinced that China remains essentially hostile. The Indian Government's concern has been especially focused on China's virulent anti-Indian propaganda, its small-scale material support to dissident tribal elements in strategic northeastern India, and on what it considers to be Sino-Pakistani collusion against India. New Delhi is also apprehensive about the Maoist bent of some Indian Communist extremist groups and the possibility of clandestine Chinese backing for them. The immediate fear of another Chinese military attack similar to that of 1962 has receded, but the government believes that it must be fully prepared for such an eventuality and continues to maintain strong forces along the Sino-Indian border.

Indian leaders have apparently concluded that the bleak relationships that have existed with the Chinese since 1962 eventually must be normalized, especially in view of improving relations among the superpowers. A favorable accord with China would give India more maneuverability in its dealings with both the Soviet Union and the United States and would enhance its regional and international position.

Domestic political risks—influenced by Chinese support for Pakistan during the India-Pakistan crisis of 1971—and the lack of Chinese encouragement have inhibited the Indian Government from taking a clear initiative to improve relations with China, but Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has hinted publicly that she is




FIGURE 9. Ladakh sector of the China-India border area (C)

willing to open a dialogue and perhaps even to take the initiative in improving relations.

Indian-Chinese relations improved somewhat in 1970 following a remark in April to Parliament by then Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh indicating India's readiness to discuss a peaceful resolution of disputes. Chairman Mao Tse-tung, at May Day celebrations in Peking, said that China was willing to reciprocate India's interest in improving the relations. In July 1971 Mrs. Gandhi wrote Chou En-lai of her government's desire to discuss the Pakistan situation and other matters at any appropriate level. The warming Sino-Indian relations were further enhanced in October-November of that year by an exchange of conciliatory messages between Mrs. Gandhi and Chou En-lai, prompted by China's admission to the United Nations. These signs of a faint thaw in relations between New Delhi and Peking receded as Indian forces overran East Pakistan in December 1971, but China's efforts on behalf of Pakistan did not go beyond moral and diplomatic support. President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972 appeared to give fresh impetus to Indian desires for accommodation. Although the Indian Government has publicly implied that its aim in any bilateral talks would be territorial recovery, it is widely presumed among Indian officials that the government would be willing to normalize relations on a near status quo basis.

As of mid-1973, there still had been no efforts to hold official discussions on the basic outstanding issues. Mrs. Gandhi has been restrained in overtures toward China by the need to protect India's special relationship with the Soviet Union. Moreover, there still has been no clear sign from either party that the issues separating them would be resolved swiftly, even if negotiations were begun. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister has cleared the way by saying that an exchange of ambassadors without prior discussions of substantive issues would be agreeable, and that bilateral talks could begin at any level at almost any time or place.

e. Indo-Soviet relations (S)

Indo-Soviet relations, which have almost steadily improved since the early 1950's, reached an important milestone with the signing of a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on 9 August 1971. The treaty was concluded on the basis of mutual interests which came to the fore during the Indo-Pakistan crisis, but divergent long term goals make it uncertain whether each party can obtain the advantages it sought by formalizing the relationship. In time, fundamental differences, complicated by India's

almost paranoid security concerns and its dislike of power blocs, could impair the cooperative relationship which existed in mid-1973.

Mutual suspicions kept Indo-Soviet relations cool in the early years after Indian independence, but in the mid-1950's they began to improve. Nehru, who had long been sympathetic to Marxism but strongly opposed to Stalinist methods, found it easier to deal with Stalin's successors. They in turn, as the United States pursued its policy of "containment," came to recognize the advantages to be gained from a close relationship with a nonaligned India.

Following the deterioration of India's relations with China and the Soviets' own rift with the Chinese in the early 1960's, Indo-Soviet relations gradually blossomed into a special relationship in which India became the keystone of Soviet policy in South Asia. Large-scale economic and military aid programs have served to lessen Indian dependence on the West and to strengthen India's lagging public sector. Moscow may have made the effort primarily because it considers India a valuable foil to the Chinese, but India's sheer size and location also weighs heavily in Soviet calculations.

Moscow's views on important issues have for sometime been generally accommodated if they do not run counter to India's foreign policy interests. India, for example, abstained in 1968 on the U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, despite a storm of protest at home and support for liberalism in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, India has continued to take an independent position on major foreign policy matters when they touch on India's special interests. Indian leaders endorsed the Soviet-United States summit held in Moscow in May 1972 but, to the displeasure of Soviet officials, the Indians characterized it as limited in scope and inferred that the summit was against the interests of the small powers. The tendency of Indian officials to label both the United States and the U.S.S.R. as "big powers" is irritating to the Soviets, since the statement is usually linked with a negative assertion about great power domination of small countries. For several years India resisted Soviet urging to establish diplomatic relations with East Germany, fearing that such an act prior to the accommodation between the two Germanies might threaten the substantial amount of foreign aid received from West Germany. New Delhi also has resisted Soviet pressure to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty which it feels might threaten its long range security interests.

Negotiations for some form of mutual assistance pact had been under consideration since at least early 1969, when the Soviets hoped for a favorable Indian response to Brezhnev's proposal for an Asian security arrangement. The timing of the 1971 treaty, however, indicates that it was directly related to the deepening Indo-Pakistani crisis on the subcontinent and to growing signs that relations between Washington and Peking were on the verge of dramatic improvement. Officials in New Delhi felt a sense of isolation and apparently concluded that by moving closer to the Soviet Union, India's position vis-a-vis Pakistan and China would be improved without serious cost. Mrs. Gandhi, strengthened by her March 1971 election victory, probably believed that she could afford politically to take such a step and reportedly took the initiative to formalize the treaty.

The key provisions of the treaty are Articles 9 and 4. Under Article 9, if either party is attacked or threatened with attack the parties will immediately consult on effective measures to insure the peace and security of their countries. Each party, additionally, undertakes to abstain from assisting a third nation at war with one of the contracting parties. Article 4 expressly mentions the Soviet Union's respect for India's nonalignment as well as India's respect for the Soviet Union's "peace-loving policy." Other treaty provisions call for expansion of cooperation in economic affairs, science and technology, and in the promotion of cultural and communications ties. The treaty is to run for 20 years with an automatic 5-year extension.

The treaty raised questions about India's nonalignment despite the disclaimers of Article 4, but Mrs. Gandhi was willing to go forward with it in order to obtain Moscow's unambiguous support at a crucial time. From the Indian viewpoint, the treaty assured them of Moscow's support no matter how a war started, especially if China should intervene. For the Soviets, long range interests probably carried the greater weight in their decision to conclude the treaty at that time.

For the Soviets, the treaty represented a conscious shift in policy. It was a calculated step away from their mediatory efforts, in January 1966 at Tashkent and afterwards, to strike a balance between India and Pakistan. The U.S.S.R.'s decision in 1968 to provide arms to Pakistan, even at the risk of Indian estrangement, is indicative of Soviet pragmatism in those years. The Soviets apparently reassessed the changing power relations both on the subcontinent and on the international scene and concluded that their interests were best served by a clear declaration of

support for India. Although the treaty, from the Soviet point of view, may have been to give Moscow a way to forestall precipitate Indian military action, it also served the longer term political and security considerations of the Soviet Union. By concluding the treaty, Moscow provided a diplomatic response to Peking's warming relations with the United States by giving notice of the intention to maintain a strong pro-Soviet power on China's southwestern border. In addition, the Soviets probably believed the treaty would help deter the Chinese from intervening on Pakistan's side should war eventuate.

The new partnership has not operated altogether smoothly. Almost from the beginning there appeared to be some differences in how the parties interpreted the more formalized relationship. For example, throughout the crisis months of March to December 1971, India sought maximum advantage, including Soviet diplomatic and material support. Indian goals were largely achieved, but during the 2-week period of actual hostilities when there was a possibility that China and the United States could become involved directly, the Soviets presumably believed that their interests dictated a moderate approach. Their actions indicated that Moscow was prepared to give only qualified support, until it was clear that they would not be drawn into an unwanted military confrontation with China or the United States. Soviet military aid, which had increased in November 1971, actually declined in December. The Soviets, additionally, were unwilling to acknowledge publicly whether or not the high-level Indo-Soviet consultations which took place after the outbreak of hostilities in December were under Article 9 of the treaty. In contrast, when Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin visited New Delhi for consultations the previous October, it was publicly acknowledged that these talks did take place under Article 9.

Relations between India and the Soviet Union continued throughout 1972 to show the hard-headed approach taken by both governments toward the mutual benefits of their new relationship. In May, they signed a trade agreement which apparently met Indian demands for larger quantities of needed imports, and concluded an agreement for the development of cooperation in space exploration. India continues to receive considerable military material but, except for some sophisticated items, is generally no longer exclusively dependent on the U.S.S.R. for new equipment or spares because of its own developing munitions industry and purchases in non-Communist countries. On the security level, the Indian military are under instructions, as a matter of

policy, to keep Soviet advisers at a safe distance, and to send them home as soon as possible. Furthermore, the Indians may still resent the fact that Soviet aid commitments to Pakistan were not interrupted until the actual outbreak of hostilities with India in 1971, and that in the postwar period Moscow again appears anxious to improve its relations with Islamabad.

The Soviets have made a concerted effort to consolidate their position at all levels within India in order to take advantage of any increased receptivity to Moscow. Soviet policy toward all of South Asia seems to have been largely subordinated to furthering relations with India. Soviet activity and influence in the press, cultural, labor, and economic fields have grown. Moreover, there were frequent high-level talks during 1972 both in New Delhi and in Moscow, and Soviet embassy and consular officers increased their contacts with Indian state officials. Although the Soviets are seeking to capitalize on their diplomatic successes, they appear acutely aware of Indian sensitivities and, in general, have proceeded with discretion. At the same time, however, they have sought to turn their enhanced prestige into practical political dividends. Soviet officials maintain contacts with and give guidance to the cadres of the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI) and are close to leftist elements of the Congress Party, but they are careful not to risk the displeasure of the Indian Government by overplaying their hand.

Since early 1968 there has been a marked increase in Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean. This has been partly related to space recovery operations to which the Indians have no objections. Additional Soviet naval deployments, however, have been part of the worldwide projection of Soviet seapower. Following the outbreak of the Indian-Pakistan conflict and the arrival of a United States naval task force in the Bay of Bengal, the Soviets dispatched a variety of ships to bolster their strength in the Indian Ocean. The number ultimately peaked at 25, but returned to prewar levels by the spring of 1972. The Indians presumably welcomed this show of force. As long as such operations remain largely flag-showing operations in support of Soviet political aims, India will probably see little need to complain. However, the Indians are not likely to jeopardize their nonaligned position by granting base rights or special naval facilities to the Soviets. Indeed, they have repeatedly made clear their preference to keep the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace" as well as their opposition to attempts by any foreign naval powers to fill the "vacuum" resulting from British withdrawal east of Suez. Thus, there exists the distinct likelihood

that continually increasing Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean will eventually run up against Indian political sensitivities. The Soviets have apparently been trying to overcome this problem by providing further assistance—primarily naval vessels—to the expanding Indian Navy.

f. Relations with the United States (S)

India and the United States have often been at odds on fundamental questions of international policy as well as on specific issues. These differences have usually reflected radical divergencies in outlook, historical circumstances, and basic attitudes. Although both countries are basically democratic, they are inclined to have different priorities and emphases. Indo-U.S. relations have been characterized by frequent fluctuations that have tended to obscure the basic underlying community of interests that exists and the gradual maturing of mutual relations and understanding.

Friendship between the peoples of India and the United States was firmly rooted prior to India's independence. The history of the U.S. struggle for independence and the American Declaration of Independence were inspirations to many Indians in their own drive for self-determination. The ideals expressed in the U.S. Constitution served as a model for adaptation to the Indian milieu. U.S. support for India's independence cause further helped to create a reservoir of goodwill which, despite essential differences, served to carry the two governments through the early years of the "cold war."

The first decade of Indo-U.S. relations was largely characterized by disputation and recurrent serious conflicts of interest. On many questions considered vital to U.S. security, including the conduct of the Korean war, the containment of the U.S.S.R. and China, the support of U.S. allies in their Asian and African territories, and the control of nuclear weapons, the Indians frequently censured both the means and motives of U.S. policies. Growing U.S. ties with Pakistan were a particularly contentious question during this period. A low point in Indo-U.S. relations occurred in the spring of 1954 when the United States announced its decision to extend military assistance to Pakistan and entered into a mutual security arrangement with that country. President Eisenhower assured Nehru that the new associations with Pakistan were in no way aimed at India, pledging that if Pakistan used American military aid against India the United States would come to India's assistance and promising that an Indian request for military aid would receive consideration. Nehru, however, scorned

this offer, and when Pakistan joined the multilateral security arrangement that was to become known as Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), India's low esteem of the United States dropped even lower.

The serious strains in Indo-U.S. relations continued through early 1956 and coincided with a marked improvement in Indo-Soviet relations and the beginnings of major Soviet economic, cultural, and political overtures within the Afro-Asian world that focused particularly on India. Toward the end of the year, however, Nehru completed a highly successful visit to the United States, and shortly afterward American food assistance to India increased. Another major spur to improved Indo-U.S. relations came in 1958 when the United States came to India's aid in a major way as the latter's economy began to falter and Washington rallied other Western capitals to assist India with substantial foreign aid. Deteriorating relations between India and China also helped to improve Indian attitudes toward the United States.

A major event in Indo-U.S. relations came when the Chinese attacked in force across the Himalayas in 1962. India already had a mutual defense assistance agreement with the United States, concluded in 1951 and amended with an exchange of notes in 1958, but it covered only periodic and relatively minor military sales to India. To supplement this, a "Presidential Declaration" to provide up to US\$25 million of immediate grant aid was made on 1 November 1962. Initial deliveries of equipment, mainly light infantry weapons, were immediately airlifted to India. In a later exchange of notes, India undertook to allow U.S. inspection of the equipment supplied and agreed that it would be used only for defense against Communist aggression. Following discussions at Nassau, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed in December 1962 to provide \$120 million in emergency military assistance to India, the United States picking up half of the bill. This money was to assist India in converting six standard infantry divisions into mountain infantry divisions, to improve Indian Air Force transport capabilities, and to upgrade the operational capability of existing combat air units. Under the Nassau agreement, the United States provided grant aid in the form of aircraft and parts, light infantry weapons, ammunition, and equipment for the mountain divisions. However, with the onset of the war with Pakistan in September 1965, all U.S. military assistance to both countries was suspended.

The U.S. military aid policy toward India and Pakistan since the 1965 war has been a source of friction. Beginning in February 1966, the United

States permitted both India and Pakistan to purchase for cash or credit (subject to a case-by-case review) nonlethal end items and, for cash only, nonlethal spare parts. In April 1967, the United States further adjusted its military supply policy to the subcontinent. With the exception of roadbuilding equipment worth \$9 million for Indian use in the construction of a strategic east-west highway in Nepal, all grant military equipment that had been suspended since September 1965 to both India and Pakistan was explicitly terminated. At the same time it was decided that Military Assistance Advisory Groups in both countries would be withdrawn. Grant aid training programs, however, were resumed on a small scale, and it was decided to consider on a case-by-case basis the cash sale of spare parts for previously supplied lethal equipment provided such parts were critically needed, contributed to a reduction of military expenditures or arms limitation, made a contribution to reasonable military stability within the subcontinent, and did not divert resources from development. The U.S. announcement in late 1970 of a decision to implement a one-time exception in the sale of military equipment to Pakistan caused increased criticism in New Delhi. Finally, the United States reaffirmed its intention to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether third country sales of military equipment to India and Pakistan would be in the interest of the U.S. Government; such equipment includes that which evolves from U.S. technology or components, is produced by the United States, or is granted or sold to a third country out of U.S. production, and its sale requires U.S. approval.

Indo-U.S. relations were subject to further strains during the developing Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1971 and deteriorated to an all-time low following the outbreak of hostilities in December. The stage for the deterioration had been set, however, almost from the beginning of the Indira Gandhi era in 1966. Mrs. Gandhi, in a rapidly changing political situation, had apparently felt the need for presenting a reformist image to the nation. As New Delhi's domestic and foreign policies became increasingly "progressive," relations with the Soviet Union warmed while Indo-U.S. relations declined. At the same time, several irritants tended to further cool India's relations with the United States. These included strongly divergent policies on Vietnam and a vague but growing Indian resentment of the U.S. aid donor role as neocolonialistic. Additionally, many left-of-center Indian officials, including Mrs. Gandhi, have long held a conspiratorial view of U.S. activities in India which has been a smoldering source of resentment against the United

States. Indians generally point to U.S. policy during the Indo-Pakistan crisis, however, as having precipitated the nadir of Indo-U.S. relations.

As the Indo-Pakistani crisis worsened, Indian reaction ranged from disappointment to rage over U.S. policy, which they alleged was partial to Pakistan, despite American protestations to the contrary. Indian leaders were particularly upset by the continued shipment of small quantities of military equipment to Pakistan until November; the swiftness with which the United States cancelled all future munitions list licenses for India as well as past licenses on ammunition and related items on December 1, 1971; and the suspension of unused economic aid for India after the outbreak of hostilities on 3 December. Indian emotions were not placated, either by Washington's explanations that the equipment sent to Pakistan included only spare parts and non-lethal items issued under licenses granted prior to March 25, 1971, the date of the Pakistan Army crackdown on East Pakistan, or by the information that substantial economic aid, covered by irrevocable letters of credit, remained in the pipeline for India.

To Indian officials, U.S. support for maintenance of the status quo in Pakistan in the face of what they considered barbarous aggression imposed by the West Pakistanis on East Pakistan was immoral and untenable. The Indians charged that the U.S. policy was inconsistent with America's professed ideals of democracy and freedom, and criticized Washington's failure publicly to condemn the actions of the West Pakistan regime. Additionally, many Indian leaders believed the United States failed to exert effective pressure on Pakistan to come to a political settlement with the Bengalees. Mrs. Gandhi visited Washington in early November 1971 to impress upon the Nixon administration the seriousness with which India viewed the East Pakistan situation and the resultant huge refugee burden on India, which New Delhi saw as a threat to the nation's security. As the year progressed, Indian leaders appeared increasingly unresponsive to pleas from Washington for patience while efforts continued to find a peaceful resolution of the internal Pakistani dispute. After hostilities began in early December, New Delhi and Washington found themselves on opposite sides at the United Nations. Arrival of an American naval task force in the Bay of Bengal shortly before the cease-fire ended the conflict led to widespread criticism of the U.S. Government in India, even among traditional friends of the United States.

India's new sense of self-confidence and nationalism as a result of its military victory over Pakistan has

had an effect on Indo-U.S. relations. Indian leaders believe that the United States has consistently ignored the realities of politics in South Asia in an attempt to create an artificial balance of power on the subcontinent. While New Delhi has indicated a willingness to improve relations with the United States, it views itself as a strong, independent nation which has been wronged, and it is hesitant about initiating measures to improve relations which could appear to compromise this image. Although some top officials favor the resumption of more cordial relations with the United States, the prevailing view has been one of distrust and extreme wariness. Indian leaders also have been vehemently against taking the initiative in seeking the restoration of economic aid, although they are aware of India's need for continuing outside assistance.

Indian leaders are also concerned about future U.S. policy toward Pakistan and Bangladesh. For example, the decision by the United States in early 1973 to complete the sale to Pakistan of 300 armored personnel carriers (APCs), as originally agreed to in 1970, was viewed with alarm in New Delhi. These APC's had not yet been delivered when the United States imposed a complete embargo on all military shipments to India and Pakistan with the outbreak of the war in December 1971. Additionally, Indians are concerned that the evolving U.S. policy toward Bangladesh not serve to undermine India's relations with Dacca.

Despite the low estate to which Indo-U.S. relations had fallen in 1972, in early 1973 there seemed to be compelling reasons to expect some improvement. India's great need for economic assistance and the Soviet Union's limitations in this field continued to be a major consideration in India's relations with the United States. India has received more U.S. economic aid than any other country in the world. Through June 1972, U.S. economic assistance had amounted to about \$9.3 billion, including agricultural commodities supplied under the P.L. 480 program. Mrs. Gandhi, a consummate pragmatist, is acutely aware of India's pressing needs and of her own campaign promise to bring about more rapid economic progress. Moreover, a secondary but nonetheless important point of contention between the two nations, namely, Vietnam, seemed on the verge of resolution. Indian criticism of U.S. policies in Vietnam was probably more outspoken than any other non-Communist country, but signs that it was decreasing gave indication that a reassessment might be underway.

Of foremost importance, however, was the growing feeling among some ranking Indian officials, as

relations between the United States and both the Soviet Union and China continued to improve, that India should attempt to achieve more balance in its relations by some positive approach to either Peking or Washington, preferably the latter. There apparently has been an increasing realization that in the evolving international situation it could be disadvantageous for India to incur the hostility of both Washington and Peking. Prime Minister Gandhi has frequently reiterated her distrust of "power blocs" and "big powers." Although the special relationship with the Soviet Union remained important to India, Mrs. Gandhi's determination to maintain nonalignment, to forge an independent foreign policy, and to have India assume leadership in South and Southeast Asia were perhaps more compelling reasons for her to seek to limit Moscow's influence in India by normalizing relations with the United States, no matter how personally distasteful such action would be.

g. Relations with Southeast and East Asia (S)

In terms of India's perception of its role as an Asian power, Southeast and East Asia are becoming an ever more important focus of Indian foreign policy. India believes that it has a vital security interest in Southeast Asia, and it is laying the groundwork for an expanded role in shaping future regional economic, political and strategic developments. New Delhi has been largely motivated by the shifting great power relationships in the area—reinforced by fears over Chinese ambitions and the expectation that the eventual U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam will create a power vacuum in Southeast Asia upon which India might be able to capitalize—and a recognition of the importance to India of the economic development and expanding markets of the region. Indian plans are vague but apparently are based on the assumption that Indian interests could be extended by emphasizing regional economic cooperation, increasing Indian exports to the area, and providing technical expertise drawn from India's abundance of trained personnel. Numerous obstacles, however, including resistance within the countries themselves, stiff competition from Japan, and severe resource limitations work against Indian aspirations. The antipathy that many Asians have to Indian regional leadership, prejudice against overseas Indian minorities in these countries, and dislike for the frequent arrogance of Indian diplomats and other representatives could be additional limiting factors. Finally, the extent to which India's image of nonalignment has been tarnished by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and by upgrading relations with North Vietnam is difficult to assess, but these actions

have raised suspicions. India's concern about its image prompted a number of high-level Indian visits to the area as well as other moves designed to dispel whatever doubts may have arisen and to demonstrate India's sincere interest in Asia.

In early April 1972 the Indian Government announced its intention to pursue some sort of international agreement for Asian "collective security." Indian officials maintain that rather than outlining a cohesive policy proposal the government has merely set forth a set of principles. At a conference of chief Indian diplomats in Asia, the envoys were instructed to discuss with their host governments a plan aimed at terminating foreign domination in the region and at guaranteeing the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of constituent nations. The proposal apparently envisions a neutral zone, with the United States and Soviet Union as guarantors and China as either a guarantor or cosigner. Consistent with India's opposition to military alliances, such a plan hopefully would be accomplished by a network of bilateral arrangements which emphasized economic ties. An important provision in any such plan would be renunciation of force. Indian leaders have held up their friendship and cooperation treaties with the Soviet Union and Bangladesh—signed in August 1971 and March 1972, respectively—and the principle of noninterference underlying them as suitable models for Asian nations to consider. It appears that New Delhi is trying to resurrect the vague plan it had launched with little result in 1968. At that time, Prime Minister Gandhi travelled to Southeast Asia and expressed India's interest in expanded relations with countries in the area, calling in particular for regional economic cooperation. Mrs. Gandhi did not spell out security aspects of her proposal other than to denounce military alliances and great power domination. Although India reacted negatively to Soviet Communist Party Secretary-General Brezhnev's loosely defined proposal in June 1969 for an Asian collective security arrangement, it continued to evolve plans for some sort of regional scheme. The timing and nature of the Indian initiative suggests the possibility of coordination with Moscow. Soviet Premier Kosygin's statements in mid-March 1972 were endorsed late that month in Brezhnev's foreign policy speech. Some divergence probably exists between Moscow and New Delhi on the subject. Moscow's initiatives have been commonly viewed as aimed at containing China and extending Soviet influence. On the other hand, India apparently favors a regional arrangement that would include China and be devoid of anti-Chinese implications. The Indians

wish, moreover, to avoid both superpower domination and the stigma of appearing to be a Soviet stalking horse in Asia.

Indian interest in a regional approach to common problems has other outlets. India is a charter member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and plays a major role in the United Nations' Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). India has adopted the policy of being a donor to the ADB and has voluntarily refrained from drawing on its funds in order to allay fears that it would be the bank's largest borrower. The Indian Government encouraged the formation in December 1968 of the Council of Asian Economic Ministers in the ECAFE region for the purpose of adopting and implementing economic projects and programs in the fields of intraregional investment, payments arrangements, preferential trade exchanges, transportation and communications. New Delhi realistically views ECAFE as the major international forum in which to assert its regional leadership role and the Asian Council of Economic Ministers as the primary agent for effecting regional economic development and cooperation. As a member of the Colombo Plan since its inception in 1950, India has made substantial contributions to regional economic development by providing the services of Indian technical experts and training facilities within India to educate technocrats and bureaucrats from the smaller developing member countries.

India enjoys varying degrees of cordiality with all the Southeast Asian states. The Indonesian independence struggle was the first anticolonial cause championed by independent India. Indo-Indonesian relations were extremely close until the end of the 1950's. Following a period of strain between 1962 and 1966, as Indonesia edged closer to China and Pakistan, they have grown cordial again in the post-Sukarno period. New Delhi appears to regard Singapore and Malaysia as two reliable friends in the area. Political and security considerations as well as growing economic and strategic location have been important in drawing India toward both. The presence of about 800,000 Indian and Indian-descended merchants and laborers in Malaysia and Singapore has been an important factor in focusing Indian attention there. These Indians are both retailers and consumers of Indian products. Malaysia and Singapore have been important trading partners for India, and Malaysia was the only Asian state to give its whole-hearted support to India during the 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute. India's relations with the Philippines have traditionally been less close, although in recent years there has been moderate

interest from New Delhi in closer political and economic ties. Thailand's SEATO membership and close association with the United States have tended to stifle Indo-Thai relations, although some movement in economic and diplomatic relations has occurred. Indian President V. V. Giri paid a state visit to Bangkok in March 1972 in order to allay misgivings about the Indo-Soviet treaty and to foster an image of independence from Moscow.

India continued to maintain correct relations with its strategically located neighbor, Burma. Traditional Burmese suspicions of Indian intentions and Burma's isolationist foreign policy in general have had an inhibiting effect on Indo-Burmese relations. New Delhi tends to view northern Burma as an extension of its own military frontier against China and fears that the Burmese are incapable of containing Chinese-supported insurgency in that region. Burma has been relatively responsive to India's initiatives toward closer relations, but Rangoon seeks to avoid any action that Peking could see as provocative. The two countries have exchanged high-level visitors, and have cooperated in demarcating their common border. They also have made some progress in ameliorating the effects of the Burmese nationalization and repatriation laws of the 1960's which caused about 175,000 Indians to leave Burma. The exchange of intelligence information and military cooperation against Naga and other tribal elements on both sides of the border has largely succeeded in stopping the rebels from crossing northern Burma to and from training areas in China.

Despite Indian protestations to the contrary, New Delhi's formal attitude toward the Vietnam conflict has been inconsistent with the evenhanded approach that the policy of nonalignment would suggest. India's position on Vietnam reflects a realistic assessment of what Indian leaders believe are India's national interests in the region. Fundamental considerations have been New Delhi's estimate of the final outcome of the conflict and its relations with the superpowers and China. India believes that nationalism is the basic factor in Asia and views North Vietnamese leaders as nationalists who would strongly resist Chinese hegemony and would act as a barrier to any attempt to expand China's influence southward. It further believes that Vietnam is one nation, if two countries. New Delhi anticipates that North Vietnam eventually will dominate not only in Vietnam but also in Cambodia and Laos. Thus, North Vietnam will emerge from the conflict as the dominant and most important indigenous nation in Indochina. Good relations with North Vietnam and the Provisional

Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam, accordingly, are important to India. The degree of sympathy with Communist positions contained in Indian pronouncements on Vietnam have almost been in direct proportion to India's warming relations with the Soviet Union. Declining relations with the United States have added to the equation. India's desire to demonstrate cooperation with the Soviets on Vietnam policy may have reached a zenith, however, in mid-1972 when high-level Indian officials found themselves outdoing the Russians in the strength of their condemnation of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong harbor. Warming relations between the United States and Soviet Union on the one hand and between the United States and China on the other have apparently caused some concern in New Delhi that its position on Vietnam will be undercut by these changing relationships. Indeed, this concern may have been reflected by New Delhi's relative restraint during the few months prior to the January 1973 cease-fire in Vietnam, as well as by its expression of interest in playing a constructive role in postwar Indochina.

Nehru supported Indochina's struggle for independence, and since 1954 India has been directly involved in the area as chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC), the tripartite body composed of India, Poland and Canada that was charged by the 1954 Geneva Conference with supervising the truce in Indochina. After maintaining diplomatic relations with both North and South Vietnam at the consulate general level, India decided in January 1972 to grant North Vietnam formal recognition and to raise its representation there to the level of an embassy. When similar treatment for South Vietnam was not forthcoming, the Saigon government gave notice to the Indian delegates to the ICC for Vietnam to leave Saigon by the end of September 1972. In November 1972, India and North Vietnam exchanged ambassadors. Indian actions in the ICC have often been dilatory and Indian representatives have frequently appeared to take the Communist side. India's bias as ICC chairman has confirmed doubts of some pro-Western Asian nations that India can play any constructive role in resolving the Vietnam conflict.

In the early 1960's India began to recognize with reluctance that the security of Southeast Asia—and to a degree all Asia—hinged on a closer Indian relationship with a resurgent Japan. In addition, India's desire for Japanese economic aid also played a role in New Delhi's willingness to improve contacts with Tokyo. Although Japan is India's most important trading partner in Asia and takes almost 15% of

India's total exports, it is also India's strongest competitor for Southeast Asian markets. This competition and Japanese protective trade barriers inhibit the budding Indo-Japanese relationship. Additionally, the Japanese view India as basically weak and disorganized and are skeptical of its ability to fulfill its obligations. The Indians favor joint ventures to manufacture labor intensive commodities in India, utilizing Japanese know-how and investment. Although the Japanese are interested in increasing commercial relations with India, they have not shown much inclination to enter joint ventures. The Japanese have not been convinced that India at this stage of its development can contribute much toward the economic development of or play a significant political role in Southeast Asia. Although Japan has strongly opposed India's participation in existing regional economic organizations, it has nevertheless offered substantial foreign aid to India. In January 1972 Japan signed a new yen credit agreement with India for the equivalent of \$101 million, an increase of more the \$75 million over the previous credit agreement. In the developing Asian power relationships, both countries see themselves as alternative models to China—India as a successful Asian experiment in democratic government, and Japan as a model for industrialization. Since both Japan and India aspire to be regarded as the most important non-Communist nation in Asia, Japan is wary of allowing relations with India to expand to a point where the latter would be helped at the expense of the former.

India established consular relations with both North and South Korea in 1968. The move to open consulates in both Korea was taken purely on political grounds. India favors reunification of Korea, and maintains friendly relations with both governments. New Delhi desires a presence in P'yongyang as another window into China, and as additional evidence of nonalignment. India has sought to improve relations with P'yongyang without unduly offending South Korea, with which it hopes to increase trade. India does not have official diplomatic or consular relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Still seeking to improve relations with Peking, the Indians avoid any actions which would imply political recognition of the Taiwan government. India has, however, sought to increase trade with Taiwan on a strictly commercial basis.

h. Middle Eastern relations (S)

Concern with the affairs of the Middle East has been one of the most consistent tenets in Indian

foreign policy, dating back to the 1920's when the Congress Party was first creating an international image and opposed the establishment of a Zionist state at the expense of Arab interests. This attitude has been reinforced by independent India's desire to prevent Pakistan from gaining solid support from its fellow Muslim nations in the Arab world, a need to remain on good terms for strategic reasons with the state controlling the Suez Canal, and a special relationship with Egypt which began in the 1950's when Nehru, Nasir and Tito were the paramount leaders in the nonaligned world. India recognizes Israel but has refused to establish full diplomatic relations, never receiving an Israeli ambassador and limiting representation to a consulate in Bombay. India's pro-Arab policy has not accomplished the goal of diminishing support for Pakistan and has presumably raised some questions as to the efficacy of following such a policy in the future. New Delhi, however, appears reluctant to alter its stance, especially toward Egypt.

Egypt has been the major focus of Indian diplomacy in the Middle East. India has strongly backed Cairo in all Arab-Israeli disputes, the Suez Canal, nationalization, and during the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956. India rallied behind the Arab states again during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and on some questions it has even taken a more pro-Arab position than the Soviet Union. Egypt, however, has been less enthusiastic in its espousal of Indian causes vis-a-vis Pakistan and China. Egyptian support for a united Pakistan during the 1971 Indian-Pakistani crisis was a disappointment to the Indians and has had a cooling effect on Indo-Egyptian relations. New Delhi presumably appreciates that Muslim solidarity generally outweighs other considerations in determining Arab policy toward the subcontinent.

India has made considerable effort to consolidate relations and to expand trade in the oil rich Persian Gulf area. The Indians tend to see Iraq as a counterweight to Pakistani influence in the Persian Gulf and as a potential source of petroleum supplies should India ever be denied access to the sources in Iran. Apparently they are attempting to secure other options to balance Pakistani efforts there, as well as to insure an oil supply and to increase trade in the area. India has sought to expand its relations with the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms which became independent as a result of British withdrawal from the area in 1971. In 1971 the Ambassador to Kuwait was accredited concurrently to Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, and an Ambassador to Qatar was named in early 1972. India, which has upgraded its diplomatic

representation in the Sultanate of Oman to embassy level, is participating in various developmental projects there and seeking means to expand trade.

Since early 1967, India has been cultivating Iran, largely as a means of undermining the relatively close Iranian-Pakistani relationship. The Shah, desiring to redress the asymmetry in Iran's relations with India and Pakistan and to establish his credentials as a world statesman, has been cautiously responsive. His attempts in 1971 to use Iranian good offices to defuse the Indo-Pakistani crisis, however, were rebuffed by India. Although the Iranian Government eventually extended both diplomatic and some material support to Pakistan—calling it a victim of aggression, Indo-Iranian relations do not appear to have been severely damaged. Nevertheless, India and Iran continue to mistrust each other, and India has expressed some concern over Iranian ambitions to project a presence in the Indian Ocean. Economic and commercial relations, particularly in the petrochemical field, have continued to show moderate growth in recent years, and presumably there will be further cooperation in science, technology, and industry.

E. Threats to government stability

India's governmental institutions have not been seriously threatened by subversion since independence, despite widespread poverty and great social, cultural, and linguistic diversities. There have been, however, strong and persisting undercurrents of discontent that have led to periodic outbursts, sometimes in the form of violent demonstrations, disruptive strikes, bloody communal rioting, and tribal insurgency. Disorders, especially since the late 1960's, frequently have tended to create a sense of serious deterioration and instability, although thus far they have generally been localized and adequately contained by the security forces. The Communists as well as other opposition political parties have attempted to exploit popular discontent in their struggle against the Congress Party's dominance of political life. The extent of Prime Minister Gandhi's ability to fulfill election promises of rapid progress in meeting the people's rising expectations will be instrumental in minimizing future threats to stability. (U/OU)

1. Discontent and dissidence (U/OU)

Indo-Pakistani hostilities in 1971 gave Mrs. Gandhi's government a reprieve in dealing with the persistent and serious economic problems which have been potential threats to government stability. The

problems remain, however, and could be exploited or exacerbated by apparently unrelated problems such as Hindu-Moslem animosities, or by unpredictable ones such as famine which might arise to upset the delicate balance of India's socioeconomic structure.

The failure of the economy to accommodate a growing number of educated jobseekers has become an increasingly serious source of discontent. Student disorders, sparked partly by dissatisfaction with antiquated university facilities and techniques and partly by dim job prospects, have been exploited by political interests of nearly every persuasion. Moreover, there are wide extremes of wealth and poverty, unrelieved by a substantial middle class or by a well-developed sense of social responsibility on the part of the relatively few "haves" toward the masses of the "have-nots."

The migration of many rural people to urban areas has created in some instances highly unsettled conditions in which disorders are easily spawned. The transplanted villager often has considerable difficulty reorienting himself to city life. Grossly inadequate housing and sanitation and uncertain employment provided evident stimulus for discontent that erupts against the upper classes and the government. Extremist groups of all political hues find the bulk of their following in the towns and cities. The status of minority groups especially has also created a climate favorable to subversive activities in some areas. Hindu-Muslim tensions, especially in the northern states where the Muslims are most heavily concentrated and Hinduism is fervently practiced, have declined in recent years, but the issue remains as a potential problem and a small spark could easily lead to new communal rioting. In the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, Muslims comprise the vast majority, and most of them are probably unreconciled to the incorporation of the Indian-held portion into the Indian union. Tribal peoples, who account for about 7% of the total population, are another large reservoir of actual and potential discontent that on occasion results in violence, and they have for years sustained two limited insurgency movements in eastern India.

The agitational approach to politics has become an integral part of the Indian political scene. Mahatma Gandhi's tradition of nonviolent resistance lends respectability to the sometimes dangerous defiance of law and order designed to win a particular political point. Moreover, the opposition parties, in the course of their long frustration over trying to break the dominance of the Congress Party, have come to rely on agitational techniques as a major weapon. This

agitational approach, which many observers feel is becoming increasingly prevalent, erodes public confidence in the political process and leads to political instability.

Most politically aware Indians are deeply committed to some form of democratic government. Although some seriously question certain features of the present parliamentary system, very few favor totalitarianism or military dictatorship. They are proud of the democratic political development that India has achieved, and many are searching for ways to improve the system and avoid the instability that has ruined the democratic experiments of many other less developed states. The attitudes of this highly influential minority are reinforced by the essential conservatism of the rural masses, whatever their ethnic or religious background. To most Indian peasants, unaccustomed to the notion that substantial changes in personal status are possible in a single lifetime, foreign-derived political and economic concepts have little meaning. The peasant generally accepts government as an inevitable, negative aspect of his institutional surroundings, placed there primarily to preserve order, settle disputes, and extract revenue. The same passiveness that frustrates economic planners renders the peasant unresponsive to revolutionary doctrines. Passions can be stirred up over communal and local issues, but the capacity to identify with abstract ideologies and to sustain prolonged revolt against traditional and governmental authority appears relatively small. Few issues of any kind are national in scope in India's highly segmented society, and the unlettered and apathetic peasants are mainly concerned with their struggle to eke out a living and to propitiate the Hindu gods. There has been, however, a growing tendency to blame the government for things formerly regarded as due to fate.

Another substantial barrier to disintegration has been the fundamental dedication of most governmental officials, whether elective, civil service, or military, to the preservation of order. In large part these officials have carried on the British administrative tradition that the maintenance of law and order has priority over all other duties. The constitution gives the central government extensive powers where the security of the state is concerned, including preventive detention and the power to suspend certain fundamental rights during emergencies. The government has thus far been willing to employ these powers when necessary, although generally it has used them within tolerable limits of democratic propriety. The Indian security forces appear adequately

prepared to cope with subversive threats to the country. They are highly watchful for such threats, and it is unlikely that major plotting has gone undetected.

2. Subversion

a. Communist subversion (S)

The Indian Communists are divided into two relatively well-organized national parties and a number of competing splinter groups. The Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPM) participate in the parliamentary process, while the extremists—such as the Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist (CPI/ML), among others—reject it and espouse armed revolution. The publicity the Communists receive is disproportionate to their limited membership, the few elected seats held, and their ability both to achieve their ends and to affect national policies. The Communists do not at present seem able to come to power either via the ballot box or by revolutionary means. Following the split in the Congress Party in 1969, the less radical of the two Communist parties, the Moscow-oriented CPI, attempted to improve its standing at the national level by working closely with Mrs. Gandhi and her Ruling Congress Party. The degree of influence which the Communists have exerted over government policy, however, appears to be quite limited, but some former CPI members still occupy key posts in the government and Congress Party organization. The CPM, meanwhile, has remained one of Mrs. Gandhi's most implacable political foes.

Communist capacity for serious subversion is limited by the efficiency of the Indian security forces and by the Communists' internal dissension and their own essentially limited appeal, although in certain strongholds they are able to create considerable unrest when they can seize upon popular issues. The Communists have neither the organizational capacity nor the popular support for the sustained and coordinated nationwide disruption that would be necessary to threaten existing political institutions. Indian security forces closely monitor them all and are capable of containing sporadic uprisings.

The Indian Communists have some capacity for covert operations, although the CPI devotes much less attention to this than do the CPM and the extremists. The CPI could probably keep a headquarters operation going in the face of a heavy government crackdown, but the party as a whole is poorly prepared to survive as an effective illegal organization. The

CPM is presumably better prepared to withstand governmental suppression, but it would undoubtedly find it extremely difficult to keep interstate channels of communication open if forced to rely entirely on covert means. The various extremist groups are highly clandestine, although their limited organization and numbers render them vulnerable to effective government repression.

The Communists place considerable emphasis on the violent agitational approach to politically sensitive issues such as land reform, food shortages, student grievances, and demands from labor for higher wages. Even where they are unable to control protest movements directly, the Communists frequently provide open or covert support and encouragement to demonstrators, and often try to jump on the bandwagon of popular protest. The greatest Communist capacity for disruption appears to be in Calcutta, where Communists are able to bring the city to a virtual standstill for a limited period and to precipitate violent clashes with the police. Communist members of the state assemblies and especially of the *Lok Sabha* frequently are a disruptive element and often inhibit the smooth flow of parliamentary business.

Both the CPI and the CPM have attempted to infiltrate government agencies with covert party members and sympathizers. However, there appear to be very few such persons within the basically conservative bureaucracy, especially at the middle and higher levels. The Communists, however, have an important influence through their labor unions on labor forces in government-operated defense plants, railroads, ports, post and telegraph services, and electronics manufacturing centers. The Communists have never been able to penetrate the armed forces significantly. They have been most successful at the state level in Kerala and West Bengal, where they came to power as the dominant element in coalition regimes in the late 1960's. In 1969 the CPM apparently made some headway in penetrating the State of West Bengal's administrative apparatus, especially the police and other departments. Their influence was virtually eliminated, however, with the resurgence of the Ruling Congress in 1972 state elections.

The Communists are also active among students, although their influence is clearly limited in most universities. Although Communists have controlled a few student unions, they have a very minor role in the national student movement. Many student unions have become more agitational in their approach, but they concentrate largely on university issues or

educational matters and tend to reject ideological influence. In the local unions where Communist students are influential, it is often unclear which Communist faction predominates. The CPI-dominated All-India Student Federation (AISF) is the most active front, largely due to strong Communist influence in student organizations in Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar. AISF is actually an affiliate of the All-India Youth Federation (AIYF), also controlled by the CPI. AIYF represents Indian youth at the international conclaves sponsored by the Communist-dominated World Federation of Democratic Youth, but this function has been partially undercut by the Soviet Union's interest in obtaining representation from Congress Party youth as well.

Widely scattered extremist groups, which have defected from the two major Communist parties in order to follow a more revolutionary course, continue to be active but are losing their followers and their effectiveness. Attempts at cooperation among a number of these self-styled Maoist groups, which sprang up in the late 1960's, have failed. The most prominent among them, the Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist, faces extinction after only 3 years of existence due to the arrest and subsequent death in custody in July 1972 of its founder, Charu Mazumdar, the key organizer of the Naxalbari peasant revolt in 1967. Factionalism has prevented the few hundred hard-core CPI/M-L members in West Bengal from agreeing on a course of action following his death, while probably only a tiny fraction of the 10,000 members claimed by the Naxalite movement during its 1969-70 heyday are still active. The movement has deteriorated into isolated acts of terrorism. The Indian security forces have been successful in surfacing and in monitoring the activities of the Maoist groups. Even though their potential for growth and influence is minimal, a few bands still advocate armed guerrilla action, while others emphasize propagation of ideology in preparation for an eventual uprising.

b. Subversion in Kashmir (U/OU)

The Indian-held portion of Jammu and Kashmir is another area vulnerable to internal and foreign-assisted subversion. New Delhi has attempted to maintain a facade of representative state government in this area and has permitted regular elections for state and local offices. Free expression of popular views has been hampered, however, by periodic repression of political parties and political leaders who too openly oppose the state's integration into the

Indian union. India maintains about 100,000 troops and paramilitary forces in the area, primarily to defend against the Pakistanis and the Chinese, but some occasionally have been deployed to maintain law and order in the state. Strong arm tactics and legal maneuvering have also been used to insure that all elected governments are committed to maintaining the state as an integral part of India.

Most Kashmiris probably favor a considerable degree of independence from both India and Pakistan. Kashmir's most popular political leader and the living symbol of the craving for autonomy, is 67 year-old Sheikh Abdullah (Figure 10). The Sheikh was a personal friend of the late Prime Minister Nehru, himself a Kashmiri by family origin, and has been steadfastly committed to the concept of a secular state. Since his ouster from Kashmir's leadership in 1953, Abdullah has spent most of his time under arrest. He was released in early 1968 and permitted to return to Kashmir, but not before the Indian Government made sure that he could be arrested again if he indulged in secessionist or subversive activities. The aging Abdullah has been careful to avoid actions or statements that could precipitate his incarceration. Despite his caution, he was expelled from Kashmir in January 1971 and held under house arrest until mid-1972. This period coincided with national and state



FIGURE 10. Sheikh Abdullah of Kashmir (C)

elections in Kashmir. He still appears to advocate an autonomous Kashmir, with perhaps a loose link to India.

Political parties with subversive potential do exist in the Kashmiri political scene. Sheikh Abdullah is most closely associated with the Plebiscite Front, a party of which he is lieutenant, Mirza Afzal Beg. The party has cooperated with the Congress-controlled state government, but it apparently no longer plans to boycott elections when permitted to participate in them. In the past it has demanded a plebiscite in which the Kashmiris would have the option of voting on their status. The front is formally committed to using nonviolent methods to achieve its ends. In order to prevent significant opposition from developing in Jammu and Kashmir prior to the 1971 elections, New Delhi detained or expelled a large number of political rivals who were charged with unlawful activities, and in January 1971 the central government declared the Plebiscite Front illegal. The Awami Action Committee, led by Mir Waiz Maulvi Mohammad Farooq, advocates Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Farooq's aggressively pro-Pakistan position earlier alienated him from Abdullah. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the discredited former Kashmir premier (equivalent to the chief minister in other Indian states) who had succeeded Abdullah in 1953, disbanded his National Conference Party—which became Kashmir's second largest party in the 1967 elections—prior to the state assembly elections and urged his supporters to join and work for the Ruling Congress Party. He died July 1972.

There has been little insurrectionary activity in the Indian-held portion of Jammu and Kashmir in the postindependence period, although there does appear to be considerable latent discontent among the rather placid Kashmiris. Even in the summer of 1965, prior to the Indo-Pakistani war, specially trained Pakistani infiltrators were unable to stir up the Kashmiris against India, and the Kashmiris appeared to be no serious security problem for New Delhi during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. The younger generation appear more inclined toward activism, however, and communal conflict breaks out periodically.

c. Other potential for subversion (U/OU)

A number of Indian groups which are not now actively subversive advocate changes that in the future could seriously jeopardize India's existing political structure. These include several communal organizations, restive tribal peoples, and regionally based parties and organizations. All now work within the constitutional system and do not immediately

threaten existing democratic institutions, but some have large followings and could create considerable trouble in the event of increased political fragmentation in India or of other developments which seriously undermined national cohesion.

Hindu communal groups have their origin in the 19th century upper caste Hindu reaction to the intrusion of Western ideas and values, especially as British education was extended and increasing numbers of Indians became involved in the colonial administration and took up Western-type professional occupations. Hindu leaders, especially Brahmans in northern and western India, formed organizations that were committed to reviving pure Hindu values from a largely imaginary era of antiquity. Organizations such as the *Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha* (Greater India Hindu Assembly) and the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (National Volunteer Corps—RSS) became active in the 1920's as it became increasingly clear that the British were turning over more political responsibility to the Indians. They strove to preserve Hindu values and the traditional position of the upper caste Hindu in the face of strong Western-inspired secular influences and the new political opportunities that were opening up to the large Muslim minority and the lower caste Hindus. In the years before independence, such organizations contributed substantially to the political alienation of many Muslims and helped to inflame communal passions that erupted in bloody rioting at the time of partition in 1947. Indicative of the emotional impact they could generate was the assassination by a Hindu fanatic of the revered Mohandas Gandhi, in many respects the traditional Hindu personality.

Hindu communal organizations have played less of an overt political role since independence, although in northern India they still have considerable influence. Their aims are generally traditionalistic and, to the extent that they influence the people, they help to undermine the foundations of the modern secular state that the Congress Party is trying to build. Their roots are deep in some aspects of Hindu culture, whereas many of the political, social, and economic ideas that motivate the government leaders are essentially alien and derived from the West.

Some unrest has developed among some groups within the some 38 million indigenous tribesmen that reside in the hill country that stretches across central India from eastern Gujarat and Maharashtra to northern West Bengal. The most recurrent problems have been with those who live in the general area of southern Bihar, eastern Madhya Pradesh, and northern Orissa and who are known as *Adivasis* (a

Hindi word meaning backward tribe). Local politicians have often raised the idea of an independent Jharkhand state for the *Adivasis*, usually for the limited purpose of gaining support from the tribesmen in Congress Party factional disputes. Economic grievances have increased tribal discontent in the area, as many of the *Adivasis* have lost their land in the gradually industrialized area around Ranchi in Bihar and are unwilling to work in the modern sector of the economy.

3. Insurgency

India's most difficult problems of insurgency have been the long-festering Naga and Mizo rebellions in the mountainous portions of the strategic eastern region, but by late 1972 the rebels no longer posed a serious threat. Both rebellions were confined to remote tribal areas and thus never directly threatened the central government. Although government forces appear to have the overall situation under control, small numbers of rebels are still operating. In 1971, the government indicated that those troops remaining in Nagaland and the Mizo Hills would no longer exercise police functions, which would be left to the Assam Rifles, the Central Reserve Police, and the Nagaland Police. The eastern region is attached to the rest of India only by the Siliguri gap area of northern West Bengal and is otherwise surrounded by the weak Himalayan buffer state of Bhutan, insurgency-infested northern Burma, and a hostile China. The emergence of independent Bangladesh—which forms almost the entire western border of the region—has now deprived the rebels of the sanctuary and support which they had received from East Pakistan. This factor, combined with internecine divisions in both rebellions, have caused a serious drop in rebel morale and given India a new opportunity to put an end to instability in this sensitive and vulnerable frontier area. (U/OU)

a. Naga rebellion (S)

Although the State of Nagaland has received more per capita economic assistance than any other Indian state and exercises more autonomy than most states, it has been the scene of India's most protracted revolt. The Nagas are a polyglot assortment of over 600,000 fairly primitive Mongoloid tribesmen (more than half of whom are English-speaking Christians) living in the rugged hilly region stretching from Arunachal Pradesh to eastern Manipur. Agitation for an independent state began as early as 1946 when the Naga tribesmen decided not to be absorbed culturally, economically,

or politically into a nation that they felt was totally alien to them. The British had never asserted full authority over the Naga area. After India gained independence, Naga leaders—headed by Angami A. Phizo, who believed the government was infringing on Naga autonomy—claimed that India had no legal basis for taking over the region. An underground "Federal Republic of Nagaland" with a political organization called the Naga National Council was established in the early 1950's, and open rebellion was launched in 1956. New Delhi negotiated an uneasy compromise with moderate Naga leaders in 1962 whereby Nagaland became a separate Indian state with substantially greater autonomy than that accorded other states within the Indian union. This solution, however, was rejected by the militants who headed the underground organizations. In September 1964 the rebels reluctantly agreed to a temporary cease-fire, which was extended in succeeding years until 1971 when the government declined to extend it again. Intermittent talks between New Delhi and the insurgents took place in the mid-1960's, but no final agreement has ever been reached. As of late 1972, there were reportedly splinter rebel groups who favored an accommodation within the framework of India. The "Federal Government" and the Naga National Council remain recalcitrant, however. There have been no indications that New Delhi intends to reopen negotiations as long as a rebel force of about 1,500 continues to demand independence.

India's generally hard-line policy toward the rebels since about 1968 and the satisfactory relationship with the moderate Nagas who dominate the state government have apparently had considerable success in stemming rebel activity. The withdrawal of army units in September 1971 reflected New Delhi's more relaxed attitude toward the insurgent threat as well as growing confidence in the state government. That same month three by-election victories for the pro-India Naga National Organization, which holds a majority in the state assembly, strengthened the position of Chief Minister Hokishe Sema. There is no Ruling Congress Party in Nagaland. Nagas who were dissatisfied with New Delhi's 1972 action in granting statehood to Manipur—homeland of three Naga tribes—probably have thrown their support to the opposition United Front of Nagaland. Some elements of the Naga National Organization favor the resumption of talks between New Delhi and the rebel Naga National Council in order to reach a final settlement and to bring a conclusion to the insurgents' protracted, disruptive and seemingly futile struggle for independence. By late 1972 the Nagaland state

administration had extended its control into the remote hills where rebel support had been strongest.

Although the Naga rebels are still capable of limited military activity, the movement is divided, disillusioned and confused. Rebel leader Phizo, 67 years old and in exile in London, is still probably revered by many Nagas, but his influence continues to decline in his absence from the scene. The rebels have not recovered from a major split which occurred in 1967, largely over tribal enmities. Most moderates, who come from central Nagaland, oppose the more militant Phizo adherents from south Nagaland who favor seeking Chinese assistance. These extremist Naga elements have maintained contact with the Chinese since 1966, when about 200 tribesmen traversed northern Burma to obtain arms and training in Yunnan, in southwest China. According to Indian estimates, about 1,500 Nagas have subsequently traveled to China for the same reasons.

The Indian Government's effort to seal off the frontier and prevent the return of any substantial number of rebels from China has been very successful. Indian security forces captured several hundred Chinese-trained Nagas and a large number of weapons and ammunition in 1969. According to Indian sources, some 300 Chinese-trained Nagas were en route home in 1971, but reportedly most went to Burma awaiting a propitious time to re-enter India. In June 1972 small numbers of Nagas still were in northern Burma. However, these returnees have been harassed by the Burmese Army, which apparently has been working with the Indians on an *ad hoc* basis. By August 1972 fighting in the Naga hills appeared to be more symbolic than actual, and the rebellion seemed best characterized as a local irritant rather than a threat to security. Top militant leaders had either voluntarily surrendered—as did rebel army commander and chief General Thinouselie—or had been captured by the Indian Army. The Bangladesh regime, friendly to India, has routed the rebels from their former sanctuaries and the Chinese appear disinclined to supply anything more than token assistance. The Naga rebels can indulge in isolated acts of sabotage but this appears to be the only tactic open to them.

b. Mizo rebellion (S)

The Mizo insurgency is of much more recent origin than that in Nagaland, although its roots also go back into the pre-independence period. The isolated Mizo Hills, which formerly constituted Assam's largest district, became a federally administered union territory named Mizoram in early 1972, following the

reorganization of northeast India. Some 270,000 Mizo tribesmen—whose ancestors migrated from the Chin Hills of Burma—populate the tongue-shaped salient wedged between Burma and Bangladesh. For the most part, they peacefully accepted their inclusion into India and cooperated by electing representatives to the Assam legislature. Partly because of the strong missionary influence—over 90% of the Mizos are Christian—Mizos are generally less hostile to outsiders than the Nagas are. Nonetheless, decades of isolation and the lack of cultural, ethnic, and linguistic affinity with the rest of India, as well as increasing disenchantment with control by the government of Assam—particularly over making Assamese the official language—sowed the seeds of a secessionist movement in the early 1960's. Probably encouraged by concessions being forced on New Delhi by the Nagas, formerly moderate Mizo leaders formed the Mizo National Front, proclaimed complete independence as their aim, and in March 1966 launched an armed revolt.

In the following weeks, Mizo guerrillas attacked and captured major administrative centers in the district, and Indian troops had to be sent into the area. The government moved loyal Mizos from jungle border areas into "progressive protected villages" where they could be guarded by security forces and be free from guerrilla demands for food, shelter and money. Mizo rebels were able, however, to acquire small arms and training in East Pakistan, and frequently sought sanctuary in the Chittagong Hills tracts, where "President" Laldenga established a base.

Since their initial incursions, Mizo guerrillas have not seriously threatened major administrative centers, but the Indian army has not been able to quell the insurgency completely. In mid-1971 an estimated 1,000 members of the Mizo rebel army reportedly were hired by Pakistan to fight the pro-Bangladesh guerrillas in what was then East Pakistan. The arrangement with Pakistan was stormy and exacerbated rifts in the rebel camp. One group reportedly favored surrendering to Indian Government forces if assured of honorable political rehabilitation in the Mizo Hills. New Delhi attempted to capitalize on this dissension by offering to upgrade the area to a union territory, thereby replacing the district council with an elected assembly and council of ministers. In January 1972 New Delhi extended an earlier period of amnesty and liberalized the terms, which already included a pardon, a small cash grant, and reward for serviceable arms and ammunition to each rebel who surrendered. While the response was not as large as expected, by mid-1972 the offer had attracted some 13

Mizo leaders and about 600 followers. The loss of sanctuaries in Bangladesh and pressure from the Burmese Army have severely hampered the Mizo rebel movement. The rebels' inability to take advantage of the Indo-Pakistani confrontation has caused disillusionment within the ranks. In addition, the creation of the union territory of Mizoram confused the leadership and precipitated further disagreement as to which status—*independence or statehood*—should be sought and to what extent demands should be pushed. The Mizo Union is the dominant political group in the union territory. It was the winner of 21 of the 30 assembly seats in the April 1971 elections, opposes the secessionists, and aims for full statehood for Mizoram. The electorate clearly rejected the Mizo insurgents, including those former rebels who ran on the Ruling Congress Party tickets.

The Mizo insurgency seems to have little chance of success, despite occasional foreign assistance. The Chinese have provided only limited arms, training, and other support. Contacts with the Chinese, with Mizo rebels in Bangladesh, and with Communists in Burma's Arakan area apparently have continued but add little strength to the rebel movement. Mizoram lacks many of the severely depressed conditions which usually engender popular support for rebel movements elsewhere. Although it has a poor network of communications and largely depends on outside food sources, Mizoram has almost 50% literacy, almost all villages are electrified and have a school and either a doctor or a pharmacist. In July 1972 there were indications that Laldenga himself favored meeting with Indian Government representatives to reach some accommodation. Since the movement has lost direct Pakistani support following Bangladesh's independence and further isolation will probably result from the developing Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, Laldenga apparently has concluded that it might be better to minimize potential losses and negotiate with the government. He is wary of Chinese intentions and the danger of relying exclusively on Communist support, which might convert Mizo Christians to communism. Mizo insurgent leaders have been resistant to Maoist indoctrination, and in order to prevent Chinese infiltration of the movement they have not permitted any Mizos to receive guerrilla training in China.

F. Maintenance of internal security

1. Police

The Indian police system, with the exception of a few new forces created by the central government, is

organized essentially as it was before independence. Primary emphasis today, as during the British colonial era, is on maintaining public order and security. Generally the police have been fairly effective in this capacity, although army units have been called out to supplement police riot control efforts. The police are less effective at criminal investigation, partly because of manpower, training, and equipment deficiencies, but also because poorly paid policemen in the lower ranks are susceptible to bribery and responsive to caste and personal considerations. Most Indians, especially in rural areas, fear the police and respect their authority but have little faith in their integrity. The Ministry of Home Affairs has attempted to foster a cooperative attitude among the people toward the police. (U/OU)

a. State police (S)

The primary responsibility for maintaining day-to-day public order rests with about 600,000 policemen, most of whom belong to the individual state police services. Within each state the police are integrated into a single police force under an inspector general of police (IG), who in turn is responsible to the state's home affairs minister and chief minister (Figure 11). The IG is assisted by several deputies who have either functional or regional responsibilities. One deputy inspector general commands a Criminal Investigation Department (CID), which investigates unusually complex crimes, gathers intelligence on state political developments, and serves as a liaison between the state force and the central government police agencies. Another deputy has overall command of the state's armed police battalions—active armed reserve units that average about 40% of the state police personnel. Other deputies are in charge of police "ranges"—administrative areas which include several districts. The IG and his regional deputies are normally less concerned with day-to-day operational matters than with broad administrative problems, such as police strength, disposition, personnel management, and discipline.

The key operational officer in many respects is the district superintendent of police. Although he is organizationally subordinate to a "range" deputy inspector general, the district superintendent is subject in most matters to orders issued by the district magistrate, who oversees nearly all governmental activities within the district. The superintendent, with the aid of several assistants, commands an organization scattered across an area averaging 3,700 square miles and inhabited by an average of 1.5 million persons. His district is divided into several




FIGURE 11. Typical state police organization (C)

police "circles," each controlled by a police station. Constables attached to the stations have specific "beats," which may include several villages. Villages frequently employ unarmed watchmen, called *chowkidars*, who report to the visiting constables. *Chowkidars* are also employed by many well-to-do people who reside in the cities.

Police forces in the larger cities are separate from the district forces. They are commanded by a police commissioner, who is usually considered equivalent in rank to a deputy inspector general and who is administratively responsible to the state's inspector general of police.

In keeping with the British tradition, most of the police are unarmed, and state and local authorities normally try to contain demonstrations, minor rioting, and other forms of localized disorder without resort to armed force. Unarmed police receive training in riot control techniques, including the use of tear gas and especially the use of the *lathi* (a long, weighted baton), which is most frequently used for crowd control. More

than 200,000 of the police are organized into about 140 or 150 state armed police battalions which can be used within their own states, moved to aid other states, or brought under centralized army control during emergencies. During preindependence days, armed police were normally only used as a last resort, and they took responsibility for firing on crowds. After independence and until late 1967, senior armed police officers, fearful of political repercussions, frequently turned to the army when the use of firearms seemed necessary. The army units, which appeared only after specific formal requests from local civilian authorities, would rapidly deploy in a skirmish line, quickly identify ringleaders, and proceed to have selected marksmen deliberately kill them. Despite the desire in recent years of both civil and military authorities to shift away from using the army to maintain law and order, it has been used—the most notable example being the movement of about two divisions to West Bengal for the elections in 1971. Normally, the state armed police assume law and order responsibilities by appearing on the scene armed with rifles, firing several rounds over the heads of rioters if necessary and, as a final resort, shooting to kill.

All states have a reserve police force known as the Home Guards. These units consist mainly of volunteers who undergo a period of active duty training, often lasting a year, after which they serve as ready reserves that may be called up on short notice to help quell disturbances. They are also used for disaster relief and for the maintenance of essential services during emergencies. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs there were about 525,000 Home Guards in 1972, and their strength is eventually to be raised to 594,000.

The morale and effectiveness of the state police vary somewhat from state to state. There are wide divergencies in the content and quality of state police training courses, and there has been general disgruntlement over the failure of pay raises to keep pace with the rising cost of living. State police units often have been hard pressed by the increased prevalence of agitational politics. By occasionally acting with excessive force, the armed police have given malcontents the additional emotion-laden issue of police brutality. Generally, however, the police have remained well disciplined, and demonstrations have been sufficiently contained to avoid prolonged disruption of vital state and local services.

b. Central government police and security services (S)

Under the constitution, the states have primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order,

and some of them have tended jealously to protect this function from encroachments by the central government. The national Ministry of Home Affairs, however, provides some coordination among state police services and maintains active liaison between the central government and the states on federal-state police matters. The Home Affairs Ministry also administers the elite Indian Police Service (IPS), whose some 1,300 highly trained members hold the key central government police and intelligence jobs and most of the top posts in the state police services. The IPS system contributes substantially to uniformity and facilitates coordination among various police jurisdictions. The Home Affairs Ministry also controls three specialized security forces (the Central Reserve Police, the Border Security Force, and the Central Industrial Security Force) and operates the Intelligence Bureau. The creation and expansion of these specialized police organizations and other central government security forces reflect a general tendency by the central government to rely less on the state governments in important and sensitive areas.

The Central Reserve Police (CRP) and the Border Security Force (BSF), which are directly responsible to the Ministry of Home Affairs, are the best trained forces in the Indian police system. The principal mission of mobile armed CRP is to augment state police forces during periods of serious disorder (Figure 12). The CRP has the power of arrest, although followup investigation and prosecution depend upon the regular state police. In the wake of a 1968-69 controversy over use of CRP units to protect central government installations in the states, New Delhi made it very clear that it alone would determine the deployment of the CRP and that CRP units would not be withdrawn merely because of the desires of a state government. The CRP is composed of 63 battalions—60 "duty" (infantry) and 3 signal—totaling about 50,000 men. The CRP battalions are armed with light machineguns, rifles, and carbines. Normally, they can be deployed fairly rapidly to trouble spots by rail or, if necessary, by air. Battalion commanders are either senior police officers, drawn principally from the ranks of the IPS, or military officers on assignment from the Indian Army. After the Chinese attack in 1962, many CRP battalions were assigned to the Indian Army, and others were engaged in patrolling border areas. However, the expansion of the army and the creation of other more specialized central government police forces have freed many of the CRP units for their intended use as a strategic police reserve force.

The Border Security Force (BSF) was established by the Home Affairs Ministry in December 1965 to take



FIGURE 12. Members of the Central Reserve Police frequently keep their rifles chained to their bodies to prevent demonstrators from seizing them (U/OU)

over responsibility from the states for patrolling India's sensitive eastern and western borders with Pakistan. The BSF is organized into 950-man battalions, variously estimated to number between 75 and 80. About half of the battalions are stationed in eastern India, subordinate to a regional headquarters in Calcutta. Most of the remainder are assigned to either the western regional headquarters in Jullundur or the northern headquarters in Srinagar. BSF units concentrate mainly on controlling smuggling and the movement of illegal immigrants across the borders. Because in peacetime army units are not stationed within 5 miles of the India-Pakistan border, the BSF operates within this area and combines normal police functions with military activities, including the construction of fortifications in vulnerable areas. It occasionally becomes involved in border incidents with the Pakistani security forces; in the early stages of the East Pakistan crisis in 1971, it was the principal organization through which India assisted the Bengalees. BSF units have also been loaned to the

army for operations against tribal insurgents in Nagaland and the Mizo Hills, and in time of war they have supported army operations against Pakistan. They are also incidentally responsible for obtaining intelligence on Pakistani military activities in the border regions and for cooperating closely with both military and other civilian intelligence organizations. In addition to those units assigned to army control for particular missions, one or two BSF battalions are placed under army command every two months for advanced training. Parliamentary legislation in 1969 formally authorized the use of BSF units to deal with civil disturbances, and they have been used during emergencies to perform functions similar to those assigned to the CRP.

Several special security forces have been organized by the central government to provide physical protection for its properties. The Defense Security Corps (DSC) provides protection for Ministry of Defense production installations. It is organized on a platoon basis from locally recruited personnel, many of whom are armed with rifles and/or shotguns. There is a link between the local DSC commander and the commander of the nearest army unit. Because of their relative lack of training and equipment, however, the 21,000 DSC personnel would be ineffective in any role other than as guards. They do, however, serve to release other more highly trained and better equipped units of military police and CRP and BSF personnel from this static guard duty.

Parliament in November 1968 passed the highly controversial Industrial Security Force Bill which authorized establishment of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). Under the control of the Home Affairs Ministry, the CISF was created to provide better protection of government-owned industrial operations throughout the country. Plans call for 30 CISF battalions, but only 14 battalions had been raised by 1972. CISF units can be sent to protect any public sector industrial site on the request of its chief executive officer, provided that such a request has the consent of the state government if the facility is owned, controlled, or managed by a public company of which the central government is not a member. The territorial scope of the force is limited to the townships attached to such industrial operations. The CISF units will have the power to arrest, even without warrant, but as with the CRP the followup investigation and prosecution will depend on the regular local police.

A much older central government security force charged with protecting public property is the Railway Protection Force (RPF). The RPF appears to be controlled through a decentralized chain of command


that is headed by the Ministry of Railways in New Delhi. The more than 50,000 men in the RPF, about half of whom are armed, keep watch over the rail lines in India.

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) was initially established within the Home Affairs Ministry in 1963, but it was apparently transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat sometime prior to October 1972. Its primary function is to investigate governmental corruption and serious interstate crimes, especially those of an economic nature, such as fraud, embezzlement, black-marketing, smuggling, and counterfeiting as well as crimes with international implications. The CBI has a field staff of about 1,000, is organized into regional branches, and works closely with the crime branches of the state CID's. In October 1966, the CBI became India's permanent representative to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and maintains regular liaison with other national central police bureaus on international criminal matters.

The Intelligence Bureau (IB), an agency within the Home Affairs Ministry, is responsible for the detection and prevention of noneconomic crimes against the state. Incriminating information uncovered by IB personnel is usually turned over to the appropriate state or national agency. The IB also provides physical protection of the Prime Minister and visiting foreign dignitaries. The services of the IB's Fingerprint Bureau and Forensic Science Laboratory are available to the various central and state police units. These facilities are limited in scope, but they are superior to those maintained by other organizations. The IB also conducts courses at its Central Detective Training School for other police organizations.


The threat from China has spurred the central government into creating several small specialized security forces for duty in the sensitive areas along the Sino-Indian border. The Directorate General of Security (DGS), an office that is formally part of the Cabinet Secretariat but apparently has direct access to the Prime Minister, commands three loosely related forces and an air arm: the Special Frontier Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, the Special Services Body, and the Air Research Center (a cover name for the air arm). The three men who have headed the DGS since the creation of the office in 1965 have all been senior IPS officers. Other senior officers have been drawn from the police, other elite civil services, and the three military services. The DGS has a good working relationship with other governmental security organizations as well as with the military.

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
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
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as occupation and property rights, are suspended during the state of emergency.

A state of emergency was declared in the wake of the 1962 Chinese attack, and this was followed up with parliamentary passage of the Defense of India Act. Under this act, any person could be seized and detained by order of a government-designated authority not lower than a district magistrate if there was a reasonable suspicion that the individual was hostile or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to India's defense, national security, or foreign relations. Orders under the act could not be challenged in court, nor could legal action be taken against public servants implementing the statute in good faith. Provisions were made for administrative review of detention cases, but the reviewing authorities at the state and central levels were in a position to be susceptible to the government's policy directives. The emergency remained in force until January 1968 and the accompanying Defense of India Act was withdrawn the following July. The act was used primarily against Communists who were thought to be sympathetic or friendly to the Chinese.

Prior to withdrawal of the proclamation of emergency and the Defense of India Act, the government in December 1967 enacted the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act to preserve its special powers to deal with threats from secessionists. Under this legislation, the central government has powers to halt the activities of any organization or individual who, by actions or statements, effectuates or supports secession or disclaims, questions, or disrupts the sovereignty or integrity of India. Government action under this act must be confirmed within 6 months by a government-appointed tribunal, although under pressing circumstances the government's decision can stand until modified by the tribunal. An elaborate variety of penalties is prescribed for offenders, including imprisonment for up to 7 years. As with the old Defense of India Act, the government is likely to be circumspect in its use of these powers. The government does, however, have the authority to forestall disruptive activity in Kashmir, and the act has been used to ban one insurgent tribal separatist movement, the Mizo National Front. Under certain circumstances the act might also be used against the Communists.

India's Preventive Detention Act, first passed in 1950 and renewed every 3 years, lapsed at the end of 1969. The act provided for the detention of up to 1 year of any person whose behavior is judged prejudicial to the defense of India, the country's relations with other states, the security of India, the

maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and essential services. Persons detained under the Preventive Detention Act had to be advised within 5 days of the grounds for their arrest, and their cases had to be reviewed by an advisory board within 10 weeks. Prisoners had the right to appear in person before the advisory board, although they did not have the right of legal counsel. A limited judicial review was provided, pertaining mainly to the procedures used in effecting the detention, but the courts were not competent to question the government's judgment that a prisoner's acts constituted a threat and that the threat was sufficiently grave to warrant detention. Although no figures are available, preventive detention was fairly widely employed to contain language riots, communal disturbances, serious labor agitation, and some political agitation. Although the federal law has lapsed, several states are considering the extension of similar state statutes.

Indian officials also frequently employ Section 144 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, which permits temporary injunctions against any assembly of five or more people during periods of unrest. Section 144 is closely related to other chapters in the Indian Penal Code which deal with offenses that disturb public order and safety. Major offenses against the state may also be prosecuted under the penal code, including waging, attempting to wage, conspiring to wage, or helping to wage war against the government, assaulting the executive officials of the government, such as the President and the state governors, engaging in seditious acts, waging war against or committing depredations on the territories of nations at peace with India, and permitting or aiding, whether deliberately or through negligence, the escape of a prisoner. Violations of the penal code are adjudicated through the Indian court system, which generally has maintained high standards of integrity and impartiality, especially at the higher levels.

As part of a general effort to strengthen security legislation, the old British-enacted Official Secrets Act of 1923 has been widened in scope through enactment of the Indian Official Secrets (Amendment) Act. This act provides a clear definition of and severe penalties for spying on behalf of a foreign power; unauthorized possession of documents, articles, or information of a classified or prohibited nature; interference with police or other government forces engaged in protection of prohibited areas; harboring of spies; failure to report the commission of offenses against the act; and attempts to incite persons to commit offenses against the act.

G. Suggestions for further reading (U/OU)

There is a substantial and growing volume of English-language literature on Indian political life by both Indian and Western scholars, in addition to much material in newspapers and Indian Government publications. Listed below is a representative selection of some of the more important introductory and reference materials. The annual bibliographic issues of the *Journal of Asian Studies* provide a much more comprehensive listing of major books and articles. Maureen Patterson's and Ronald Indem's *South Asia: Introductory Bibliography* (University of Chicago Press, 1962) is also very useful. Major political developments in India are reported widely in the U.S. press and several major newspapers—including *The Washington Post*, *The Sun* (Baltimore), and *The New York Times*—have correspondents posted in South Asia. *Time-Life* publications, the *Economist*, and *The London Times* also provide good coverage of current events. For more detailed coverage of current developments, see the Indian English-language newspapers, such as the *Hindustan Times*, *The Times of India*, the *Statesman*, and the *Hindu*, and also such periodicals as the *Economic and Political Weekly* and the *Far Eastern Economist*.

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Chronology (u/ou)

1947

August

On 15 August India becomes an independent dominion in the British Commonwealth with Jawaharlal Nehru as its first Prime Minister.

October

Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir, faced with rebellion by his Muslim subjects, accedes to India and requests Indian troops to repel tribal invaders from Pakistan. Indo-Pakistani war continues in Kashmir throughout 1948.

1948

January

Mahatma Gandhi is assassinated on 30 January.

1949

January

United Nations arranges cease-fire in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir and calls for plebiscite to determine its future.

1950

January

India becomes an independent republic on 26 January under a new national constitution.

1951

June

First major U.S. assistance agreement with India is signed; provides for loan-gift of 2 million tons of wheat.

October

First general elections begin, lasting through March 1952.

1952

December

First Five Year Plan (FY1951/52-1955/56) is formally presented to Parliament, somewhat behind schedule.

1954

April

Sino-Indian treaty recognizes Chinese suzerainty in Tibet.

1955

February

First major Soviet aid project, a steel mill, is provided to India.

1956

November

State boundaries are reorganized along linguistic lines in response to regional pressures.

1957

Chinese build road in Ladakh district of Kashmir in first Chinese seizure of Indian territory.

1960

September

Agreement on division and use of Indus River waters is signed with Pakistan.

1961

December

Indian troops seize control of Portuguese India on 18 December.

1962

September

Serious skirmishing with Chinese troops breaks out along the Indo-Tibetan border, followed in October by large-scale Chinese attacks in Ladakh and the then North East Frontier Agency of Assam State.

1964

May

Prime Minister Nehru dies on 24 May.

June

Lal Bahadur Shastri becomes Prime Minister on 2 June.

1965

August

Armed Pakistanis infiltrating into Kashmir spark widespread fighting, which leads to full-scale war in the Punjab, 6-23 September.

1966

January

Prime Minister Shastri dies on 11 January in Tashkent, U.S.S.R., only hours after signing an accord with Pakistani President Ayub aimed at restoring normalcy to Indo-Pakistani relations. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, is named Prime Minister on 19 January.

1967

February

Fourth general elections result in a substantial decline in Congress Party legislative strength at both national and state levels.

1969

April

Fourth Five Year Plan begins after delay of 3 years, since 1965 and 1966 droughts and deteriorating economic conditions had necessitated emergency planning.

August

V. V. Giri, with Prime Minister Gandhi's backing, defeats regular Congress Party candidate for Indian presidency.

November

Prime Minister Gandhi's Congress Party rivals form a separate organization in Parliament.

SECRET

1971

March

Fifth general elections result in a smashing victory for both Prime Minister Gandhi and her ruling Congress Party and halt trend toward coalition government at the national level. Pakistan Government "crackdown" to reestablish its authority in East Pakistan on 25 March begins flow of 10 million refugees to India and precipitates the Indo-Pakistani crisis.

August

India and the Soviet Union sign the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on 9 August in New Delhi.

December

Following months of increasing border violations and Indian support of Bengali independence fighters, a full-scale war erupts, 3-17 December; India defeats Pakistan.

1972

March

State election victories restore Congress Party hegemony at the state level.

July

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi meets with Pakistan President Bhutto at Simla, India; progress on a number of bilateral problems results.

1973

August

India and Pakistan sign an agreement clearing the way for the release of most of the 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held in India. The agreement also provides for the repatriation of more than 150,000 Bengalees stranded in Pakistan and for Pakistan's acceptance in return of a "substantial number" of the non-Bengalees (Urdu-speaking Biharis) living in Bangladesh.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	INDIAN NAME	ENGLISH
AICC.....	All-India Congress Committee
AISF.....	All-India Student Federation
AIYF.....	All-India Youth Federation
BKD.....	<i>Bharatiya Kranti Dal</i>	Indian Revolutionary Party
BSF.....	Border Security Force
CBI.....	Central Bureau of Investigation
CEC.....	Central Election Committee (Congress Party)
CID.....	Criminal Investigation Department
CISF.....	Central Industrial Security Force
CPI.....	Communist Party of India
CPI/M-L.....	Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist
CPM.....	Communist Party of India/Marxist
CRP.....	Central Reserve Police
DGS.....	Directorate General of Security
DMI.....	Directorate of Military Intelligence
DMK.....	<i>Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</i>	Dravidian Progressive Federation
DNI.....	Directorate of Naval Intelligence
HMP.....	<i>Hind Mazdoor Panchayat</i>	Indian Labor Council
HMS.....	<i>Hind Mazdoor Sabha</i>	Indian Labor Congress
IAS.....	Indian Administrative Service
IB.....	Central Intelligence Bureau
IPS.....	Indian Police Service
ITBP.....	Indo-Tibetan Border Police
JIC.....	Joint Intelligence Committee
NEFA.....	North East Frontier Agency
OCP.....	Organization Congress Party
PCC.....	Pradesh Congress Committee
PDA.....	Progressive Democratic Alliance
PSP.....	<i>Praja Socialist Party</i>	People's Socialist Party
RPF.....	Railway Protection Force
RSS.....	<i>Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh</i>	National Volunteer Corps
SFF.....	Special Frontier Force
SSP.....	<i>Samyukta Socialist Party</i>	United Socialist Party
...	<i>Shiromani Akali Dal, or Akali Dal</i>	Army of the Servants of God
...	<i>Rajya Sabha</i>	Council of States
...	<i>Swatantra Party</i>	Freedom Party
...	<i>Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha</i>	Greater India Hindu Assembly
...	<i>Lok Sabha</i>	House of the People
...	<i>Bharatiya Jana Sangh, or Jana Sangh</i>	Indian People's Party